Parties and voters in Iceland: A study of the 1983 and 1987 Althingi elections. by Hardarson, Olafur Thordur
Olafur Thordur Hardarson
Parties and voters in Iceland.
A study of the 1983 and 1987 Althingi elections
A thesis submitted for a final examination 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Government 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London 
1994
UMI Number: U074584
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Disscrrlation Publishing
UMI U074584
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
h+eses
F
723.S
1^ 1
To Hjordis
Abstract
This thesis analyses the 1983 and 1987 Althingi elections 
in Iceland, a micro state with rich literary and
historical traditions, including the Althingi which 
Icelanders claim to be the oldest parliament in the 
world. Three theoretical approaches - a party 
identification approach, a rational approcah, and a 
social-structural approach - are used. A special effort 
is made to compare the Icelandic findings to voting
behaviour in Norway and Sweden.
Direct party switching (23% in 1983 and 36% in 1987) is
shown to be the main reason for the major changes in
election results, while the impact of new voters and 
mobilization and demobilization of voters was small.
As in many European countries, voters often change party 
identification when they switch parties, thus limiting 
the usefulness of the party identification model. 
Nevertheless party identification, while weaker than in 
Scandinavia, serves to tie parties to voters, along with 
party membership, participation in primaries, and 
exposure to the press.
In accord with a rational approach, Icelandic voters have 
a cognitive map of the party system along left-right 
lines, as is the case in Scandinavia. Most voters can 
rank the parties on a left-right continuum, which is 
related to party choice, like and dislike for the parties 
and party leaders, and voters' stance on issues. A left- 
right issue factor is by far most strongly related to 
party choice, as in Scandinavia, while an urban-rural 
factor on which the ranking of parties is different, 
reduces the correspondence between the left-right 
spectrum and vote switching. While issue voting in 
Iceland is high, it is lower than in Norway and Sweden. 
The thesis argues, that the main reason is that Icelandic 
parties offer less clear and stable alternatives in 
elections.
Social-structural variables are generally weakly related 
to party choice. Class voting has decreased dramatically, 
and is much weaker than in Norway and Sweden.
The thesis is based on the first election surveys in 
Iceland, conducted by the author. Three data sets are 
used, based on random samples from the National Register: 
from 1983 (N=1003) , from 1987 (N=1745) , and a 1983-1987
panel (N=678).
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Chapter I: Introduction
This thesis is a study of the elections to the Icelandic 
parliament, the Althingi, in 1983 and 1987. Iceland is 
really a micro-state with some 250,000 inhabitants, who in 
this century have developed a highly modern and affluent 
society, which in many ways resembles the other Nordic
countries. The country was settled in the ninth and tenth 
centuries, mainly from Norway. The settlers founded a
commonwealth without a king or executive power. Its central 
institution, founded in 930 AD, was the Althingi, which had 
legislative and judicial powers. In 1262 the country came 
under the Norwegian king, and later became a Danish
dependency. The Althingi gradually lost its legislative 
power and was abolished in 1800, after having functioned
mainly as a judicial body for centuries. In 1845 the
Althingi was reestablished as an elected, consultative 
assembly to the Danish king. The 1874 constitution granted 
the Althingi legislative and financial powers, although the 
king retained an effective veto.
Iceland has been a parliamentary democracy since 1904, 
when the country obtained home rule and an Icelandic
minister, responsible to the Althingi. In 1918 Iceland
became a sovereign state, but remained in a union with
Denmark until 1944, when the country became a republic and 
an elected president, largely without political powers, took 
over from the Danish king as the head of state.
1) See O.Th. Hardarson (1987), p. 468.
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I.l The outlines of the Icelandic party system
In the 19th and early 20th century the question of 
Iceland's relationship with Denmark dominated Icelandic 
politics. The first political parties, which emerged at the 
turn of the century, were cadre parties, formed by rival 
political leaders and groups competing for the new 
ministerial power. The ideological differences between these 
parties, which frequently split and were restructured, 
concerned mainly the constitutional relationship with 
Denmark.^ )
Between 1916 and 1930 a complete transformation of the 
party system took place, the independence question having 
largely been resolved in 1918. A system of four parties, 
based primarily on socio-economic cleavages emerged, and 
would dominate Icelandic politics for decades.
Two class-based parties emerged in 1916, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), and the Progressive Party (PP) , 
claiming to represent the interests of workers and farmers 
respectively. The opponents of those two parties on the 
right joined forces in 1929, when the Independence Party 
(IP) was formed by a merger of the Conservative Party and 
the Liberal Party. In 1930, the communists split from the 
SDP and formed a separate Communist Party (CP), later to be 
succeeded by the United Socialist Party (USP), and then the 
People's Alliance (PA).
The SDP was founded as the political arm of the labour 
movement, and remained organizationally linked to the 
Icelandic Federation of Labour until 1942. The party 
represented reformist working-class politics, and grew
2) See G.H. Kristinsson (1991), pp. 56-78.
steadily in strength during its first two decades, polling 
21.7% in 1934 (see Table 1.1) . After 1942, however, the 
party was the smallest of the four parties until 1987, 
polling on average around 15% of the vote. This stands in 
stark contrast to the development of the Social Democratic 
parties in Scandinavia, where they became the largest 
parties in their countries, and natural parties of 
government.
The party nevertheless frequently participated in 
government coalitions, the PP-SDP coalition 1934-38, the PP- 
IP-SDP coalition 1939-42, the IP-USP-SDP coalition 1944-47, 
the SDP-IP-PP coalition 1947-49, the PP-SDP-PA coalition 
1956-58, and the IP-SDP coalition 1959-71, which was 
preceded by an SDP minority government 1958-59. In the 
period 1971-87, on the other hand, the party only took part 
in the PP-SDP-PA coalition 1978-79, and formed a minority 
government in 1978-79. The SDP radically changed its 
economic . policies after the breakdown of the PP-SDP-PA 
coalition in 1958, rejecting the strongly state 
interventionist policies that had dominated Icelandic 
politics from the 1930s in favour of a more market-oriented 
approach and liberalization of foreign trade.3)
Since the formation of the four-party system the PP has 
been the second strongest party in electoral terms, polling 
around 25% on average in the 1931-1987 period. The party has 
always been overrepresented in the Althingi in relation to 
its vote share. This was especially evident in the 1930s due 
to an electoral system which favoured the rural a r e a s .
3) See G.H. Kristinsson (1993), pp. 345-346.
4) The electoral system was based on the "first past the 
post" system 1845-1916. In 1916-1959, the electoral system
19
While the party has always been strongest among farmers and 
in the rural areas, it became quite successful in towns, 
especially in the 1960s and early 1970s. The party held the 
premiership continuously from 1927-42, first in a PP 
government, then in coalitions with the SDP and/or the IP. 
It took part in coalitions with the SDP and IP 1947-49, with 
the IP 1950-56, and with the SDP and the PA 1956-58. After 
having been in opposition for the next 13 years, the party 
was then involved in all government coalitions from 1971-87, 
with the exception of the short-lived SDP minority 
government of 1979-80.
Since its foundation the IP has always polled most votes 
in national elections, receiving on average around 39% in 
the 1931-1987 period. The party has combined elements of 
liberalism and conservatism, and emphasized nationalism and 
opposition to class conflict. In the 1930s, when the party 
was mostly in opposition, party policy was more strongly 
directed toward economic liberalism and private initiative, 
while after the war the IP increasingly accepted the welfare 
state and participated in coalition governments whose 
economic policies were strongly in favour of state 
intervention and protectionism. The party has always had a 
major working class following, in stark contrast to 
conservative and liberal parties in Scandinavia. While the 
party spent most of its first 15 years in opposition, only 
taking part in government coalitions 1932-34 and 1939-42, in 
1944 the IP became natural party of government, being
was a mixture of "first past the post" and proportional 
representation. In 1959, a system of eight multi-member 
constituencies with proportional representation was 
introduced.
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continuously in government from 1944-1971, with the 
exception of the years 1956-59.
After 1971 the party experienced increasing difficulties: 
a serious leadership struggle developed within the party, 
its following at the polls dropped, and divisions increased 
between those who favoured liberal economic policies and 
those who wanted to retain a more state regulated economy, 
especially in agriculture and fisheries. The party spent 
half of the 1971-87 period in opposition, taking part in 
coalitions with the PP in 1974-78, and in 1983-87.
The People's Alliance (PA) is descended from the 
Communist Party (CP), and other breakaway groups from the 
SDP. The CP, which was an orthodox communist party and a 
member of the Comintern, met with moderate electoral success 
in the 1930s, winning three seats in the Althingi in 1937, 
when the party polled 8.5% of the vote. After the SDP 
refused to join the CP to form a Popular Front, the left 
wing of the SDP broke off in 1938 to join the CP in the 
United Socialist Party (USP), which in its first election in 
1942, polled 16.1% of the vote, more than the SDP. In 1956 
the SDP split again, and its left wing formed an electoral 
alliance with the USP, the People's Alliance, which became a 
formal political party in 1968 when the USP was dissolved. 
While the USP was not a Comintern member, the party was 
clearly pro-Soviet and most of its leaders had been 
prominent members of the CP. The USP took part in a 
coalition with the IP and the SDP in 1944-47, but that 
coalition broke down due to disagreements over foreign 
policy. The USP, and later the PA, strongly opposed the
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American base in Keflavik and Iceland's membership of NATO, 
mainly on a nationalistic platform.
Since 1947, the PA and the IP have not joined forces in a 
government coalition, due mainly to disagreements on foreign 
p o l i c y . 5) The PA took part in the PP-SDP-PA coalition 1956- 
58. The party increasingly moved in a reformist direction, 
and became a more acceptable coalition partner in the 1970s, 
taking part in coalitions 1971-74, 1978-79 and 1980-83. The 
party has nevertheless never held the vital portfolios of 
Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs or Justice, but was 
entrusted with the Finance Ministry for the first time in 
1980.
The four-party system had its heyday from the early 1940s 
until the 1970s. The political system became highly elitist 
and the parties dominated most spheres of society. While the 
parties had all adopted a formal mass organization in the 
1930s, they nevertheless remained in fact "network parties", 
based on personal t i e s , o r  "cadre parties", marked by 
strong clientelistic tendencies. They have been unprincipled 
on policy, and eager to take part in coalition governments, 
a necessary condition for success if the parties' aims are 
to distribute goods and favours, rather than pursue 
p o l i c y . T h e  party leaders were influential in the strongly 
state-regulated economy and the state banks, and they had 
strong ties with interest organizations. The administrative
5) Nevertheless, in 1980 Gunnar Thoroddsen, deputy leader of 
the IP, supported by three other IP MPs, formed a coalition 
government with the PA and the PP, while the IP 
parliamentary party remained in opposition. Since 1978, the 
PA has not made the removal of the US base in Keflavik a 
precondition for government participation, thus making a IP- 
PA government coalition a real possibility.
6) O.R. Grimsson (1978b).
7) See G.H. Kristinsson (1993), pp. 337-346.
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bureaucracy was weak and dominated by m i n i s t e r s . &) The press
"did not constitute an independent sphere of influence/ it
was simply yet another arm of the party l e a d e r s h i p " . The
party leaders also dominated the cultural sector.
The educational system was almost entirely state 
controlled. As in other spheres, appointments were 
in the hands of those party leaders who formed the 
existing government, especially those who 
controlled the Ministry of Education. The 
appointments of teachers and headmasters of 
primary schools and secondary schools were often 
influenced by party considerations. Some of the 
largest publishing enterprises were established to 
serve party political interests/ a few of the 
others were controlled by party leaders, e.g. the 
very active state-owned publishing h o u s e . 0^)
On the whole then, the parties were strong in the sense 
that party leaders were powerful, but they remained 
organizationally weak and weak on policy making.
Around 1970, the established power system started to show 
increasing signs of disintegration. The 1959-71 IP-SDP 
government had introduced some liberal economic policies,
especially regarding trade, and clientelism in the economy
became weaker as state regulation decreased. Increasing 
professionalization served to depoliticize the civil service 
and interest organizations became more independent of the 
political parties. Similarly, the parties' near-monopoly of 
political communication disappeared.  ^ Within the parties, 
the influence of the party leadership on nominations 
decreased, as primaries were increasingly used to select
candidates for party l i s t s . 2^)
8) See ibid., pp. 346-353.
9) O.R. Grimsson (1976), p. 20.
10) Ibid., p. 21.
11) See O.Th. Hardarson and G.H. Kristinsson (1987), p. 220
12) S. Kristjansson and O.Th. Hardarson (1982), pp. 9-10.
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The increasing pluralism of the 1970s coincided with the 
old parties' loosening grip on the electoral market. Tables
1.1.1 and 1.1.2 show that during the first formative years 
of the party system after the foundation of the modern 
parties, there had been considerable fluctuation in the 
parties' fortunes at elections, as indicated by the fact 
that the victorious parties' net gains^^) in elections were 
usually around 10%. In 1931-37, a fifth party, the Farmers' 
Party, twice obtained representation in the Althingi with 
three MPs in 1934 and two in 1937.
The 1942-1967 period was characterized by remarkable 
electoral stability. Challenges to the four parties were 
infrequent and unsuccessful, except for the National 
Preservation Party which had two MPs elected in 1953. Net 
gains for the victorious parties in elections in this period 
were usually 2-6%. The standard deviations from the parties' 
mean results were only 1.5-2.3% (see Table 1.1.2) . While 
this does not necessarily indicate that voters did not 
switch p a r t i e s , 1 4 ) various indirect evidence suggests that 
voters were in fact extremely loyal to their parties during 
this p e r i o d . 1 5 ) i t  is at least evident, that the parties' 
risk on the electoral market was minimal.
13) Net gains in an election are simply obtained by adding 
the percentage point changes for all parties gaining votes. 
This is a common indicator on net volatility, sometimes 
called the "Pedersen Index". See I. Crewe and D. Denver 
(eds.), (1985), p. 9.
14) This is further discussed in Chapter II. Crewe (in I. 
Crewe and D. Denver (eds.) (1985, p. 10)) points out, that a 
small, even zero, net volatility could be the result of 
considerable, but self-cancelling, change in the electorate, 
while in practice roughly parallel movement in both net 
volatility and overall party switching is the usual pattern.
15) See O.Th. Hardarson (1981).
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Table I.1.1. Results of Althingi Elections 1916-1987. 
Percentages. Net gains.
Year IP PP SDP PA Others Total Net
gains
1916 12.9 6.8 80.3 100
1919 13.3 6.8 79.9 100
1923 (53.6) 26.5 16.2 3.7 100
1927 (42.5) 29.8 19.1 8 . 6 100 (12.0)
1931 43.8 35.9 16.1 3.0 1.2 100 (10.4)
1933 48.0 23.9 19.2 7.5 1.4 100 12.0
1934 42.3 21.9 21.7 6.0 8.1 100 9.6
1937 41.3 24.9 19.0 8.5 6.3 100 5.5
1942a 39.5 27.6 15.4 16.2 1.3 100 11.7
1942b 38.5 26.6 14.2 18.5 2.2 100 3.4
1946 39.4 23.1 17.8 19.5 0.2 100 5.7
1949 39.5 24.5 16.5 19.5 - 100 1.5
1953 37.1 21.9 15.6 16.1 9.3 100 9.3
1956 42.4 (15.6) (18.3) 19.2 4 .5 100 (11.1)
1959a 42.5 27.2 12.5 15.3 2.5 100 (11.7)
1959b 39.7 25.7 15.2 16.0 3.4 100 4.3
1963 41.4 28.2 14.2 16.0 0.2 100 4 . 4
1967 37.5 28.1 15.7 17 . 6 1 . 1 100 4.2
1971 36.2 25.3 10.5 17.1 10.9 100 10 . 9
1974 42.7 24 . 9 9.1 18.3 5.0 100 8 .1
1978 32.7 16.9 22.0 22.9 5.5 100 19.4
1979 35.4 24 . 9 17.5 19.7 2.5 100 13.0
1983 38.7 19.0 11.7 17.3 13.8 100 16.6
1987 27.2 18 . 9 15.2 13.4 25.3 100 23.1
Due to an electoral alliance between the PP and the SDP in 
1956, the figures do not show the "real" strength of the 
parties that year. As a result of this alliance the figures 
for net volatility in 1956 and 1959a are inflated. The IP 
figures in 1923 and 1927 are in fact for the Citizens' Party 
and the Conservative Party respectively. The PA figures 
1931-37 are for the Communist Party, and the 1942-53 figures 
are for the United Socialist Party.
Net gain is calculated by adding gains (in percentages) for 
all parties (including minor parties separately) in each 
election.
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Table 1.1.2. Mean support for the four old parties in
Althingi elections during selected periods 1931-1987
Percentages.
Mean Standard Lowest Highest
support deviation support support
Formation period
(1931-37,
4 elections)
IP 43.9 3.0 41.3 48.0
PP 26.7 6.3 21 .7 35.9
SDP 19.0 2.3 16.1 21.7
Communist Party 6.3 2.4 3.0 8.5
Stability (1942-67 f
9-10 elections)
IP 39.8 1 . 9 37 .1 42.5
PP 25.9 2.3 21 . 9 28.2
SDP 15.2 1 .5 12.5 17 . 8
USP/PA 17.4 1.7 15 . 3 19.5
Volatility (1971-87,
6 elections)
IP 35.5 5.3 27.2 42.7
PP 21.7 3.8 16.9 25.3
SDP 14.3 4 . 9 9 .1 22.0
PA 18.1 3.1 13.4 22.9
Post-war period
(1946-87,
13-14 elections)
IP 38.0 4.3 27.2 42.7
PP 23.7 3.6 16.9 28.2
SDP 14 . 9 3.4 9 .1 22.0
USP/PA 17.7 2.4 13.4 22.9
Total period (1931--87,
(19-20 elections)
IP 39.3 4.4 27.2 43.8
PP 24.7 4.2 16.9 35.9
SDP 15.7 3.4 9.1 22.0
CP/USP/PA 15.4 5.2 3.0 22.9
The 1956 results for the PP and the SDP are omitted. due to
the parties' electoral alliance that year. Thus the Ns for
periods including the 1956 election are one lower for the PP
and the SDP than for the IP and the PA.
The 1971-1987 period is very different. This is a period 
of great electoral volatility, both in comparison to the 
earlier period in Icelandic politics and to liberal 
democracies in general in the post-war period. Net gains in
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elections are only once below the 10% mark, culminating in 
19.4% in 1978, and 23.1% in 1 9 8 7 .IG) There are great 
fluctuations in the electoral fortunes of the old parties - 
the SDP vote varies from 9-22%, the IP vote 27-43%, the PP 
vote 17-25%, and the PA vote 13-23%. The old parties' share 
of the electoral market decreases sharply, as many new 
parties put up candidates, some of them with some success. 
Five of these parties obtain parliamentary representation 
during the period, the Union of Liberals and Leftists in 
1971 (5 MPs) and 1974 (2 MPs), the Social Democratic
Alliance in 1983 (4 MPs), the Women's Alliance in 1983 (3
MPs) and in 1987 (6 MPs), the Citizen's Party in 1987 (7
MPs), and the Union for Regional Equality in 1987 (1 MP) .
16) An international comparison of net volatility, presented 
in I. Crewe and D. Denver (eds.) (1985), shows that net gains 
(or net volatility) in elections in 11 liberal democracies 
in the post-war period rarely reach the level of volatility 
in Iceland in 1971-87. In congressional elections in the USA 
1948-82, net gains never exceed 8% (p. 29). In Canada in 
1945-1980, net gains exceed 10% in 1949 (10.9%), in 1958 
(14.7%), and in 1962 (16.7%) (p. 53). In Australia in 1946-
83, net gains exceed 10% in 1946 (15.2%), and in 1949 
(11.2%) (p. 77). In Great Britain in 1950-83, net gains
exceed 10% in February 1974 (13.3%) and in 1983 (11.8%) (p.
102). In Ireland in 1948-82, net gains exceed 10% in 1948 
(13.3%), in 1951 (14.1%), and in 1957 (11.1%) (p. 178). In
West Germany in 1953-83, net gains exceed 10% in 1953 
(22.9%), and in 1961 (12.1%) (p. 238). In Austria in 1949-
83, net gains never exceed 6% (p. 269). In Italy in 1948-83, 
net gains exceed 10% in 1948 (21.7%), and in 1953 (13.2%)
(p. 392). In Belgium in 1950-81, net gains exceed 10% in 
1965 (15.2%), and in 1981 (12.5%) (p. 326). In the
Netherlands in 1948-1982, net gains exceed 10% in 1967 
(10.8%), 1971 (13.4%), in 1972 (12.2%), and in 1977 (12.7%) 
(p. 350). In Denmark in 1950-1984, net gains exceed 10% in 
1950 (10.4%), 1960 (11.1%), 1968 (11.8%), 1973 (29.1%), 1975 
(17.8%), 1977 (18.2%), 1979 (11.0%), 1981 (12.5%), and in 
1984 (10.8%). Out of a total of 135 elections, net gains 
exceed 10% in 29 cases (21%) . Net gains exceed 15% in only 8 
out of the 135 elections (6%), while this is the case for 
three out of the six Icelandic elections in 1971-87. Only 
Denmark in the 1973-84 period shows a similar degree of net 
volatility, while net gains in the Netherlands in 1967-82 
were also rather high.
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Besides, a splintergroup from the IP in the South 
constituency had one MP elected in 1979.
Clearly, the four party system has been in a crisis for 
the last two decades. The old parties have lost much of the 
power they held in 1942-67. On the other hand, they remain 
organizationally weak, have increasingly suffered from
internal disputes, and continue to have difficulties in 
forming consistent and comprehensive policy p r o g r a m m e s .
1.2. Theoretical background
While an abundance of theories on voting behaviour have
been put forward in the literature on electoral research in
the last 50 years, three major approaches can be discerned -
a social-structural or sociological approach, a
psychological or party identification approach, and a
rational or issue-oriented approach. The first two
approaches were dominant in electoral research in the 1950s
and in the 1960s, while the rational approach has become
increasingly popular since the 1970s.
Ivor Crewe has summarized the main features of the
social-structural paradigm:
It assumed that party systems and the voting
alignments on which they were based were 
refractions of the country's social structure.
Most electors voted not as the autonomous
individuals beloved of liberal theorists but as 
members of a social group, or, more accurately, an 
organised community based on their class or
religion but occasionally based on language, race, 
national origin or region. These communities 
supported an overlapping network of institutions, 
including but by no means confined to political 
parties, which inculcated loyalty to the community 
- and its party. Elections were an occasion on
which political parties mobilised their pre-
17) See S. Kristjansson (1993), pp. 381-398, and G.H. 
Kristinsson, H. Jonsson, and H.Th. Sveinsdottir (1991).
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organised, deeply-rooted support; the vote was an 
opportunity to re-affirm one's communal loyalties. 
Social structures change but glacially; parties 
and their allied trade unions, churches and other 
associations have ample time to adapt to these 
gradual changes; hence it was hardly surprising 
that elections registered continuity rather than 
change in party systems and their mass base.^^)
The psychological or party identification approach was
first developed by the Michigan scholars in the 1950s, and
introduced in the influential book The American Voter in
1960. The party identification model assumes
that most electors acquire an enduring allegiance 
(an "identification") to a major, established 
party; that this identification not only 
determines their vote but colours their general 
perception of the world of party politics; and
that it is therefore self-reinforcing and self­
strengthening over time. It persists long after 
the event or issue which originally provoked it 
has disappeared from the scene; indeed it tends to 
be bequeathed from one generation to the next.
Thus party identification in the electorate gives 
the party system ballast, sustaining it against 
sudden gusts of public opinion or the storms of 
political crisis. Any one election will register a 
modest amount of change, perhaps enough to 
supplant the party in office, but the change 
reflects the strictly short-term forces released 
by the campaign. Over the long-term, party support 
reflects the distribution of party identification; 
single election results are short-lived and self­
cancelling deviations from a stable "normal 
vote".19)
The basic assumption of the rational model is that 
"rational voting consists in supporting the party which is 
most likely to achieve the voter's political g o a l s " . ^0) 
While there remain differences within the rational approach 
on, for example, whether voters mainly make forward-looking 
judgements or retrospective evaluations of the existing
18) I. Crewe in I. Crewe and D. Denver (eds.) (1985), p. 2
19) Ibid., pp. 2-3.
20) M. Harrop and W.L. Miller (1987), p. 145.
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government's p o l i c i e s , ^1) an issue-oriented or ideological
model of voting generally assumes that
the way people vote - and change their vote - can 
be explained in terms of the relationship between 
their own positions and the parties' (perceived) 
positions on major, divisive i s s u e s . 22)
While considerable disagreement remains on the 
explanatory power of those three approaches to voting 
behaviour, it seems clear that all three have some validity. 
Their ability to explain voting also clearly varies a great 
deal between different political systems and at different 
periods of time. One of the major aims of this thesis is to 
explore the explanatory value of the three approaches to 
voting behaviour in the Icelandic setting in the 1980s.
We will examine the strength of party identification in 
the Icelandic electorate and its impact on voting behaviour, 
the extent to which Icelandic voters have a rational 
cognitive map of the party system, to what extent those 
perceptions and voters' stands on issues are related to 
electoral behaviour, and finally to what extent social- 
structural variables are related to voting.
Another aim of the thesis is to explore the reasons for 
the increased electoral volatility in Iceland since the 
1970s in light of the three theoretical approaches. Two of 
the approaches, the social-structural approach and the party 
identification approach, would clearly predict relatively 
small volatility. If the vote is strongly influenced by 
social structures, which change slowly, or by party 
identification, which is transmitted from one generation to
21) The latter approach is for example emphasized by V.O.
Key (1966), and M. Fiorina (1981).
22) I. Crewe in I. Crewe and D. Denver (eds.) (1 985), p. 134.
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the next, we should in general expect small changes in 
election results. A rational model allows for much greater 
electoral change, even though a party system in which 
voters' preferences and parties' policies are relatively 
clear and stable could also show great electoral stability. 
A very high level of electoral volatility would on the other 
hand be expected in a period where increased issue voting 
was replacing a system of voter alignments in which party 
identification and/or social structures had been the major 
determinants of voting behaviour.
1.3 The data
This thesis is based on data from the first two Election 
Studies that were carried out in Iceland by the author 
immediately after the elections of 1983 and 1987. In 1983 a 
random sample of 1400 individuals (20 years and older on 
polling day) was selected from the National Register, on 
which the Electoral Register is based. From that total 
sample, 500 individuals were randomly selected among those 
living in the Reykjavik area for more extensive face-to-face 
interviews (202 variables), while the remainder of the 
sample was interviewed by telephone (87 variables) or, in a 
few cases, answered a post-questionnaire.23) Of the 1400 
individuals originally selected, 132 were excluded from the 
sample (and no attempt made to interview them) : 3 were
deceased, 24 were foreign citizens, 25 were Icelanders 
living abroad, 30 were hospital patients, and 45 individuals
23) Telephone ownership is almost universal in Iceland. The 
telephone interviews usually lasted around 20 minutes, while 
the face-to-face interviews lasted on average around an 
hour.
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born in 1900 or before (aged over 83) were also excluded. Of 
those selected for face-to-face interviews 5 had moved 
outside the Reykjavik area. This left 1268 individuals in 
the net sample, thereof 445 in the sample for face-to-face 
interviews. Table 1.3.1 shows the response rate in 1983 
among those we tried to contact for interviews.
Table 1.3.1. Response rate in the Icelandic Election Study 
of 1983.
Face-to-face Telephone Total
interviews interviews sample
Respondents 73.9% (329) 81.9% (674) 79.1% (1003)
Refusals 20.9% (93) 11.8% (97) 15.0 (190)
Not found 5.2% (23) 6.2% (51) 5.8% (74)
Other — — 0 .1% (1) 0 .1% (1)
Net sample 100% (445) 100% (823) 100% (1268)
The figures for telephone interviews include 77 individuals 
who were on an open-line telephone or whose telephone 
numbers we could not find, and were sent a mail 
questionnaire, 33 of which were returned.
The questionnaire for the face-to-face interviews in the 
Reykjavik area was much more extensive than for the 
telephone interviews. All questions included in the 
telephone interviews were also included in the face-to-face 
interviews, but a few had a different format (see Appendix 
A) . The mail questionnaire was almost identical to the 
telephone questionnaires. In this thesis we do not use the 
face-to-face interviews subsample separately; those 
respondents are included in the total 1983 sample of 1003 
respondents.
In 1987, we decided to try to re-interview the 1983 
respondents, thus forming a panel. Of the 1003 respondents 
from 1983, 22 individuals were no longer on the National
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Register. In addition, 43 individuals were living abroad or 
deceased, and 10 were hospital patients, leaving us with 928 
individuals whom we tried to reach for the panel interviews. 
Table 1.3.2 shows the response rate in the 1983-1987 panel.
Table 1.3.2. Response rate in the 1983-87 panel. Telephone 
interviews.
Respondents 73.6% (683)
Refusals 15.4% (143)
Not found 11.0% (102)
Net sample 100% (928)
The 1987 answers of the panel respondents were connected 
to their 1983 answers. Due to interviewers' mistakes we were 
unable to connect the answers of 5 respondents. Our panel 
therefore consists of 678 individuals, who answered both in 
1983 and 1987.
In the 1987 Election Study a new sample of 1500 was 
randomly selected from individuals who had reached the new 
voting age of 18, and were born 1907 or later. Of those 
selected 44 were foreign citizens, Icelanders living abroad, 
or deceased, and 25 were hospital patients. This gives us a 
net sample of 1431 individuals, whom we tried to contact for 
interviews. The response rate among the new 1987 sample is 
shown in Table 1.3.3.
Table 1.3.3. Response rate in new sample in 1987. Telephone 
interviews.
Respondents 74.2% (1062)
Refusals 14.2% (203)
Not found 11.6% (166)
Net sample 100% (1431)
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The answers from the new sample in 1987 were combined
with the 1987 answers from the panel respondents, thus
giving us a total sample of 1745 respondents in 1987. As no
new voters are included in the panel, and the 1987 new 
sample was selected at random, new voters are
underrepresented in this total 1987 sample. We have 
therefore weighted the new voters from the new 1987 sample 
in the 1987 total sample; thus the N for the total sample in 
calculations in this thesis is 1845.
All interviews in 1987 were telephone interviews,
conducted by the interviewers of the Social Science Research 
Institute at the University of I c e l a n d . ^4)
When the distributions of gender, age, and region in the
samples are compared to the actual distributions in the
Icelandic populations, the deviations are small. The
deviations in the reported party vote in the samples, as 
compared to the actual election results, are reported in 
Chapter II.
J .4 The structure of the thesis
The major aim of the thesis is to examine to what extent 
our three theoretical approaches, the social-structural 
approach, the party identification approach, and the issue- 
oriented approach, can explain voting behaviour in 1983 and 
1987, as well as the increasing electoral volatility since 
the 1970s. While the analysis focuses mainly on Icelandic 
voters, we also make comparisons with other countries, 
mainly to Scandinavia, especially Norway and Sweden, as the 
party systems in those countries are much more comparable to
24) The telephone interviews lasted on average 23 minutes
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the Icelandic system than, for example, the British or the 
American one.
The first task of the thesis is to analyse what happened 
in the elections of 1983 and 1987. In Chapter II we briefly 
analyse the election campaigns. We examine the impact of new 
voters, of mobilization and demobilization of voters, and of 
direct party switching on the election results. The patterns 
of party change, as well as alternative parties considered 
by voters, are analysed: those patterns can be seen as
indicators of how the party system is structured in the 
minds of the voters, what parties are close and what parties 
are far apart. The extent to which alternative parties are 
considered by the voters when making up their minds can also 
be seen as an indicator of the potential volatility of the 
electorate. Another such indicator is how long before the 
election the voters made up their minds.
In Chapter III we examine the impact of party 
identification on Icelandic voting. We analyse how strength 
of party identification is related to voting and electoral 
volatility, and discuss whether our data can discern between 
life-cycle effects, generational effects, and period effects 
on partisanship. We further examine if, as in many European 
countries, Icelandic voters tend to change their party 
identification when they change their vote.
In Chapter III we also examine other ties between the 
parties and voters: party membership, participation in
primary elections, exposure to the (party) press, and 
finally the impact of voters' personal acquaintance with 
MPs.
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Chapters IV and V test the applicability of the rational 
model to Icelandic voting behaviour. In Chapter IV we focus 
on the voters' cognitive map of the party system: we examine 
how voters rank themselves and the parties on a left-right 
continuum, and to what extent own left-right position 
corresponds to the perceived left-right position of the 
parties. In order to explore the impact of the voters' 
cognitive map, we also examine the relationship of the left- 
right dimension to like and dislike of parties and party 
leaders, to voters' issue positions, and to vote switching.
In Chapter V we analyse issue voting. We explore the 
strength of the relationships between voters' stands on 
issues and party choice. We also examine the ranking of the 
parties' voters on individual issues, both in order to see 
what parties are close on what issues, and to see if the 
ranking in general corresponds to the left-right spectrum. 
We also present a factor analysis of the issues, giving us a 
few general issue dimensions, and examine their relationship 
to party choice.
In Chapter VI we test the social-structural approach in 
the Icelandic setting by examining the relationship of 
various background variables to voting and electoral 
volatility: age, gender, education, class, occupation,
private or public sector employment, income and parental 
influence. A special attempt is made to assess whether class 
voting in Iceland has decreased in recent decades.
Finally, in Chapter VII we present the major findings of 
the thesis and discuss their bearing on our three 
theoretical approaches.
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Chapter II: The elections of 1983 and 1987
In this chapter we will analyse what happened in the 
Althingi elections of 1983 and 1987. We start in Section
11.1 by giving a short analysis of the 1983 election 
campaign, including a description of the two new parties, 
the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Women's 
Alliance (WA). In Section II.2 we analyse the impact of new 
voters on the election outcome in 1983, as well as the 
impact of mobilization and demomobilization and direct 
switching between the parties. In Section II. 3 we analyse 
the voters' decision-making process in 1983, focusing on 
when the voters made up their minds and to what extent they 
considered voting for other parties. Section II.4 analyses 
the 1987 campaign, including the emergence of the Citizens' 
Party. Sections II.5 and II.6 then give analyses of the 1987 
election comparable to the analyses of the 1983 election 
presented in Sections II.2 and II.3.
11.1 The 1983 election campaign
The crisis of the old four party system in Icelandic 
politics was very visible in the 1983 c a m p a i g n . T h e  
outgoing Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition 
both came from the same party, the IP. In two 
constituencies, splintergroups from the IP and the PP put up 
candidates in competition with their party lists. Two new 
parties entered the political stage and seemed likely to 
gain parliamentary representation.
1) The analysis of the 1983 election campaign is mainly 
based on newspaper coverage and an unpublished research 
report on the campaign by Sveinn Helgason (1990) .
37
In 1978 the socialist parties, the SDP and the PA, had 
won their greatest victories ever, and formed a left-leaning 
coalition headed by the PP. That coalition was dissolved in 
the autumn of 1979 due to internal disputes. A fresh 
election was held in December 1979, in which the PA and the 
SDP lost votes, and the results of the four old parties were 
closer to their post-war norm. As usual, a coalition 
formation process followed the election, but when numerous 
attempts to form a coalition government proved unsuccessful 
the deputy leader of the IP, Gunnar Thoroddsen, supported by 
three parliamentary members of his party,2) formed a 
coalition with the PA and the PP. The leader of the IP, 
Geir Hallgrimsson (Prime Minister 1974-1978), strongly 
opposed this move, as did the bulk of the party; the IP as a 
party opposed the coalition.3) This led to vicious disputes 
within the party but Thoroddsen and his supporters 
nevertheless remained in the IP.^) As the PA and the PP 
jointly had 28 members in the Althingi, the Thoroddsen 
coalition had 32 supporters among the 60 Althingi members, 
the minimum needed for a working majority in both 
chambers.
2) The three IP MPs were Fridjon Thordarson and Palmi 
Jonsson, who both got ministerial posts in the coalition, 
and Eggert Haukdal. A fourth MP from the IP, Albert 
Gudmundsson, also stated his neutrality towards the 
Thoroddsen government for the time being.
3) In the 1970s there had been a serious leadership struggle 
within the IP between Thoroddsen and Hallgrimsson, but it 
had been kept under control until 1980.
4) Actually, before the 1983 election, when Thoroddsen 
retired from politics because of old age, the three 
dissenters who had supported his coalition formation all won 
safe seats on IP lists through primaries and were 
subsequently re-elected to the Althingi as IP-members!
5) While all MPs were elected in the same election, the 
United Althingi elected 1/3 of the MPs by proportional 
representation to sit in the Upper House, while the 
remaining 40 MPs sat in the Lower House. As legislation had
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In August 1982, the government introduced economic 
austerity measures in the form of provisional legislation.G) 
One of the Thoroddsen supporters, Eggert Haukdal, then 
declared that he no longer supported the government. The IP 
leader, Geir Hallgrimsson, demanded that the coalition 
resign, as it no longer had a working majority in the 
Althingi.7) Prime Minister Thoroddsen maintained that the 
coalition still enjoyed the support of a majority in the 
Althingi, and would carry on. Both were right, of course, as 
32 members were needed for a working majority in both 
chambers, but 31 members (even only 30) would defeat a 
censure motion in the United Althingi.
The winter of 1982-83 was difficult for the Thoroddsen 
government. Lacking a working majority, and suffering from 
increasingly bitter internal disputes among the coalition 
partners, it lost control, most clearly indicated by the 
fact that when it left office, inflation was running at over 
100 per cent. Nevertheless the government remained 
surprisingly popular among the electorate according to
to pass through both houses a working majority of 32 (21 in 
the Lower House and 11 in the Upper House) was required. 
Censure motions, on the other hand, were voted on in the 
United Althingi. 30 MPs could thus defeat a censure motion.
6) The constitution gave ministers powers to issue 
provisional legislation on matters of great emergency, if 
the Althingi was not in session. This legislation would then 
be introduced at the next Althingi, which could confirm or 
reject if. If there was no vote on the legislation before 
the end of that session, the provisional legislation 
automatically became void. While this method had been 
commonly used by governments, e.g. to "handcuff" their own 
supporters, it was usually presupposed that a minister would 
issue such a legislation only if he was relatively confident 
that it would pass in the next Althingi. In principle 
though, a government without a working majority in both 
chambers could issue provisional legislation, ensure that it 
was never put to a vote in the next session of the Althingi, 
and then issue new provisional legislation at the end of the 
session, when the old provisional legislation became void!
7) Morgunbladid, August 25th 1982.
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opinion polls by the daily newspaper DV. In October 60% of 
those stating an opinion supported the government, and in 
February the support had only declined to 55%.
During the winter two new parties emerged, the Social 
Democratic Alliance (SDA), and the Women's Alliance (WA) . 
The DV polls soon indicated that both of them had realistic 
possibilities of having members elected to the Althingi in 
the coming election (See Table II.1.1).
Table II.1.1. Voting intentions 1982-1983 according to DV" s 
opinion polls. Only those who named a party are included. 
Percentages.
Oct. 19th 1982 Feb. 16th 1983 April 18th 1983
SDP 10.7 5.7 7.3
PP 22.8 22.1 17.9
IP 51.9 40.6 41.0
PA 14.5 13.9 15.0
SDA - 12.1 10.9
WA - 3.5 7.2
Others - 2.2 0.6
Total 99.9 100.1 99.9
On November 18th 1982, Vilmundur Gylfason declared in the 
Althingi that he was leaving the SDP in order to found a new 
party. He also introduced a parliamentary motion, proposing 
a separation of the legislative and executive powers by 
direct election of a Prime Minister, who would appoint his 
ministers for a fixed four-year term, thus proposing to 
change the Icelandic political system from a parliamentary 
to presidential government. Gylfason (born 1948), who was 
educated as a historian in England, had in the 1970s become 
one of the first investigative journalists in Iceland, 
fiercely attacking the Establishment in TV programmes and 
the newspapers. He became a candidate for the SDP in 1978 
and was the main architect of the outstanding success of the
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SDP in the elections that year. Under the slogan "SDP - a 
new party on an old base", the SDP presented many new, young 
candidates and tried to combine "new politics", emphasising 
various populist issues, an anti-establishment image, and 
new forms of participation such as primaries, with "old 
politics", including a commitment to welfare, industrial 
democracy, and a new anti-inflationary programme. Despite 
the fact that the 1978 SDP victory - the party doubled its 
share of votes from 9.1% to 22% - was generally credited to 
Gylfason's performance, he did not become a Minister in the 
PP-PA-SDP coalition 1978-79, but served as Minister of 
Education, Justice and Ecclesiastical affairs in the SDP 
minority government 1979-80. Always critical of his party's 
leadership, and having been involved in numerous intra-party 
disputes, his departure from the party came shortly after he 
had by a narrow margin lost his second challenge for the 
post of deputy leader at the SDP national convention.
The SDA was founded on January 15th 1983 and Gylfason was 
elected leader. Some of his supporters in the SDP had left 
that party in order to join the SDA, but many SDA members 
were young people, especially university students, who had 
not taken active part in politics before.
Besides the radical proposals for abolishing the 
parliamentary system of government, the SDA platform was in 
some aspects similar to the 1978 SDP platform, but with a 
stronger emphasis on market solutions and decentralization 
instead of clientelistic and corporatist politics. The party 
was clearly anti-establishment and all the old parties were 
accused of standing for corruption and stagnation. "We have
) See O.Th. Hardarson (1987), pp. 476-477.
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a political philosophy which is basically opposed to the 
philosophy that the old political parties have in common", 
Gylfason declared.9)
Gylfason's departure and the foundation of the SDA were 
major blows to the SDP. The opinion polls gave the SDA a 
flying start, and indicated that the new party might win 
more votes than the SDP. The SDA campaign was on the other 
hand not very successful, partly because many of the 
candidates, especially in the rural constituencies, were 
clearly inexperienced and did badly in TV debates. While the 
final result of 7.3% and four members elected could be seen 
as a major breakthrough for a new party, especially in 
comparison to other new parties since the 1930s, Gylfason 
was deeply disappointed by the r e s u l t . 0^)
The other new party in 1983 was the Women's Alliance, a 
separate party for women, which clearly had its roots in the 
increasing political activism of women and women's rights 
groups during the 1970s. In the local elections of 1982 
women's lists had appeared in Reykjavik and the northern 
town of Akureyri and been quite successful. After some 
dispute among women activists on the wisdom of a similar 
attempt at the parliamentary level, a meeting of 500 women 
in Reykjavik on February 26th and 27th 1983 decided to put 
forward lists of candidates, and the Woman's Alliance was
9) DV, January 20th 1983. My translation.
10) In a radio programme the day after the election with the 
leaders of all the political parties the author declared the 
SDA the greatest victor of the election. Without disputing 
that Gylfason, on the other hand, clearly felt like a 
looser! The WA representative on the programme was, however, 
obviously delighted with the party's 5.5% and three elected 
members.
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founded on March 1 3 t h . T h i s  was followed by WA
candidatures in three of the eight constituencies, including
Reykjavik and the Southwest, two constituencies which
contained over 60% of the electorate. The major
characteristics of the new party have been analysed thus:
In its ideology, the Women's Alliance claims to 
take its point of departure from the common values 
and joint experience of women. Such values are 
said to have been systematically ignored through 
male dominance in the major decision making bodies 
in society and the exclusion of women from 
positions of influence. The Woman's Alliance aims 
at increasing the influence of women in politics, 
and males cannot take places on its lists. The 
Women's Alliance has been particularly concerned 
with social welfare issues and the problem of low 
wages in those occupations characterized as 
"women's jobs", for example in the public sector.
To most voters - including its own - these 
emphases have firmly established the Women's 
Alliance on the left of the political spectrum, 
although its activists vehemently reject any such 
characterization as being irrelevant and outmoded.
The Women's Alliance comes closest to being the 
Icelandic equivalent of a "green party". It puts 
great emphasis on environmental protection, its 
foreign policies are strongly pacifist, and it 
maintains a decentralized party apparatus with the 
smallest possible amount of organizational 
hierarchy. In fact, it does not regard itself as a 
party at all, preferring to be seen as a grass­
roots movement.
A number of different factors may have created the 
conditions for the emergence of a specific women's 
party in Iceland. A social basis for the party has 
been created in recent decades through a process 
of social change: young, well educated women have 
in increasing numbers become active in the labour 
market, not least in the public sector and service 
occupations, making demands for career 
opportunities and wages equal with males, and 
increasing the pressure for improved welfare 
measures for all households.
11) Separate women's lists are not new in Icelandic 
politics. Such lists first appeared in the local elections 
of 1908 and were quite successful. In the at-large Althingi 
elections of 1922, where three members were elected for the 
whole country, the first woman to enter the Althingi was 
elected from a women's list. An attempt to repeat this in 
1926 was unsuccessful, and women's lists first reappeared in 
1982 . See A. Styrkarsdottir (1979 and 1986) .
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However, since these conditions are hardly unique 
to Iceland, the decisive factors are probably to 
be found in the established party system. All of 
the parties were too slow in responding to the 
demands from the new women's movement for 
increased representation - prior to 1983 there had 
never been more than 3 women MPs at the same time 
in the Althingi. This was probably the combined 
result of the small number of seats each party 
could hope for in each constituency (in 1983 there 
were 60 seats in 8 constituencies) , and a 
decentralized nomination process in which 
established local leaders could easily ward off 
threats from newcomers. More spectacular is the 
failure of the parties on the Icelandic left to 
integrate the new women's movement into their 
electoral base. This was not entirely for lack of 
trying - particularly in the case of the People's 
Alliance. In many respects the policy differences 
between the People's Alliance and the Women's 
Alliance are a question of different emphases 
rather than of conflicting policies. But through 
its participation in the Thoroddsen government 
1980-83, the PA seems to have damaged seriously 
its credibility as the natural channel for new 
social grievances and opposition to the status 
quo. Both the women's list in Reykjavik in 1982 
and the Women's Alliance in 1983 emerged against 
the background of the People's Alliance sharing 
governing responsibility - in the Reykjavik 
council 1978-82, and in the national government 
1980-83.12)
It was clear in the campaign that the representatives of 
the old parties did not quite know how to deal with this new 
challenge from the WA. The main response was to try to 
ignore the party - or at least not attack it directly. The 
PA - which seemed most directly threatened by the new party 
- also followed this strategy but complained that the WA 
candidature was not really necessary, as most of the party's 
programme was already included in the PA platform.
For the four old parties, the election campaign started 
with the selection of candidates to the party lists, in many 
cases through primaries. This process, which took place from
12) O.Th. Hardarson and G.H. Kristinsson (1987), pp. 222- 
223.
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November 1982 to March 1983, created internal strife in all 
parties. The IP party leader, Geir Hallgrimsson, suffered a 
major blow in the IP primary in Reykjavik in November, in 
which he only managed to obtain the seventh seat on the 
party list - and subsequently lost his seat in the Althingi, 
as the party had only six members elected from Reykjavik in 
the 1983 election.13) In two constituencies disputes over 
candidate selection resulted in separate splintergroup 
lists; one in the West Peninsula constituency, headed by a 
former IP MP, and one in the North West constituency, headed 
by a sitting PP MP.l^)
As usual, personalities and the government record played 
a large part in the election campaign at the expense of 
clear and consistent policy alternatives. The Opposition 
strongly criticized the Government's disastrous economic 
record. The IP declared the state of the economy the main 
issue of the election and promised to reduce inflation and 
cut both taxes and state expenditure. The SDP put most 
emphasis on long-term solutions to the problems of the 
economy, maintaining that the system of inflation indexing 
of wages should be abolished in return for a social contract 
securing a minimum wage, stability and general welfare.
The PP claimed that the economic crisis was largely due 
to external circumstances but also blamed its coalition
13) Hallgrimsson did not resign as party leader until the 
autumn of 1983 when Thorsteinn Palsson took his place. He 
served as Foreign Minister in the PP-IP coalition from 1983- 
1985 after which he left politics and became one of the 
three directors of the Central Bank of Iceland.
14) According to electoral law, a party is allowed to put up 
more than one list in a constituency (and votes for both 
lists are combined in the allocation of supplementary seats 
for the party). The PP agreed that its Northwest 
splintergroup could use the PP party name, while the IP 
refused its West Peninsula dissenters use of the IP label.
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partner, the PA, for failing to respond to the economic 
problems and especially for not supporting an economic 
austerity bill proposed by Prime Minister Thoroddsen in 
February 1983 postponing inflation indexed wage increases. 
The PA, on the other hand, maintained that the Thoroddsen 
bill only cut wages without solving the economic problems. 
While the party said it was prepared to consider some 
changes in the system of index-linking it strongly opposed 
the "Reagan-Thatcher inspired" economic proposals of the 
IP, which would only increase unemployment.
Another prominent issue in the campaign was the 
"aluminum-issue", focusing on the disputes between the PA 
Minister of Industry, Hjorleifur Guttormsson, and Alusuisse, 
the owner of the only large aluminum plant in Iceland, 
concerning re-negotiation of Alusuisse's contract, including 
for example higher prices for electricity. Guttormsson was 
heavily criticized for his handling of the negotiations, and 
his general performance on the (lack of) development of 
power intensive industry through foreign investment, not 
only by the opposition parties - the IP and the SDP - but
also by the PP, which claimed that this issue had been the
source of bitter disputes in the Thoroddsen government. In 
the campaign the PA moved closer to its old hard-line
position of the early 1970s, being highly critical of 
foreign investment and the development of heavy industry as 
a solution to the overwhelming dependency of the Icelandic 
economy on the export of fish and fish products. By 
hardening its position on this issue, the PA moved further 
from the other three old parties, and closer to the WA,
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which strongly opposed foreign investment and the 
development of heavy industry in Iceland.
Housing policy was a third major issue in the campaign. 
This is an important issue in Iceland, as a large portion of 
the funding available to individuals buying a home comes 
from the State Housing Fund. Disputes on foreign policy were 
less prominent than had been the case in the early 1970s. 
The PA and the WA emphasized that a freeze should be put on 
all construction at the US base in Keflavik, and supported 
the idea that the Nordic countries should be declared a 
nuclear-free zone. The WA also declared that in principle it 
was opposed to both the Keflavik base and NATO, having been 
pressed by the pro-NATO parties to make its position clear.
A potential source of conflict between the old parties 
was resolved in February 1983, when the party leaders agreed 
on proposals for changes in the electoral system which 
reduced somewhat the overweighting of votes in rural 
constituencies and increased the number of MPs to 63, a 
change that took effect in 1987. While the changes were 
modest, as indicated by the fact that the Reykjavik and 
Southwest constituencies, containing over 60% of the 
electorate, can never control over 48% of the Althingi seats 
under the system, the party leaders' agreement put demands 
for more equal weighting of votes off the agenda. The SDA 
constitutional proposals did not include more equality of 
votes in Althingi elections, but Gylfason emphasized that a 
direct election of the Prime Minister meant that the "one 
man - one vote - one value" rule would be put into effect 
concerning the executive. All the old parties, on the other 
hand, completely rejected the SDA constitutional proposals.
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Table II.1.2. Results of Althingi Elections 1971-1983.
Percentage of valid votes (number of seats in the Althingi).
1971 1974 . 1978 1979 1983
IP 36.2 (22) 42.7(25) 32.7 (20) 35.4 (21) 38.7(23)
PP 25.3(17) 24.9 (17) 16.9(12) 24 .9(17) 19.0 (14)
PA 17.1 (10) 18.3(11) 22.9(14) 19.7(11) 17.3(10)
SDP 10.5(6) 9.1(5) 22.0(14) 17.5(10) 11.7(6)
ULL 8.9(5) 4.6(2) 3.3(0) - -
SDA - - - - 7.3(4)
WA — — - - 5.5(3)
Others 2.0(0) 0.4(0) 2.2(0) 2.5(1) * 0.5(0)#
Total 100% (60) 100% (60) 100% (60) 100% (60) 100%(60)
Total for old 
parties 89.1 (55) 95.0 (58) 94.5(60) 97.5(59) 86.7 (53)
* Two splintergroups from the IP account for 1.9 percent. 
The IP splintergroup in the South constituency had one 
elected member. He later joined the IP parliamentary block, 
and was reelected on the IP party list in 1983.
# An IP splintergroup in the West Peninsula.
If we try to estimate the effect of the campaign on the 
election results by comparing the strength of the parties in 
the DV newspaper opinion polls (Table II.1.1) and their 
actual outcome in the election (Table II. 1.2), three major 
trends emerge. First, the IP did much better in the opinion 
poll in October 1982 than in the 1983 opinion polls and in 
the actual election. While this may partly be a sign of a 
weak campaign, this pattern had been observed in earlier 
elections and can also indicate a measurement error in the 
opinion polls due to greater willingness of IP supporters to 
claim a voting intention for "their" party than is the case 
for potential voters of other p a r t i e s . 15) Second, i t  also
15) Another way of putting this hypothesis is to say that 
the IP tends to have fewer potential voters than the other 
parties among the undecided respondents, as many of them 
have yet not decided which of the "left" parties to vote 
for, but remain nevertheless unlikely to vote for the IP. 
This tendency may be particularly strong when the IP is in 
opposition.
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seems clear that the SDP improved its position during the 
campaign at the expense of the SDA, even though the SDP 
result was disastrous compared to the 1979 election. 
Finally, the PA seems to have somewhat increased its 
strength during the campaign.
The main victors in the election on April 23rd were 
clearly the two new parties, SDA and WA, jointly obtaining 
12.8% of the vote. The share of the four old parties, while 
still high at 86.7%, was the lowest since the emergence of 
the four-party system in the early 1930s.
Compared to the post-war period as a whole, none of the 
four old parties did particularly well. Even though the IP 
gained 3.3% from the 1979 election, the party was slightly 
below its post-war norm.^^) The PA lost 2.4% compared to the 
party's 1979 result but remained close to its post-war norm. 
The main losers, however, were clearly the PP and the SDP.
II. 2 Movements in the 1983 election: How did the results
come about?
Changes in parties' electoral fortunes can stem from 
three sources:
1. Changes in the electorate: New voters, who have reached 
voting age since last election, and deceased voters.
2. Changes in non-voting: Mobilized voters, voting in the 
present election but not in the last one, and demobilized 
voters, who voted in the last election but not the present 
one.
3. Direct switching between the parties.
16) The mean percentage for the IP in Althingi elections 
1946-1979 is 38.9%. The party was above the mean in seven 
elections and below the mean in five elections.
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In this section we will try to examine how these factors 
contributed to the actual results of the 1983 election. We 
will do this by analysing reported vote in 1983 and 
comparing it to the 1978 and 1979 vote as reported in the 
1983 survey.
A note of caution concerning the reliability of the data 
is appropriate here. The problems of using recall data on 
voting behaviour are well known. Part of the population 
tends to forget or remember incorrectly how they voted in an 
election a few years ago. Moreover, incorrect reporting of 
past vote is not random but systematic: there is a tendency 
to exaggerate consistency in voting behaviour - people tend 
to give their current party preference as past vote. The 
extent of incorrect reporting varies. (As an example we can 
mention that in the Danish election survey, 12.7% of 
respondents in a panel study remembered their 1971 vote 
incorrectly when interviewed again in 1 9 7 3 . The overall 
effect of this systematic error is of course an over­
estimate of voting stability.
A second problem concerning the data is sampling error, 
which is most serious when the groups involved are small, 
e.g. first time voters and mobilized or demobilized voters.
In Table II.2.1 the actual results in the elections in 
1978, 1979 and 1983 are compared to the reported vote in our 
survey.
17) Borre et al. (1976:
50
Table II.2.1. Actual results and reported vote in 1978, 1979 
and 1983. Percentages.
1978 1979 2983
Result Report Result Report Result Report
SDP 22.0 18.0 17 .5 17.5 11.7 12.5
PP 16.9 18.3 24.9 18.6 19.0 15.9
IP 32.7 41.2 37.3 I) 43.3 I) 39.22) 41.7 2 )
PA 22.9 20.3 19.7 20.1 17.3 15.8
ULL 3.3 1.7
SDA 7.3 7 . 8
WA 5.5 6.2
Others 2.2 0.4 0.6 0.4
N= (716) (736) (854)
1) Including the IP splintergroups in the North East and in
the South.
2) Including the IP splintergroup in the West Peninsula.
As was to be expected the table shows considerable 
discrepancies between the actual results and reported vote 
in our survey. The differences in 1983 are within the 
margins of sampling error, even though the possibility of a 
systematic error cannot be ruled out. In general the swings 
between the old parties are underestimated in the data; this 
can be seen in Table II. 2.2.
Table II.2.2. Net gains/losses of the old parties 1978-1979 
and 1979-1983. Percentages.
1978 -79 1979- 83
Election Survey Election Survey
Results Data Results Data
SDP -4.5 -0.5 -5.8 -5.0
PP 8.0 0.3 -5.9 -2.7
IP 4.6 2.1 1 . 9 -1 . 6
PA -3.2 -0.2 -2.4 -4.3
The discrepancies can stem from incorrect reporting of 
past vote, which is likely to be the major factor, sampling
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error and the impact of 1978 and 1979 voters who have left 
the electorate in 1983.
The recall data fits best for the PA and SDP, and for the 
latter party especially. In both cases the data shows the 
actual trend of those parties' fortunes at the polls; in 
both cases the data also underestimates the support of those 
parties in 1978, when those parties reached their all-time 
peak.
The recall data reflects the electoral fortunes of the PP 
and the IP considerably less well. IP support is 
overestimated in all three elections. This seems also quite 
common in polls taken by various agencies, probably a result 
of some systematic error. The recall data does not reflect 
the victory of the PP in 1979 when the party recovered from 
its severe loss in 1978, gaining 8% more votes.
The impact of first time voters
New voters are of particular interest. They are often 
supposed to be more volatile than older voters, not having 
yet formed clear attachments to the political system or 
developed a strong party identification. Thus, first time 
voters may be likely to follow the "electoral winds" to a 
greater extent than older voters.
To what extent can the impact of new voters account for 
the changes in the 1983 election? Table II. 2.3 shows how the 
new voters' choices differed from those of the older ones
and the impact of the new voters on the overall r e s u l t . 1^ )
18) See e.g. J.G. Blumler, D. McQuial and T.J. Nossiter 
(1975), p. 1.9, and J.G. Blumler, D. McQuail and T.J. 
Nossiter (1976), pp. 22-30.
19) The table shows only those who revealed the party voted 
for in 1983. The proportion who claimed not to have voted
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The new voters, who are 20-23 years of age, constitute 10% 
of the respondents in the table.
Table II.2.3. The impact of new voters 1983. Percentages.
New Older All Effect of ^ Actual net
voters voters voters new voters gain/loss^
SDP 8.3 13.0 12.5 -0.5 -5.8
PP 15.5 16.0 15.9 -0 .1 -5 . 9
IP 40.5 41.8 41.7 -0 .1 1.4
PA 13.1 16.1 15.8 -0.3 -2.4
SDA 15.5 7.0 7.8 0.8 7 . 3
WA 7.1 6.1 6.2 0 .1 5.5
Total 100.0 100.0 99.9
N= (84) (770) (854)
* The figures in this column show how the inclusion of new
voters changes each party's share of the vote; the party's
share among older voters is simply subtracted from its share
among all voters
# The figures in this column show net gain/loss in the 1983
election : each party's actual share of votes in 197 9 is
subtracted from the party's share in 1983.
On the whole the new voters do not vote very differently
from older voters. The only party which has much greater 
success among the new voters than the older ones is the SDA, 
mainly at the expense of the SDP and, to a lesser extent, 
the PA. Without the new voters, the SDA would have received 
7.0% of the vote instead of 7.8%, and the SDP would have 
increased its share from 12.5% to 13.0%. It is noteworthy 
that only the two new parties gain by the addition of new 
voters to the electorate; all the old parties lose.
The data gives support to the suggestion that new voters 
tend to follow the "electoral winds" to a greater extent
was higher among first time voters (8.4%) than older ones 
(6.5%) and 5.3% of first time voters said they cast a blank 
ballot, while 2.4% of the older ones did so. Refusals to 
answer the question were much more frequent among older 
voters (5.5%) than younger ones (1.1%). 1.1% of first time 
voters and 0.3% of older voters did not remember their 1983 
vote.
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than older ones, but the trend is relatively weak. In all 
cases but one (the IP) the impact of new voters can explain 
part of the parties' gains and losses but other factors 
obviously constitute the bulk of the explanation.
A further test of the assumption that younger voters are 
more likely to jump on the bandwagon in elections can be 
made by looking at the recall data of voting in 1978 and 
1979 .
Table II.2.4. New voters in 1978 and 1979 compared
voters . Percentages •
1978 1979
New All New All
voters voters voters voters
SDP 28 18 13 18
PP 11 18 16 19
IP 33 41 50 43
PA 29 20 22 20
Others 0 2 0 0
Total 101 99 101 100
N (80) (713) (32) (736)
The percentage distribution for new voters should be 
interpreted with caution, especially in 1979 when the number 
of new voters among the respondents (as in the electorate) 
is very low. Nevertheless, an interesting pattern emerges
when the new voters are compared to the voters as a whole.
The new voters do indeed seem to follow the electoral 
winds to a greater extent than others. The large victories 
of the SDP and the PA are clearly reflected among the new
voters, while the recalled vote of the whole sample under­
estimates their share by 4-5%. The losses of those parties 
in 1979 are also clearly reflected among young voters.
Correspondingly, the trends for the IP and PP are more
54
clearly reflected among the new voters than others in 1978 
and 1979.
On the whole our data supports the suggestion that new 
voters are more likely to have supported the victorious 
parties in elections than are other voters.
Table II.2.5. Results and net gains/losses 1978, 1979 and 
1983. Comparison of the actual result, recalled vote of the 
whole sample and recalled vote of new voters. Percentages.
' 78
SDP
'19 ' 83 ' 78
PP
'19 ' 83 ' 78
IP 
' 19 ' 83 ' 78
PA 
' 19 ' 83
Result 22 18 12 17 25 19 33 37 39 23 20 17
Sample 18 18 13 18 19 16 41 43 42 20 20 16
New vot. 28 13 8 11 16 16 33 50 41 29 22 13
Net gain/loss
Result -4 — 6 8 -6 4 2 -3 -3
Sample 0 -5 1 -3 2 -1 0 -4
New voters -15 -5 5 0 17 -9 -7 -9
Mobilized and demobilized voters
In recent decades around 10% of Icelandic voters have not 
used their vote in Althingi elections, most of them by not 
turning up at the polling booth. In addition, a few have 
returned a blank or void ballot (2.5% of total votes cast in 
1983, 1.1% in 1987) . The Icelandic turnout is among the
highest in the world.
Various behaviour patterns and reasons can lie behind a 
stable figure of 10% abstention in Althingi elections. This 
figure could indicate that a small part of the electorate 
never uses its vote for various reasons/ for example 
disaffection with the political system or the parties, 
disinterest in politics generally, or even because of 
Downsian rationality. If this were the case, it could mean 
that a part of the electorate were in a sense alienated from
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the political system. On the other hand, some people might 
abstain occasionally, for instance for personal reasons of 
various kinds or because they want to punish their own party 
without going as far as voting for a new one.
The size of the non-voting population and its sub­
populations, consistent and occasional non-voters, is 
obviously important for democratic theory. But the latter 
group can also be of importance for parties' gains and 
losses in elections. Mobilization and demobilization of 
voters - their movements in and out of the voting population 
in successive elections - can have considerable effects on 
election results. These effects are likely to be greatest 
when there are great fluctuations in turnout, as was the 
case in Iceland in the 1930s and 1 9 4 0 s . 20) when turnout is 
high and stable, as in the last decades, the effects are 
likely to be smaller. Nevertheless they can make a 
difference, especially if the group of occasional voters 
constitutes a large part of the non-voting electorate in 
each election.
Table II.2.6. Voting or non-voting (abstaining or turning in 
a blank or void ballot) 1978, 1979 and 1983. Percentages.
Voted in all three elections.................  84 (678)
Voted in two elections........................ 11 (87)
Voted in one election......................... 4 (29)
Voted in none of the elections.............. 2 (14)
Total  101 (808)
Excluded from the table are 50 respondents for whom inform­
ation was missing for at least one election, and 145 who 
were not eligible to vote in all three elections.
Analysis of the non-voting population, based on the 
electoral records, is not available for Iceland. Our survey.
20) See S. Kristjansson (1977), Section II.1.
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on the other hand, gives some indication of the composition 
of the non-voting population. Table III. 2.6 shows how our 
respondents recalled whether they had voted or not in the 
1978/ 1979 and 1983 elections.
The data is likely to underestimate non-voting to some 
extent. First, permanent non-voters may be more likely to 
refuse to take part in an electoral survey than others^l) 
and, second, there may be some tendency among the 
respondents to claim they voted even if they did n o t . 22) 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the figures in the 
table are almost identical to figures presented by Holmberg 
for the Swedish elections 1973, 1976 and 1979 although his
figures are based on an analysis of abstentions in the 
voting records.
We can also obtain some information on non-voting by 
looking at the answers to a different question, where people 
were asked in a general way how frequently they used their 
vote in Althingi elections. This general question and the 
questions on recalled vote occurred at different places in 
the questionnaire. In Table II.2.7 the answers to this 
question are related to recalled voting behaviour.
21) Of our respondents, 6.7% claimed they had abstained in 
1983 while 11.7% of voters abstained in the election. 2.7% 
of the respondents claimed they returned a blank ballot, 
while 2.2% of registered voters returned blank or void 
ballots in the election. This could imply that abstainers 
are less willing or able to take part in an electoral survey 
or they wrongly claim to have voted.
22) Holmberg (1981, p. 32) reports e.g. that in the Swedish 
election study after the 1979 election, 27% of 98 
respondents who had abstained nevertheless claimed they had 
voted, while less than one percent of those who had voted 
claimed they had abstained.
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Table II.2.7. How often do you use your vote by recalled 
voting behaviour 1978, 1979, and 1983. Percentages.
RECALLED VOTING BEHAVIOUR
Voted in Voted in Abstained Abstained Total
all/gives all/fails in one in all
USES party to give or two three
VOTE party elections elections
Always 91 79 31 7 80
Usually 9 21 62 21 18
Seldom 0 - 7 36 2
Never — — — 36 1
Total 100 100 100 100 101
N= (622) (56) (116) (14) (808)
Respondents in column 2 claim to have voted in all three
elections but fail to mention party voted for in at least
one election. - Respondents in column 3 claim to have voted
in one or two elections but abstained, or returned a blank
or void ballot in the other. - Excluded from the table are
50 respondents for whom no information was available for at
least one election and 145 who were not eligible to vote in
all three elections.
Q: Some people always vote in Althingi elections, and some 
people never vote. If you consider the period since you came 
of voting age, do you think you have always voted in 
Althingi elections, usually voted, seldom, or never?
The answers to both questions suggest that a considerable 
share of the electorate are occasional non-voters, or 15- 
20%. Table II.2.7 shows that, of those who reported that 
they did not vote for a party in at least one of the three 
elections on which they were specifically asked about 
voting behaviour, 31% nevertheless claimed they always had 
voted, when asked in a general way. This may indicate that a 
larger part of the electorate is in fact occasional non­
voters than the tables suggest^^). In any case it is clear
23) It is also very likely that the size of the consistently 
non-voting part of the electorate is underestimated in our 
data, e.g. for the reasons given above. Besides, it is 
likely that non-voters are a larger proportion of those 
individuals for whom information on voting behaviour is 
missing for at least one of the elections than among those 
included in the tables.
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that occasional non-voting can make a difference in election 
results and mobilization and demobilization of voters thus 
deserve a separate analysis.
Table II.2.8. Effects of mobilization and demobilization in 
the 1983 election. Percentages.
Demob­ Mobil­ 1983 1983+ 1983- 1983+ EFFECTS
ilized ized vote dem. mob. d. - m. Dem. Mob. Both
il) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
SDP 21.1 8.7 12.5 12.9 12.7 13.1 -0 . 4 -0.2 -0 . 6
PP 21.1 17.4 15.9 16.1 15.8 16.1 -0.2 + 0 .1 -0.2
IP 42.1 26.1 41.7 41.7 42.6 42 . 6 0.0 -0 . 9 -0 . 9
PA 15.8 13.0 15.8 15.8 16.0 16.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
SDA 15.2 7.8 7.5 7.4 7 .1 + 0.3 + 0.4 + 0.7
WA 19.6 6.2 5.9 5.4 5.2 + 0.3 + 0.8 + 1 .0
N= (38) (46) (854) (892) (808) (846)
Col.l and 2: Demobilized and mobilized voters in the table 
are only those who revealed the party voted for in one 
election and said they abstained or returned a blank or void 
ballot in the other.
Col.3: Reported vote in the 1983 election.
Col.4: Col.3 + Col.l.
Col.5: Col.3 - Col.2.
Col.6: Col.3 + Col.l - Col. 2 (i.e. the result if the 
mobilized had not voted and the demobilized had voted in the 
same way as in 1979).
Col.7 : Col.3 - Col.4.
Col.8: Col.3 - Col.5.
Col.9: Col.3 - Col.6.
The mobilized and demobilized voters in our data are not 
large groups/ mobilized voters constitute 5.4% of the 1983 
vote. If demobilized voters were added to the 1983 vote its 
size would increase by 4.4%. Nevertheless the table shows 
that movements in and out of the voting population do have 
some effects.
Any demobilization is beneficial to the two new parties 
by definition. Had the demobilized voters voted for their 
old parties, the SDA's and the WA's share of the vote would 
have decreased by 0.3% each. Two of the old parties suffer
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from demobilization, the SDP and the PP, the parties that 
suffered greatest losses in the election.
Each of the six parties could on the other hand 
potentially gain by mobilization. The data indicates, 
however, that it was mainly the two new parties, the major 
victors of the election, that were successful in mobilizing 
1979 non-voters, especially the WA. Without the mobilized 
voters the WA's share of the vote would have dropped by 0.8% 
and the SDA's share by 0.4%. Somewhat surprisingly, the data 
indicates that the IP, which in fact gained 1.4% in the 
e l e c t i o n 2 4 )  ^ suffered most from mobilization; without the 
mobilized voters the party would have increased its share by 
0.9%.
The main conclusion is that all the old parties lost by 
movements in and out of the voting population, while the new 
and victorious parties gained. Without those movements the 
SDA's share of votes would have decreased by 0.7%, and the 
WA's by 1.0%. The WA was particularly successful in 
mobilizing 1979 non-voters.
Direct switching between the parties
The single factor likely to cause greatest swings in 
election outcomes is direct switching between the parties. 
When turnout is stable at around 90%, large swings are 
impossible without some direct switching.
Nevertheless a sizeable amount of direct party switching 
(gross volatility) may not necessarily be reflected in 
swings in elections as measured in net gains and losses of
24) But it should be borne in mind that the recall data 
shows a total loss of 2.0% for the IP 1979-1983.
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the parties (net volatility) . Movements between the parties 
can cancel each other out, so it is theoretically possible 
that every voter may switch parties in an election without 
any changes in the parties' shares of the v o t e . 25)
While it is likely that the increased net volatility in 
Icelandic elections in the 1970s is a reflection of 
increased direct party switching, this can not be tested by 
survey data. On the other hand, it is clear that the great 
swings that occurred in elections in the 1970s could not 
have taken place without considerable party switching.
Table II.2.9. Electoral behaviour 1978, 1979 and 1983. 
Percentages.
Voted for the same party three times .................  60
Voted for the same party twice, did not vote for a
party in one election .................................. 6
Voted for one party, did not vote for a party in
two elections ........................................... 3
Voted for same party 1979 and 1983 but another 1978... 6
Voted for same party 1978 and 1983 but another 1979... 3
Voted for same party 1978 and 1979 but another 1983... 13
Voted for two different parties, abstained once......  4
Voted for three different parties...................... 2
Did not vote for a party in any of the elections....... 2
Total: 99 
(N=733)
Summary:
Voted for same party in all elections.................  60
Did not change party, but did not vote in every
election.................................................  9
Voted for two parties...................................  26
Voted for three parties................................. 2
Did not vote for a party in any election..............  2
Total: 99 
(N=733)
Excluded from the table are 125 who did not describe their 
voting behaviour in all three elections and 145 who were not 
eligible to vote in all three elections.
25) Assuming that no party has over 50% of the vote
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Table II.2.9 shows the amount of party switching in
elections from 1978-1983 as recalled by our respondents. As
mentioned previously, it is likely that the recall data
underestimates the movements that actually took place.
According to their recall, 28% of those who reported
their voting behaviour in all three elections (see Table
II.2.9) changed party at least once. This figure is likely 
to be somewhat too low.
Table II.2.10. Answers to the question: "Do you always vote 
for the same party?" by recalled electoral behaviour 1978- 
1983. Percentages.
RECALLED BEHAVIOUR
Voted Changed Did not Voted, Did not No in­ Total
for party vote in not vote in form­
PARTY same all el­ known any el­ ât ion
VOTED party ections what ection
FOR
Always same 64 3 29 13 30 40 41
Usually the
same 32 63 38 44 10 31 40
Usually
different 4 34 33 43 60 29 19
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= (442) (180) (114) (54) (10) (45) (845)
ETA= .55
Excluded from the table are 145 respondents who were not 
eligible to vote in all three elections and 8 who did not 
answer the general question.
Q: Some people always vote for the same party in Althingi 
electionsf while some people usually vote for different 
parties. Have you always voted for the same party in Al­
thingi electionsf have you usually voted for the same party, 
or have you usually voted for different parties?
Some indication of the reliability of the recall data can 
be obtained by comparing the results in Table II.2.9 to the 
respondents' answers to a general question: they were asked 
if they always voted for the same party, usually for the 
same party or usually for different parties (see Table
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II.2.10). The general question was not in the same part of 
the questionnaire as the questions on past vote.
The answers to the general question seem at first to 
indicate greater volatility than the data on recalled vote: 
only 41% of those who were eligible to vote in the three 
elections claim they have always voted for the same party, 
while 60% of those who give sufficient information on voting 
behaviour on all three elections claim to have voted for the 
same party on all occasions.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the two questions 
are not entirely commensurable; the general question relates 
to all Althingi elections in which the respondent has taken 
part, while the recall questions ask specifically about the 
three last elections. Thus, a higher degree of volatility 
might be expected in response to the general question.
Second, there is a good correspondence between the recall 
data and the general description of own voting behaviour 
among those who report a party vote in all three elections 
(Col. 1 and 2; ETA=.59) . Very few respondents contradict
themselves in answering the two q u e s t i o n s . 26) The main 
reason for higher volatility on the general question is that 
a third of those who recall having voted for the same party 
in the last three elections say also that they do not always 
vote for the same party.
Third, occasional non-voters are not as volatile as party 
switchers, according to the general question, but more
26) The 3% of party switchers, who claim they always have 
voted for the same party, clearly contradict themselves and 
the 4% of those who report having voted for the same party 
in all three elections, but also say they usually vote for 
different parties, come close to a contradiction.
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volatile than those who claim to have voted for the same 
party 1978-83.
Finally, 87% of those who claim they voted in all 
elections from 1978-1983, but do not recall a party voted 
for on at least one occasion, and 60% of those for whom 
information is missing for at least one election, do not say 
they usually vote for the same p a r t y . ^7)
Our data indicates that more than half of the voters are 
potential party switchers. 23% of those who recall party 
voted for 1979-83 claim they actually switched parties (see 
Table II.2.13). This figure is likely to be too low, both 
because of recall error, and because the answers to the 
general question indicate that those respondents for whom 
information on the party voted for in at least one election 
is missing are more volatile than those who report a party 
vote for all three elections. Thus, direct party switching 
can potentially explain quite large swings in election 
results .
Table II.2.11 shows that the four old parties had varying 
success in keeping the loyalty of their 1979 voters. The SDP 
suffered the worst losses in 1983 and the table reveals that 
the party lost four of every ten of their 1979 voters. The 
PP and the PA, which also lost in 1983, kept the loyalty of 
around 70% of their 1979 voters, but the IP, which gained in 
1983, was clearly most successful in this respect: four of 
every five IP voters in 1979 also voted for the party in 
1983. An interesting question is whether this simply
27) The fact that only 13% of those who claim to have voted 
in all three elections, but do not recall a party vote at 
least once, say they always vote for the same party makes it 
more likely that they simply don't remember the party voted 
for.
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reflects the fact that the IP was winning in 1983, or if 
this is a more general phenomenon, i.e. that IP voters tend 
in general to be more loyal to their party than voters of 
the other three old parties.
Table II. 2.11. Party switching 1983: What happened to> the
1979 vote? Percentages.
1979 VOTE
1983
VOTE
SDP PP IP PA Trotsky-
ites
Not el­
igible
Did not 
vote
SDP 59 2 3 3 - 7 5
PP 4 71 1 3 - 13 10
IP 14 8 82 5 - 35 16
PA 2 6 1 67 100 13 8
SDA 12 4 5 6 - 13 9
WA
Did not
3 2 3 12 6 12
vote 6 6 5 4 — 13 40
Total 100 99 100 100 100 100 100
N= (129) (135) (318) (148) (3) (97) (77)
Excluded
behaviour
from the table are 96 respondents for whom 
in 1979 or 1983 was missing.
vot ing
Table II.2.12. Party switching 1983: Where did the 1983 vote 
come from? Percentages.
1983 VOTE
1979 SDP PP IP PA SDA WA
VOTE
SDP 83 5 6 3 33 12
PP 3 87 4 7 13 9
IP 10 4 88 2 33 29
PA 4 5 3 86 20 50
Trotskyites — — — 3 — —
Total 100 101 101 101 99 100
N= (92) (111) (299) (115) (45) (34)
Excluded from the table are those who did not vote in 1979
or 1983, those who were not eligible to vote in 1979, and 96
respondents for whom voting behaviour in 1979 or 1983 was
missing.
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Table II.2.12 contains the same information as Table 
II.2.11, except that now the base for the percentages is the 
1983 vote. The table thus reveals the profile of the 
parties' 1983 voters - and answers the question: Where did 
the 1983 voters come from?
It should be noted, that in Table II. 2.12 both mobilized 
voters and new voters in 1983 are excluded. Between 11 and 
16 per cent of the old parties' total vote came from those 
two groups, but 30-31% of the new parties' total vote. 20% 
of the SDA's total vote came from new voters and 18% of WA's 
total vote came from mobilized voters.
The table shows that, among the voters who voted for a 
party both in 1979 and 1983 and voted for one of the old 
parties in 1983, 83-88% came from their 1979 stock. The two 
new parties, the SDA and the WA, obviously had no 1979 
voters, so for them the table simply shows how large a 
proportion of the voters they gained from other parties came 
from each of the old parties. This composition of their vote 
is of particular interest. On what fronts were they 
especially successful?
Both of the new parties had some success on all fronts, 
but they did not attract voters from all the four old 
parties to the same extent. If that was the case, the 
profiles of the new parties should simply reflect the 
proportional strength of the old parties in 1979 - which 
they do not.
First, the new parties were not as attractive to voters 
of the IP and the PP as they were to voters of the socialist 
parties. Even though 33 and 29% of the SDA's and WA's votes 
respectively came from the IP, this simply reflects the fact
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that the IP is a large party - in 1979 43% of the
respondents in Table II.2.12 voted for the IP, so IP voters 
are clearly underrepresented in the new parties' profiles. 
The same is the case for the PP; in 1979 18% of those
respondents voted for the party, while only 13% of the SDA 
vote and 9% of the WA vote comes from 1979 PP voters.
Second, when the strength of the old parties is borne in 
mind, the SDA is by far most successful among former SDP
voters: while 17% of our respondents in Table II.2.12 voted 
for the SDP in 1979, 33% of the SDA voters come from SDP's
1979 vote. Nevertheless it is clear that the SDA is not only 
a splintergroup from the SDP in electoral terms: two of
every three voters whom the SDA gained from the other 
parties did not come from Gylfason's former party.
Third, former PA voters are strongly overrepresented 
among WA voters. 50% of the voters the WA gains from other
parties come from the PA, while 20% of the respondents voted
for the PA in 1979.
In Table II.2.13 the effect of party changes between 1979 
and 1983 are summarized. Only those who reported the party 
voted for in both elections are included.
The figures must of course be interpreted with great 
caution but, according to the table, direct party changes 
cause the SDP greatest losses; the party's net loss is 4.2% 
of those voters who revealed a party choice both in 1979 and 
1983. Two thirds of the party's net loss is due to voters 
who have been attracted to the two new p a r t i e s , 28) mainly to
28) It should be borne in mind that the old parties can of 
course only lose votes to the new parties, while they both 
lose and gain votes from the other old parties. Thus the 
table on net gains reveals a different picture from e.g. 
Table II.2.11 on the destination of the 1979 vote.
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the SDA (2.2%), but the party's net loss to the WA (0.6%) is 
also greater than its loss towards the IP (1.3%) if the 
relative sizes of the WA and IP are taken into account.
Table II.2.13. Party vote 1979 by party vote 1983. Total 
percentages.
1983
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA
1979
SDP 10.9 0.7 2.6 0.4 2.2 0 . 5
PP 0.4 13.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.4
IP 1.3 0 . 6 37.7 0.3 2.2 1 .4
PA 0.6 0.7 1.2 14.2 1.3 2.4
Trotskyites - - - 0 . 4 - -
(N=695)
Net gains or losses of the parties due to party change 1979
1983.
Net
gain
or
loss
Net
effect 
of party 
change
SDP PP IP PA SDA m
PP -0.3 SDP 0.3 SDP 1.3 SDP-0.2 SDP 2.2 SDP 0 . 5
IP -1.3 IP -1.0 PP 1.0 PP 0.5 PP 0.9 PP 0.4
PA 0.2 PA -0.5 PA 0.9 IP -0.9 IP 2.2 IP 1 .4
SDA-2.2 SDA-0.9 SDA-2.2 SDA-1.3 PA 1.3 PA 2.4
WA -0.6 WA -0.4 WA -1.4 WA -2.4
Tr. 0.4
-4.2 -2.5 -0.4 -3.9 5 . 5 4 . 8
Excluded from the table are 96 respondents, for whom voting 
behaviour in 1979 or 1983 was missing, 97 who were first 
time voters in 1983, 38 mobilized voters in 1983, 46 demobi­
lized voters in 1983, and 31 respondents who abstained or 
turned in a blank ballot both in 1979 and 1983.
A similar pattern emerges for the PP, which only gains 
(slightly) from its switches with the SDP. The PP loses on 
the other hand relatively less to the new parties, as around 
half of its net losses are due to switches with other old 
parties.
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The IP - which was winning in the election - gains from 
all party switches between old parties, but it is 
interesting that the party gains only slightly more from its 
switches with the SDP than with the PP or the PA. The IP 
loses on the other hand some votes to the two new parties, 
and as those slightly override the net gains from the old 
parties IP suffers a small net loss from all party changes 
in the data.
The PA loses on most fronts. Even though the party gains 
0.5% on its switches with the PP, and attracts the 1979 
Trotskyite voters, its total net loss is 3.9%. Interestingly 
enough, the PA's net loss to the IP (0.9%) is the main 
reason that the party suffers a small net loss (0.2%) in its 
changes with the old parties, but most of the PA's total net 
loss due to party switching stems from its voters going to 
the new parties (3.7 out of 3.9% net loss) . The PA loses 
almost twice as many voters to the WA as to the SDA.
Finally, as the two new parties can only benefit from 
party switching, their profiles in Table II.2.13 simply 
reflect their profiles in Table II.2.12.
The discussion so far has focused on the effects of party 
switching, mobilization and demobilization, and the impact 
of new voters. Table II.2.14 summarizes those results, and 
enables us to compare the relative contribution of each of 
the three factors on the election result.
Not surprisingly, direct party switching is by far the 
strongest factor explaining changes in electoral outcomes. 
According to the table, about 80-90% of the net losses of 
the SDP, PP, and PA is due to the effects of direct party 
switching. On the other hand, mobilization and
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demobilization contribute most to the net loss of the IP in 
the table, but it should be borne in mind that the total 
loss of the IP in the data is only 1.4% - much less than 
that of the other old parties - and in fact our data fails 
to reflect that the IP actually gained in the election.
Table II.2.14. Party vote 1983: Effects of party switching, 
mobilization and demobilization and first time voters.
Vote
1979
Party
switching
Mobilization,
demobilization
New
voters
Sum Vote
1983
SDP 17.5 -4.2 — 0 . 6 -0.5 12.2 12.5
PP 18.6 -2.5 -0.1 -0.1 15.9 16.0
IP 43.3 -0.4 -0 . 9 -0 .1 41 . 9 41 .7
PA 20.1 -3.9 -0.2 -0.3 15.7 15.8
SDA 0.0 6.6 0.7 0.8 8.1 7 . 8
WA 0.0 4.8 1.1 0.1 6.0 6.2
The figures in Col.5 (Sum) are obtained simply by adding or 
subtracting the figures in Col.2-4 from the figures in 
Col.l. Col.6 (Vote 1983) shows the share of each party in 
the sample. The discrepancies between Col. 5 and 6 are due to 
rounding error and the fact that the percentages in the 
columns are not calculated from exactly the same figures.
II. 3 The decision-making process 1983: When did the voters 
decide? Did they consider other parties?
We have seen that direct party switching is the major 
explanation of the parties' gains and losses in the 1983 
election. So far we have concentrated our analysis on the 
voters' actual voting decisions as reported in our survey. 
Now we shall turn to the decision-making process: When did 
the voters decide what party to vote for? What other parties 
did they consider - if any?
Analysis of such questions throws further light on what 
happened in the election - and what could have happened.
Such an analysis can, first, give us a new indicator on 
the potential volatility of the electorate. How large a
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proportion of the voters did consider voting for another 
party?
Second, we get some indication of the destinations of the 
"floating" voters? Are they evenly distributed among the 
parties, or do some parties attract them more than others? 
What parties are most successful during the election 
campaign?
Third, we get some information on the potential of the 
parties. How many voters considered voting for a given party 
but did not do so? What would the result have been if those 
voters had in fact voted for the party?
Fourth, we get a new indicator of the voters' perceptions 
of the party system. What parties are close together in the 
minds of the voters - what parties are seen as realistic 
alternatives?
Table II. 3.1 shows when the voters of the six parties 
made their final voting decision. While the relationship 
between party voted for and decision time is in general weak 
(ETA=.14),29) some clear patterns nevertheless emerge.
If we look at the proportion of each party's voters who 
did not consider voting for another party, the two new 
parties discern them clearly from the four old ones - not 
surprisingly. Around half of the voters of the old parties 
did not consider voting differently, while only a fourth of 
the SDA voters and just over a third of WA voters did not 
consider voting for another party.
29) Using time of decision as the dependent variable, 
forming a scale from 1 (decided on polling day) to 6 (did 
not consider another party) .
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Table II.3.1. When did the 1983 voters decide what party to
vote for?
A. Column percentages
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA All
Did not consider another
party 49 56 56 53 23 38 51
More than a month before 2 13 11 8 22 13 11
8-30 days before 7 2 6 7 17 4 7
One week before 14 9 7 5 17 9 9
During the last week 15 5 8 11 11 19 10
On polling day 14 15 11 15 11 17 13
Total 101 100 99 99 101 100 101
N= (101) (130) (347) (131) (65) (53)(827)
B. Cumulative percentages
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA All
Did not consider another
party 49 56 56 53 23 38 51
More than a month before 51 69 67 62 45 51 62
8-30 days before 57 72 74 69 62 55 68
One week before 71 80 81 74 78 64 77
During the last week 86 86 89 85 89 83 87
On polling day 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= 101 130 347 131 65 53 827
Of the 854 respondents who revealed party choice in 1983 27
who did not answer the *question on voting decision are
missing from the table.
Q: Did you ever consider voting for another party? (If yes):
How long before the election did you make a final decision?
If we look, on the other hand, at how many had made up 
their minds a month or more before polling day, a different 
pattern emerges. Three of the old parties have in common 
that two out of every three of their voters had come to a 
final decision before the election campaign really started: 
the PP (69%), the IP (67%), and the PA (62%) . This was the 
case for only about a half of the voters of the two new 
parties and the SDP, which of course means that those three
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parties gained half of their voters during the election 
campaign.
Relatively few voters say they made up their minds 8-30
days before polling day, or 2-7% of each party's voters,
with the notable exception of the SDA: 17% of the SDA's
voters say they decided in that period. This may indicate 
that the last week of the campaign was a bad one for the SDA 
- which is in accord with the feeling of many observers at 
the time.
The last few days seem on the other hand to have been 
successful for the SDP and in particular for the WA. 36% of 
the WA's and 29% of the SDP's voters claim to have made the 
final decision less than a week before the election. The 
corresponding figures for the other parties are 26% for the
PA, 22% for the SDA, 20% for the PP, and 19% for the IP.
Thus, the most "floating" voters were not evenly distributed 
among the parties.
Table II. 3.1 also gives us a new indicator on the 
potential volatility of the electorate. 49% of the voters 
said they had considered voting for another party. This is 
compatible with the data presented in Section 11.2/ there we 
saw that 60% claimed to have voted for the same party 1978, 
1979 and 1983 (Table II.2.9) while 41% said they always 
voted for the same party in an answer to a general question 
(Table II.2.10) .
While only half of the electorate did not consider voting 
for another party, 62% had made up their mind a month or 
more before the election, i.e. before the election campaign 
really started. 32% came to a final conclusion in the last
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seven days/ 13% say they made the final decision on polling 
day. Obviously the election campaign is important.
Let us turn to what could have happened in the election. 
An analysis of which other parties the voters considered 
while making up their minds can give us an indication of the 
potential maximum each party could have reached in the 
election.
Table II.3.2. Potential maximum vote of the parties 1983.
Number of parties Percentages Ratio :
also considered : Max. Voted Max. Max.vote/
Vote 1983 One Two Three vote 1983 vote 1983 vote
SDP 107 62 21 7 197 12.5 22.3 1.78
PP 136 52 7 2 197 15.9 23.3 1.47
IP 356 65 14 2 437 41.7 49.4 1.18
PA 135 44 13 4 196 15.8 22 .1 1.40
SDA 67 79 19 4 169 7 . 8 19.1 2.45
WA 53 48 14 5 120 6.2 13 . 6 2 .19
N= (854) (350) (44) (8) (885) (854) (885)
406 respondents named 1-3 parties they considered voting 
for. Of those 31 did not vote, returned a blank ballot or 
information on their 1983 vote is missing. Thus the number 
of respondents goes up to 854 for maximum vote. Second 
preferences of four voters, who considered voting for the IP 
splintergroup in the West Peninsula, are omitted from the 
table.
Maximum vote for each party is calculated by simply adding 
the number of respondents who claimed to have considered 
voting for the party to the number of respondents who said 
they did in fact vote for the party in 1983.
Table II.3.2 shows, that the parties' relative gains from 
attracting all voters who considered voting for them are 
very different. The two new parties, the SDA and the WA, 
would have more than doubled their share of the votes. The 
SDP would almost have doubled its share, while the PA and 
the PP would have increased their share by almost 50%. Such 
an addition of "potential" voters would relatively increase
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the size of the largest party, the IP, to a much smaller
degree.
Why do the parties differ in this respect? Various
explanations are possible and need not be the same for all 
parties. Let us consider two here.
First, the explanation could be related to the political 
performance of the parties. Most voters may be inclined to 
vote for "their" party in accordance with the party 
identification model. If, on the other hand, voters of a 
party are dissatisfied with the performance of their own 
party their doubts could be reflected both in a high 
proportion considering voting for someone else and in a late 
final decision on how to vote.
Second, this difference could be a reflection of an 
electorate in which a relatively large proportion of voters 
is either without party identification or has a weak one. If
that were the case, the observed differences between parties
could of course also stem from those voters' perceptions of 
the performance of the parties - in other words, the 
electoral winds - but the explanation could also be of a 
more structural nature; a large part of the "floating" 
voters may not have developed an identification with any one 
party, but nevertheless developed some identification with a 
group of parties or just an antagonism towards one or more 
parties. If this were the case, this underlying structure 
would influence the destinations of the "floating" voters, 
which were then not only determined by the electoral winds. 
Some parties would always tend to get a relatively small
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share of those who decide late; in fact the contenders for 
the "floating" vote would not really be all p a r t i e s . 30)
Voters' considerations of voting for another party can 
also tell us something about the fronts in the election 
campaign: what parties were fighting for the same votes?
Table II.3. 3. Party considered by 1983 vote . Only those who
revealed a party voted for 1983 and considered one other
party. Percentages.
1983 vote
Considered SDP PP IP PA SDA WA All#
voting for
SDP - 18 37 6 13 4 22
PP 13 22 20 16 9 18
IP 38 35 8 35 17 28
PA 10 25 6 - 10 48 14
SDA 27 16 28 24 - 22 24
WA 13 6 8 41 26 — 15
Total 101 100 101 99 100 100
N= (48) (51) (119) (49) (31) (23)
# This column gives the proportion of respondents who
mentioned each party when those who voted for that party are
excluded. N' thus varies from 202 (IP) to 298 (WA) , and the
percentages do not of course add up to 100.
The proportional distribution of respondents' recalled vote
1) in the table above and 2) in the total sample was as
follows :
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA All N
1) (Table) 15% 16% 37% 15^ è 10% 7% 100% (321)
2) (Total sample) 13% 16% 42% 16(& 8% 6% 101% (854)
While the table has to be interpreted with caution, as
the number of respondents supporting each party is low 
(especially for the SDA and WA), some clear patterns emerge. 
Voters of the various parties are not equally attracted to 
other parties. The relative size of the parties has to be
30) Such an underlying structure would also lead to a 
systematic bias in opinion polls before elections, as such 
polls usually assume that the division between parties of 
those voters who are undecided is the same as those who 
reveal what party they are going to vote for.
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kept in mind (see bottom section of the table). The 
proportion of each party's voters who considered another 
party can be compared to the figures in the last column, 
giving the proportion of all voters who considered that 
party and excluding those who voted for it. While for 
example 38% of SDP voters who considered voting for one 
other party mentioned the IP, 28% of those who voted for 
SDP, PP, PA, SDA or WA and considered voting for one other 
party mentioned the IP.
Of those who considered voting for one other party, and 
did not vote for the SDP, 22% mentioned the SDP as their 
second choice. But voters of different parties were 
attracted to the SDP to a very different degree. The party 
was by far most popular among IP voters; 37% of this group 
considered voting for the SDP. 18% of PP voters considered 
voting for the SDP, as did 13% of SDA voters. The SDP was 
clearly least attractive to PA and WA voters; the party was 
only mentioned by 6 and 4% respectively.
18% of those who did not vote for the PP mentioned that 
party as a second choice. PP's attraction to other parties' 
voters varied much less than in the case of the SDP. The PP 
was most popular among IP and PA voters (22 and 20%), while 
only 9% of WA's voters considered voting for the PP.
Only 28% of those who did not vote for the IP considered 
voting for the party, while 37% of those who considered
voting for one other party, and 42% of the total sample,
voted for the IP. The IP attracted the voters of three 
parties to a similar degree, SDP (38%) , PP (35%) , and SDA
(35%) . The IP appealed much less to the voters of the WA
(17%) and the PA (8%) .
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14% of those who did not vote for the PA mentioned the 
party as a second choice. Its attraction was mainly felt by 
the voters of two parties: 48% of the WA's voters considered 
voting for the PA while 25% of PP voters did so. 10% of SDP 
and SDA voters mentioned the PA but only 6% of IP voters.
As we saw in Table II. 3.2, when the relative sizes of the 
parties are taken into account, the two new parties were 
most popular among those who considered voting for another 
party. 10% of those included in Table II.3.3 actually voted 
for the SDA, while 25% of those who did not vote for the 
party considered doing so. The SDA's appeal to other 
parties' voters varies less than does that of other 
perties: the party was most popular among voters for the IP 
(28%) and the SDP (27%) and least popular among PP voters 
(16%) .
15% of those who did not vote for the WA considered doing 
so and the variations in the party's appeal are large. 41% 
of PA voters who considered voting for one other party had 
the WA in mind when coming to a decision. A corresponding 
figure for SDA voters was 26%, while the WA's appeal to 
other parties' voters was much weaker (6-13%).
The clearest pattern emerging from this analysis is that 
the PA and WA were competing for the same voters. WA was 
also, to a lesser degree, competing with the other new 
party, the SDA, while the attraction of WA to the voters of 
the IP, SDP and PP was relatively small and vice versa. The 
PA seems to be closer to the PP than the SDP in the minds of 
the voters, while the opposite positions of the IP and PA 
are clearly reflected in the very small affection these 
voters show for each other's party.
7The IP and the SDP are also clearly fighting for the 
loyalty of the same voters. SDP voters are only slightly 
more attracted to the IP than are the voters of the PP and 
the SDA but IP voters are much more inclined to vote for the 
SDP than the PP.
Table II.3.4. Total percentage choosing each pair of 
alternatives. Only those revealing a party choice, and 
mentioning one other party they considered voting for.
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA
SDP — 5 19 2 5 2
PP - - 14 1 4 2
IP - - - 3 14 4
PA - - - - 5 10
SDA 4
(N=321)
Table II. 3.4 shows the total percentage of the voters who 
form each "pair" of parties. Of the 321 voters who 
considered voting for one other party 5%, for instance, 
either voted for the SDP and considered voting for the PP or 
vice versa. While the relative size of the parties has to be 
kept in mind when the "closeness" of parties in the voters' 
mind is considered, this table shows directly the amount of 
voters considering each pair of alternatives.
And despite the patterns that emerge it should be borne 
in mind that the battle for the voters' loyalties are fought 
on all fronts - even between the IP and the PA.
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II.4 The 1987 election campaign
Two major factors characterized the 1987 election 
campaign. The outgoing government was fairly popular and had 
a strong record on economic policy. The positions of the 
governing parties, the Independence Party and the 
Progressive Party, had weakened, however, as reflected in 
electoral losses in the local elections in the spring of 
1986, and their generally below average ratings in the 
opinion polls. The government had started out with a policy 
package aimed primarily at bringing down inflation and 
included a temporary ban on inflation indexing of wages and 
collective bargaining. As the external conditions of the 
economy - that is, fish catches and prices - improved from 
the near-crisis situation of 1982-83 to relative prosperity 
in 1986, some of the austerity measures were relaxed. Early 
in 1986 the government struck a deal with the trade union 
leadership, compensating the unions for accepting wage 
restraint by providing various social measures. The result 
was relative peace and quiet in industrial relations and 
considerable success in the fight against inflation, but the 
price of success was increasing public debt.^l)
Between January and March 1987 the election campaign 
proper gradually took off and focused mainly on the 
government record. Opinion polls showed that while the 
government parties had lost support, they seemed able to 
maintain their majority. These polls indicated that the SDP 
and the WA would gain considerably in the election, as can 
be seen in Table II.4.1, which shows reported voting
31) See O.Th. Hardarson and G.H. Kristinsson (1987). This 
article gives a more detailed analysis of the election 
campaign than is presented here.
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intentions among respondents stating a preference in the 
regular opinion polls of the Social Science Research 
Institute at the University of I c e l a n d . ^2)
Table II.4.1. Voting intentions May 1986-April 1987,. Only
those who revealed a party choice. Percentages.
May Nov 5-12 27 Mar. 10-14 . 18-21
1986 1986 Mar. 3 Apr. Apr . Apr .
1987 1987 1987 1987
IP 39.8 33.6 38.9 26.5 29.6 28.1
CiP - - - 16.6 12.2 11.3
PA 15.9 15.4 15.8 14.2 11. 9 13.0
PP 15.4 17.3 13.8 12.9 14.6 16.6
SDP 15.5 24.1 18.0 15.3 15.5 14 . 0
WA 9.0 8.7 7.2 10.8 12.1 12.8
Others 4.4 0.8 6.2 3.5 4 . 1 4.2
Total 100.0 99.9 99.9 99.8 100 . 0 100 . 0
In March the whole election campaign was turned upside 
down. On Thursday March 19th, eight days before the final 
date for submitting nominations, an independent newspaper 
revealed that the IP minister Albert Gudmundsson had been 
guilty of tax evasion while he served as Minister of Finance 
(1983-1985) and that party leader Thorsteinn Palsson had 
privately demanded his resignation as Minister of Industry. 
Later the same day Palsson confirmed the paper's story, but 
said that as Gudmundsson was abroad on official business 
further comments on his political future would be delayed to 
the coming week-end. One of the most dramatic weeks in 
Icelandic politics followed.
Gudmundsson returned home on Saturday and it soon became 
clear that the party demanded his resignation from 
government, but wanted him to hold his first seat on the 
party's list in Reykjavik. On Tuesday Gudmundsson resigned.
32) Ibid., p. 224.
but seemed prepared to remain on the IP list, despite 
pressure from his supporters for a separate candidature. The 
same evening Palsson declared on television that Gudmundsson 
would never again become a minister for the IP.
The following day the Citizens' Party was founded, and 
enthusiastic Gudmundsson supporters managed in only two days 
to propose lists in all constituencies and submit them on 
Friday night - an organizational miracle. Opinion polls 
taken the following weekend showed support of 16 to 17% for 
the new party while the IP had dropped to 25 to 26%. This 
dramatic sequence of events dominated the media for two or 
three weeks, putting the 'normal' campaign in the shadows. 
It was really only after the week-long Easter holiday that 
the 'real' campaign started again - with five days to go to 
the election.
Table II.4.2. Election results 1983 and 1987 . Percentages of
valid votes (number of Althingi seats).
1983 1987
Independence Party 38.7 (23) 27.2 (18)
Citizens' Party - 10.9(7)
Progressive Party 19.0 (14) 18.9(13)
Social Democratic Party 11.7 (6) 15.2(10)
People's Alliance 17.3(10) 13.4 (8)
Women's Alliance 5.5(3) 10.1 (6)
Social Democratic Alliance 7.3(4) 0.2(0)
Union for Regional Equality - 1.2(1)
Humanist Party - 1.6(0)
National Party - 1.3(0)
IP splinter group in W.Peninsula 0.5(0) —
Total 100% (60) 100%(63)
Numbers in brackets give the number of MPs. The number of
MPs was increased from 60 to 63 between 1983 and 1987.
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The results on election day - shown in Table II.4.2 - 
were the greatest blow to the established party system so 
far and in particular a disaster for the IP. The four 
established parties between them only managed three-quarters 
of the votes - by far their lowest share since the 
foundation of the four-party system in the 1930s. The IP and 
the PA suffered their worst defeats ever. The joint share of 
the government parties, the IP and the PP, fell from 57.7% 
in 1983 to 46.1% in 1987 and the government lost its 
majority in the Althingi. The great winners in the election 
were the challengers to the established four-party system, 
and three of them won seats in the Althingi.33) Never before 
had a challenger to the four-party system managed to win 
over 10% of the votes - let alone two at the same time. Nor 
had one been able to, as the WA now managed, increase its 
share of votes following its initial s u c c e s s . 34) in the next 
section we analyse the voter movements that led to these 
dramatic results.
33) It should be noted, that the Social Democratic Alliance, 
which lost almost all its following in 1987 and the four 
members it had in 1983, was really not the same party in 
1987 as in 1983. In 1986 three of its Althingi members had 
joined the SDP, and one the IP. The party had essentially 
been abolished in 1987, although some grass-root activists 
nevertheless put up lists in two constituencies using the 
name of the party.
34) The Union for Regional Equality, which had one member 
elected, only put up a list in the Northeast constituency, 
and received 12.1% of the votes there. This candidacy was 
led by a elderly local leader of the Progressive Party, an 
MP of long standing, representing farmers and the more 
sparsely populated areas within the constituency, who had 
put forward a strong claim for first place on the party list 
but was rejected.
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II. 5 Movements in the 1987 election: How did the results
come about?
In this section we will try to estimate how new voters, 
voters' mobilization and demobilization, and direct party 
switching contributed to the 1987 election results. First we 
shall, however, look at how accurately our data reflects the 
outcome and the net changes that occurred. Table II.5.1 
shows how the reported vote of our total sample in 1987 and 
of our panel respondents corresponds to the actual results.
Table II.5.1. Reported vote in 1987 election by total sample 
and panel compared to actual results. Percentages.
Actual results Total sample Panel
SDP 15.2 15.6 14 . 9
PP 18 . 9 17.0 16.5
IP 27.2 30.0 31.2
PA 13.4 13.1 12 . 6
SDA 0.2 0.3 0.2
WA 10.1 12.5 12.6
Humanist Party 1. 6 1.5 1.1
Union for Reg. Eq. 1.2 1. 3 1 .1
National Party 1 . 3 1. 4 1 . 6
CiP 10.9 7.2 8.3
Total 100.0 99.9 100 .1
N= (152722) (1539) (564)
Table 11.5.1 shows that the IP (+2.8%) and the WA (+2.4%) 
are overrepresented in the survey of the total sample, while 
the CiP (-3.7%) and PP (-1.9%) are underrepresented. 
Discrepancies for other parties are 0.4% or less. The panel 
does not deviate greatly from the total sample.
Our data contains several measurements of the 1983 
election results. We have the 1983 vote as reported by the 
total sample in 1983 and by the total sample in 1987. In 
addition we have the 1983 vote as reported by the panel both 
in 1983 and in 1987. In the latter case the same respondents 
are reporting the same behaviour, so the results should be
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identical if the reports are accurate at both time points. 
But, as we indicated earlier, some discrepancies should be 
expected and that is indeed the case, as can be seen in 
Table II.5.2.
Table II.5.2. Reported vote 1983 by total sample 1983, panel 
1983 and 1987 and total sample 1987, compared to actual 
results. Percentages.
Actual Total Panel Panel Total
result sample report report sample
1983 1983 1983 1987 1987
SDP 11.7 12.5 12 . 9 12.4 14.4
PP» 19.0 15.9 14 . 9 15 . 6 16.7
IP# 39.2 41.7 40.9 44.3 42.0
PA 17.3 15.8 15.7 15.2 17 .1
SDA 7.3 7.8 8.3 5.0 3.5
WA 5.5 6.2 7.3 7.6 6.2
Total 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.1 99.9
N= (129962) (854) (591) (540) (1228)
# Including the IP splintergroup in the West Peninsula 1983.
There are some discrepancies between the actual result in 
1983 and the reported vote of the total sample in the 1983 
election study, but as we noted in Section II.2 these are 
within the margins of sampling error. The greatest 
deviations in the panel results concern, first, the IP: in
1983 40 . 9% claimed to have voted for the IP, but in 1987 
44.3% claimed to have done so. The other striking deviation 
is that while 8.3% of the panel claimed in 1983 to have 
voted for the SDA, only 5% did so in 1987. This trend is 
even stronger if we compare the 1983 and 1987 total samples: 
7.8% of the 1983 sample said they voted for the SDA, while 
only 3.5% of the 1987 sample "admitted" having done so. This 
is to be expected, as people are likely to be somewhat 
reluctant to say they voted for a party generally considered 
"dead" at the time of interviewing. The other discrepancies
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between the reported vote by the 1983 total sample and the 
1987 total sample are within margins of sampling error, the 
greatest being increased overestimation of the SDP vote from 
12.5% to 14.4%.
Table II.5.3. Vote in 1983 as reported by the panel 
respondents in 1983 and 1987. Percentages.
1983-REPORT
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA Abst. NA
1987-REPORT
Same party 67 73 84 69 47 72
Other party 17 14 5 12 45 14 27 39
Abst./blank 3 3 2 4 2 7  58 7
No answer 13 10 8 15 6 7 15 54
Total 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100
N= (76) (88) (242) (93) (49) (43) (59) (28)
The column "Abstained" shows those who said they did not 
vote or turned in a blank ballot. The column NA (No answer) 
shows those who refused to answer the question or said they 
did not know which party they voted for.
Panel respondents' reported 1983 vote - summary:
Reports same party 1983 and 1987 ........................  64.3
Reports different parties 1983 and 1987 ................  11.4
Reports party 1983 but abstention 1987 .................  2.8
Reports party 1983 but no answer 1987 ..................  8.7
Reports abstention 1983 but gives party 1987 ........... 2.4
Reports abstention both in 1983 and 1987 ...............  5.0
Reports abstention 1983 but no answer 1987 .............  1.3
No answer in 1983 but gives party 1987 .................  1.6
No answer in 1983 but reports abstention 1987 .......... 0.3
No answer both in 1983 and 1987 .........................  2.2
Total 100 . 0
N= (678)
Table II.5.2 reveals that while 591 (87.2%) of the panel
respondents reported a party voted for in the 1983 survey, 
only 540 (79.6%) of them revealed in 1987 what party they
had voted for in 1983. Table II.5.3 shows to what extent the 
answers of the panel respondents to this question were 
consistent in the two interviews.
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71.5% of the panel respondents are consistent in the 
sense that in both interviews they report the same party as 
the party they voted for in 1983, or they claim to have 
abstained in the 1983 election, or they refuse to answer or 
say they don't remember their 1983 vote in both interviews.
11.4% are inconsistent in the sense that they simply 
report different parties as the party they voted for in 
1983, and 5.2% are inconsistent in the sense that in one of 
the interviews they name the party voted for in 1983 but in 
the other interview they claim to have abstained in that 
election. Thus 16.6% of the total panel clearly gives an 
incorrect answer in one of the two interviews.
The remaining respondents, 11.9%, give a party or claim 
abstention in one of the interviews but refuse to declare or 
do not remember the 1983 vote in the other. In most of these 
cases the respondents had given a party (8.7%) or claimed 
abstention (1.3%) in the 1983 interview but do not remember 
or refuse to answer in the 1987 interview. Those respondents 
are obviously not inconsistent. Thus we can say that 83.4% 
of the panel give consistent answers in both interviews.
The consistency of the voters of different parties varies 
greatly. Only 5% of the IP voters (as reported in 1983)
claim to have voted for another party when asked again in
1987, while corresponding figures for the SDP, PP, PA and WA 
are 12-17%. This largely explains why the IP's share in the 
1987 panel report (540 respondents) is 44.3%, while only 
40.9% in the 1983 panel report (591 respondents) as shown in
Table II.5.2. By far the greatest inconsistency is shown by
SDA-voters (as reported in 1983); only 47% of those
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"admitted" in 1987 to have voted for the SDA in 1983, while 
45% claimed in 1987 to have voted for another party in 1983,
As we mentioned in Section II. 2, recall errors are
generally not random but related to current behaviour. In
Table II.5.4 we compare the panel's recall of the 1983 vote 
and its voting behaviour in 1987.
Of the panel respondents who report the same party as 
party voted for in 1983 in both interviews, 65% vote for 
that party in 1987 while 31% switch to another party. Very 
few claim to have abstained in 1987 or do not know or refuse 
to give a party vote.
Those who give a different 1983 party in the two
interviews are of most interest here; we would expect their 
recall error to be related to their 1987 vote. Of the 77 
respondents in this group, 22 (29%) had voted for the SDA in 
1983 according to their 1983 report.
As expected, a large portion - 29 - of those 77
respondents (38%) report in 1987 that they voted for the 
same party in 1983 and 1987, while their 1983 report
indicates that they did in fact change parties. 8 of those 
29 (28%) had reported an SDA vote in 1983. This is the known 
recall error, where respondents make past behaviour 
consistent with current behaviour, and leads to 
underestimation of electoral volatility in our case. Those 
29 individuals who "lie themselves consistent" constitute 4% 
of the total sample.
Table II.5.4. Voting behaviour in 1987 compared to reported
1983 vote by panel respondents in the 1983 and 
surveys. Percentages.
the 1987
Report same 1983 party vote in 1983 and 1987:
Vote for same party 1983 and 1987 65% (42%)
Vote for different parties 1983 and 1987 31% (20%)
Did not vote/blank vote in 1987 2% (1%)
Refuse/don't know 1987 vote 2% (1%)
Total 100% (64%)
N= (463) —
Report different 1983 party vote in 1983 and 1987:
Votes 1987 for 1983 party as reported 1987: 38% (4%)
Votes 1987 for 1983 party as reported 1983: 
Votes 1987 for neither 1983 party as reported
25% (3%)
1983 or 1987 31% (4%)
Did not vote/blank vote in 1987 4% (0%)
Refuse/don't know 1987 vote 3% (0%)
Total 101% (11%)
N= (77) -
Report 1983 party in 1983 but claim 1983 abstention or 
refuse/say don't know 1983 party in 1987:
Votes 1987 for 1983 party as reported 1983 19% (2%)
Votes for different parties 1983 and 1987 14% (2%)
Did not vote/blank vote in 1987 8% (1%)
Refuse/don't know 1987 vote 59% (7%)
Total 100% (12%)
N= ‘ (78) -
Report 1983 party in 1987, but claim 1983 abstention or 
refuse/don't know 1983 party in 1983:
Votes 1987 for 1983 party as reported 1987 44% (2%)
Votes for different parties 1983 and 1987 41% (2%)
Did not vote/blank vote in 1987 7% (0%)
Refuse/don't know 1987 vote 7% (0%)
Total 99% (4%)
N= (27)
Claim 1983 abstention or re fuse/don't know 1983 vote 
both in 1983 and 1987:
Give party voted for in 1987 40% (4%)
Did not vote/blank vote 1987 20% (2%)
Refuse/don't know 1987 vote 40% (4%)
Total 100% (10%)
N= (60)
Numbers in brackets give the size of each group as a 
percentage of the total sample (678 respondents).
More surprisingly perhaps, 19 of those 77 respondents 
(25%), vote for the same party in 1987 as they reported 
voting for 1983 in the survey that year but recall in 1987
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that they voted for another party in 1983. Those respondents 
"lie themselves inconsistent" in the 1987 interview. Recall 
error of this kind leads of course to an overestimate of 
volatility. This group constitutes 3% of the total panel.
27 (31%) of the 77 respondents who reported different
1983 vote in 1983 and 1987 claimed to have voted for a third 
party in 1987, while 3 claimed to have abstained and 2 
refused to answer or did not remember their 1987 vote. While 
it is perhaps most likely that those respondents did in fact 
change party from 1983-1987, it is impossible to know if 
some of them were in fact giving random answers. On the 
whole it seems nevertheless that this group which shows 
recall error is much more volatile than those who report the 
same 1983 party in both interviews; only 25% of the former 
group voted for the same party in 1983 and 1987, if we 
believe their 1983 report, while 65% of the latter group did 
so. The overall effect of recall bias on volatility is on 
the other hand small, as we have errors in both directions.
78 individuals who gave the party voted for in 1983 
claimed to have abstained in 1983 or refused to answer or 
did not know in the 1987 interview. Most of those 
respondents (59%) refused to reveal their 1987 vote; the 
change is simply that while they were prepared to reveal 
their party in 1983 they were not prepared to do so in 1987. 
Among the 26 respondents in this group (33%) who gave the 
party voted for in 1987, 58% voted for the same party in
1983 and 1987, while 42% changed parties.
Only 4% of the total panel claimed abstention or refused 
to answer or did not remember the 1983 vote in the survey 
that year but recalled a 1983 party in the 1987 interview.
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85% of this group gave the party voted for in 1987. Just 
over half claimed to have voted for the same party in both 
years.
Finally, 10% of the panel sample claimed in both 
interviews that they had abstained in the 1983 election or 
refused to reveal the party for which they voted. 4 0% of 
this group gave the party voted for in 1987, while 20% 
claimed to have abstained in 1987, and 40% refused to name 
the party voted for that year.
With these limitations of the data in mind, we can now 
proceed to analyse the movements in the electorate that lead 
to the changes in election results from 1983-1987. We will 
use the voting behaviour in 1983 and 1987 as recalled by 
respondents in 1987 but check those results with the panel 
data where appropriate.
The impact of first time voters 1987
In Section II.2 we saw that in 1983 the first time voters 
did not vote very differently from the older ones. 
Nevertheless the inclusion of the young voters had some 
impact on the election result in that year; the young voters 
followed the electoral winds to a slightly greater degree 
than older voters, thus increasing the net gains and losses 
of the winners and the losers in the election.
In the 1987 election the minimum voting age had been 
lowered from 20 years of age to 18 years. Thus an unusually 
large proportion of new voters entered the electorate in 
that election, as people from 18-23 years of age were able 
to vote for the first time. Table II. 5.5 shows to what 
extent the vote of the first time voters deviated from the
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vote of the older ones and the effect on the overall gains 
and losses in the e l e c t i o n . 35)
Table II.5.5. The impact of new voters in 1987. Percentages.
New Older All Effect of Actual net
voters voters voters new voters gain/loss#
SDP 12.6 16.2 15.7 -0.5 3.5
PP 14.8 17.2 16.9 - 0 . 3 — 0 .1
IP 32.6 29.6 30.0 0.4 ■' -11.5
PA 14.8 12.9 13.1 ;i 0.2 -3.9
SDA 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 -7.1
WA 12.6 12.5 12.5 0.0 4.6
HP . 3.0 1.3 1.5 0.2 1.2
URE 1.5 1.2 1.3 0.1 1.2
NP 1.5 1.4 1.5 0.1 1.3
CiP 5.2 7.5 7.2 -0.3 10.9
N= (221) (1314) (1535)
* The figures in this column show how the inclusion of new
voters changes each party's share of the vote; the party's
share among older voters is simply subtracted from its share
among all voters.
# The figures in this column show net gain/loss in the
actual 1987 election; each party's share in 1983 is
subtracted from the party's share in 1987.
The first time voters in 1987 did not deviate greatly 
from older voters. Moreover, the weak trend of first time 
voters to follow the electoral winds to a greater extent 
than the older voters, observed in 1983, is not repeated 
here. The SDP, which gained 3.5% in the election, did worse 
among first time voters than the older ones and the same is 
true of the new Citizens' Party, which gained 10.9%. The 
Women's Alliance gained 4.6%, but first time voters only 
contributed to that victory to the same extent as older
35) The table shows only those who revealed a party voted 
for in 1987. A much higher proportion of first time voters 
(8.3%) than older voters (3.2%) claimed not to have voted, 
while the proportions returning a blank ballot were similar 
in these two groups (1.3 and 1.1%). Refusals to answer the 
question were much more frequent among older voters (12.3%) 
than younger ones (4.5%). None of the younger voters did not 
remember his vote, while this was the case for 0.3% of the 
older ones.
92
voters. Three of the losing parties, the IP, PA and SDA, did 
in fact better among first time voters than older ones. The 
major conclusion must be that the inclusion of new voters in 
1987 has only a marginal effect on the changes that took 
place in the election, just as was the case in 1983. The 
simple hypothesis that the young are more prone to follow 
electoral winds than older voters, which is supported to a 
limited extent by the 1983 data, is contradicted by the 1987 
results. The young may be more volatile than older voters - 
a point to which we will return - but their voting behaviour 
in these two elections was similar to that of older voters 
and it is too simplistic to expect them to be more likely to 
jump on the bandwagon in an election campaign.
Mobilized and demobilized voters in 1987
The turnout in the 1987 election was 90.1%, while it had 
been 88.3% in 1983. Table II.5.6 shows the turnout in those 
two elections among our respondents.
According to the table 89,9% of the total sample voted in 
the 1983 election and 95.2% did so in 1987. 92% of the panel 
claim to have voted in 1983 and 94.7% in 1987. The turnout 
is probably somewhat o v e r e s t i m a t e d , 36) but the broad picture 
is in accord with the result presented in Table II.2.6, 
showing voting and non-voting 1978-1983. Mobilized voters 
constitute 7.5% of the 1987 vote according to the total 
sample (6% according to the panel) and the corresponding 
figure in 1983 was 5.4%. If the demobilized voters were 
added to the 1987 vote its size would increase by 1.9% (3.1%
36) The general reasons for this are discussed in Section 
II. 2.
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according to the panel); the corresponding figure in 1983 
was 4 .4 %.37) As these groups are small they are very 
unlikely to have had a great effect on the overall result.
Table II.5.6. Turnout in 1983 and 1987 
and panel respondents. Percentages.
by total sample 1987
1987 sample Panel
Voted both in 1983 and 1987 88 .1 89.0
Voted in 1983, but not in 1987 1 . 8 3.0
Voted in 1987, but not in 1983 7 .1 5.7
Voted neither in 1983 nor 1987 2.9 2.2
Total 99.9 99.9
N= (1324) (593)
Excluded from the table are those who were too young to vote 
in 1983 and those who refused to answer or said "don't know" 
to the question either in 1983 or 1987. The 1983 vote for 
the total sample is as reported in the 1987 interview, but 
as reported in the 1983 interview for the panel.
The effect of demobilization is small (see Table II.5.7) . 
If the demobilized voters had voted in the same way as they
did (or claimed to have done) in 1983 the IP would have
gained 0.2% and the WA and the CiP lost 0.2% each. The
impact of mobilized voters is also small; it is greatest for 
the IP, which would have increased its share by 0.9% had the 
mobilized voters abstained as they did in 1983, and in that 
case the WA would have obtained 0.5% less of the voters than 
it in fact did. In general the impact of movements between 
voting and non-voting on the election results is small.
37) The number of mobilized voters is expected to be higher 
than the number of demobilized voters because a higher 
proportion of first time voters in 1983 uses their vote in 
1987 (95.5% according to the panel) than in 1983 (84.8%). 
But this does not of course account for the differences 
between the sizes of the two groups among the total sample 
1987 and the panel; this is most likely due to recall error 
in the total sample.
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except for the IP, which loses 0.9% due to these changes, 
and the WA, which gains 0 .7 %.38)
Table II.5.7. Effects of mobilization and demobilization in 
the 1987 election. 1987 total sample. Percentages.
Dem. Mob. 1987 1987 + 1 9 8 7 - 1987 + EFFECTS
vote dem. mob . d.-m. Dem. Mob. Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
SDP 17.4 16.0 15.6 15.7 15.6 15.7 -0.1 0.0 -0 .1
PP 17.4 16.0 17.0 17.0 17.1 17 . 1 0 . 0 -0 .1 -0.1
IP 43.5 20.2 30.0 30.2 3 0.7 30 .9 -0.2 -0 .7 -0 . 9
PA 17.4 12.8 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.2 -0 .1 0.0 -0.1
SDA 4.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 -0 .1 0.0 -0 .1
WA 0.0 20.2 12.5 12.3 12.0 11.8 + 0.2 + 0.5 + 0.7
HP. 3.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.0 0.0 + 0 .1
URE 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 + 0 .1 + 0 .1 + 0 .1
NP 4.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1 .2 0 . 0 + 0.2 + 0.2
CiP 6.4 7.2 7.0 7.2 7 .1 + 0.2 0.0 + 0 .1
Total 100.0 100.2 99.9 99.9 99.9 10 0. 0
N= (23) (94) (1539) (1562) (1445) (1468)
Col. 1 and 2: Demobilized and mobilized voters in the table 
are only those who revealed the party voted for in one 
election and said they did not vote or turned in a blank or 
void ballot in the other.
Col.3: Reported vote in 1983 election.
Col. 4: Col.3 + Col.l.
Col.5: Col.3 - Col.2.
Col.6: Col.3 + Col.l - Col.2 (i.e. the result if the
mobilized had not voted and the demobilized had voted as 
they did in 1983).
Col.7: Col.3 - Col.4.
Col.8: Col.3 - Col.5.
Col.9: Col.3 - Col.6.
38) The impact of mobilization and demobilization in the 
panel deviates somewhat from the figures in the total sample 
presented in Table II.5.7. The total impact of mobilization 
and demobilization in the panel is as follows (the figures 
from the total sample in brackets): SDP +0.1 
(-0.1), PP +0.4 (-0.1), IP -1.0 (-0.9), PA -0.2 (-0.1), SDA 
0.0 (-0.1), WA 0.0 (+0.7), HP. +0.2 (+0.1), URE +0.2 (+0.1), 
NP +0.1 (+0.2), CiP +0.3 (+0.1). The most significant 
deviation is that according to the panel the WA did not gain 
from movements between voting and non-voting, while the 
results for the IP are similar and the impact on other 
parties small in both cases. It is hard to estimate which 
dataset is likely to be more accurate; recall error should 
be smaller in the panel, but the margins of sampling error 
for the panel (N=678) are larger than for the total sample 
(N=1845).
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Direct switching between the parties in 1987
The net gains for the victorious parties in the 1987 
election were 23.1% as compared to 16.6% in 1983, 13.0% in
1979, and 19.4% in 1978. Thus the swing in 1987 was the 
biggest since the formation of the modern Icelandic party 
system. Until then the 1978 swing had been by far the 
largest. We have seen that the impact of new voters, 
mobilization and demobilization can only account for those 
changes to a very limited extent. The bulk of the 
explanation must therefore lie in direct switching between 
the parties.
Table II.5.8. Electoral behaviour 1979, 1983, and 1987.
Panel respondents. Percentages.
Voted for the same party three times 44
Voted for the same party twice, did not vote for a
party in one election 9
Voted for one party, did not vote for a party in 
two elections 4
Voted for same party 1983 and 1987 but another 1979 6
Voted for same party 1979 and 1987 but another 1983 5
Voted for same party 1979 and 1983 but another 1987 14
Voted for two different parties, abstained once 10
Voted for three different parties 7
Did not vote in any of the elections 2
Total 101
N= (555)
Summary:
Voted for same party in all elections 44
Did not change party but did not vote in every election 13
Voted for two parties 35
Voted for three parties 7
Did not vote for a party in any election 2
Total 101
N= (555)
Excluded from the table are 57 who did not describe their 
voting behaviour in all three elections and 66 who were not 
eligible to vote in 1979.
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Table II.5.8 shows the amount of party switching from 
1979 to 1987 according to our panel and can be compared to 
Table II.2.9, which shows party switching from 1978-1983.39) 
The table indicates that electoral volatility was much 
higher 1979-1987 than in 1978-1983. Only 44% of the panel 
report having voted for the same party 1979-1987, while 60% 
of the 1983 sample did so for the elections from 1978-1983. 
35% voted for two parties and 7% for three parties in the 
1979-1983 period, while the corresponding figures for 1978- 
1983 were 26% and 2%.
Another indication of increased volatility can be found 
by comparing the party switch from 1983-1987 to the 
switching from 1979-1983, and this is done in Table II.5.9. 
The table is based on the 1979 and 1983 vote as reported by 
the total sample in 1983, the 1983 and 1987 vote as reported 
by the total sample in 1987, and how the panel reported its 
1983 vote in 1983 and its 1987 vote in 1987. By comparing 
the results of the total 1987 sample and the panel we get an 
estimate of the recall error in the total sample.
Let us first note how small the deviations of the total 
sample in 1987 from the panel results are. If we only look 
at those who give a party in both elections 63.6% of the 
total sample claims to have voted for the same party 1983- 
1987, while 61.3% of the panel does so. The expected recall 
error of "lying oneself consistent" only raises the 
proportion of consistent voting 1983-1987 by 2.3%. In this 
case the 1987 recall seems fairly accurate.
39) The 1979 and 1983 vote in Table II.5.8 is as reported in 
1983 and the 1987 vote as reported in 1987. Voting in 1978, 
1979 and 1983 in Table II.2.9 is on the other hand only 
based on the recall in 1983, thus possibly underestimating 
volatility to a greater extent.
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Table II.5.9. Party switching 1979-1983 and 1983-1987 
Percentages.
1979-1983 1983-1987 1983-1987
1983 sample 1987 sample Panel
Voted same party 68.2 56.1 54 . 6
Switched parties 20.7 32 .1 34.4
Vote + abstention 3.8 1.7 2.9
Abstention + vote 6.3 7 .1 6.3
Two abstentions 1.0 3.0 2.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N= (783) (1319) (581)
Only those who give a party in both elections :
Voted same party 76.7 63.6 61.3
Switched parties 23.3 36.4 38.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N= (696) (1163) (517)
Excluded from all samples are those who did. not describe
their voting behaviour in both elections. The 95 respondents
who were not eligible to vote in 1979 are also excluded from
the 1983 sample, as are the 279 not eligible to vote in 1983
in the 1987 sample.
If we compare the total 1983 and 1987 samples, the 
proportion of party switchers rises from about 23% in 1983 
to about 36% in 1987.40) The net gain increase in the 
election results, from 16.6% in 1983 to 23.1% in 1987, is
40) The number of party switchers must be regarded as rather 
high, especially in 1987. Heath et al. (1991, p. 20) report 
that the number of party switchers in Britain in 1964 and 
1970 was 16-18%, in 1974, 1979, and 1983 22-24%, and 19% in 
1987. For Sweden Holmberg (1984, p. 25) reports that in 1954 
and 1958 only 7% switched parties, but vote switching 
increased in the 1960s, and reached 16% in 1970 and 1973, 
and 18-20% in 1976, 1979, 1982, and 1985 (1985 figure given 
in Holmberg and Gilljam (1987), p. 89). In Norway 18% 
switched parties in 1969, 24-25% in 1973 and 1977, while the 
figure was down to 19-20% in 1981 and 1985 (Aardal and Valen
(1989), p. 162). In Canada 22% switched parties in 1974, 27%
in 1979, and 21% in 1980 (Crewe and Denver (1985), p. 59), 
while in Australia the figures were 24% in 1969 and 9% in 
1977 (ibid., p. 83-85). In Denmark just over 20% switched 
parties in 1971, around 40% in 1973, around 25% in 1975, and
just under 20% in 1979 and 1981 (ibid., p. 381).
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clearly a reflection of increased gross volatility in the 
electorate as a whole.
Table II.5.10. Party switching 1987: What happened to the
1983 vote? 1987 total sample (panel for SDA).
1983 vote
Percentages.
1987 vote
SDP PP IP PA SDA^l) WA
SDP 65 4 8 4 26 7
PP 6 69 7 8 2 4
IP 9 4 65 2 22 7
PA 3 4 1 61 4 14
SDA - - 0 - - -
WA 7 7 4 16 17 64
HP 1 1 1 2 2 -
URE - 4 0 1 2 3
NP 1 2 0 2 4 -
CiP 4 5 12 1 20 3
Did not vote 2 2 2 2 - -
Total 98 102 100 99 99 102
N= (170) (200) (498) (201) (46) (74)
41) The figures for the SDA in the table are not from the 
total sample 1987 but from the panel, using 1983 vote as 
reported that year. Due to the large recall error for the 
SDA in 1987 (only 3.5% said they voted for SDA 1983, 
although the party obtained 7.3% in the election) the panel 
figures are likely to be much more accurate. The number of 
panel respondents who reported SDA vote in 1983 is 4 6, while 
only 43 respondents in the much larger 1987 sample recalled 
voting for the SDA in 1983. The deviations between the panel 
and the total sample regarding the 1987 vote of 1983 SDA 
voters are large. Of the 43 1983 SDA voters in the total 
sample, 40% claimed to have voted for the SDP in 1987, none 
for the PP, 12% for the IP, 7% for the PA, 26% for the WA,
2% for the HP, 5% for the NP, 7% for the CiP and 2% said 
they did not vote in 1987.
The panel results regarding the destination of the other 
parties' 1983 vote deviate on the other hand little from 
those of the total sample. In 45 of the 55 entries for those 
parties in the table the deviation is 2% or less. In 7 cases 
the deviation is 3%, and in 3 cases greater; while 61% of 
1983 PA voters in the total sample claims to have voted for 
the PA again in 1987, 65% of the panel does so; while 4% of 
1983 WA voters in the total sample reports a PP vote in 
1987, none does so in the panel; and while none of the 1983 
WA-voters in the total sample claims not to have voted in 
1987, 5% in the panel failed to do so. Taking into account 
the recall error and the small size of the panel (e.g. only 
40 1983 WA voters) these deviations can be considered small.
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Excluding the SDA, all parties kept the loyalties of 61- 
69% of their 1983 voters. The 1983 parties that gained in 
the 1987 election, the SDP and the WA, retain 65% and 64% of 
their 1983 vote, respectively. In 1983, when the SDA lost, 
it kept 59% of its 1979 vote. The PP, which lost 0.1% in the 
election, keeps 69% of its 1983 vote, but it had kept 71% of 
its 1979 vote in 1983, when it lost 5.9%. The PA, which lost 
3.9% in the election, keeps 61% of its vote but had kept 67% 
of its 1979 vote in 1983 when the party lost 2.4%. The IP, 
which lost 11-12% in the election, keeps 65% of its 1983 
vote, but in 1983 when the party gained slightly it kept 82% 
of its 1979 voters, by far the highest proportion in that 
election. As the IP keeps its 1983 voters to a similar
extent as the other parties despite heavy losses in the 1987 
election, this must indicate that the IP is less successful 
in gaining votes than the others.
Table II.5.11 contains the same information as Table
II.5.10, except that now the base for the percentages is the 
1987 vote. The table therefore presents the profiles of the 
parties' 1987 voters - and answers the question: Where did 
the 1987 voters come from?
The major discrepancies between the two sections of the 
table are regarding the proportion of 1983 SDA voters in 
each of the parties' 1987 profiles. As we noted earlier the 
recalled SDA vote in 1983 was much too low in the 1987
interviews on which Section A of the table is based. Thus
the proportions of SDA voters are higher - in some cases 
much higher - in Section B than in Section A of the table 
and because of this the other proportions tend in general to 
be somewhat lower in Section B than in Section A. By using
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both sections we should nevertheless get a fair picture of 
the major switches that took place between the parties from 
1983-1987.
Table II.5 .11 . Party switching 1987: Where did the 1987 vote
come from? Total sample 1987. Percentages •
A. Based on total 1987 sample 1983 vote as recalled in
1987.
1987 vote
SDP PP IP PA WA HP URE NP CiP
1983 vote
SDP 59 5 4 3 9 (17) - (15) 8
PP 4 68 2 5 10 (8) (62) (31) 11
IP 21 17 89 3 15 (25) (15) (8) 72
PA 4 8 1 80 24 (42) (8) (31) 2
SDA 9 - 1 2 8 (8) - (15) 4
WA 3 2 1 7 34 - (15) 2
Total 100 100 98 100 100 100 100 100 99
N= (188) (202) (360) (154) (137) (12) (13) (13) (83)
B. Based (on panel respondents. 1983 vote as reported in
1983.
1987 vote
SDP PP IP PA WA CiP
1983 vote
SDP 57 4 2 3 10 7
PP 1 66 2 7 11 5
IP 17 22 86 4 10 61
PA 7 5 2 75 16 5
SDA 16 1 6 3 13 21
WA 1 2 1 7 41 2
Total 99 100 99 99 101 101
N= (75) (83) (165) (68) (63) (44)
On the whole, the table shows more volatility than was 
evident in 1983 (see Table II.2.12). A lower percentage of 
the 1987 vote for three of the old parties (among voters who 
voted for a party both in 1983 and 1987) came from their old 
stock than was the case in 1983.
The proportion of voters from own old stock decreased 
most for the SDP from 1983 to 1987, as was to be expected
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because the party lost in 1983 and gained in 1987. In 1987
less than 60% of the SDP vote came from 1983 SDP voters,
while the corresponding figure in 1983 was 83%. The voters 
gained by the SDP in 1987 came mainly from the IP (as was 
the case in 1983) and the SDA.
1983 PP voters constitute almost 70% of the 1987 PP vote 
in Table II.5.11. The PP lost only 0.1% in 1987 but in 1983, 
when the party lost 5.9%, the corresponding figure was 87%. 
The PP gains in 1987 came mainly from the IP, while in 1983 
the party gained a similar amount of voters from the SDP, 
the IP and the PA. This means that former IP voters were 
least attracted to the PP in that year, when the size of the 
parties is taken into account.
The PA lost both in 1987 (-3.9%) and 1983 (-2.4%). In
1983 86% of its voters (who voted both in 1979 and 1983) 
came from its stock of 1979 voters, while in 1987 75-80% 
came from the party's 1983 stock. The PA made small gains 
from the other old parties in 1987 as in 1983, but in both 
elections it was relatively more attractive to former PP 
voters than voters of the IP and the SDP. Bearing in mind 
the small size of the WA in 1983 it is clear that the PA was 
relatively most attractive to 1983 WA voters: 7% of the PA 
vote in 1987 came from the WA, which made large gains from 
the PA in 1983. The PA, like the PP, obtained on the other 
hand very little of the 1983 SDA vote.
The IP lost heavily in 1987 while it made small gains in 
1983. On both occasions the IP gained very little from other 
parties. Almost 90% of its vote among those who had voted 
for a party in the previous election came from its own stock 
both in 1983 and 1987.
102
The WA almost doubled its vote in the 1987 election. Only 
34-41% of its 1987 vote among those who voted both in 1983 
and 1987 came from its own stock. As in 1983, the WA gained 
considerably from all other parties, but the party was 
relatively least attractive to IP voters in 1987 as in 1983 
and most attractive to PA voters, even though the latter 
tendency was not as strong in 1987 as in 1983.
The profile of the new party, the Citizens' Party, is of 
great interest. The discrepancy between the total sample and 
the panel regarding the 1983 SDA vote is greatest for the 
CiP profile. According to the total sample only 4% of the 
CiP vote came from the SDA while the panel figure is 21%. 
According to both samples the bulk of the CiP vote came from 
the IP (61-72%) and the CiP was least attractive to WA and 
PA voters.
In Table II.5.12 the effects of direct switching between 
the parties in the 1987 election are summed up. Only those 
who reported party vote for both elections are included.
As the 1983 vote in Table II.5.12 is based on the 1987 
recall of the total sample, the impact of party switching 
from the SDA is underestimated in the t a b l e . ^2)
42) According to the panel the net gain for the SDP in 1987 
from party switching with the SDA was 2.3% (1.5% in the 
total sample as presented in the table), 1.9% for the IP 
(0.4%) and 1.7% for the CiP (0.3%). There are other 
discrepancies between the panel and the total sample 
regarding net gains/losses. In Table II.5.12 we have 39 net 
changes between parties (78 entries in the table, as each 
net change is entered twice, once as a gain, once as a 
loss). Of these 39 cases, the deviation of the panel from 
the total sample is 0.0 in 7 cases, 0.1 in 11 cases, 0.2 in 
9 cases, 0.3 in 2 cases, 0.4 in 4 cases, and 0.5 or more in 
6 cases. Three of the six largest deviations are those 
already mentioned including the SDA while the other three 
are: According to the panel the net gain for the WA from 
switching with the PA was 0.9% (1.9% in the table), the PP 
lost 0.2% from its switches with the PA according to the
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Table II.5.12. Party vote 1983 by party vote 1987, as 
recalled by the total sample in 1987. Total percentages.
1983 vote
1987-vote
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA Total
SDP 9.5 0.6 3.4 0.7 1.5 0.4 16.1
PP 0.9 11.8 3.0 1.4 - 0.3 17.4
IP 1.4 0.7 27.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 30.9
PA 0.4 0.7 0.4 10.6 0.3 0 . 9 13 . 3
SDA - - - 0.1 - - 0.1
WA 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.8 0.9 4.0 11.6
HP 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0 .1 - 1.1
URE - 0.7 0.2 0.1 - 0.2 1.2
NP 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 - 1.1
CiP 0.6 0.8 5.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 7.3
Total
(N=1163)
14.2 16.9 42 . 0 16.9 3.7 6.4 100 .1
Net gains or losses of the parties due to party change 1983- 
1987.
SDP PP IP P A S D A W A HP U R E NP CiP
SDP X 0 .3 -2 .0 -0 .3 -1 .5 0 . 6 0 .2 0 .0 0 .2 0 . 6
PP -0 .3 X -2 .3 -0 .7 0 .0 0,.9 0 . 1 0 .7 0 .3 0 .8
IP 2 .0 2 .3 X 0,.1 -0,.4 1 ,.3 0 .3 0 .2 0 . 1 5 .2
PA 0,.3 0,.7 -0.. 1 X -0,.2 1 ,.9 0,. 4 0 . 1 0,.3 0,.2
SDA 1 ,.5 0,.0 0,.4 0,.2 X 0 ,.9 0,. 1 0 ,.0 0,.2 0 ,.3
W A -0,. 6 -0,. 9 - 1 ,.3 -1,. 9 -0,. 9 X 0,.0 0,.2 0 ,.0 0,.2
HP -0,.2 -0..1 -0..3 -0,.4 -0.. 1 0..0 X X X X
URE 0,.0 -0..7 -0..2 -0,. 1 0..0 -0..2 X X X X
NP -0..2 -0..3 -0.. 1 -0..3 -0.,2 0 .,0 X X X X
CiP -0..6 -0..8 -5..2 -0..2 -0.,3 -0.,2 X X X X
Total 1 .,9 0.,5- 11., 1 -3.,6 -3.,6 5. 2 1., 1 1 .,2 1 ., 1 7 .,3
Excluded from the table are 259 respondents for whom voting 
behaviour in 1983 or 1987 was missing, 267 who were not 
eligible to vote in 1983, 94 mobilized voters in 1987, 23
demobilized voters in 1987 and 39 respondents who abstained 
both in 1983 and 1987.
According to the table 63.6% of those who voted both in 
1983 and 1987 voted for the same party in both elections, 
while the corresponding figure in 1983 was 76.6% (see Table 
II.2.13). 13.9% switched between the four old parties, the 
SDP, the PP, the IP and the PA (11.6% in 1983), 8.7%
panel (but gained 0.7% in the table), and the WA gained 0.8% 
from the IP according to the panel (1.3% in the table).
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switched between the four old parties and the WA (4.8% in 
1983), 3.7% moved from the SDA (2.2% to the four old
parties, 0.9% to the WA, and 0.6% to the new parties), 9.7%
changed from the four old parties to the new parties (the 
Citizens' Party, the Humanist Party, the Union for Regional 
Equality and the National Party), and 0.4% moved from the WA 
to the new parties. So while 2.3% of the 13% increase in the 
proportion of party switchers is due to increasing movements 
between the four old parties from 1983-1987, the bulk of the 
increase is due to increasing movements to and from the WA 
and from the four old parties to the four parties that put 
up candidates for the first time in 1987.
Direct party changes cause the IP greatest losses, 11.1%. 
The party suffers a net loss from its switches with all
parties except the SDA. Half (5.2%) of the net loss is to 
the Citizens' Party, but the losses to the PP (2.3%), the
SDP (2.0%), and the WA (1.3%) are also worth mentioning.
The PA suffers a net total of 3.6% loss due to direct 
party switching. The party loses 1.9% to the WA, 0.7% to the 
PP and 1.0% to the four new parties. The PP gains slightly 
from party switching according to the table. It gains mainly 
from the IP but loses to the WA, the CiP and the URE. The 
SDA gains 1.9% from party switching, mainly from the IP and 
the SDA. The WA gains on most fronts but its greatest gains 
come from the PA. As the new parties can only gain from 
party switching their profiles in Table II.5.12 simply 
reflect their profiles in Table II.5.11 (A).
Table II.5.13 summarizes the impact of party switching, 
mobilization, demobilization and new voters on changes in 
the 1987 election.
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Table II.5.13. Party vote 1987: Effects of party switching, 
mobilization and demobilization and first time voters. 1987 
total sample.
New Mob. / Party Total Survey Election
voters demob. switch change* change* *
SDP -0.5 -0.1 1.9 1.3 1.3 3.5
PP -0.3 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 -0.1
IP 0.4 -0.9 -11.1 -11. 6 -12.2 -12.0
PA 0.2 -0.1 -3.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.9
SDA 0.1 -0.1 -3.6 -3.6 -3.2 -7.1
WA 0.0 0.7 5.2 5.9 6.5 4.6
HP 0.2 0.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1 . 6
URE 0.1 0.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2
NP 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.4 1.4 1 . 3
CiP -0.3 0.1 7.3 7 . 1 7.2 10 . 9
* The proportion of the sample which recalled voting for the 
party in 1983 subtracted from the proportion reporting a 
vote for the party in 1987.
** Actual net gains or losses in the 1987 election.
Due to rounding error and the fact that the percentages in 
the columns are not calculated from exactly the same base 
figures the total column does not always equal the column 
showing survey change.
Just as in 1983 (see Table II.2.14), direct party 
switching is by far the strongest factor accounting for the 
changes in election results. Over 90% of the losses of the
IP, PA and SDA accounted for in the table are due to direct
party switching, as are almost 90% of the gains made by the
WA and the overwhelming proportion of the gains made by the
four new parties. The PP's gains from party switching is on 
the other hand so small that it is almost outweighed by the 
(small) losses the party suffers from mobilization, 
demobilization and the impact of new voters. The losses the 
SDP suffers from those same factors decrease the party's 
gain of 1.9% from party switching down to 1.3% total gain, 
but as our survey underestimates the gains made by the SDP 
in the election the impact of party switching on the SDP's 
electoral fortunes in 1983 are underestimated in the table.
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It is quite clear that the large swings both in 1983 and 
1987 are mainly due to direct switching of voters between 
parties.
II. 6 The decision-making process 1987; When did the voters 
decide? Did they consider other parties?
We have seen that the proportion of voters who changed 
parties from 1983-1987 increased from 23.4% to 36.4% 
compared to 1979-1983. Now we will examine if similar
changes can be observed in the decision-making process of 
the voters: do the voters make their decision closer to
election day and does a larger proportion consider voting 
for other parties? Is the increasing frequency of switching 
parties a reflection of a general tendency in the electorate 
to be more volatile or did only a higher proportion of a 
potential party changers actually switch parties in 1987 
than in 1983?
If we compare the results in Table II. 6.1 to Table II.3.1 
we see that the electorate is more volatile in 1987 than in 
1983 in the sense that more voters considered voting for
more than one party and more voters made their decision on 
or close to polling day. In 1983 51% of all voters did not 
consider voting for another party but in 1987 only 39% 
failed to do so. In 1983 32% made their decision seven days
or less before they voted - including 14% who decided on
polling day. In 1987 39% made their decision in the last 
seven days - including 19% who decided on polling day.
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Table II.6. 1. When did the 1987 voters decide what party to
vote for? Total 1987 sample.
A. Column percentages
SDP PP IP PA WA HP URE NP CiP All
Did not consider another
party 44 43 44 39 33 (9) (42) (18) 21 39
More than a month
before 10 11 8 9 10 (7) (10) (-) 5 9
8-30 days
before 10 8 14 13 14 (-) (16) (22) 41 14
One week
before 6 9 9 6 6 (18) (-) (-) 9 8
During the
last week 13 10 10 12 19 (9) (27) (33) 9 12
On poll.day 18 19 16 20 18 (58) (5) (27) 15 19
Total 101 99 99 99 100 (101) (100) (100) (100) (101)
N= 239 261 459 199 192 24 19 22 110 1530
B. Cumulative percentages
SDP PP IP PA WA HP URE NP CiP All
Did not consider another
party 44 43 44 39 33 (9) (42) (18) 21 39
More than a month
before 54 54 52 48 43 (16) (52) (18) 26 48
8-30 days
before 63 62 66 62 57 (16) (68) (40) 67 62
One week
before 69 71 74 68 63 (34) (68) (40) 76 69
During the
last week 82 81 84 80 82 (42) (95) (73) 85 82
On poll.day 100 100 100 100 100 (100) (100) (100) 100 100
N= 239 261 459 199 192 24 19 22 110 1530
Of the 1539 respondents who revealed party choice in 1987, 9
did not answer the question on voting decision and are
omitted in the table.
Q: Did you consider voting for another party? (If yes): How
long before the election did you make a final decision ?
The relationship between time of decision and party
choice is weak in 1987 (ETA=.16) as it was in 1983
(ETA=.14). Nevertheless, there are differences between the 
four old parties and other parties in both elections.
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The proportion of the four old parties' voters who did 
not consider voting for another party decreased from 49-56% 
in 1983 to 39-44% in 1983. A somewhat lower proportion of WA 
voters did not consider another party in 1987 (33%) than had 
done so in 1983 (38%) . The proportion of voters for major
parties not considering another party was lowest among CiP 
voters in 1987 (21%), but had been lowest among SDA voters
in 1983 (23%).
In 1983 two of every three voters for the PP, IP and PA 
had made their decision more than a month before polling 
day, while this was the case for around half of voters for 
the SDP, SDA and WA. In 1987 only half of the voters of the 
four old parties had decided at this point in time while the 
corresponding figure for the WA is 43%. The Citizens' Party 
has to be considered separately here, as its sudden birth 
happened in the last week before the final date to submit 
nominations, which is four weeks before polling day. While 
8-14% of the voters for the other major parties say they 
made their final decision 8-30 days before the election, 41% 
of CiP voters made up their mind in that period. Bearing in 
mind that the CiP was a new party, a relatively small 
proportion of its voters decided to vote for the party in 
the last week of the campaign, which reflects the losses of 
the CiP in opinion polls during the campaign (see Table 
II.5.1).
The last few days of the 1987 campaign seem on the other 
hand to have been particularly successful for the WA, as was 
the case in 1983. 37% of WA voters in 1987 claimed to have 
made their final decision within a week of polling day (36% 
in 1983) while the corresponding figure (1983 figures in
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brackets) for the PA is 32% (26%) , 31% for the SDP (22%) ,
29% for the PP (20%), 26% for the IP (19%) and 24% for the 
CiP.
We have seen that the number of voters who considered 
voting for another party than they finally did increased 
from 49% in 1983 to 61% in 1987. Table II.6.2 shows what 
could have happened in the election. It shows the percentage 
each party would have obtained if it had managed to get the 
votes of all electors who considered voting for it.
Table II.6.2. Potential maximum vote of the parties 1987.
Voted Con­ Con- Max. Vote Max. Ratio :
for sidered sidered vote 1987 vote Max./'87
1987 (one) (two) 1987 (%) (%) vote
SDP 241 104 149 494 15.6 31.7 2.03
PP 262 71 94 427 17.0 27.4 1 . 61
IP 462 98 37 597 30.0 38.4 1 .28
PA 202 58 28 288 13.1 18.5 1.41
SDA 5 2 - 7 0.3 0.4 1.33
WA 192 173 80 445 12.5 28.6 2.29
HP 24 16 - 40 1.5 2.6 1.73
URE 19 4 - 23 1.3 1.5 1 .15
NP 22 21 - 43 1.4 2.8 2.00
CiP 110 76 72 258 7.2 16.6 2 . 31
N= (1539) (623) (230) (1556) (1539) (1556)
853 respondents named one or two parties they considered 
voting for besides the one to which they actually gave their 
vote. Of those 17 did not vote in 1987 or refused to say 
what they voted for. As they are included in the figures for 
maximum vote the number of respondents used as a base figure 
for maximum vote is 1556 while the base figure for actual 
vote is 1539.
Maximum vote for each party is calculated simply by adding 
the number of respondents who claimed to have considered 
voting for the party to the number of respondents who said 
they did in fact vote for the party in 1987.
The table reveals that the relative impact of obtaining 
the maximum vote is quite different for the parties just as 
in 1983 (see Table II.3.2). The 1987 ratios showing how much 
each party's share would have increased by obtaining the
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maximum vote are in general higher than in 1983, as a higher 
proportion of voters considered voting for more than one 
party in 1987. Nevertheless, a relatively clear pattern 
emerges when those two elections are compared.
In 1983 the two new parties, the SDA and the WA, would 
have gained most by obtaining the maximum vote: they would 
have more than doubled their share (2.45 and 2.19 
respectively). In 1987 the benefits would have been greatest 
to the new Citizens' Party (2.31) and the Women's Alliance 
(2.29) . Those parties won the greatest victories in 1987 as 
the SDA and the WA did in 1983.43)
But the ratio between actual vote and maximum vote is not 
simply a reflection of what parties were winning and losing 
in the elections. The four old parties show the same pattern 
regarding maximum vote both in 1983 and 1987 despite 
fluctuations in their electoral fortunes.
Of the old parties the SDP would have gained most by 
obtaining its maximum vote both in 1987 (2.03) and in 1983
(1.78). In 1983 the SDP lost almost 6% while it gained 3.5% 
in 1987.
The gains of the PP would have been the second greatest 
of the old parties both in 1983 (1.47) and in 1987 (1.61).
In 1983 the PP lost almost 6% while its loss in 1987 was 
only 0.1%.
The party furthest to the left, the PA, lost both in 1983 
(-2.5%) and 1987 (-3.9%). Its gains from obtaining its
maximum vote would on both occasions have been the second 
lowest of the old parties, 1.40 in 1983 and 1.41 in 1987.
43) The number of respondents voting for the other new 
parties and the SDA is really too small to seriously 
consider their ratios.
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The party that is largest and furthest to the right, the 
IP, would have gained least of the old parties by obtaining 
its maximum vote both in 1983 (1.18) and in 1987 (1.28). In 
1983 the IP gained 1.4% while it lost 11-12% in 1987.
This pattern seems to indicate that the "floating" voters 
are not simply following electoral winds. The growing 
potential in both elections is greater for the new parties 
(including the WA as "new" in 1987) than for the two old 
parties in the centre, especially the PP, and least for the 
two polar parties, especially the IP.
Table II .6.3. Party considered by 1987 vote. Only those who
revealed party voted for 1987 and considered one other
party. Percentages.
1987 vote
SDP PP IP PA WA CiP All*
Considered
SDP 14 27 7 24 18 19
PP 8 — 17 10 18 13 14
IP 24 24 - 3 10 55 21
PA 4 10 2 - 35 5 10
SDA 1 - - 1 - 0
WA 39 33 25 70 - 8 33
HP 5 2 2 3 3 - 3
URE —  — 2 - - - 1
NP 7 5 2 4 3 2 3
CiP 12 13 25 4 6 - 14
Total 100 101 102 101 100 101
N= (96) (97) (166) (71) (91) (67)
* This column gives the proportion of respondents who
mentioned each party when those who voted for that party are
excluded . N thus varies from 449 (IP) to 548 (CiP) and the
percentages do not of course add up to 100.
The proportional distribution of the recalled vote of the
respondents in the table compared to the total sample:
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA HP URE NP CiP All N
TABLE : 16% 16% 27% 12% 0% 15% 2% 1% 2% 11% 102% (615)
SAMPLE : 16% 17% 30% 13% 0% 13% 2% 1% 1% 7% 1 0 0 % ( 1 5 3 9 )
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Table II.6.3 shows what other parties each party's voters 
were attracted to. It is important to keep the relative size 
of the parties in mind and the results can be compared to 
those of 1983 in Table II.3.3.
As in 1983 each party's voters are attracted to other 
parties to different degrees and on the whole a similar 
pattern emerges.
As in 1983 one in every five voters who did not vote for 
the SDP and considered more than one party gave SDP as 
second choice. The SDP had greatest appeal to IP voters in 
1987 (27%) as in 1983 (37%) and least to PA voters (6-7%) .
18% of the CiP voters considered voting for the SDP as did 
24% of the WA voters - while in 1983 only 4% of WA voters 
named the SDP as a second choice.
14% of those who did not vote for the PP considered 
voting for the party. As in 1983 the attraction of the PP 
varied less among voters of other parties than was the case 
for the SDP, and in fact for all the old parties. In 1987 
voters of the SDP were least attracted to the PP (8%), while 
its greatest attraction was among WA (18%) and IP (17%) 
.voters.
Both in 1983 and 1987 the proportion considering IP among 
voters who considered more than one party and did not vote 
for the IP is much lower than the proportion voting for the 
IP, both among those considering more than one party, and 
the electorate as a whole. In 1987 only 21% of those who 
considered more than one party and did not vote for the IP, 
considered voting for the party. The party had by far the 
most attraction among CiP voters: 55% of those considered
voting for the IP. Both in 1983 and 1987 the attraction of
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the IP was much greater to SDP voters (38% and 24%) and PP 
voters (35% and 24%) than to PA voters (8% and 3%) and WA 
voters (17% and 10%).
Only 10% of those who did not vote for the PA in 1987 
named the party as a second choice as compared to 14% in 
1983. In both elections the profile is very clear. The PA is 
by far most attractive to WA voters both in 1983 (48%) and
1987 (35%) and then to PP voters (25% in 1983, 10% 1987) .
The PA has the least attraction for SDP (10% and 4%) and 
especially IP voters (6% and 2%) in both elections.
33% of those who did not vote for the WA and considered 
more than one party had the WA in mind as a second choice 
compared to 15% in 1983. The party has the same profile in 
both elections, the major difference being that a higher 
proportion considered voting for the party on all fronts in 
1987 . The party is by far most attractive to PA voters: 
while 41% of them considered the WA in 1983, 70% did so in
1987. The proportion of SDP voters considering the WA 
increased from 13% to 39% from 1983-1987, while the 
corresponding figures were from 6% to 33% for the PP and 
from 8% to 25% for the IP. In 1983 the WA competed to some 
extent with the other new party (26% of SDA voters 
considered voting for the WA) , but this was not the case 
regarding the Citizens' Party in 1987: only 8% of its voters 
who considered more than one party had the WA in mind when 
making the decision.
The Citizens' Party has a clear profile. 25% of IP voters 
considered voting for the party, while 12-13% of the SDP and 
PP voters did so. Only 4-6% of PA and WA voters considered 
voting for the CiP.
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Table II.6.4. The parties' popularity as a second choice
among each party's voters. Deviations from percentage of all
voters1 considering each party.
Voted for
SDP PP IP PA WA CiP All#
Considered
SDP
1983 - -4% + 15% -16% -18% - 22%
1987 - -5% + 8% -12% + 5% -1% 19%
PP
1983 -5% - + 4% +2% -9% - 18%
1987 -6% - + 3% -4% + 4% -1% 14%
IP
1983 + 10% + 7% - -20% -11% - 28%
1987 + 3% + 3% - -18% -11% + 34 21%
PA
1983 -4% + 11% -8% - + 34% - 14%
1087 -6% 0% -8% - +25% -5% 10%
WA
1983 -2% -9% -7% +26% - - 15%
1987 + 6 % 0% -8% + 37% - -25% 33%
CiP
1987 -2% -1% + 11% -10% 8% - 14%
N 1983 : (48) (51) (119) (49) (23)
N 1987 : (96) (97) (166) (71) (91) (67)
# This column gives the percentage of respondents who
mentioned each party when those who voted for that party are
excluded. The figures in the column are the same as in
Tables II.3.3 and 11 .6.3. Those two tables give the
percentages from which the deviations in this table are
calculated.
Table II. 6.4 may give a clearer picture of the other 
parties' popularity among each party's voters. The table 
shows to what extent the percentage of each party's voters 
considering a given party deviates from the percentage 
considering that given party among all voters who considered 
voting for another party. The table thus reveals for example 
that in 1983 the SDP was considered by 4% fewer PP voters 
than among all voters who did not vote for the SDP but 
considered doing so (i.e. 18% of PP voters considered voting 
for the SDP, while the corresponding figure for all voters
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was 22%). Table II.6.4 thus summarizes Tables 11.3,3. and 
II.6.3.
The strongest link between two parties emerging from this 
analysis is between the PA and the WA, and this is true for 
both elections. The WA is by far the most popular second 
choice among PA voters and vice versa. The table also 
reveals a positive link between IP voters on the one hand 
and SDP and PP voters on the other (and of course a strong 
positive relationship between the IP and the CiP). The IP is 
on the other hand obviously an unpopular choice among PA and 
WA voters and vice versa. There is clearly a negative 
relationship between the SDP and the PA and also, although 
this is weaker between the SDP and the PP. The PP is much 
more popular as a second choice among PA voters than are the 
SDP and the IP.
Table II.6.5. Total percentage choosing each pair of 
alternatives 1987. Only those revealing party choice and
mentioning one other party they considered voting for.
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA HP URE NP CiP
SDP — 4 11 2 0 10 1 0 2 4
PP - - 8 3 0 8 0 0 1 3
IP - - - 1 0 8 1 0 1 13
PA - - - - 0 13 1 0 0 1
SDA - - - - - 0 0 0 0 0
WA - - - - - - 1 0 1 2
HP - - - - - - - 0 0 0
URE - - - - - - - - 0 0
NP - - - - - - - - - 0
(N=615)
Table II.6.5 shows the total percentage of voters who 
considered each pair of parties. Of the 615 respondents who 
considered voting for one other party, 4% for instance voted 
for the SDP but considered voting for the PP or vice versa. 
As the size of the parties is different the figures do not
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tell us directly the relative attractiveness between pairs 
of parties but the table shows the proportion of voters 
considering each pair of alternatives. Thus the table 
reveals for instance that a considerable proportion (8%) of 
the voters considering more than one party had the WA and IP 
in mind, even though - as we saw before - these two parties 
were relatively unpopular choices among each party's second 
choices.
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Chapter III: Voters' ties to the parties
Political parties are a basic characteristic of liberal 
democracies: the parties are the structured alternatives
voters face in elections. Some voters develop formal or 
informal ties to a party and may support "their" party very 
strongly, while other voters feel little or no loyalty 
towards any party. In this chapter we will analyse the ties 
between Icelandic voters and parties. In Section III.l we 
deal with party identification, in Section III.2 with party 
membership, in Section III.3 with participant ion in primary 
elections, in Section III. 4 with exposure to the (party) 
press, and finally in Section III.5 with personal 
acquaintance with members of the Althingi.
III.l Party identification
The key concept in the psychological model of voting
behaviour is party identification, a concept introduced by
the Michigan scholars Angus Campbell and Warren Miller in
the 1950's. In the classic work. The American Voter, party
identification is described thus:
Generally this tie is a psychological identification, 
which can persist without legal recognition or evidence 
of formal membership and even without a consistent 
record of party support. Most Americans have this sense 
of attachment with one party or the other. And for the 
individual who does, the strength and direction of 
party identification are facts of central importance in 
accounting for attitude and behavior.
Direction of party identification refers to what party an 
individual supports or identifies with; strength refers to 
the degree of support.2)
1) Campbell et al. (1964), pp. 67-68.
2) The initial question in the Michigan surveys was: "Gener­
ally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a
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Both direction and strength of party identification seems
to be important in explaining American voting behaviour.
Many Americans retain their party identification over long
periods of time, even though they do not consistently vote
for "their" party's candidates. The model sees this in terms
of various "short-term effects" which can cause the voter to
deviate from his "normal" behaviour. While many of the
original model's assumptions on American voting behaviour
have been seriously questioned in the last two decades,
Niemi and Weisberg conclude, that
partisanship is stable enough for the party 
identification concept to remain meaningful as a 
long-term component of the vote decision. Party 
identification is not totally stable, but it is 
sufficiently so as to preserve its preeminent 
status in understanding voting.3)
The usefulness of the concept of direction of party
identification has on the other hand been criticized in
European electoral research, as it has been shown that
voters in e.g. H o l l a n d , Britain and Sweden usually change
their party identification when they change their choice of
a party in elections.5) The differences between American and
British voters may be explained
by referring to ballot differences: Americans
develop party loyalties as they vote for several 
different offices at the same election, while 
British citizens cast a vote for only a single 
office and so are less likely to distinguish
Democrat, an Independent, or what?" (If Rep. or Dem.):
"Would you call yourself a strong (Rep. or Dem.) or not a 
very strong (Rep. or Dem.)?" (If Independent): "Do you think 
of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic 
Party?" Party identification thus formed a seven-fold scale. 
Ibid.
3) Niemi, R.G. and H.F. Weisberg (1993b), pp. 275-276.
4) Thomassen, J. (1993), pp. 263-266.
5) S. Holmberg (1981), pp. 176-177.
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between their current party and their current 
vote.G)
While Richardson has argued that partisanship may be 
prevalent for particular types of parties (traditional 
cleavage based parties), even in E u r o p e , t h e  predominant 
view has been that the Michigan model's basic assumption, 
that party identification is a more lasting characteristic 
than the choice of party, has at best a somewhat limited 
validity in the European parliamentary systems. If voters 
simply change party identification when they change party at 
the polling booth we have a tautological relationship: 
direction of party identification is simply party choice.
This does not mean that the strength of party identi­
fication is not also important in Europe. A party system 
where few voters identify with the parties would be expected 
to be more volatile than a party system where many or even 
most voters consider themselves as strong supporters of 
parties. Various parties in the same party system can also 
differ in this respect and this can have important 
consequences, presuming of course that the strength of party 
identification is related to other political variables.
In our surveys we asked about party identification in the 
following manner: Now I would like to ask you about your
attitudes towards the political parties. I would like to 
remind you that any information you may give is strictly 
confidential. Many people consider themselves supporters of 
political parties. Do you in general consider yourself as a
6) Niemi, R.G. and H.F. Weisberg (1993), p. 213. Butler and 
Stokes in Political Change in Britain (1969) were first to 
report that party identification might be less stable in 
other countries than in the United States and gave the above 
explanation.
7) B.M. Richardson (1991).
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supporter of any political party or organization? Those who 
considered themselves a party supporter were then 
subsequently asked: Would you say you are a very strong,
rather strong or not a very strong supporter (of a given 
party) ? Those who did not consider themselves a party 
supporter were on the other hand asked: Do you nevertheless 
feel somewhat closer to any one party or organization than 
to others? Thus the answers form a five-fold scale of party 
identifica t i o n . T a b l e  III.1.1 shows strength of party 
identification by age.
Even though 3% fewer of our respondents consider 
themselves party supporters in 1987 than in 1983 the changes 
in the strength of party identification are small. Almost 
half of the respondents consider themselves as party 
supporters in both elections, almost a third do not but feel 
nevertheless closer to some party, and about one in every 
five voters has no party identification at all.^)
8) The exact wording here is from the 1983 study. In 1987 
the wording was slightly different. (See Appendices B and 
C) .
9) While the overall changes reported here are small our 
panel data shows that changes on the individual level are 
greater. Of 618 panel respondents 34% claimed to be a party 
supporter both in 1983 and 1987 while 15% said on both 
occasions that they were closer to a party and 8% claimed no 
party identification both in 1983 and 1987. Thus 57% of the 
panel gave the same strength of party identification 1983 
and 1987. 22% of the panel respondents moved between the 
"supporter" and "closer to" categories and 13% between 
"closer to" and "no party identification". 8% moved between 
"supporter" and "no party identification".
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Table III.1.1. Strength of party identification by age in 
1983 and 1987. Percentages.
A. 1983 election :
AGE
PARTY I DENT IF I-
CATION 20-23 24-29 30-39 4 0 — 4 9 50-59 60-69 70-83 All
Very strong 3 3 6 11 12 9 16 7 . 8
Rather strong 17 19 19 29 22 22 29 21 . 9
Not very strong 14 16 20 17 24 26 23 19.7
Closer to 39 36 36 28 24 28 21 31.5
No party ident. 27 25 20 15 19 14 11 19.0
Total 100 99 101 100 101 99 100 99.9
N= (94) (165) (256) (165) (135) (99) (80) (994)
ETA=.21 (with strength of party identification dependent)
B. 1987 election :
AGE
PARTY I DENT IF I-
CATION 18-23 24-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-80 All
Very strong 8 5 8 12 15 21 18 11 . 1
Rather strong 17 22 19 21 22 14 17 19.1
Not very strongl5 13 14 16 19 20 22 16.0
Closer to 31 39 36 32 26 29 22 32.3
No party ident.29 21 22 20 19 17 21 21 . 6
Total 100 100 99 101 101 101 100 100 .1
N= (241) (257) (404) (309) 1[194) (175) (115) (1695)
ETA=.14 (with strength of party identification dependent)
Summary:
AGE
18-23 24-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-80 All
Party supporters :
1983 34 38 45 57 58 57 68 49.4
1987 40 40 41 49 56 55 57 46.2
Closer to a party:
1983 39 36 36 28 24 28 21 31 .5
1987 31 39 36 32 26 29 22 32.3
No party identification :
1983 27 25 20 15 19 14 11 19.0
1987 29 21 22 20 19 17 21 21 . 6
Those figures indicate that party identification in 
Iceland is somewhat weaker than in Denmark and Sweden
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although the general pattern is similar. In the early 1970's 
51-56% of the voters in Denmark were party supporters, 31- 
35% felt closer to a party, while 10-16% had no party 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .10) in Sweden the percentage of party 
supporters dropped from 65% in 1968 to 58% in 1979, while 
the number of those who felt closer to a party rose from 28% 
to 33%, and those with no party identification from 7% to 9% 
in the same period.11)
The table shows that strength of party identification is 
clearly related to age. While in 1983 only 34 % of the 
youngest voters (20-23 years old) claimed to be party 
supporters 68% of the oldest (70-83) did so. In 1987 this 
gap was considerably narrower: 40% of the youngest (18-23)
said they were party supporters, while 57% of the oldest did 
so. The overall relationship tends to be linear but can not 
be considered strong. It is also noteworthy that, while the 
proportion with no party identification decreases clearly 
with age in the 1983 data, this is not the case in 1987 
where the proportion is around 20% for all age groups except 
for the youngest voters.
The pattern of increasing strength of party 
identification with age is common in electoral research,^^) 
and is in accord with the psychological school's life-cycle 
theory, which claims that strength of party identification
10) 0. Borre et ai.(1976). The figures presented here are 
based on table 1, p. 100, but the category "don't know, 
missing information" is omitted in our calculations.
11) S. Holmberg (1981), p. 180.
12) P.R. Abramson (1983, p. 106) claims it is "One of the 
most well-documented findings of political-attitude 
research". In Sweden in 1979, for instance, 40% of the 
youngest (18-21) were party supporters, while the 
corresponding figure was 70-80% among those over sixty. 
(Holmberg (1981), p. 182).
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tends to increase as an individual grows older. The data 
does on the other hand also fit to a contending theory, 
which has gained increasing support in recent years, 
claiming that the pattern is a result of generational 
differences; that younger generations simply form weaker 
identifications than the preceding generations did, and 
those younger generations will maintain those weaker party 
identifications through their lives. While both theories are 
in accord with data from one time point, showing 
partisanship increasing with age, the theories have 
different and very important consequences for the future. If 
the generational theory is correct the overall strength of 
partisanship in an electorate showing this pattern is going 
to weaken in the future (unless new generations form 
stronger links to the parties) . This is likely to increase 
electoral volatility and thereby the risk for parties in 
elections. If on the other hand the life-cycle theory is 
correct the observed patterns do not give us any reason to 
expect increasing volatility in the electorate.
While various criticisms of the life-cycle theory in 
recent years clearly indicate that it cannot be taken at 
face value,13) our data does not allow any rigid test of the 
two contending theories here. Such a test needs time series 
data, preferably based on panel studies. Our data may 
nevertheless give some indications concerning the validity 
of the two theories. Let us first look at the changes in our 
panel. Table III.1.2 shows the strength of party 
identification as reported by the panel respondents in both
13) See e.g. Abramson (1983, pp. 105-119, Holmberg (1981), 
pp. 182-186 and Jennings and Niemi (1975) .
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1983 and 1987, using the 1983 age groups. Thus we have 
answers from the same respondents in each group at two 
points in time. The obvious limitations are both the short 
time span, four years, and the small size of the age groups, 
resulting in a large margin of sampling error.
Table III.1.2. Strength of party identification in 1983 and
1987 by age in 1983. Panel respondents. Percentages.
AGE IN 1983
PARTY IDENTIFI­
CATION 20-23 24-29 30--39 40-49 50--59 60-69 70-83 All
Very strong
1983 3 4 5 10 17 14 21 8.4
1987 3 4 8 13 20 10 14 9.5
Rather strong
1983 20 18 23 33 24 21 21 23.5
1987 27 26 19 25 13 25 24 22.0
Not very strong
1983 9 16 20 16 19 25 17 17.6
1987 17 10 16 17 19 21 28 16.7
Closer to a party
1983 42 39 36 29 25 27 28 33.5
1987 34 31 38 27 33 27 10 31 .2
No party identification
1983 25 23 16 12 15 14 14 17 . 0
1987 19 30 20 18 15 17 24 20.6
N= (64) (110) (168) (116) (79) (52) (29) (618)
Summary:
Party supporters :
1983 32 38 48 59 60 60 59 49.5
1987 47 40 43 55 52 56 66 48.2
Only those panel respondents who answered the question on
party identification both in 1983 and 1987 are included in
the table.
The total proportion of party supporters in the panel 
decreased from 49.5% to 48.2% from 1983-1987, compared to a 
decrease from 49.4% to 46.2% if the two total samples are 
compared (see Table III.1.1). The greatest change in party 
support in the panel occurs among the youngest voters, who 
were 20-23 years old in 1983. At that time 32% of this group 
claimed to be party supporters as compared to 47% in
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1987.14) The table also shows a small increase in party 
supporters (38% to 40%) among the panel respondents who were 
24-29 years old in 1983, while in the age groups from 30-69 
there is a decrease of party supporters of 4-8%. According 
to the table the proportion of party supporters among the 
oldest increased from 59% to 66%, but it must be borne in 
mind that this group contains only 29 respondents in the 
p a n e l . 15) if we compare the total samples the proportion of 
party supporters was lower in 1987 than in 1983 among all 
voters over thirty, including the oldest age group.
The other side of the coin is that the number of voters 
without party identification decreased among the youngest 
panel respondents (from 25% to 19%) while it increased among 
voters who were 24 years or older in 1983.
The data seems to support the life-cycle theory in a 
very limited way: only for the youngest voters. The increase 
in partisanship evident among the panel respondents who were 
in their early twenties in 1983 is not evident among older 
voters. On the other hand a small general decrease in 
partisanship can be observed. This is of course contrary to 
the life-cycle theory, nor is it in accord with the 
generational model, which assumes that each generation's 
partisanship stays the same for its lifetime having been
14) The increase in party supporters among this group is 
bigger in the panel than in the total samples. Party 
supporters in the 20-23 age group in the total sample 1983 
was 34%, while they constituted 40% of the total 1987 
sample's 24-29 age group (which includes the panel 
respondents who were 20-23 years old in 1983) . The greater 
increase in the panel is probably due to the small number of 
respondents (64). Nevertheless, both data sets show a 
considerable increase in only four years.
15) The success rate in getting a second interview in 1987 
was, as expected, rather low among the respondents who had 
been 70-83 years old in 1983.
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formed at an early stage in the generation's life. What we 
seem to have here is what can be called a period effect/1^) 
some political factors that are having impact on all age 
groups in the 1983-1987 period.
A comparison of the two total samples from 1983 and 1987 
gives a similar picture. Table III.1.1 shows that among the 
new voters (under 24 years of age) the strength of 
partisanship weakened in the sense that the proportion of 
voters with no party identification increased from 27% in 
1983 to 29% in 1987. On the other hand a higher proportion 
of first time voters in 1987 (40%) claimed to be party
supporters than in 1983 (34%). Thus the proportions of both
party supporters and voters without party identification 
increased from 1983-87 while the proportion of voters 
claiming they are closer to a party decreased.
While Table III. 1.1 shows the strength of partisanship in 
different age groups in the total samples from 1983 and 
1987, a better base for comparing generational changes in 
those four years can be obtained by using birth cohorts, as 
is done in Table III.1.3. These include respondents born in 
1906-1963, the years of birth covered by both samples.
Table III.1.3 generally supports the results of our panel 
data. Among the voters who were in their early twenties in 
1983 the proportion of party supporters increased from 33% 
in 1983 to 40% in 1987, while the proportion of voters 
without party identification decreased from 27% to 21%. In 
the four other birth cohorts the number of party supporters 
decreased by 2-5% in three and stayed the same in one, the 
proportion without party identification stayed the same
16) See e.g. S. Holmberg (1981), pp. 184-185.
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among those born 1948-57 and increased by 1-4% in the three 
older cohorts.
Table III.1.3. Strength of partisanship 1983 
different birth cohorts. Total samples.
and 1987 in
YEAR OF BIRTH
1958-63 1948-57 1938-47 1928-37 1906 -27
Party supporters : 
1983 33 
1987 40
43
41
51
48
55
55
61
56
Closer to a party: 
1983 40 
1987 39
35
36
32
32
27
26
25
26
No party identification : 
1983 27 22 
1987 21 22
17
20
18
19
14
18
N 1983 (152) 
N 1987 (257)
(272)
(404)
(199)
(309)
(143)
(194)
(206)
(290)
In this table, respondents in 
from 1901-05 are excluded, as 
sample who are born from 1964-
the 1983 sample who are 
are respondents in the 
69.
born
1987
On the whole the data indicates that in these four years 
there was a marked increase in the strength of partisanship 
among those who were in their early twenties in 1983. The 
process of forming partisan ties, which clearly begins 
before the age of twenty, is still going on at that age. 
This is in accord with the life-cycle theory, but can also 
be in accord with a generational theory, depending on when 
the formation of a generation's partisanship is expected to 
take place.
Second, the data does not support the life-cycle theory 
for voters over thirty: as no increase is seen in strength
of partisanship among those voters, the theory gets no 
support as an explanation of the general pattern of 
strengthened partisanship with increasing age. While it is
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clearly true that a longer time span is needed to fairly 
test the life-cycle theory, the data suggests rather that 
different generations form different levels of strength of 
partisanship. The data also suggests that the strength of 
partisanship can change in all age groups; even though the 
decrease in partisanship from 1983-87 is rather small it is 
consistent in different age groups and therefore more likely 
to be a true period effect than a random change due to 
sampling error.
Strength of party identification is also clearly related 
to electoral volatility, as can be seen in table III.1.4.
Two things are of particular interest in the table. 
First, those with weaker or no party identification were 
much more likely to change parties in both elections. In the 
1983 election 23% of all respondents claimed to have 
switched parties from 1979-83, while the proportion of party 
switchers was only 7-12% among party supporters, 36% among 
those who felt closer to a party, and 58% among those with 
no party identification. While the overall party switching 
in 1987 was considerably higher - 36% of all respondents
changed party - the pattern was largely similar: 17-20% of
party supporters changed party while 55% of those who felt 
closer to a party and 65% of those with no party 
identification did so. The overall increase in electoral 
volatility from the 1983 to the 1987 election is a 
reflection of increased volatility in all party 
identification groups.
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Table III.1.4 . Party switching 1979-1983 and 1983-1987 by
strength of party identification. Only those revealing party
choice in both elections. Total samples . Percentages.
PARTY IDENTIFICATON
VOTING Very Rather Not very Closer None All
1979-83 strong strong strong to
Same party 93 88 89 64 42 77
Between old* 1 4 4 20 36 12
To new## 6 8 7 16 22 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= (68) (185) (161) (207) (73) (694)
VOTING
1983-87
Same party 83 80 80 46 35 64
Between old# 2 5 8 25 26 14
From/to new## 15 15 12 30 39 22
Total 100 100 100 101 100 100
N= (157) (263) (209) (354) (144) (1127)
Proportion of party switchers changing
between the four old parties
1983 14% 33% 36% 56% 62% 52%
1987 12% 25% 40% 45% 40% 39%
Strength of relationship when voting is dichotomous variable 
(same party/switched party):
1983: ETA=.39 (vote dep.), ETA=.34 (party ident. dep.)
1987: ETA=.40 (vote dep.), ETA=.36 (party ident. dep.)
# Switched between two of the four old parties.
## All other party switches. In 1983 those are only switches 
from the four old parties to the two new parties, the SDA 
and the WA. In 1987 they include switches to the new 
parties, the HP, URE, NP and CiP, but also to and from the 
SDA and the WA.
Second, a relationship emerges between the strength of 
party identification on the one hand and the tendency to 
change between the four old parties on the one hand or to 
move to or from a new party on the other. As party 
identification grows stronger a smaller proportion of the 
party switchers within each group tends to change to an old
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party. This may indicate that not only do party identifiers 
find it more difficult in general to change parties, but 
also that they find it easier to change to a new party than 
to change to one of the old "enemies". We will return to 
this point later in this section.
Table III.l. 5. Electoral behaviour by party identification
1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
1983 election :
Party i dentification
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA Other None Total
Vote 1983 unknown
SDP 89 1 2 1 0 4 14 10 11
PP 1 82 1 2 0 0 21 13 14
IP 1 6 85 0 0 0 14 25 38
PA 1 2 0 80 5 0 21 5 14
SDA 5 3 5 3 86 0 4 12 7
WA 0 0 2 7 0 92 11 7 6
Blank/void 0 1 1 4 0 0 11 8 3
Did not vote 3 5 4 3 9 4 4 20 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= (87) (124) (355) (145) (22) (24) (28) (158) (943)
1987 election :
Party identification
SDP PP IP PA WA CiP Other None All
unkn
Vote 1987
SDP 90 1 2 1 3 18 13 15
PP 3 87 3 3 1 19 18 16
IP 1 - 87 - 3 2 15 19 29
PA - 1 1 88 7 - 14 6 13
SDA - - - 1 - - 0 0
WA - 1 1 2 80 13 12 12
HumP 2 1 - 2 - 6 2 2
URE - 4 - 1 1 1 1 1
NP - 2 0 1 - - 4 1
CiP 2 3 4 - 1 98 !5 8 7
Blank/void 1 1 1 - 1 9 3 1
Didn' t vote2 1 2 2 4 (5 14 4
Total 101 102 101 101 101 100 101 100 101
N= (179) (181) (436) (175) (162) (50) (99]1 (283) (1586)
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But let us first consider the relationship of direction 
of party identification and voting. To what extent did those 
who identify with a party also vote for it?
Table III.1.5 clearly reveals that those who identify 
with a party do indeed have a very strong tendency to vote 
for that party. In both elections 80-90% of identifiers
voted for "their" party and the figures are even higher for
the WA in 1983 (92%) and for the CiP in 1987 (9 8 %).1^) The
proportion of party identifiers who turned in a void or
blank ballot or abstained in those elections was 0-9%; in 
eight of these twelve cases 2-5%. In 1983 4-13% of party
identifiers voted for a party they did not identify with. 
Those figures tended to be a little higher in 1987; 8-16% of 
five parties' identifiers voted for another party while only 
2% of CiP identifiers did so.
While the number of party identifiers "deserting" their 
party is small, a few patterns emerge. First, a clear link 
is revealed in the table between the PA and the WA. In 1983 
7% of PA identifiers voted for the WA and in 1987 7% of WA 
identifiers voted for the PA.
Second, in 1983 the WA's appeal to the old parties'
identifiers was much narrower than the appeal of the other
new party, the SDA. The only addition to the votes of 7% of
PA identifiers that the WA managed to get was 2% of IP
identifiers, while the SDA obtained 3-5% of the identifiers 
of all four old parties. In 1987 the CiP obtained the votes
17) It must of course be borne in mind that the 1983 base 
figures (N) for the SDA, WA, and other/unknown party 
identification are very small and the percentages for those 
groups have therefore to be interpreted with extreme 
caution. The figures for SDA and WA are very small because 
relatively few of those parties' voters identify with the 
party (see Table III.1.6).
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of 2-4% of the identifiers with SDP, PP and IP, thus showing 
wider appeal than the WA in 1983, but narrower than the SDA. 
Bearing in mind that the CiP got 12% of the 1983 IP vote
(see Table II.5.10) its share among IP identifiers must be
considered small.
Third/ it is noteworthy that 4% of PP identifiers in 1987 
voted for the URE-list headed by an old PP local leader in 
the Northeast constituency.
Considering those who claim "other" or "unknown" party 
identification,18) the great underrepresentation of the IP 
among this group in both elections stands out as
particularly interesting.
The voting behaviour of those with no party identifi­
cation is clearly different from the electorate as a whole, 
both in 1983 and 1987. First, a higher proportion of this 
group claimed to have turned in a blank or void ballot or 
abstained than was the case for the whole electorate: 28% as 
compared to 10% of the total sample in 1983 and 17% as
compared to 5% of the total sample in 1987 did so.
Second, the party choice of this, group differs 
considerably from the total sample. If we compare the share 
of each party's votes among those with no party 
identification (who revealed the party voted for) to the 
parties' share in the total sample the SDA in 1983 is by far 
the most successful: the party obtained 17% of the votes of
18) The category "other/unknown" includes those respondents 
who identified with a political group other than the 
parliamentary parties, those who identified with more than 
one party, and those who said they identified with a party, 
but refused to reveal what party.
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those with no party identification while its corresponding 
share in the total sample was 8%.19)
Two parties clearly perform worse in both elections among 
those with no party identification than among the total 
electorate. In 1983 the IP received 35% of the votes cast 
for a party by those without party identification (-7% 
compared to the total sample) and the PA received 7% in this 
group (-9%) . The corresponding figures in 1987 were 23% 
(-8%) for the IP and 7% (-8%) for the PA.
The remaining parties, the SDP, PP and the WA in both 
elections and the CiP in 1987, did similarly well or better 
among those with no party identification than among the 
electorate as a whole (0-5% better).
This pattern does not simply reflect who was winning and 
losing in the elections (as it should if those without party 
identification were simply more likely to follow the 
electoral winds than others). In some instances the losing 
parties do considerably worse among those without party 
identification than among others; this is the case for the 
PA both in 1983 and 1987 and the IP in 1987. But the losses 
of the SDP and PP in 1983 were not due to less support for 
those parties among those with no party identification than 
among others. And the IP gained slightly in 1983 although 
its vote among those without party identification was 
considerably lower than among the total electorate, just as 
was the case in 1987 when the party lost heavily.
The only case of a winning party doing much better among 
those without party identification than among others is the
19) These figures are not the same as in the Table III.1.5; 
here those who turned in a blank or void ballot or abstained 
are not included.
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SDA in 1983. The other major winners, the WA in 1983 and 
1987 and the CiP in 1987, did only slightly better among 
those without party identification than among others and the 
SDP had the same support in both groups in 1987.
This seems to indicate that the most volatile part of the 
electorate, those without party identification, do not 
simply follow the electoral winds - they do not simply jump 
on the bandwagon at election time. More complex factors are 
at work and the fact that the polar parties in the party 
system, the IP and the PA, are greatly underrepresented 
among this group at both elections may suggest that 
underlying structures in the party system alignments may 
play a part here.
The differences that we have observed result in very 
different profiles of the parties' voters, as can be seen 
clearly in Table III.1.6.
The most marked difference in the parties' profiles is 
between parties fighting their first election and others. 
While the bulk of the old parties' voters - and WA voters in 
1987 - also identified with "their" party, only 28% of SDA 
voters in 1983, 42% of WA voters in 1983 and 46% of CiP
voters in 1987 did so.
What is particularly interesting is that a relatively 
large number of voters who cast their vote for a newcomer to 
the electoral arena retain a party identification with 
another party. Thus 42% of the SDA voters in 1983, 32% of
the WA voters in 1983 and 27% of CiP voters in 1987 
identified with one of the other major parties. The old
parties - and the WA in 1987 - on the other hand only
obtained 2-10% of their votes from other parties'
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identifiers. The IP had the least appeal in both elections 
to identifiers of other parties: only 2% of the party's vote 
came from their ranks in both elections.
Table III.1.6. Party identification by party voted for in 
1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
1983 election :
Vote 1983
Party
identification SDP PP IP PA SDA WA
SDP 72 1 0 1 6 0
PP 1 75 2 2 6 0
IP 7 3 86 0 24 13
PA 1 2 0 86 6 19
SDA 0 0 0 1 28 0
WA 1 0 0 0 0 42
Other/unknown 4 4 1 4 1 6
None 15 15 11 6 28 21
Total 101 100 100 100 99 101
N= (107) (136) (354) (135) (67) (53)
1987 election :
Vote 1987
Party
identification SDP PP IP PA WA CiP
SDP 70 2 1 — — 3
PP 1 62 - 1 1 5
IP 4 5 83 1 2 17
PA 1 2 - 78 2 -
WA 2 1 1 6 69 2
CiP - - 0 - - 46
Other/unknown 8 8 3 7 7 5
None 15 20 12 8 19 23
Total 101 100 100 101 100 101
N= (231) (255) (454) (198) (187) (106)
The profile of the WA clearly changed from 1983-1987. 
While its 1983 profile resembles the 1983 profile of the 
SDA, and the 1987 profile of the CiP, in 1987 the WA profile 
had become similar to the profiles of the SDP and the PP.
If we look at the profiles of the old parties - and the 
WA in 1987 - the major difference between the two polar
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parties in the system (IP and PA) on the one hand and the 
parties closer to the centre on the other is that the polar 
parties obtain a higher percentage of their vote from own 
identifiers (78-86%) than is the case for the others (62- 
75%) . The polar parties were unpopular among those with no 
party identification as we have seen - only 6-12% of their 
vote came from this group - while 15-20% of SDP and PP votes 
in both elections, and WA votes in 1987, came from this part 
of the electorate. The parties fighting their first election 
received the highest share of their votes from voters 
without party identification: 28% of the SDA vote in 1983
came from this group, 21% of WA voters in 1983 and 23% of 
CiP voters in 1987.
The parties differ in the extent to which their voters 
also identify with the party. What stands out is that in 
those two elections only parties fighting their first 
election obtained a considerable share of voters who 
retained identification with another party and that the PA 
and the IP were by far the least successful in obtaining the 
votes of those with no party identification.
Let us next examine whether the parties differ in respect 
to how strongly their identifiers support their party. Is 
the partisanship of those who identify with parties which 
obtain relatively less of their votes from own identifiers 
weaker than the partisanship of those who support parties 
which get most of their votes from own identifiers? In other 
words: Are the parties not only different in how large a 
proportion of their voters identifies with the party but 
also in how strong the partisan feeling is among those who 
identify with the party?
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Table III.1.7. Strength of party identification by party 
identified with 1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages
1983 election :
Strength of 
party
Party identified with
identification SDP PP IP PA SDA WA
Very strong 8 11 11 7 5 8
Rather strong 28 23 30 26 19 38
Not very strong 17 33 25 28 10 4
Closer to 47 33 33 38 67 50
Total 100 100 99 99 101 100
N= (88) (123) (359) (145) (21) (24)
Chi-sq:28.86 (sign=.0168)
1987 election:
Party identified with
Strength of party
identification SDP PP IP PA WA CiP
Very strong 16 15 16 19 8 26
Rather strong 18 19 31 29 27 26
Not very strong 21 35 23 20 15 15
Closer to 45 32 30 33 49 33
Total 100 101 100 101 99 100
N= (181) (183) (438) (176) (164) (51)
Chi-sq:59.35(sign=.0000)
Mean 1983: SDP PP IP PA WA SDA Total
1.98 2.13 2.20 2.03 2.04 1 . 62 2 .11
N= (88) (123) (359) (145) (24) (21) (760)
F-probability=. '0790/ETA= . 11/Scheffe (. 05-level) ::No two groups
sign, diff./LSD(.05):PP and IP sign. diff. from SDA.
Mean 1987: SDP PP IP PA WA CiP Total
2.04 2.17 2.32 2.34 1.95 2.44 2.21
N= (180) (183) (438) (176) (163) (50) (1193)
F-probability=.0003/ETA=.14/Scheffe(.05) : IP sign. diff. from 
WA/LSD(.05) : IP,PA,CiP sign. diff. from WA,SDP.
The scale for calculating the means is; 4=very strong, 
3=rather strong, 2=not very strong, l=closer to.
138
While the different strength of partisanship among the 
identifiers of the various parties must be considered as 
generally weak both in 1983 (ETA=.ll) and 1987 (ETA=.14)
some interesting patterns nevertheless e m e r g e . ^0)
We have already seen that the share of own identifiers 
was lowest in the vote of parties fighting their first 
election, 28-46%. While the very small base of SDA and WA 
identifiers in 1983 (and even CiP identifiers in 1987) 
resulting in a large margin of sampling error - must be
20) In Table III. 1.7 we have calculated whether the 
difference in means of partisanship are significantly 
different. The F-test indicates that in 1983 there was not a 
significant difference between the parties at the .05 level, 
while the difference was significant in 1983. Different 
significance tests can be used to estimate if individual 
parties are significantly different and they give different 
results. In 1987, using the .05-level, the conservative 
Scheffe test indicates that only the IP and WA were 
significantly different, while LSD (least significant 
difference) and Duncan indicate that IP,PA and CiP were 
significantly different from both WA and SDP, the Student- 
Newman-Keuls test, Tukey (honestly significant difference), 
and Tukey's alternate test indicate that IP is significantly 
different from both WA and SDP, and PA from WA, and the 
modified LSD indicates that IP and PA are significantly 
different from WA. In 1983 the LSD indicates that PP and IP 
are significantly different from SDA, Duncan gives a 
significant difference between IP and SDA, while the other 
significance tests indicate no significant differences 
between two parties.
The different significance tests here use variously 
stringent criteria. But as all significance tests are very 
sensitive to group size (e.g. in 1987, Scheffe gives only 
significant difference between IP and WA even though the 
means for PA and CiP are higher than for IP) it is wise to 
consider also the strength of relationship (e.g. ETA). If 
the same (weak) patterns for small groups repeat themselves 
in different surveys, this is probably a result of a real 
difference, even though the difference in each survey is not 
significant due to the smallness of groups. This nature of 
significance tests has to be considered when relationships 
are weak, even though it is probably more common to 
interpret very weak relationships as meaningful only because 
they are statistically significant - while the fact is that 
almost any relationship becomes significant if sample size 
is big enough!
In Table III. 1.7 we include two significance tests, 
Schuffe, the most conservative, and LSD, one of the least 
stringent. The tests should be used with other indicators in 
assessing the data.
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borne in mind, the table shows that in 1983 the relatively 
few SDA and WA voters who identified with those parties also 
had relatively weak party attachments, as was to be 
expected. In 1983 SDA identifiers showed markedly weaker 
attachment to the party than was the case for the other 
parties: 67% of its identifiers only felt closer to the
party. The attachment of WA identifiers in 1983 was also 
weak: half of the party's identifiers only felt closer to
the party as was the case for one of the old parties, the 
SDP, while this group constituted only a third of the 
identifiers of the other three old parties, the IP, PP and 
PA.
A real surprise in Table III. 1.7 is the strength of party 
identification reported by CiP identifiers in 1987: only 33% 
of those feel closer to the party and the mean strength 
(2.44) is the highest for any party in the two elections. 
This is contrary to the expectation that strong party 
identification develops slowly. The rapid decline of CiP 
support in opinion polls after the 1987 election also 
indicates that the strong attachments measured in 1987 did 
not last. It may be suggested, that the extraordinary 
circumstances that surrounded the birth of the CiP in 1987 
may have served to raise the feelings of CiP supporters but 
what we have here is clearly not a measurement of what is 
usually implied by the concept of strong party 
identification.
If we look at the four old parties - and the WA in 1987 - 
a clear distinction emerges between the SDP and the WA on 
the one hand and the IP, PP and PA on the other. Around half 
of the SDP and WA identifiers only feel closer to their
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parties (means=l.98-2.04) , while the corresponding figures 
in both elections was around a third for the IP (means=2.19 
and 2.33)f the PP (means=2.13 and 2.17) and the PA
(means=2.03 and 2.34).21) The WA 1987 profile of strength in 
partisanship among the party's identifiers is very similar 
to its 1983 profile even though in 1987 69% of the party's 
vote came from own identifiers as compared to 42% in 1983.
The total pattern that emerges is that party attachments 
to parties fighting their first election is weak in the
sense that a low proportion of their voters identifies with 
the party (28-46%) and in two cases (the WA and SDA in 1983) 
also in the sense that the attachments to the party is weak
among identifiers, while the latter is not the case for the
CiP in 1987.
The voter alignments to the SDP in both elections and the 
WA in 1987 are relatively weak: 69-72% of their vote came
from own identifiers and around half of those identifiers 
only felt closer to the party. While a similar proportion of 
the PP vote comes from own identifiers (62-75%) the 
alignments of PP identifiers were stronger: one of every
three only felt closer to the party. The polar parties in 
the party system have the strongest voter alignments: 78-86% 
of their votes came from own identifiers and a third of the 
identifiers only felt closer to their party.
Let us finally consider whether our data gives any 
suggestions as to whether there exists any analytical 
distance between the concepts of direction of party
21) The relatively low mean for the PA in 1983 is mainly due 
to the fact that among those who said they were party 
supporters relatively few claimed to be very strong 
supporters.
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identification and voting among Icelandic voters. Do they
simply change party identification if they change party?
It must be kept in mind that the data has some
limitations when it comes to answering this question.
Although we have two samples from 1983 and 1987 with
relatively large numbers of respondents those samples have 
two limitations. First, they only contain reported party 
identification at the time of the interview and therefore 
can not answer the question as to whether the respondents 
have changed their party identification between elections. 
Second, the vote in the previous election - four years 
earlier - is as reported at the time of the interview, thus 
subject to recall error.
The panel does not have these limitations. Here we have 
both party identification and 1983 vote as reported in 1983 
and 1987 vote and party identification as reported in 1987. 
The major limitation of the panel data is on the other hand 
its relatively small size (N=678). We will analyse both sets 
of data. Table III.1.8 is based on the total samples in 1983 
and 1987 and shows how voting in the present and previous 
election corresponds to present party identification, among 
those who identified with a party at the time of the 
interview and reported their vote in both the present and 
previous election.
Table III.1.8 shows that a large majority of party 
identifiers in both elections reported that they had voted 
for their own party both in the present and previous 
elections. 80% of the identifiers did so in 1983 but only 
69% in 1987. This drop was to be expected, as the overall 
volatility in 1987 was greater than in 1983. In both
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elections 8% of the party identifiers reported voting for 
their own party in the previous election but not in the 
present one. Those voters seem to behave in accordance with 
the Michigan model, retaining identification with their old 
party while voting for a new one.
Table III.1.8. Voting 1979 and 1983 compared to party 
identification 1983. Total sample 1983. Voting 1983 and 1987 
compared to party identification 1987. Total sample 1987. 
Percentages.
1983 election :
Party identification 1983 same as vote '79 and '83 80
Party ident. 1983 same as vote '83 but not '79 10
Party ident. 1983 same as vote '79 but not '83 8
Party ident. 1983 neither same as vote '79 nor '83 2
Total 100
(N=602)
1987 election :
Party identification 1987 same as vote '83 and '87 69
Party ident. 1987 same as vote '87 but not '83 19
Party ident. 1987 same as vote '83 but not '87 8
Party ident. 1987 neither same as vote '83 nor '87 4
Total 100
(N=919)
From the 1983 sample the table includes only those who in 
1983 identified with one party and reported the party voted 
for both in 1979 and 1983 (60% of the total sample) . From
the 1987 sample the table includes only those who in 1987 
identified with one party, and reported party voted for both 
in 1983 and 1987 (50% of the total sample).
10% of the identifiers in 1983 and 19% in 1987 reported 
voting in accordance with their declared party 
identification in the present but not in the previous 
election. These voters have either adopted a new 
identification in accordance with their present voting 
behaviour (the 4% who both identified with and voted for a 
new party (SDA or WA) in 1983 and the 5% in 1987 who
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identified with and voted for HP, URE, NP or CiP obviously 
had made such an adoption) or their vote in the previous 
election deviates from their "normal" vote.
Table III.1.9 shows changes in both voting behaviour and 
party identification 1983-1987 among our panel respondents. 
In order to enable a comparison to Table III. 1.8 we also 
show how voting behaviour in 1983 and 1987 corresponds to 
party identification in 1987.
Table III.1.9. Voting and party identification 1983-1987. 
Only those who report party voted for and identify with one 
party both in 1983 and 1987. Panel respondents. Percentages.
1983-1987:
Changed neither party vote nor party identification 66
Changed party identification but not party vote 2
Changed party vote but not party identification 12
Changed both party vote and party identification 20
Total  ^ 100
(N=369)
Party identification 1987 same as vote '83 and '87 69
Party ident. 1987 same as vote '87 but not '83 21
Party ident. 1987 same as vote '83 but not '87 8
Party ident. 1987 neither same as vote '83 nor '87 2
Total 100
(N=369)
The table includes only those in the panel who reported vote 
1983 and identified with one party in the 1983 interview and 
reported vote 1987 and identified with one party in the 1987 
interview (54% of the panel respondents).
The differences between Table III. 1.8 - based on the
total 1987 sample giving party identification in 1987 and 
vote in 1983 and 1987 - and Table III. 1.9 - based on the 
1987 panel respondents who identified with one party in 1987 
and reported the party for which they voted both in the 1983 
and 1987 interviews - are small when we compare voting 
behaviour in 1983 and 1987 to party identification in 1987
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(lower section of Table III. 1.9) . The difference is that the 
proportion reporting that their party identification in 1987 
is the same as their 1987 vote but different from their 1983 
vote is 2% higher among panel respondents (21%), while the 
proportion voting in accordance with the 1987 party 
identification neither in 1983 nor 1987 is 2% higher in the 
panel than in the total sample. Those differences are 
clearly within the margins of sampling error.
The other part of Table III. 1.9 is more interesting, as 
it gives us new information not included in Table III.1.8. 
As we have both party identification and voting behaviour in 
both elections we can see directly what changes took place.
66% of the panel respondents neither changed party nor 
party identification 1983-1987. This figure is lower than 
the proportion reporting that their vote in 1983 and 1987 is 
in accordance with the 1987 party identification because 8 
individuals had changed their party identification but not 
their voting behaviour between the two elections. In 1987 7 
of those 8 identified with the party they voted for both in 
1983 and 1987 while one changed party identification while 
still voting for the party identified with in 1983. Those 7 
individuals seem to have retained an old party 
identification while having changed their voting behaviour 
but later adopted a new party identification corresponding 
to their new voting behaviour. For them party identification 
seems a somewhat more lasting characteristic than voting 
behaviour.
The proportion of voters in the panel who changed their 
vote from 1983-1987 but retained their party identification, 
is 12%. This figure is higher than the 8% who reported their
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party identification in 1987 to be the same as their vote in
1983 but not in 1987 . These voters are included in the 12%
figure22) but in addition we have 12 individuals (3%) who
did not change party identification 1983-1987 and voted in
accordance with that identification in 1987 but not in 1983.
Those 12 individuals' voting behaviour fits the Michigan
model; in terms of the model those 12 "deviated" in their
vote in 1983 but returned to "normal" in 1987.23)
20% (72 respondents) of the panel changed both party vote
and party identification 1983-1987. Most of them (15% or 57
respondents) voted in accordance with party identification
both in 1983 and 1987, thus simply changing party
identification with their vote. 2% (9 individuals) voted
according to party identification in 1987 but not in 1983,
1% (3 respondents) voted according to party identification
in 1983 but not in 1987, and 1% (3 respondents) voted in
neither election in accordance with their party
identification.
Our panel results can be compared to Swedish panel data
from 1973-76 and 1976-79 on the basis of which Soren
Holmberg concludes for Sweden:
The direction of party identification is 
therefore not to the same extent as in USA a 
useful instrument for analysis of voting 
behaviour in Sweden. It measures actual voting 
to far too great an extent, and therefore is 
measurewise far too close to what is to be
explained.24)
22) Except 3 respondents who changed both party vote and 
party identification from 1983 to 1987, and who in neither 
election voted in accordance with party identification, but 
whose 1987 identification was in accordance with 1983 vote.
23) Also included in this category are 5 individuals, who 
voted in neither election in accordance with party 
identification 1987, but nevertheless identified with the 
same party both in 1983 and 1987.
24) Holmberg (1981), p. 177. My translation.
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In both of the Swedish panels 78% neither changed party 
vote nor party identification while this was the case for 
66% of the respondents in the Icelandic panel. 4-5% of the 
Swedish panels changed party but not party identification as 
compared to 12% in the Icelandic one, 5-7% of the Swedes 
changed their identification bu£ not party while only 2% of 
the Icelanders did so, and 11-12% of the Swedish panels 
changed both party and party identification while the 
corresponding figure in the Icelandic panel was 20%.
In the 1973-76 Swedish panel 15% changed party 
identification while 18% changed party vote. In the 1976-79 
Swedish panel 17% changed party identification and 17% 
changed party vote. In the Icelandic panel on the other hand 
22% changed party identification while 32% changed their 
vote from 1983-87. Thus the behaviour of the Icelandic 
voters seems to fit the Michigan model somewhat better than 
that of the Swedish voters. But, as in Sweden, a higher 
proportion of vote switchers changed their party
identification than retained it. In the Swedish 1973-76 
panel 61% of party switchers also changed party
identification while 71% in the 1976-79 panel did so. In the 
Icelandic panel 62% of party switchers also changed party 
identification but only 49% simply moved their
identification with their vote in the sense that they voted 
in accordance with party identification both in 1983 and 
1987.
The Icelandic party system in the 1980s was not only 
different from the Swedish one in the 1970s in that the 
overall volatility in Iceland was much higher but also in 
the fact that both in the 1983 and 1987 elections in Iceland
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new parties were quite successful. It is possible that 
voters view new competitors with their old party
differently than the old enemies, i.e. that they find it
easier to vote for a new party while retaining party 
identification for their old party.
The data from the total 1983 sample seems to fit this 
hypothesis. Of the 76 respondents who switched to the two 
new parties, the SDA and the WA, only 29% had adopted a
party identification for their new party while 46% still 
identified with the party they voted for in 1979, 21%
reported no party identification, and 4% said they 
identified with an old party that they had not voted for in 
1979. While the data from 1983 does not allow us to
calculate comparable figures for switches to the old 
parties, it is likely that a higher percentage of those also 
adopted an identification with the party they switched to in
the election.25)
25) In the 1983 total sample 29% of the switchers to new 
parties also identified with the party they voted for. All 
those voters had obviously adopted a new party 
identification. This is not the case for switchers to old 
parties. In 1983 47% of the switchers to old parties 
identified with the party they voted for in 1983 while 16% 
identified with the party they voted for in 1979 and 39% 
reported no party identification. This does not mean that 
47% of the switchers to old parties had changed their party 
identification and only 16% retained it, mainly because 
those who maintained identification with the same party 
1979-83 and voted in accordance with party identification in 
1983 but not in 1979 are included in the 47%.
This can be seen clearly if we compare the results from 
the 1987 total sample and the panel results. In the 1987 
total sample 46% of switchers to old parties identified with 
the party they voted for in 1987 while only 18% identified 
with the party they voted for in 1983, and 29% reported no 
party identification. In the panel, on the other hand, 27% 
of vote-switchers to the old parties in 1987 had retained 
their 1983 party identification.
The patterns for switchers to old parties in the total 
samples of 1983 and 1987 are very similar. If the behaviour 
that created those patterns (which we cannot describe for 
1983 but only for 1987 by using the panel) is similar in
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Table III.1.10. Party identification 1983-87 of switchers in 
the 1987 election. Panel respondents. Percentages.
Switchers to new parties 1987 (HP^URE, NP,CiP)
Identify with same party 1983 and 1987 
Identify with old party 1983 and another 
Identify with old party 
No party identification 
Identify with old party 
No party identification 
No party identification
Total
old 1987 
1983 and new in 1987 
1983, with new in 1987 
1983, no party ident. 1987 
1983, with old party 1987 
1983 and 1987
Switchers to old parties 1987:
Identify 
Identify 
No party 
Identify 
No party
Total
with same party 1983 and 1987 
with different parties 1983 and 
identification 1983, with party 
with party 1983, no party ident 
identification 1983 and 1987
1987
1987
1987
32
2
35
9
7
4
12
101
(N=57)'
27
39
15
10
10
101
(N=82)
Switchers to WA in 1987:
Identify with same old party 1983 and 1987 
Identify with an old party 1983, with WA 1987 
Identify with old party 1983, no party ident. 1987 
No party identification 1983, with WA 1987 
No party identification 1983 and 1987
Total
11
53
25
100
(N=36)
Only those panel respondents who reported vote in both 
elections and switched parties are included in the table. 
Those whose party identification was "other/unknown" in 
either election are excluded.
Our panel data allows us to test directly if switchers to 
new parties in 1987 were less prone to adopt a new party 
identification than switchers to old parties. Table III.1.10 
shows changes in party identification 1983-87 among
both elections switchers to new parties have adopted 
identification with the party they voted for in 1983 to a 
considerable less degree than the switchers to old parties 
in 1983.
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switchers to new parties (HP, URE, NP, CiP) , old parties 
(SDP, PP, IP, PA) and to the WA.
Table III.1.10 shows that 44% of switchers to new parties 
identify with their new party (35% who have changed their 
identification from an old party in 1983 and 9% who had no 
party identification in 1983) while - as we saw before - the 
corresponding figure in 1983 was 29%. In 1987 only 32% of 
switchers to old parties still identified with the same old 
party they identified with in 1983,26) while in 1983 46% of 
switchers to new parties still identified with the party 
they voted for in 1979. Switchers to new parties thus 
adopted a party identification with their new party to a 
considerable greater degree in 1987 than in 1983.
The table also reveals that the differences between 
switchers to new and old parties in 1987 are small. 27% of 
switchers to old parties retained their party identification 
as compared to 32% of switchers to new parties. This is a 
small difference, especially in light of the small number of 
respondents on which the percentages are based.
If we look only at those who identified with a party both 
in 1983 and 1987, 41% of switchers to old parties retained
their party identification while 46% of switchers to new 
parties did so. The panel data does not support the 
hypothesis that switchers to new parties are more likely to 
retain their old party identification than switchers to old 
parties.
What stands out in Table III.1.10 is switches to the WA. 
While the number of respondents in this group is admittedly
26) 16 of 18 individuals in this group voted according to 
party identification in 1983.
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very small, only 11% of these switchers retained their old 
party identification (or 17% if we look only at those who 
identified with a party both in 1983 and 1987) .
Our overall conclusion must be that while the direction 
of party identification in Iceland does not simply measure 
voting behaviour, the fact that more voters who switch their 
vote change their identification than retain it seriously 
limits the usefulness of the concept in the Icelandic 
context. This does not of course apply to the concept of 
strength of party identification, which is clearly related 
to electoral volatility.
III. 2 Party membership
Party members are often seen as the core of modern mass 
parties. The party activists who may take part in forming 
policies, choosing leadership, running the election 
campaign, etc. will be formal members of their party. Party 
members could also be expected to be more loyal to their 
party in the polling booth than other supporters or 
identifiers.
Party systems have however differed considerably with 
regard to mass membership of the parties. American parties 
have for instance usually had few formal members although 
they have mobilized many voters in primary elections. In 
Western Europe, where high party membership was common, 
membership has generally declined in recent decades. 
Individual parties within the same party system have also 
differed in terms of the members/voters ratio and membership 
has been of different nature, e.g. direct or indirect.
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The four old Icelandic parties are all formally mass 
parties organized in a similar way.27) in all cases 
membership is direct. While the parties have claimed certain 
membership figures, no independent evidence has been 
available on the size of their membership.
In this section we will examine the party membership of 
Icelandic voters. How large a part of the electorate are 
formal members of the parties? Do the parties differ in this 
respect? Are party members more loyal supporters than 
others?
In our surveys we asked those respondents who supported a 
party or felt closer to a party if they were members of that 
party. In 1983 those identifiers who were not party members 
were further asked: Would you consider becoming a member?
In 1987 the follow-up question was not asked. The results 
are presented in Table III.2.1.
Table III.2.1. Are you - or would you consider becoming - a 
member in the party you identify with? Total samples 1983 
and 1987. Percentages.
1983 1987
Members of party identified with 20 20
Not members of party identified with 62 57
No party identification 19 22
Total 101 99
N= (967) (1641)
Of party identifiers who are not members:
-Would consider becoming members 31 N.A.
-Would not consider becoming members 69 N.A.
Total 100
N= (548)
27) See e.g. O.R. Grimsson (1978b), O.Th. Hardarson (1987), 
and G.H. Kristinsson (1991).
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The proportion of party members is the same in 1983 and 
1987 and they are clearly a minority in the electorate: only 
one in every five voters claims to be a formal member of a 
political party. As we have seen before the same proportion, 
about one in every five, has no party identification at all 
while about three in every five identify with a party 
without being a member. In this last category, according to 
the 1983 survey, one in three would consider becoming a 
member, the other two would not. Thus the parties certainly 
have potential recruits but it is noteworthy that half of 
their identifiers would not consider becoming members 
according to the 1983 figures. Even if all those who said 
they would consider becoming members actually joined a party 
only 40% of the electorate would be party members.
How are the party members divided between the parties, 
and to what extent do our figures fit the membership figures 
claimed by the parties?
The estimates based on our survey figures correspond 
broadly to the overall membership pattern indicated by the 
parties' own figures even though there are some 
discrepancies (see Table III.2.2). Our results suggest that 
SDP's and PP's membership figures are exaggerated, that more 
voters consider themselves PA members than the party's 
records show - and the IP claimed increase in membership 
between 1982-86 is not substantiated by the survey data.28)
28) Party officials of the PP and SDP acknowledge that their 
records are not very accurate and might well be inflated. 
Membership dues are either not collected, or only collected 
irregularly, so a name registered in the party records can 
easily stay there for years without the person taking any 
part in party activity. This is also the case for the IP, 
while the PA records are probably more accurate and 
membership dues collected more stringently. The claimed 
increase in IP members from 1982-86 may at least partly stem
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The major characteristic of the Icelandic party membership 
pattern is however confirmed: the IP is more successful than 
the other parties in mobilizing their support into formal 
membership of the party. Between 47% (1987) and 57% (1983)
of all formal party members belong to the IP althoguh the 
party obtained 27.2% of the votes in 1987 and 38.7% in 1983.
Table III.2.2. Party membership of respondents in 1983 and 
1987 compared to the parties' claimed membership in 1982 and 
1986.
Party members 
in sample
Membership 
estimate based 
on sample
Membership 
claimed by 
the parties
1983 1987 1983 1987 1982 1986
SDP 21 (11%) 39 (12%) 3200 3600 5000 5000
PP 33(18%) 47 (15%) 5000 4400 6-9000 N.A.
IP 107(57%) 153 (47%) 16100 14200 15-20000 25-26000
PA 23 (12%) 46 (14%) 3500 4300 3000 3000
SDA 2 (1%) 300
WA 3(2%) 18 (6%) 500 1700
CiP 15 (5%) 1400
Others 4 (1%)
Total 189 322
(101%) (100%)
Others in 1987 are the Humanist Party (1), the Union of 
Regional Equality (2) and the National Party (1).
The estimate of party members in the electorate is 
calculated simply by multiplying each party's number of 
party members by the ratio: total electorate/size of the
sample - for 1983 150.977/1003, and for 1987 171.402/1845. 
The claimed membership figures in 1982 and 1986 are based on 
information from the parties' headquarters (See O.Th. 
Hardarson (1983 and 1987)).
Table III.2.3 shows the profiles of the parties' voters 
in terms of membership.
from people "recruited" for participation in a primary 
election, who after the primary nevertheless do not consider 
themselves as party members. CiP identifiers who had been 
members of the IP are of course included in the IP figures 
from 1986.
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Table III.2.3. Membership and party identification by party 
voted for in 1983 and 1987. Percentages. Total samples. 
Percentages.
Party voted for in 1983
SDP PP IP PA WA SDA Total
Member of
-party voted for 20 23 27 17 6 3 21
-other party 2 - 0 1 6 6 1
Not member but identifies with
-party voted for 52 52 58 71 37 24 55
-other party 11 10 3 5 31 38 10
No party identif. 15 15 11 6 21 29 13
Total 100 100 99 100 101 100 100
N= (107) (135) (349) (132) (52) (66) (841)
Party voted :for in 1987
SDP PP IP PA WA CiP Total
Member of
-party voted for 17 18 32 22 9 13 22
-other party 1 1 1 1 2 8 2
Not member but identifies with
-party voted for 54 45 52 57 61 33 51
-other party 12 15 3 11 9 23 10
No party identif. 16 21 12 8 19 23 16
Total 100 100 100 99 100 100 101
N= (216) (244) (438) (190) (180) (104) (1372)
We saw earlier, in Table III. 1.6, what proportion of each 
party's vote came from its own identifiers, identifiers of 
other parties and voters without party identification. The 
IP and the PA obtained the highest proportion from their own 
identifiers, the SDP, PP and WA in 1987 somewhat lower, and 
the SDA and WA in 1983 and CiP in 1987 obtained the lowest 
share from own identifiers. Table III.2.3 shows on the other 
hand how each party's vote is composed of the party's 
members, members of other parties, identifiers of the party 
and other parties who are not party members, and voters 
without party identification.29)
29) The percentage of own identifiers in each party's vote 
can be calculated in Table III.2.3 by adding own members and 
identifiers who are not members. Similarly, by adding other
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In both elections the IP stands out as the party which 
gets the highest share of its vote (27-32%) from own
members while the corresponding figures for the other old 
parties, the SDP, PP and PA, are 17-23%. Party members 
constitute a much lower share of the new parties' vote as 
might be expected, but it should be noted that 13% of the 
Citizens' Party's vote in 1987 came from own members
compared to 3 and 6% for the SDA and WA respectively in 1983 
- probably a reflection of the strong grass-root 
mobilization of Gudmundson's supporters in the 1987 
campaign.
While the proportion of own members in the WA vote
increases from 1983-87 from 6% to 9%, the share of own
identifiers in the WA vote increase from 4 3% to 70%. In 1987 
the share of members in the WA vote is still much lower than 
is the case for the old parties while its share of 
identifiers is similar to that of the PP and the SDP. Thus 
in a relatively short time the WA voters have to a high 
degree started to identify with their party although the 
process of becoming party members is developing at a much 
slower rate.
Of course, relatively few party members vote for another 
party. Nevertheless, 6-8% of the votes for parties putting 
up candidates for the first time came from members of other 
parties (SDA and WA in 1983 and CiP in 1987) while this
parties' members and identifiers who are not members we get 
the percentage of other parties' identifiers in each party's 
profile. The percentages in Table III.2.3 do not correspond 
exactly to the figures in Table III.1.6, as a few more 
respondents are missing in Table III.2.3, and due to 
rounding error but the discrepancies are very small.
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figure was down to 2% for the WA in 1987, which is similar 
to the old parties.
As we saw before, the IP and the PA stand out in that 
they obtain relatively little from voters identifying with 
other parties and from voters without party identification. 
But while these parties have in common a large share of 
voters from own identifiers, they differ in that a much 
higher proportion of the IP identifiers are party members. 
PA identifiers are also less inclined to join the party 
according to the 1983 figures.30)
We have seen that the parties differ in terms of 
membership, but to what extent are the members really the 
core of the parties' supporters? We will discuss this 
question in the remainder of this section by examining party 
membership in relation to strength of party identification 
and vote switching.
Table III.2.4 reveals a strong relationship between the 
strength of party identification and party membership. As 
party identification becomes stronger the proportion of 
party members increases and the pattern is similar both in 
1983 and 1987. The 1983 figures also show that among those 
voters who are not party members the inclination to join a 
party decreases sharply as party identification grows 
weaker. The party members are clearly the core of the 
parties in the sense that they identify more strongly with 
their party than others. The two variables are, however, by 
no means identical. Almost a third of those who consider 
themselves "very strong supporters" are for instance not
30) In 1983 64% of PA identifiers said they would not 
consider becoming members while the corresponding figure for 
the SDP was 53%, SDA 50%, IP 46%, PP 45% and WA 29%.
157
party members and only 35-40% of "rather strong supporters" 
are party members.
Table III.2.4. Party membership by strength of party
identification 1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
Strength of party identification
1983 election Very Rather Not very Closer
strong strong strong to
Party members 69 40 20 8
Would consider becoming members 16 32 19 22
Would not consider becoming m. 15 28 61 71
Total 100 100 100 101
N= (75) (202) (184) (278)
ETA=.4 8 (membership dep., ), ETA=.4 8 (party ident. dep.)
1983 election^^^ Very Rather Not very Closer
strong strong strong to
Party members 68 38 19 7
Not party members 32 62 81 93
Total 100 100 100 100
N= (77) (213) (194) (301)
ETA=.44 (membership dep. ), ETA=.4 3 (party ident. dep.)
1987 election Very Rather Not very Closer
strong strong strong to
Party members 68 35 21 6
Not party members 32 65 79 94
Total 100 100 100 100
N= (186) (323) (268) (477)
ETA=.4 8 (membership dep. ), ETA=.47 (party ident. dep.)
31) This section of table is included to enable direct 
comparison with the 1987 figures. The Ns are somewhat higher 
than in the first section of the table, where those for whom 
there is no response (mainly "don't knows") on the question 
if they would consider joining a party are omitted.
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Table III.2.5. Mean strength of party identification by 
party membership and party identified with in 1983 and 1987. 
Total samples.
Party identified with in 1983
SDP PP IP PA WA SDA Total
Party members 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.0(3.7)(3.5) 2.9
N= (21) (33) (107) (23) (3) (2) (189)
(F-prob=.3346/ETA=.17/Scheffe(.05) and LSD (.05): No two 
parties significantly different).
Identifiers who are
not party members 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.9
N= (66) (89) (248) (121) (21) (18) (563)
(F-prob=.0883/ETA=.13/Scheffe(.05): No two parties sign, 
diff./LSD(.05) : IP sign. diff. from SDA,SDP).
All identifiers 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.1
N= (87) (122) (355) (144) (24) (20) (752)
(F-prob:.1326/ETA=.11/Scheffe(.05): No two parties sign, 
diff./LSD(.05) :SDA sign. diff. from PP, IP) .
Party members (2.9) vs. not party members (1.9): F- 
prob=.0000/ETA=.43.
Party identified with in 1987
SDP PP IP PA WA CiP Total
Party members 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.1
N= (39) (47) (150) (46) (17) (15) (315)
(F-prob=.2125/ETA=.15/Scheffe and LSD(.05): No two parties 
sign. diff.).
Identifiers who are
not party members 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.9
N= (132) (129) (276) (124) (140) (34) (838)
(F-prob=.0286/ETA=.12/Scheffe(.05): No two parties sign, 
diff./LSD(.05): IP sign. diff. from SDP and PP, PA sign, 
diff. from SDP).
All identifiers 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.5 2.2
N= (171) (176) (426) (171) (157) (49) (1153)
(F-prob=.0007/ETA=.14/Scheffe(.05): IP sign. diff. from WA 
/LSD(.05): WA and SDP sign. diff. from IP,PA,CiP).
Party members (3.1) vs. not party members (1.9): F- 
prob=.0000/ETA=.46.
Scale for strength of party identification: 4=very strong, 
3=rather strong, 2=not very strong, l=closer to.
But while party members are clearly stronger party 
supporters than non-members, is there a difference between
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the individual parties in how strongly their identifiers 
support the party? Table III.2.5 shows the mean strength of 
party identification among each party's identifiers in 1983 
and 1987 both among party members and identifiers who are 
not party members.3^)
The overall patterns in Table III.2.5 are similar both in 
1983 and 1987. While there are differences in the strength 
of party identification between party members and 
identifiers who are not party members (ETA=.43 and .46), the 
relationship between strength of partisanship and party is 
weak within the two membership categories (ETA=.12 to .17). 
Nevertheless, in both elections the strength of party 
identification is greater among identifiers of IP and PA who 
are not party members than is the case for the SDP, PP and 
WA. The difference is too small to be statistically 
significant on the Scheffe-test. The parties do not vary 
greatly in how strongly members or identifiers who are not 
members support their party.
A similar pattern can be observed if we examine the 
relationship between party membership and vote switching.
Table III.2.6 shows that party members were less likely 
to switch parties than identifiers who are not party members 
both in 1983 and 1987 - and in both elections those without 
party identification were by far most likely to switch 
parties. The table also reveals that the increased overall 
volatility from 1983 to 1987 is a reflection of increased 
volatility among both party members and non-members.
32) The means for all identifiers in Table III.2.5 are 
slightly different from the means in Table III. 1.7 as the 
identifiers for whom information on party membership is 
missing are omitted here.
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Table III.2.6. Party switching 1979-1983 and 1983-1987 by 
party membership. Total samples. Percentages.
1979 -83 1983-87
Same Party N Same Party N
party change party change
Party members 92 8 (170) 86 14 (285)
Other identif. 76 24 (443) 62 38 (659)
No party id. 42 58 (72) 35 65 (144)
Chi-sq=70.92 Chi-sq=110.47
(sign=.0000) (sign=.0000)
ETA=.32 (change dependent) ETA=.32 (ch. dep. )
Party members:
SDP 100 0 (21) 85 15 (34)
PP 97 3 (30) 93 7 (45)
IP 91 9 (95) 95 5 (130)
PA 100 0 (20) 93 7 (40)
Chi-sq=5.01 Chi-sq=4.35
(sign=.1712) (sign=.2263)
ETA=.17 ( change dependent) ETA=.13 (ch. dep. )
Identifiers who are not party members :
SDP 79 21 (53) 63 37 (100)
PP 83 17 (71) 69 31 (94)
IP 82 18 (191) 79 21 (201)
PA 78 22 (92) 77 23 (92)
Chi-sq=.98 
(sign=.8164)
ETA=.05 (change dependent)
Chi-sq=l0.4 6 
(sign=.0151) 
ETA=.15 (ch.dep.)
The latter part of the table tests whether there are 
differences between the old parties within the membership 
categories. Party members of the different parties did not 
show a significantly different tendency to switch parties 
either in 1983 or 1987. The same is the case for identifiers 
who are not members in 1983/ in 1987, however, the 
difference is significant: a higher proportion of SDP and PP 
identifiers change party than is the case for the IP and the 
PA.
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Table III.2.7. Party switching 1983 and 1987 by strength of 
party identification and party membership. Total samples. 
ANOVA. and MCA.
Party switching 1979-83 and 1983-87 is coded 0 (did not 
switch parties) and 1 (did switch parties) . Thus, the party 
switching means in the table show directly the percentage of 
party switchers in each group.
Party switching 1979-83:
Party Not party All
Party identificat ion members members
Very strong .06 (47) .10 (20) .07 (67)
Rather strong .04 (73) .18 (110) .13 (183)
Not very strong .15 (34) .10 (125) .11 (159)
Closer to .19 (16) .37 (188) .36 (204)
No party ident. .00 (0) .58 (72) .58 (72)
All .08 (170) .28 (515) .23 (685)
Significance (F) of ma in 'effects :
Strength of party identif ication=.000
Party membership= .039
Significance (F) of 2-way interact ions :.,151
MCA table:
Very strong party ident 
Rather strong 
Not very strong 
Closer to 
No party id
N
(67)
(183)
(159)
(204)
(72)
Unadjusted 
deviations 
-.16 
-  .11 
-.13 
. 12 
.35 
ETA=.39
Adjusted
deviations
-.12
-.10
-.13
.11
.33
BETA=.36
Party members 
Not party members
Multiple R=.393 
Multiple R squared=.155
(170)
(515)
-.15
.05
ETA=.21
-.06
.02
BETA=.08
continued. . .
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Party switching 1983-87:
Party Not party All party
Party identification members members identifiers
Very strong .13 (109) .23 (47) .16 (156)
Rather strong .08 (103) .28 (160) .20 (263)
Not very strong .14 (49) .21 (156) .20 (205)
Closer to .50 (22) .54 (288) .54 (310)
No party id .00 (0) .65 (144) .65 (144)
All .14 (283) .43 (795) .35 (1078)
Significance (F) of main effects :
Strength of party identification=.000
Party membership=.000
Significance (F) of 2-way interaction=.324
MCA table:
N Unadjusted Adjusted
deviations deviations
Very strong party ident. (156) -.19 -.13
Rather strong (263) -.15 -.13
Not very strong (205) -.16 -.16
Closer to (310) .19 .16
No party ident. (144) .30 .26
ETA=.4 0 BETA=.35
Party members (283) -.21 -.09
Not party members (651) .07 .03
ETA=.2 6 BETA=.12
Multiple R=.416 
Multiple R squared=.173
In a previous section (Table III. 1.4) we examined the 
relationship between strength of party identification and 
party switching and found it largely similar to the 
relationship between party membership and party switching, 
which is not surprising as party membership is strongly 
related to strength of party identification.33) In Table 
III.2.7 we use analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple
33) Among party identifiers the relationship between 
strength of party identification (on a scale 1-4) and party 
membership (1,2) was in 1983 ETA=.43 (N=785) and in 1987 
ETA=.47 (N=1254), using the strength of party identification 
as a dependent variable. For all voters the relationship 
between strength (scale 1-5) and membership (1,2) was in 
1983 ETA=.47 (N=964) and in 1987 ETA=.52 (N=1623). If party 
membership for all voters is coded l=party member,
2=identifier, but not member, and 3=no party identification 
(a category identical to 5=no party identification of the 
strength of party identification variable) the 1983 ETA=.74 
(N=964) and the 1987 ETA=.77 (N=1623).
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classification analysis (MCA) to show the impact of both 
party membership and strength of party identification on 
party switching.
Strength of party identification and party membership can 
together explain 16% of the variance in party switching in 
1983 and 17% in 1987. As indicated by the BETAs the
independent impact of the five-fold variable of strength of 
party identification is greater in both elections than is 
the impact of the dichotomous variable of party
m e m b e r s h i p . 34) The overall patterns for both elections are 
similar.
First, it is clear that party members are less likely to 
switch parties than non-members. Of party members, 8% in 
1983 and 14% in 1987 switched parties, while the 
corresponding figure for non-members was 28% in 1983 and 43% 
in 1987.
Second, the strength of party identification is clearly 
important, but the five-fold variable shows basically three 
groups in terms of switching behaviour, as the differences 
between the first three categories - of very strong, rather 
strong, and not very strong supporters - are small. Those 
three categories constitute the group which shows by far the
least tendency to switch parties: 7-13% did so in 1983 and
34) The reason for the different strength of relationship 
can be seen by comparing the different groups. Most party 
members are also supporters (154), while only 16 party 
members say they only feel closer to a party. Over 40% of 
the non-members feel on the other hand only closer to a 
party (188 of 443). As the tendency of party members to 
switch is on the whole only slightly less than of party 
supporters, but those who only feel closer to a party show 
by far the greatest tendency to switch, the relationship 
between switching and strength of party identification is 
greater as the most homogeneous group of switchers is 
basically a sub-group of non-members.
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16-20% in 1987. Those who only feel closer to a party are 
much more likely to switch (36% did so in 1983 and 54% in 
1987) while the group most likely to switch is those without 
party identification (58% switched in 1983, 65% in 1987).
Third, within each category of strength of party 
identification party members are less likely to switch than 
non-members in seven cases out of e i g h t . ^5) Thus, party 
members are less likely to switch than non-members, even 
when the strength of party identification is taken into 
account.
In this section we have shown that the party members - 
only 20% of the electorate - are indeed the core of party 
support in the sense that party members both identify more 
strongly with the parties than non-members and they are less 
likely to switch parties. But informal party identification 
is also important - many of the voters who strongly support 
their own party and show only a weak tendency to switch 
parties are not party members.
We have also shown that among members of the various 
parties the variations in strength of support and tendency 
to switch parties are not great. The same is true for non­
members who identify with the various parties. But as the 
proportion of members in the IP vote is higher than for the 
other parties, and the proportion of own identifiers in the 
IP and the PA vote is higher than for the other parties, 
those two parties - and especially the IP - seem to have 
stronger ties to their voters than the others. Using the 
same criteria we can conclude that the new parties have
35) The only exception is among "not very strong" supporters 
in 1983.
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weakest ties to their voters, even though the strong 
increase in identification with the WA from 1983-87 should 
be noted.
It should also be emphasized that while party membership 
and the strength of party identification are important for 
electoral volatility those factors can only account for a 
small proportion of the variation. And the increase in party 
switching from 23% in 1983 to 35% in 1987 is not due to any 
decrease in membership which did not in fact change. Neither 
can it be explained by declining strength of party 
identification, despite some decrease in its strength from 
1983-87. While the overall pattern of relationship between 
party switching and the two partisanship variables are 
similar in both elections, we observe increased volatility 
in 1987 in all partisanship groups except one. Partisanship 
is a slightly better predictor of volatility in 1987 than in 
1983 but it cannot explain the overall increase in party 
switching, which is probably due to some period effect.
III. 3 Participation in primaries
The involvement of the general voter in the candidate 
selection in elections varies greatly between parties and 
political systems. In recent decades open primaries have 
been widely used in American politics. While the exact rules 
for participation vary among US states, voters can usually 
take part in the parties' candidate selection without being 
formal party members.
In parliamentary democracies open primaries are non­
existent, except in Iceland. Candidature is either decided
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by party organs or by primaries confined to party 
members.36)
The oldest known example of a primary election in Iceland 
is from 1914.37) while various forms of primaries had 
occasionally been used in Icelandic politics, especially by 
the IP and PP, this form of candidate selection became 
increasingly popular in the early 1970s and has been used by 
all the four old parties to some extent. The IP and the PP 
have used primaries in most Althingi elections since this 
time. They are sometimes open to all voters (or party 
supporters) and sometimes closed, i.e. confined to party 
m e m b e r s .38) in 1975 the SDP adopted a party rule making open 
primaries compulsory. While the PA was the party most 
sceptical of using primaries, it has increasingly used 
closed primaries for candidate selection during the last 10- 
15 years.
The use of primaries can have great impact on the 
political system, e.g. on the type of candidates selected, 
personification of politics, ideology and party discipline. 
But the nature of candidate selection can also be an 
important part of the relationship between voters and 
parties.
In this section we will examine primary participation in 
Iceland. How large a part of the electorate takes part? Are 
the parties different in this respect? Is primary 
participation confined to the hard core of party supporters
36) A. Ranney (1981), pp. 77-80.
37) See H. Gudmundsson (1979), p. 28.
38) The distinction between an open and a closed primary is 
not clear-cut due to the loose definitions of party 
membership (see footnote 28 in this chapter).
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and party members? Is primary participation related to
electoral volatility?
In the 1983 survey respondents were asked if they had
ever taken part in a primary election. The results are
presented in Table 111.3.1 which also shows the
participation rate in the primaries before the elections of 
1983 and 1987.
Table III.3.1. Participation in primary elections. Total 
samples. Percentages.
Have you ever taken part Participated Participated
in a primary? (asked 1983) in 1983 in 1987
Yes 4 6 29 19
No 54 71 81
Total 100 100 100
N= (998) (992) (1814)
While 29% took part in a primary election before the 1983 
election and 19% in 1987,39) almost half of the voters 
claimed in 1983 that they had at some time participated in a 
primary. Table 111.3.2 shows what proportions of different 
political groups had ever taken part in a primary in 1983.
Primary participation has not been confined to a narrow 
group of voters. Table 111.3.2 shows that all the different 
groups in the table have participated in primaries to a 
considerable extent, even though clear differences emerge. 
It should nevertheless be underlined that the table does not 
distinguish between regular and occasional (even only one
39) Svanur Kristjansson has gathered the actual figures for 
primary participation in 1983 and 1987. According to his 
(unpublished) figures, 39,364 individuals (26% of registered 
voters) took part in primaries in 1983, while 27,489 (16%) 
did so in 1987. Our figures are slightly higher, partly as 
non-voters (who have a low participation rate in primaries) 
are underrepresented in the samples. The oldest voters, who 
are excluded from our samples, are also likely to have a low 
participation rate in primaries.
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time) participation. Thus we would expect stronger
relationship with the political variables in any one 
election.
Table III.3.2. Have you ever taken part in a primary? By 
party voted for 1983, strength of party identification, 
party membership and vote switching 1979-83. Total 1983 
sample. Percentages.
Have you ever voted in a primary? (Asked 1983)
1983-vote
SDP
PP
IP
PA
SDA
WA
Did not vote/blank ballot 
Total
Chi.sq=87.92(sign=.0000)/ETA=.31
Party identification 
Very strong 
Rather strong 
Not very strong 
Closer to a party 
No party identification
Total
Chi.sq=51.35(sign=.0000)/ETA=.23
Party membership 
Party member
Identifier but not party member 
Total
Chi.sq=87.05(sign=.0000)/ETA=.34 
Vote switching 1979-83
Yes No Total N
59 41 100 (107)
42 58 100 (136)
62 38 100 (354)
30 70 100 (134)
33 67 100 (67)
28 72 100 (53)
24 76 100 (94)
47 53 100 (945)
71 29 100 (78)
59 41 100 (218)
46 54 100 (195)
36 64 100 (311)
37 63 100 (188)
46 54 100 (990)
78 22 100 (189)
39 61 100 (597)
48 52 100 (786)
Voted for same party 1979 and 1983 56 44 100 (533)
Voted for diff. parties 1979 and 1983 39 61 100 (161)
Total 52 48 100 (694)
Chi.sq=13.99(sign=.0002)/ETA=.15
Around 60% of SDP and IP voters had participated in a 
primary while the corresponding figure for the PP is 42% and 
only 30% for the PA, as was to be expected. The two new 
parties did not hold primaries for the 1983 election but
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almost a third of WA (28%) and SDA (33%) voters had at some
time participated in a primary. 24% of those who did not
vote or turned in a blank ballot claimed to have voted at 
some time in a primary, further indicating that this group 
is not a group permanently alienated from the political 
system.40)
As party identification grows stronger the proportion 
which has taken part in a primary increases, but over a 
third of those who have the weakest identification - those 
who either only feel closer to a party or have no party 
identification - have taken part in candidate selection 
through primaries. The highest participation rate (78%) is 
among party members.
While a higher proportion (56%) of voters who did not 
change parties from 1979-83 had at some time taken part in a 
primary, 39% of the switchers had also done so.
Tables III.3.3 and III. 3.4 show the relationship of 
primary participation in 1983 and 1987 to the same political 
variables.
When we compare the relationship between primary 
participation and the political variables the overall
pattern for those having at some time taken part (Table
III. 3.2.) is to a large extent repeated for participation in 
1983 (Table III.3.3) and in 1987 (Table III.3.4). The fact 
that primary participation in 1987 was much lower (19%) than 
in 1983 (29%) is mainly reflected in a lower participation
rate in most categories.
40) See our earlier discussion on non-voters in Section
II.2.
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Table III.3.3. Did you take part in a primary before the 
1983 election? By party voted for 1983, strength of party 
identification, party membership and vote switching 1979-83. 
Total 1983 sample. Percentages.
Participation in 1983 primary 
Yes No Total N
1983-vote 
SDP 
PP 
IP 
PA 
SDA 
WA
Did not vote/blank ballot 
Total
Chi.sq=107.34(sign=.0 00 0)/ETA=.34
Party identification 
Very strong 
Rather strong 
Not very strong 
Closer to a party 
No party identification
Total
Chi.sq=95.8 8(sign=.0000)/ETA=.31
Party membership 
Party member
Identifier but not party member 
Total
Chi.sq=10 9.34(sign=.OOOG)/ETA=.38 
Vote switching 1979-83
42 58 100 (107)
26 74 100 (136)
46 54 100 (356)
13 87 100 (135)
13 87 100 (67)
11 89 100 (53)
10 90 100 (94)
30 70 100 (948)
58 42 100 (78)
47 53 100 (218)
25 75 100 (196)
19 81 100 (313)
17 83 100 (189)
29 71 100 (994)
63 37 100 (189)
22 78 100 (599)
32 68 100 (788)
Voted for same party 1979 and 1983 39 61 100 (534)
Voted for diff. parties 1979 and 1983 19 81 100 (162)
Total 34 66 100 (696)
Chi.sq=21.79(sign=.0002)/ETA=.18
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Table III.3.4. Did you take part in a primary before the 
1987 election? By party voted for 1987, strength of party 
identification, party membership and vote switching 1983-87. 
Total 1987 sample. Percentages.
Primary participation in 1987
1987-vote
SDP
PP
IP
PA
WA
CiP
Others
Did not vote/blank ballot
Yes
28
25
26 
16
6
17
14
5
No Total N
72
75
74
84
94 
83 
86
95
100 (240) 
100 (261) 
100 (460) 
100 (201) 
100 (190) 
100 (110) 
100 (70)
100 (93)
Total
Chi.sq=59.2 9(sign=.0000)/ETA=.19
20 80 100 (1625)
Party identification
Very strong 46 54 100 (188)
Rather strong 26 74 100 (323)
Not very strong 21 79 100 (270)
Closer to a party 12 88 100 (544)
No party identification 7 93 100 (363)
Total
Chi.sq=150.83(sign=.0 000)/ETA=.30
19 81 100 (1688)
Party membership
Party member 57 43 100 (330)
Identifier but not party member 11 89 100 (936)
Total
Chi.sq=2 88.7 0(sign=.0000)/ETA=.4 8
23 77 100 (1266)
Vote switching 1983-87
Voted for same party 1983 and 1987 28 72 100 (735)
Voted for diff. parties 1983 and 1987 14 86 100 (422)
Total
Chi.sq=25.64(sign=.0002)/ETA=.15
23 77 100 (1157)
An exception to this can, however, been observed if we 
look at the parties' participation rates in 1987. In 1983 
the PP voters with 26% participation in primaries were far 
behind IP (46%) and SDP (42%) . In 1987 the PP rate hardly 
went down (25%) , making the party similar to the IP (26%) 
and the SDP (28%) . While the PA had the lowest participation
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in both elections, its rate went up from 1983 (13%) to 1987 
(16%) , bringing the party much closer to the other old 
parties in terms of primary participation.
The strongest relationship in all three tables is between 
primary participation and party membership. This 
relationship is strongest in 1987 (ETA=.48) when
participation is down; while primary participation 1983- 
1987 decreased from 22% to 11% among party identifiers who 
were not party members it only slipped from 63% to 57% among 
party members. Party members are thus not only the group 
most likely to take part in primaries - their participation 
rate also seems most robust.
Let us finally consider to what extent those voters who 
took part in primaries in 1983 and 1987 actually voted for 
the party list they had put their mark on by ranking 
candidates in a primary election. Table III.3.5 shows the 
voting behaviour of those who took part in the four old 
parties' primaries in 1983 and 1987.
Participants in the closed PA primary 1987 remained most
loyal to the party in the election as 90% gave the PA their
vote.41) In terms of loyalty the IP came second (83-86%),
the PP third (79-80%) and the participants in the SDP 
primaries showed least loyalty: 73-75% of them voted for the
SDP in the elections.42)
41) It should though be noted that N is only 35 for the PA 
in 1987, resulting in a large margin of error, not to 
mention the 12 PA respondents in 1983.
42) One of the most consistent criticisms of primary 
elections, especially open ones, has been that they allow 
opponents of a party to decide its list of candidates or 
even organize the victory of the least "dangerous" 
candidate! While our rate of "defections" does not rule out 
such an explanation - and in a close primary the "defectors" 
could have made the difference - a closer look at the data 
makes this seem unlikely. A large part of the "defectors"
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Table III.3.5. Election vote by primary vote in 1983 and
1987 among those who voted in the old parties' primaries.
Total samples. Percentages.
Voted in the primary of
SDP PP IP PA Total
1983 election vote:
SDP 73 - 3 - 15
PP 8 79 4 - 13
IP 6 10 83 (8) 59
PA 4 7 1 (83) 6
SDA 2 - 3 - 3
WA 2 3 2 - 2
Did not vote 4 — 2 (8) 3
Total 99% 99% 98% (99%) 101%
N= (48 ) (29 ) (180) (12) (269 )
1987 election vote:
SDP 75 8 1 5 21
PP 5 80 1 - 20
IP 5 3 86 - 38
PA 1 1 - 90 11
WA 8 1 2 - 3
CiP 1 3 8 - 4
Others 3 3 2 6 3
Did not vote 1 1 1 - 1
Total 99% 100% 101% 101% 101%
N= (74 ) (73) (129) (35) (311)
Of all participants in the four old parties' primaries in
1983 (269 ) 81 . 1% voted for the party in which primary they
had taken part , 11 . 4% voted for another old party, 4. 9%
voted for a new party and 2.6% did not vote. Of the 1987
participants (311 ) 82 . 5% voted for the party in which
primary they had taken part, 7% voted for another old party.
9 . 7% voted for WA or a new party and 1% did not vote.
In this section we have seen that primary participation
has been widespread in Iceland, both in the sense that
almost half the electorate has taken part at one time or
another and that participation is not confined to particular
are e.g. voters who either only feel closer to a party or 
have no party identification. In 1983 this group constituted 
30% of all primary participants and 53% of the defections.
In 1987 the group constituted 27% of primary participants 
and 62% of the defections. Defections seem therefore more 
likely to be simply a result of a change of mind of voters 
weakly committed to the parties rather than an organized 
effort of strongly committed opponents.
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groups even though clear differences emerge. Voters with 
strong party identification and especially party members are 
more likely to participate than others. Primary participants 
are less likely to switch parties but the relationship can 
not be considered strong. While all the old parties are to 
some extent tied to their voters through primary
participation, those ties have clearly been most pronounced 
in the case of the IP and the SDP and least so in the case 
of the PA.
III.4 Exposure to the (party) press
Icelanders claim to have had one of the highest literacy 
rates in Europe for centuries. Newspapers and magazines were 
important media of political communication in the period of 
independence politics in the 19th and early 20th century. 
Newspaper editors argued for different paths on the way to 
independence from Denmark, a debate often marked by complex
legalistic arguments. Sometimes the papers favoured
individual candidates for Althingi elections and when cadre 
parties emerged in the Icelandic political system at the 
turn of the century most papers supported a particular 
party.43)
With the emergence of the modern parties and especially 
with the consolidation of the four-party system in the 1930- 
1942 period the major newspapers became linked to the 
political parties either formally or informally. The
political system became highly elitist and the parties
dominated most spheres in society, including political
43) See O.R. Grimsson and Th. Broddason (1977), pp. 200-201 
and O.R. Grimsson (1978a).
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communication.  ^ Three parties owned their newspapers: the
SDP owned Althydubladid (founded 1919), PP owned Timinn (a 
weekly from 1917, a daily from 1938), and Thjodviljinn
(1936) was the paper of the Communist Party, later
supporting the Socialist Party and then the PA. Morgunbladid 
(founded 1913) - which became by far the largest paper in
the country and is now printed in around 50,000 copies in a 
country with an electorate of ca. 180, 000 - had played an 
important part in the early 1920s in unifying the right wing 
elements in Icelandic politics which had been divided 
between various cadre parties and factions based on
independence p o l i t i c s . ^5) The paper supported the final 
consolidation of the right in the form of the IP from the 
party's foundation in 1929. The oldest daily, Visir (founded 
1910), also supported the IP, which at times owned the 
paper. All the papers were highly partisan, presenting the 
party line, smearing political opponents and usually not 
printing any dissenting point of view, not to mention 
articles by opponents. Icelandic State Broadcasting (founded 
1930) was heavily influenced by the political party leaders 
(e.g. through the Radio Council) and its neutrality rule was 
interpreted as being apolitical, i.e. minimizing political 
coverage. For all practical purposes the parties monopolized 
political communication through the newspapers.
44) O.R. Grimsson (1976) gives a detailed analysis of the 
elitist features of the four-party system.
45) See H. Gudmundsson (1979). A loose alliance of 
opposition MPs which was formed in 1923 without a name 
was e.g. called "the Morgunbladid Party" by its 
opponents (p. 86).
46) As a case in point we can mention, that in 1943, when 
all the political parties agreed to dissolve the union with 
Denmark, and declare Iceland a republic, the dissenting 
minority which protested that this should wait until after
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In th In the early 1970s mass communication, like many other 
spheres apheres of society, became more pluralistic as the grip of 
the partihe parties weakened. The state radio and state television 
(the lattthe latter founded in 1966) increasingly aired programs 
with poliiith political content, discussions and critical commentary. 
Visir hadisir had become increasingly independent of the IP and 
after a f.fter a feud on the paper in 1975 the independent Daghladid 
was founcas founded. Both papers were basically independent of 
parties larties but favoured centre-right editorial policy and 
competed ompeted in the evening market for several years before 
merging emerging again as Dagbladid Visir or DV in 1981. From the 
late 196ate 1960s Morgunbladid had also slowly become more 
independerndependent of the IP, while still supporting the party. In 
1986, af986, after the abolition of the state monopoly on 
broadcastJroadcasting, a private television station, Channel 2, was 
founded arounded and several private radio stations went on the air. 
All those 11 those developments led to increasing pluralism and the 
erosion orosion of party control over the media. Increasingly the 
politiciaroliticians had to take journalists seriously as the Fourth 
Estate. Tlstate. They had - sometimes painfully - to operate in an 
often hostften hostile media environment over which they had little 
control, ontrol.
While While we have no direct evidence to the effect, it is 
likely theikely that the parties' monopoly of the news media from the 
1930s to 930s to around 1970 served to strengthen or keep their 
voter alioter alignments intact, resulting in the low electoral 
volatilityDlatility from 1942-1967. Similarly, it is likely that the 
increasingicreasingly open and critical media market since the early
Second Woracond World War had finished found it very difficult to 
have theirave their views printed in the media.
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1970s has played its part in the increasing electoral 
volatility of the two last decades.
The impact of the media on human attitudes and behaviour 
has been widely discussed in last decades and been the 
subject of extensive scholarly research. While it is clear 
that the power of the media to mould human behaviour has 
often been exaggerated (its limitations as an agent of 
socialization - and its possibilities to trigger events - 
became for instance obvious in Eastern Europe in 1989), the 
debate has not led to any universally accepted general 
theories of the impact of the media - and it is doubtful if 
such a theory will ever be formed. A narrower approach which 
would attempt to measure the impact of a particular type of 
media on particular types of attitudes or behaviour is 
likely to be more fruitful. Nevertheless, electoral studies 
focusing on the media's impact on voting behaviour, for 
instance have not been able to reach any general 
c o n c l u s i o n s . 47) Such impact seems to vary depending on the 
location and time and research of this kind is always 
difficult, especially if we attempt to establish a causal 
link. If we observe for instance that the readers of a 
partisan newspaper overwhelmingly vote for the party which 
the paper supports we still do not know whether the paper 
persuaded its readers or if the readers simply selected the 
paper that broadly represented the views they had in the 
first place. If the latter were mainly the case we would
47) Many comments on the political impact of the media focus 
e.g. on how television has changed electoral politics. While 
this is obviously the case: politicians communicate through 
TV, the style of election campaigns has changed, etc., this 
tells us nothing about the impact of the medium per se on 
voters' decisions.
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nevertheless expect the paper to reinforce those views to 
some extent, thus having some political impact even though 
we could not measure the persuading impact itself.
In this section we will examine to what extent there 
still exist ties between parties and voters in the Icelandic 
electorate through the newspapers, i.e. to what extent the 
political position - or support for a particular party - of 
a newspaper is reflected in the political profile of its 
readers. While we would expect those ties to have weakened 
in recent decades, we have no evidence to test that 
hypothesis; we can only observe the situation in the 1980s.
In our surveys we asked the respondents how often they 
saw each daily paper: daily, often, seldom or never. Table
III.4.1 shows to what extent the voters of the different
parties were exposed to each newspaper in 1983 and 1987.
The first thing to note in Table III.4.1 is the very 
different circulation of the Icelandic newspapers. 
Morgunbladid, by far the strongest, was seen daily by 55-60% 
of voters; around 75% saw the paper daily or often. Second 
is the independent evening paper, DV , seen daily by 40-42% 
of voters; around 70% saw the paper daily or often. Far 
behind are the small party newspapers; daily readers of the 
PP's Timinn constituted 11-15% of voters while the 
corresponding figure for the PA's Thjodviljinn was 11-13%. 
The rural PP newspaper, Dagur, published in the northern 
town of Akureyri was seen daily by 7% of voters in 1987, but 
the paper's circulation is mainly confined to the Northeast 
and Northwest constituencies, where it is quite strong. 
Smallest is the SDP's paper, Althydubladid, which was seen
daily by 3-4% of Icelandic voters.
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Table III.4.1. Exposure to the daily newspapers by party 
voted for in 1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
Sees newspaper
Daily Often Seldom Never Total N
Althydubladid (SDP)
1983 vote
SDP 14 5 33 49 101 (107)
PP 2 2 30 67 101 (135)
IP 2 3 29 66 100 (353)
PA 5 2 27 67 101 (134)
SDA 1 3 40 55 99 (67)
WA 8 4 28 60 100 (53)
Did not vote 1 1 25 73 100 (93)
Total 4 3 30 64 101 (942)
Chi-sq=54.26(sign=.0000)/ETA= .21 (exposure dependent)
1987 vote
SDP 9 4 41 46 100 (241)
PP 1 1 29 69 100 (262)
IP 2 2 35 61 100 (460)
PA 2 2 36 60 100 (202)
WA 5 3 37 55 100 (191)
CiP 3 - 32 65 100 (110)
Other 1 2 34 62 99 (70)
Did not vote 2 27 71 100 (94)
Total 3 2 35 60 100 (1630)
Chi-sq=67.46(sign=.0000)/ETA=.19 
Dagur (PP, rural)
1987 vote
SDP 5 3 11 82 101 (239)
PP 15 5 19 61 100 (261)
IP 5 4 13 78 100 (460)
PA 7 9 15 70 101 (202)
WA 4 2 16 79 101 (190)
CiP 2 2 8 88 100 (110)
Other 20 7 15 58 100 (70)
Did not vote 8 3 14 76 101 (94)
Total 7 4 14 75 100 (1626)
Chi-sq=93.18(sign=.0000)/ETA=.22
continued.
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DV (independent)
1983 vote
SDP 46 28 20 7 101 (107)
PP 38 29 27 7 101 (135)
IP 44 28 23 5 100 (354)
PA 38 30 31 2 101 (135)
SDA 52 30 16 2 100 (67)
WA 28 47 23 2 100 (53)
Did not vote 39 23 31 6 99 (94)
Total 42 29 25 5 101(945)
Chi”Sq=28.70(sign= .0522)/ETA= .10
1987 vote
SDP 42 30 25 3 100 (240)
PP 37 22 33 8 100 (262)
IP 41 26 29 4 100 (461)
PA 33 33 31 4 101 (202)
WA 28 32 36 3 99(192)
CiP 58 26 15 1 100 (110)
Other 46 20 26 8 100 (70)
Did not vote 45 23 28 5 101 (94)
Total 40 27 29 4 100 (1631
Chi-sq=58.64(sign= .0000)/ETA= . 15
Morgunbladid (IP)
1983 vote
SDP 55 21 18 7 101 (106)
PP 34 20 42 4 100 (135)
IP 74 14 9 3 100 (355)
PA 36 24 36 4 100 (135)
SDA 58 21 19 2 100 (67)
WA 60 30 9 0 99 (53)
Did not vote 44 21 25 11 101 (94)
Total 56 19 21 4 100(945)
Chi-sq=144.11(sign=.00 00)/ETA=.33
1987 vote
SDP 68 15 14 3 100 (240)
PP 44 17 31 8 100 (262)
IP 80 8 9 3 100 (460)
PA 36 26 30 8 100 (202)
WA 56 21 22 1 100 (192)
CiP 69 12 15 4 100(110)
Other 38 12 40 10 100 (70)
Did not vote 43 24 26 7 100 (94)
Total 60 16 20 5 101 (1630)
Chi-sq=212.70(sign=.0000)/ETA=.33
continued
Timinn (PP)
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1983 vote
SDP 7 7 46 41 101 (106)
PP 43 13 30 14 100 (136)
IP 11 9 46 34 99(352)
PA 16 13 52 19 100 (134)
SDA 9 15 55 21 100 (67)
WA 15 13 53 19 100 (53)
Did not vote 8 14 36 43 101 (93)
Total 15 11 45 29 100 (941)
Chi-sq=133.45(sign= .0000)/ETA= .33
1987 vote
SDP 5 5 46 44 100 (241)
PP 29 15 29 27 100 (261)
IP 7 5 47 41 100 (458)
PA 9 8 47 37 101 (201)
WA 9 9 44 38 100 (191)
CiP 6 4 51 39 100 (110)
Other 14 7 40 40 101 (70)
Did not vote 4 14 35 47 100 (92)
Total 11 8 43 39 101 (1624)
Chi-sq=l63.28(sign= .0000)/ETA= .26
Thjodviljinn (PA)
1983 vote
SDP 5 7 34 55 101 (107)
PP 7 5 38 50 100 (134)
IP 5 5 37 53 100 (353)
PA 40 16 34 10 100(135)
SDA 6 9 48 37 100 (67)
WA 19 23 43 15 100 (53)
Did not vote 5 8 27 60 100 (93)
Total 11 8 37 44 100 (942)
Chi-sq=223.79(sign= .0000)/ETA= .46
1987 vote
SDP 6 6 39 50 101 (241)
PP 7 2 40 51 100 (262)
IP 6 4 41 49 100 (459)
PA 43 18 25 14 100 (201)
WA 21 13 40 27 101 (192)
CiP 7 4 39 50 100 (110)
Other 6 3 48 43 100 (70)
Did not vote 7 11 31 52 101 (92)
Total 13 7 38 43 101 (1627)
Chi-sq=342.27(sign= .0000)/ETA= .43
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The table reveals clear relationships between party voted 
for and newspaper r e a d e r s h i p . 48) The strongest relationship 
is between party voted for and exposure to Thjodviljinn 
(ETA=.46 and .43), followed by Morgunbladid (ETA=.33) and 
Timinn (ETA=.33 and .26). This relationship is weaker for 
Dagur (ETA=.22) and Althydubladid (ETA=.21 and .19) - and
weakest for the independent DV (ETA=.1049) and .15) . By 
using squared ETAs we can say that 18-21% of the variance of 
Thjodviljinn's readership can be explained by party voted 
for. Corresponding figures are 11% for Morgunbladid, 7-11% 
for Timinn, 5% for Dagur, 4% for Althydubladid and 1-2% for 
DV,
Morgunbladid has a high readership among voters of all 
parties even though its readership has a distinct political 
profile. 74-80% of IP voters saw the paper daily, closely 
followed by CiP voters (69%). A majority of voters for the 
SDP (55-68%), WA (56-60%) and SDA (58%) also saw 
Morgunbladid daily while this was the case for just over a 
third of PP (34-44%) and PA (36%) voters.
The other daily with a large circulation, DV, has a very 
different profile. While the differences between the four 
old parties are not great, a somewhat higher proportion of 
IP and SDP voters (41-46%) saw DV daily than was the case 
among PP and PA voters (33-38%) . When we look at the new 
parties, however, an interesting pattern emerges. Both in 
1983 and 1987 only 28% of WA voters saw DV daily while 52%
48) Here as in Table III. 1.4 those who did not vote or 
turned in a blank ballot form a separate category when the 
ETAs are computed. The ETAs change, however, very little 
(.00 or .01) if this goup is omitted from the calculations.
49) Not significant at the .05 level.
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of SDA voters in 1983 and 58% of CiP voters in 1987 were 
daily readers of
Timinn, which dropped in circulation from 1983-87, was 
seen daily by 43% of PP voters in 1983 but only 29% in 1987. 
Timinn was somewhat more popular among PA and WA voters than 
among voters of SDP, IP, SDA and IP.
Thjodviljinn was seen daily by 40-43% of PA voters. The 
most noteworthy aspect of the paper's profile is, however, 
that 19-21% of WA voters were daily readers of Thjodviljinn, 
while 5-7% of voters for all other parties saw the paper 
daily.
Althydubladid was seen daily by only 9-14% of SDP voters. 
Only 1-2% of voters for other parties saw the paper daily, 
with the exception of voters of the WA (5-8%) and PA in 1983 
(5%).51) Almost half of the SDP voters never see the party's 
paper and 82-87% of SDP voters saw the paper seldom or 
never. Those SDP voters can hardly have been influenced by 
Althydubladid in their voting behaviour!
Other patterns emerge beside the clear tendency of voters 
to favour their party's newspaper. PP and PA voters have in 
common a relatively low proportion reading Morgunbladid and 
they read DV somewhat less frequently than IP and SDP 
voters, even though WA voters are lowest on that score. WA
50) This may be connected to the populist, anti­
establishment tone of DV. The paper was also clearly 
sympathetic towards Vilmundur Gylfason, the SDA leader who 
frequently wrote a column for the paper and Albert 
Gudmundsson, the CiP leader.
51) This may partly be due to the fact that many public 
institutions subscribe to the papers - a form of state 
subsidy. As we will see in Chapter VII PA and WA are much 
stronger in the public sector than in the private sector.
The smaller the total circulation of a newspaper the greater 
is the proportional impact of the individuals who read the 
paper at work.
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and PA voters read Timinn to a greater extent than voters of 
other parties (except the PP of course) and WA voters show a 
relatively high readership of Thjodviljinn. Thus the voters 
of the PP, PA and WA show some similarities in their 
newspaper reading habits.
Table III.4.2 shows to what extent the daily readership 
of each paper is confined to voters of the party the paper 
supports.
Table III.4.2. Voting behaviour of each paper's daily 
readers in 1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
Daily readers of
Alth Dagur DV Mbl Timinn Thjodv All
Voted for
(SDP) (PP) (ind. ) (IP) (PP) (PA) voters
SDP 1983 42 n . a . 13 11 5 5 11
SDP 1987 41 9 16 17 7 7 15
PP 1983 6 n . a . 13 9 40 9 14
PP 1987 6 34 15 12 44 9 16
IP 1983 19 n . a . 39 50 26 16 38
IP 1987 19 20 29 39 17 14 28
PA 1983 17 n . a . 13 9 15 52 14
PA 1987 8 12 10 8 10 43 12
WA 1983 11 n . a . 4 6 6 10 6
WA 1987 19 6 8 11 10 19 12
SDA 1983 3 n . a . 9 7 4 4 7
CiP 1987 6 2 10 8 4 4 7
Other 1987 2 12 5 3 6 2 4
Didn't vote 1983 3 n . a . 9 8 5 5 10
Didn't vote 1987 - 6 7 4 2 3 6
N (1983) (36) - (393) (529) (145) (104) (948)
N (1987) (52) (120) (649) (969) (173) (203) (1633)
Figures for the rural PP daily Dagur are not available for 
1983 as the paper was not a daily then.
By comparing the percentage of each party's voters of 
each newspaper's daily readers to the party's share of all
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voters we can see to what extent the paper's political 
profile deviates from the profile of all voters. For DV the 
deviations are remarkably small both in 1983 and 1987. In 
1983/ for instance/ when 38% of the sample voted for the IP, 
39% of DV's daily readers did so and when the IP vote went 
down to 28% in 1987 29% of DV's daily readers claimed to 
have voted for the IP.
There are considerable deviations for all the other 
papers. In 1983 50% of Morgunbladid's daily readers voted 
for the IP while the party obtained 38% of all voters. In 
1987 the figure was down to 39%, corresponding to the IP 
losses at the polls.
40-53% of the daily readers of Althydubladid, Timinn and 
Thjodviljinn voted for the party the paper supports. 34% of 
Dagur's daily readers voted for the PP, but due to Dagur's 
local concentration in the north it is misleading to compare 
the paper's political profile to that of all v o t e r s . 52)
If we consider those figures in terms of the papers' 
persuasion power we can see that, despite clear 
relationships between voting behaviour and readership of the 
papers supporting particular parties, in most cases over a 
half of each paper's daily readers do not vote in accordance 
with the paper's political line. The papers still have a 
function as a tie between parties and voters but their power
52) It is more realistic to compare Dagur's figures in Table
III.4.2 to the actual 1987 results in the Northeast 
constituency, which were as follows: SDP 14.3%, PP 24.9%, IP 
20.9%, PA 13.1%, WA 6.4%, CiP 3.6%, Others 16.8%. Dagur's 
deviations from those figures are much smaller than from the 
national figures. While PP voters are still overrepresented 
in Dagur's daily readers, the paper's political profile is 
remarkably similar to the Northeast general profile.
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to mould the voter's behaviour in the polling booth should 
not be exaggerated.
If we finally consider whether newspaper readership has 
any impact on electoral volatility, the relationship between 
readership and party switching is not significant (chi- 
square, .05-level) both in 1983 and 1987 for all papers 
except DV. Those who read DV frequently are more likely to 
switch parties than others, but while the relationship is 
statistically significant it is very weak.53)
III. 5 Personal acquaintance with Members of Althingi
Iceland is one of the smallest democracies of the world. 
The ratio between the members of Althingi and the number of 
eligible voters in the electorate was 1:2500 in 1983, and 
1:2700 in 1987. In the most scantly populated constituency, 
the West Peninsula, which elected five members to the 
Althingi in the 1987 election, a total of 6527 votes were 
cast. Thus it is not unreasonable to expect that members of 
the Icelandic Althingi are able to nurture more personal 
relationships with their voters than is the case in most 
other countries. Personal contacts may constitute a more 
important tie between voters and their representatives in 
Iceland than is the case in most countries.
In 1983 we asked our respondents if they knew one or more 
members of Althingi personally. Table III. 5.1 shows that of 
the total electorate one-half knew a member personally. 15% 
claimed to know one member, while one-third of the
53) With party switching dependent (coded 0,1) the ETAs are 
.11 in 1983 and .10 in 1987. If readership is dependent the 
ETAs are .08 and .09.
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electorate said they knew two or more members of Althingi
personally. Those figures must be considered extremely high.
Table III.5.1. Do you know one or more Members of Althingi
personally? By party voted for 1983, Strength of party
identification, party membership. party switching, sex ,
region, age. 1983 total sample. Percentages.
Personally knows
None One Two or Total N
MP MP more
All voters 51 15 34 100 (1000)
Vote 1983
SDP 54 13 33 100 (107)
PP 42 17 41 100 (136)
IP 45 16 40 101 (355)
PA 4 8 16 37 101 (134)
SDA 69 9 22 100 (67)
WA 64 23 13 100 (53)
Did not vote 63 15 22 100 (94)
Chi-sq=37.45(sign=.0002)/ETA= .19
Party identification
Very strong 31 13 56 100 (78)
Rather strong 42 20 38 100 (218)
Not very strong 50 12 38 100 (196)
Closer to a party 55 16 29 100 (311)
No party identification 64 12 24 100 (178)
Chi-sq=45.01(sign=.0000)/ETA= .20
Party membership
Party member 24 15 61 100 (189)
Identifier but not member 55 16 29 100 (597)
No party identification 64 12 24 100 (178)
Chi-sq=8 6.52(sign=.0000)/ETA=,.30
Party switching
Voted same party 1979-83 41 16 43 100 (533)
Voted diff.parties '79-83 56 14 30 100 (161)
Chi-sq=l1.51(sign=.0032)/ETA=., 13
Sex
Male 41 14 45 100 (534)
Female 62 17 21 100 (466)
Chi.sq=64.53(sign=.0000)/ETA=.25
Region
Reykjavik 57 14 29 100 (369)
Southwest 52 17 31 100 (237)
Other constituencies 44 16 40 100 (394)
Chi-sq=14.87(sign=.0050)/ETA=.12
continued...
Age
20-23 77 15 8 100 (95)
24-29 68 16 16 100 (166)
30-39 51 19 31 101 (256)
40-49 35 11 54 100 (167)
50-59 40 14 46 100 (134)
60-69 37 15 49 101 (101)
70-83 54 14 32 100 (81)
Chi-sq=107.20(sign= .0000)/ETA=.32
Acquaintance with MPs is dependent when ETA is calculated.
In this section we will examine if this kind of voter 
integration to the political system - personal acquaintance 
with a member of Althingi - is related to our political 
variables, in particular electoral volatility. First we 
shall, however, see if three background variables, sex, age, 
and region, are of any importance in this context.
Of these three variables, age is most strongly related to 
acquaintance with members of Althingi. 77% of the first time 
voters do not know any member, while this is only the case 
for 35-40% of those in middle age (30-59) . The relationship 
to sex is somewhat weaker but a much higher percentage of 
men (59%) know one or more members than is the case for 
women (38%) . Somewhat surprisingly, the relationship to 
region is weakest, while it is in the expected direction. In 
the urban Reykjavik (43%) and Southwest (48%) constituencies 
the number claiming to know an Althingi member personally is 
perhaps a higher figure than was to be expected, while the 
corresponding figure for other constituencies (56%) is 
relatively low, bearing in mind that most people in those 
regions live in villages or small towns inhabited by a few 
hundred to a few thousand people and the number of voters 
per representative is much lower in those constituencies 
than in Reykjavik and the Southwest. It is also commonly
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assumed that the rural members of Althingi are much more 
closely tied to their constituents and more engaged in 
clientelistic politics. This is not strongly represented in 
the figures here.
If we turn to the political variables, acquaintance with 
Althingi members is, as expected, related to strength of 
party identification and especially party membership. Three 
out of every four party members know an Althingi member 
personally, while this is the case for less than a half of 
identifiers who are not members. Two out of every three 
voters without party identification do not know any member 
personally.
If we look at the voters of the different parties two 
major groups emerge: the voters of the old parties on the 
one hand (42-54% of whom do not know any member personally) , 
and on the other hand the voters of the new parties, the SDA 
and the WA, and those who did not vote (63-69%).
The relationship to vote switching is weaker than to 
party membership, strength of party identification and party 
voted for in 1983. While 41% of the stable voters - those 
who did not switch parties from 1979-83 - did not know any 
Althingi representative, the corresponding figure for 
switchers was 56%.
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Table III.5.2. Party switching 1979-83 by strength of party 
identification, party membership and aquaintance with a 
member of Althingi. 1983 sample. ANOVA and MCA.
Party switching is coded 0 (did not switch) and 1 (did 
switch) . Thus, the party-switching means in the table show 
directly the percentage of party switchers in each group.
MPs known personally
None One Two or All
Party identification more voters
Very strong .18 (17) .00 (8) .05 (42) .07 (67)
Rather strong .19 (73) .14 (36) .05 (74) .13(183)
Not very strong .14 (73) .06 (18) .09 (68) .11 (159)
Closer to .40 (103) .31 (36) .33 (64) .36 (203)
No party ident. .55 (38) .67 (9) .58 (24) .58 (71)
All .29(304) .21 (107) .17(272) .23(683)
Party membership
Party member .16 (38) .12 (26) .05 (106) .08 (170)
Not party member .31 (266) .25 (81) .25(166) .28(513)
All .29 (304) .21 (107) .17 (172) .23(683)
Significance (F) of main effects: 
Strength of party identification=.000 
Party membership=.112 
MP acquaintance=.144
MCA-table:
N Unadjusted Adjusted
deviations deviations
Very strong party ident. (67) -.16 - . 12
Rather strong (183) -.11 -.09
Not very strong (159) -.13 -.13
Closer to (203) . 13 .11
No party ident. (71) .34 .32
ETA=.38 BETA=.35
Party members (170) -.15 -.05
Not party members (513) .05 .02
ETA=.20 BETA=.07
Knows no MP (304) .06 .03
Knows one MP (107) -.02 -.02
Knows two or more MPs (272) — .06 -.03
ETA=.13 BETA=.07
Multiple R=.397 
Multiple R squared=.158
Earlier we saw that 16% of the variance in vote switching 
1979-83 could be explained by strength of party 
identification and party membership (Table III.2.7). In
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Table III.5.2 we can see if adding personal acquaintance to 
a member of Althingi as an independent variable increases 
the explained variance.54)
While in general the proportion of party switchers 
decreases as acquaintance with members of Althingi 
increases, also within the categories of partisan strength 
and party membership, the relationship is weak. If 
acquaintance is added as an independent variable the 
explained variance only increases from 15.5% to 15.8%. The 
independent impact of acquaintance with Althingi 
representatives on vote switching seems to be minimal.
54) In Table III.5.2 party-switching means for groups based 
on all three variables are omitted. For party-switching 
means of party identification by party membership see Table
III.2.7.
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Chapter IV: Voters' view of party system dimensions
Left and right have been commonly used terms in political 
discourse since the French Revolution. While their exact 
meaning has been open to dispute - and has changed in the 
last two centuries - they are still frequently used to 
describe the ideologies and issue positions of political 
parties and voters in scholarly analysis, media discussion 
and political debate.
IV. 1 The left-right model and Icelandic politics
The basic idea of Anthony Downs in his rationalistic 
theory of voters and parties is that both voters and parties 
are rational actors, voters aiming to maximize their 
ideological utility through voting, parties aiming at 
maximizing their vote in order to benefit from governing. 
Voters are distributed along a single left-right axis and 
they vote for the party that is closest to them on that 
axis. The parties position themselves on the axis in such a 
way that they maximize their vote. In Downs's two-party 
model both parties tend to be close to the centre, as the 
distribution of voters along the left-right axis tends to 
approximate a normal distribution.
While Downs is mainly concerned with two-party systems, 
the basic idea that the ideological distance between voters 
and parties is important for voting behaviour, has been used 
widely in electoral studies of multi-party systems. If the 
voter's perception of the party system follows those lines 
the way in which ideological dimensions are structured among
1) A. Downs (1957) .
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the electorate can contribute to explaining why people vote 
for certain parties. Such a structure should also restrain 
electoral volatility, as we would expect the ideological 
position of both voters and parties on the left-right axis 
to be relatively stable or change slowly. Party switching 
should to a large extent be limited to parties which are 
adjacent on the left-right axis. This ideological 
structuring of the party system in the voters' minds should 
serve as a stabilizing factor in electoral politics. Such 
structuring should also serve to stabilize party conflict. 
If the parties are positioned at different places on the 
left-right axis and they have to nurture voters in the 
ideological neighbourhood, their room for manoeuvre is 
limited. The lines of party battles become well known and 
stable and coalition formation, for example, is likely to be 
restricted by ideological left-right considerations.2)
In Sweden, Soren Holmberg argues, party political 
conflicts are seldom surprising; the parties usually fight 
each other according to known patterns. The positions of the 
parties on different issues can almost always be ranked in 
the same way. Government coalitions and party alliances are 
usually formed between neighbouring parties on the left- 
right axis. While it would be an exaggeration to say that 
the Swedish system is one-dimensional (the dispute on 
nuclear energy does not follow the left-right division), the 
left-right axis has clearly been dominant in Swedish
2) Coalition theories which disregard ideological 
differences and only emphasize the size factor, such as the 
theories on "minimal winning coalitions" of W. Gamson (1961) 
and W.H. Riker (1962), have obtained meagre support from 
empirical studies while theories emphasizing ideological 
dimensions seem to have fared better. See e.g. A. De Swaan 
(1973) and E.G. Browne and J. Dreijmanis (eds.) (1982) .
194
politics. An overwhelming majority of Swedish voters in 1979 
(94-95%) were prepared to position themselves and all five
parliamentary parties on a left-right scale. Their position
on the left-right axis is strongly related to choice of 
party, to answers to questions on left-right issues, to 
their second preference of party, and to their ranking of 
parties on a like-dislike scale. Holmberg's conclusion is
that a very large part of Swedish voters are able to
("correctly") relate the ideological concepts of left and 
right to the political parties and that voters' sympathies 
for and antipathies to the various parties are still very 
clearly structured by some version of a left-right model.
To large extent this is also true of Norway; while the 
Norwegian party system is not one-dimensional, the left- 
right dimension has been dominant.4)
For various reasons we would expect the ideological 
structuring according to the left-right model to be weaker 
in Iceland than in Scandinavia. The system of government 
coalitions has been relatively open; all four old parties 
have teamed up with each other in coalitions, even though 
the polar players have only joined forces once, in the 1944- 
1947 IP-SDP-USP coalition.5)
Second, Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson has shown that the 
Icelandic PP has had a much weaker party organization and 
has shown much less stability in election programmes than 
the centre parties in Norway and Sweden. Sudden changes in
3) S. Holmberg (1981), Chapter 11.
4) H. Valen (1981), Chapter 10. H. Valen and B.C. Aardal 
(1983), Chapter 7. B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), Chapter 4.
5) O.R. Grimsson (1982). The PA also took part in the 
Thoroddsen government 1980-1983 with the PP and a few IP MPs 
while the IP as a party remained in opposition (see Section 
II.1).
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emphasis of policy have not been u n c o m m o n . G) it seems likely 
that the Icelandic parties in general have had less clear 
ideological positions than the Scandinavian parties and 
shown more flexible (or opportunistic) behaviour in terms of 
ideology.
Third, the existence of two blocks of "socialist" parties 
on the one hand and "bourgeois" parties on the other has not 
been as clear cut in Iceland as in Scandinavia. In fact, 
those terms are rarely used in the political debate. The SDP 
and the PA were commonly called "the working-class parties" 
{verkalydsflokkarnir), especially by their own supporters, 
while in recent years it has been more common to refer to 
them as the A-parties {A-flokkarnir) , A being their common 
initial in Icelandic (SDP: Althyduflokkurinn, PA:
Althydubandalagid) . The commonly used terms "the left 
parties" {vinstri flokkarnir) and "the socially concerned 
parties" {felagshyggjuflokkarnir) usually refer to the PP 
(and recently also the WA), as well as the SDP and the PA.
Fourth, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson has argued that the 
Icelandic party system is basically two-dimensional. Besides 
the left-right spectrum (PA-SDP-PP-IP) there is a NATO-US 
base spectrum, along which the ranking of parties is 
different (PA-PP-SDP-IP).^) Grimsson's analysis is based on
6) G.H. Kristinsson (1991).
7) The SDP and PP change places on the two dimensions. The 
SDP as a social democratic party is closest to the PA on the 
left-right spectrum. On the foreign policy dimension the PP 
is on the other hand closest to the PA. The PP has (at 
times) been more critical of the Keflavik base than the SDP. 
The PP has also been more critical of Icelandic involvement 
in European integration. Most of the party's MPs abstained 
when Iceland joined EFTA in 1970 under the IP-SDP coalition, 
while the PA opposed the move. The PP and the PA took a 
tough nationalistic stand on the extension of Iceland's 
fisheries limits in 1958-61 and in 1971, while the IP and 
the SDP were more prepared to negotiate with other European
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party programmes and elite behaviour but not on voter
surveys and he tries to explain coalition formation and 
dissolution on the basis of a two-dimensional s y s t e m . O u r  
analysis in Section IV.4 shows on the other hand that on the 
voter level attitudes towards NATO membership and the 
Keflavik base were strongly related to voters' left-right 
positions both in 1983 and 1987.
Fifth, on some aspects of economic policy related to the 
left-right axis the SDP, rather then the PP, has been 
closest to the IP, while the PP policies have more resembled 
the policies of the PA. The longest lasting coalition
government in Icelandic history, the coalition of the IP and
SDP 1959-71, greatly liberalized trade in the early 1960s by 
abolishing strict import controls and state regulation of 
trade, despite strong opposition from the PP and the PA. In 
recent years the SDP has argued for more liberal policies in 
the strongly regulated and state-subsidized economy, 
especially regarding agriculture and fisheries, increased 
privatization of banks and closer ties to the freer European 
markets.9) The party has claimed that the Icelandic economy 
is overly state regulated, much more so than is the case in 
neighbouring countries which have been governed by Social
governments and accept the jurisdiction of the International 
Court.
8) O.R. Grimsson in O.R. Grimsson and Th. Broddason (1977, 
pp. 238-243) and O.R. Grimsson (1982) .
9) G.H. Kristinsson (1990, p. 28) points out, that Icelandic 
agriculture gets much more state support than is customary 
in Western Europe. In 1985 state expenditure on agriculture 
was 7% of the total in Iceland, while a comparable figure in 
the EFTA countries was 0.4% The cost of import protection of 
agricultural products in the EC countries has been estimated 
as 1% of GNP, while in Iceland it may be as high as 4%. 
Thorvaldur Gylfason {Morgunbladid, Oct. 9th, 1990) points 
out that state support to agriculture in Iceland is similar 
to total state expenditure on education and only slightly 
less than total state expenditure on health services.
197
Democrats or heavily influenced by their policies. Thus the 
SDP claims to be firmly in the mainstream of European Social 
Democracy: committed to goals like social justice and the
welfare state, but also careful not to interfere too much in 
the market economy. The PP has been much more reluctant on 
such policies of liberalization claiming that due to the 
smallness of Iceland the economic policies practiced in 
Europe are not generally appropriate. They are particularly 
likely to harm Icelandic farmers, and lead to further 
regional disharmony, i.e. increased migration to the towns, 
especially the Reykjavik area, from rural areas and small 
fishing villages. Policies of this nature - where the PP is 
advocating more state intervention than the SDP - may 
contradict the more traditional notion that the SDP is a 
socialist party and the PP non-socialist when the parties' 
policies are described in terms of left and right.
In this chapter we will examine to what extent Icelandic 
voters are able to perceive themselves and the political 
parties in left-right terms. We will also examine the 
relationship of voters' left-right positions to their choice 
of party, their attraction to or dislike of the various 
parties and party leaders, vote switching and their 
attitudes on various issues.
IV. 2 Voters' left-right positions and their like-dislike of 
parties and party leaders
In our surveys a large majority of voters were prepared 
to position themselves and the parties in terms of left and 
right. In 1983 when respondents were simply asked to use a 
3-fold classification of left, centre and right 90% gave
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their own position and 85-89% ranked the four old parties. 
Respondents were not asked to rank the new parties, the SDA 
and the WA. In 1987 respondents were asked to use a left- 
right scale from 0-10 on which 78% were prepared to rank 
themselves, 80% ranked the four old parties, 78% the WA and 
76% the CiP. It should be noted that WA voters were not more 
reluctant to position themselves or the parties on the left- 
right scale than voters of other parties despite the fact 
that the WA claims that it cannot be classified in terms of 
left and right, concepts the party considers misleading and 
outdated.
Among our panel respondents there is a considerable 
consistency (r=.62) between own left-right position in 1983 
(on the 3-fold scale) and 1987 (on the 11-point scale). This 
is a slightly weaker correlation than was the case in the 
Swedish panels 1976-1979 (r=0.67), 1979-1982 (r=0.76) and
1982-1985 (r=0.75).10)
While the proportion of Icelandic voters prepared to use 
the left-right scale is not as high as in Sweden, it must 
still be considered quite high. It should also be borne in 
mind that in 1987 the Icelandic respondents were asked to
use the scale in a telephone interview, and obviously lacked
the show cards used in the Swedish face-to-face interviews. 
It is likely that the lower response rate in 1987 compared
to 1983 is at least partly due to the more complex
measurement.
10) S. Holmberg (1981), p. 197. S. Holmberg and M. Gill jam 
(1987), p. 259.
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Figure IV.2.1 shows how the Icelandic respondents in 1987 
positioned themselves on the left-right scale. Most voters 
tend to place themselves in or around the centre, a pattern 
well known from other European countries.  ^ Table IV.2.1 
shows how voters of the different parties ranked themselves 
and the four old parties in terms of left and right in 1983. 
It should be borne in mind, that the means in the table are 
based on three-fold classification, left (1), centre (2), 
and right (3).
Table IV. 2.1 reveals a clear pattern. If we look at how 
the total sample ranks the parties, it is quite clear that 
the PA is conceived as being furthest to the left, and the 
IP furthest to the right. The SDP and PP are close to each 
other in the centre, even though the SDP is placed on the 
left side of the PP.
11) H. Valen and B. Aardal (1989, p. 27), quoting Listhaug, 
Macdonald and Rabinowitz, point out that comparative 
analyses of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, West-Germany, 
Netherlands, and France, show the same pattern.
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Table IV.2.1. Perceived left-right positions of the parties 
and own left-rigth position 1983. Means (l=left, 2=centre, 
3=right). Total sample.
Perceived left -right positi on of
PA SDP PP IP
Ranking by
PA voters 1.08 2.24 2.31 2.96
WA voters 1.10 1. 96 2.22 2.94
SDP voters 1.05 1.85 2.22 2 . 91
PP voters 1.07 2.07 1. 94 2.96
SDA voters 1.11 1.85 2.28 2.92
IP voters 1.08 1. 92 2.07 2.89
Did not vote 1.20 2.06 2.22 2.87
Total sample 1.09 2.00 2 .14 2.92
Voters' self-rated positions on left--right scale
Total sample Men Women PA WA SDP PP SDA IP
2.07 2.07 2.06 1.21 1.71 1.85 1.80 2.06 2.62
N= (902) (494) (408) (131) (49) (93) (119) (63) (49)
85-89% of the respondents ranked the four old parties as 
being left, right or centre, while 90% gave own position on 
the left-right scale.
87-94% of each party's voters were prepared to give own 
position and 77-87% of SDP and PP voters ranked the parties, 
while 86-92% of IP voters and 90-99% of PA, SDA and WA 
voters did so.
The respondents in the telephone interviews were asked: Left 
and right are common terms in politics. Do you generally 
consider yourself to the right in politics^ to the left, or 
are you in the centre in politics? They were then asked to 
rank the four old parties on the same scale. The 329 
respondents in the face-to-face interviews were on the other 
hand asked to use a scale from 1 (furthest to the left) to 9 
(furthest to the right) to place themselves and the parties. 
Here 1-3 on the scale (21.5% of the face-to-face 
respondents) constitute left, 4-6 (43.4%) centre and 7-9 
(35%) right. The figures for the total sample are: 25.5% 
left, 42.2% centre, 32.3% right.
In general there is a large degree of consensus among 
voters of different parties on how to rank the parties on 
the left-right scale. The only exception from the PA-SDP-PP- 
IP ranking is among PP voters, who conceive the PP slightly 
to the left (1.94) of the SDP (2.07).
The self-ranking of the voters on the left-right scale 
shows that they do indeed prefer parties that are close to 
them on the scale. PA voters are clearly furthest to the
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left and IP voters furthest to the right, while SDP and PP 
voters are close to the centre. As in many other countries, 
there is a tendency of voters on the left and right side of 
the spectrum to put themselves closer to the centre than 
their p a r t i e s . ^2) Thus PA voters do not conceive themselves 
(1.21) quite as far to the left as their party (1.08), and 
the IP voters see their party as farther to the right (2.89) 
than themselves (2.62).
While both PP voters and SDP voters position themselves 
close to the centre, PP voters see themselves slightly 
further left (1.80) than do SDP voters (1.85). SDP voters on 
the other hand clearly perceive their party as being on the 
left (1.85) of the PP (2.22).
The voters of the two new parties position themselves on 
the open spaces in the continuum: as expected, the WA voters 
see themselves as being on the right of the PA but on the 
left of the SDP and the PP - and SDA voters, while close to
the centre, see themselves to the right of the SDP and the
PP.
In the 1983 survey, respondents were asked to rank the 
four old parties, beginning with the one they disliked most 
and ending with the one they liked most. In Table IV.2.2 we
have calculated the mean ranking of each of the old parties
among each party's voters so we can check whether the 
voters' likes and dislikes for the parties correspond to the 
left-right spectrum.
12) For Norway see e.g. H. Valen (1981, pp. 236-237), B. 
Aardal and H. Valen (1989, pp. 30-31). For Sweden see e.g 
S. Holmberg (1981), pp. 198-200.
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Table IV.2.2. Likes and dislikes of the parties 1983 by 
party voted for. (Means on a 1-4 scale). Total sample.
Mean ranking from likes best (4) to dislikes most (1)
Ranking by
PA SDP PP IP
PA voters 3.9 2 .1 2.5 1.5
WA voters 2 . 9 2.7 2.4 2.0
SDP voters 1.7 3.8 2.0 2.4
PP voters 2.0 1.8 3.9 2.1
SDA voters 2.1 2.8 2.2 3.0
IP voters 1.3 2.4 2.3 3.9
N of voters: PA (120-123) , WA (39-40), SDP (84-89), PP (107-
116), SDA (57-58), IP (306-319).
Q: Now I would like you to rank the four old parties^ i.e. 
the SDP, PP, IP and PA according to how much you like or 
dislike them. What party do you generally dislike most? And 
second most? Which one is the second best? And which one is 
the best ?
78-79% of all respondents ranked the parties.
While the left-right spectrum is clearly reflected in the 
pattern of voters' likes and dislikes for the parties, the 
ties between the SDP and IP on the one hand and between the 
PP and the PA on the other can also be observed. The
strongest dislike is of IP voters for the PA (1.3) and of PA 
voters for the IP (1.5). WA voters like the PA best of the 
old partiesl3) and their ranking of other parties is in
accordance with the left-right dimension. But although the 
difference is small, PA voters like the PP (2.5) better than 
the SDP (2.1) and SDP voters like the IP (2.4) better than
the PP (2.0). PP voters' ranking of the PA (2.0) is very
similar to their ranking of the SDP (1.8) and the same is
13) As the new parties (SDA and WA) are not ranked, the 
figures for the new parties' voters are not directly 
comparable. A second preference of an old party's voter who 
likes own party best gives the score of 3 in the 
calculations, while a similar second preference of a new 
party's voters gives a score of 4. The ranking orders should 
on the other hand be comparable.
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the case for IP voters' ranking of the SDP (2.4) and the PP 
(2.3) .
In 1987 respondents ranked the left-right positions of 
themselves and the parties on a 0-10 scale. The pattern that 
emerges is similar to that of 1983 but slightly clearer, as 
can be seen in Table IV. 2.3. The parties are perceived as 
being positioned from left to right on the whole scale at 
rather regular intervals: PA (1.7), WA (3.6), SDP (4.9), PP 
(5.6), CiP (7.9) and IP (8.8).
Table IV.2.3. Perceived left-right positions of the parties 
and own left-right position 1987. (Means of scores on a 0-10 
point scale). Total sample.
Perceived left -right position of
PA WA SDP PP CiP IP
Ranking by
PA voters 1.6 3.2 5.3 5.6 8.7 9.1
WA voters 1.7 3.8 5.0 5.6 8.4 9.1
SDP voters 1.6 3.7 5.0 5.7 7 . 9 8.8
PP voters 1 . 9 3.9 5.0 5.5 7.9 8.8
CiP voters 1.5 3.8 4.7 5.5 7.7 8.7
IP voters 1 . 6 3.5 4 . 8 5.6 7.4 8.7
Total sample 1.7 3.6 4 . 9 5.6 7.9 8.8
Voters' self--rated positions on left -right scale
Total sample Men Women PA WA SDP PP CiP IP
5.4 5.5 5.2 2.3 3.9 5.1 5.3 6.5 7.4
N= (1439) (830) (603) (181) (153) (203) (192) (94) (403)
80% of all respondents were prepared to rank the four old 
parties on the left-right scale, 78% ranked the WA and 76% 
the CiP. 78% of all respondents gave own left-right 
position.
80-90% of each party's voters were prepared to rank the 
different parties and give own left-rigth position; only 70- 
73% of PP voters were, however, prepared to do so. The Ns in 
the table give the number of each party's voters that were 
prepared to give own position on the left-right scale. While 
the number of each party's voters willing to rank individual 
parties was not exactly the same, the variations are small. 
Q: Sometimes people try to rank the political parties 
depending on how far to the left or the right they are. Now 
we would like you to rank the Icelandic political parties on 
a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is furthest to the left, but 
10 furthest to the right. If we start with the SDP, where 
would you put it on such a scale?...
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While the SDP and the PP are both close to the centre, 
the 1987 data puts the SDP more firmly on the left of the PP 
than was the case in 1983. This time the ranking order of 
the six parties is the same for all groups of voters. PP 
voters clearly put the SDP (5.0) on the left of the PP 
(5.5). The self-ranking of SDP voters is also further to the 
left (5.1) than the self-ranking of PP voters (5.3).
In 1987 as in 1983 there is a strong tendency among 
voters to choose a party which is close to their own 
position on the left-right s c a l e . 4^) The tendency of voters 
on the left and right to put themselves closer to the centre 
than their party can also be observed in the 1987 data.
In 1987 the respondents were not asked to rank the old 
parties according to how much they liked or disliked them, 
as had been done in 1983. Instead they were asked to give 
each of the six parliamentary parties and their leaders 
marks on a scale from -5 to +5 according to their likes and 
dislikes (Table IV.2.4). This time respondents therefore 
could give two or more parties the same marks.
Most voters give their own parties high marks although 
some differences can be observed. WA voters show the 
strongest liking for their own party (4.2), while the PA 
voters show most discontent (3.2) . The voters of the other 
four parties give their own party marks from 3.5 to 3.7.
14) When we construct a variable containing the value of the 
left-right position each voter gave his own party the 
correlation between the left-right position of the party 
voted for and the voter's own left-right position is 0.78 
(Pearson's r, N=1175).
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Table IV.2.4. Likes and dislikes for party leaders and 
parties by party voted for in 1987. (Means on a scale from 
-5 to +5). Total sample.
Svavar Gestsson 
PA
Difference
WA
Difference
SDP
Difference
Steingr, Hermannsson 1.9 
PP
Difference
Albert Gudmundsson -2.1 
CiP
Difference
IP
Difference
Party voted for in 1987
PA WA SDP PP CiP IP All
2.3 0.4 -0.6 -0 .3 -0 .7 -1 .5 -0.3
3.2 0.5 -1.0 -1 .0 -1 .2 -2 .1 -0.6
-0.9 -0.1 0.4 0 .7 0 .5 0 .6 0.3
2.8 4.0 2.1 2 .3 1 .5 1 .2 2 .1
2.2 4.2 1. 6 1.7 1 .0 0 .7 1 .7
0 . 6 -0.2 0.5 0 .6 0 .5 0 .5 0.4
0.0 0.0 2.1 -0 . 9 -0 .3 0 .0 0.2
0.5 0.6 3.5 -0 .5 0 .0 0 .3 0.7
-0.5 — 0 . 6 -0 . 8 -0 .4 -0 . 3 -0 .3 -0.5
1 2.7 2.9 4 .5 3 . 4 3 . 4 3.2
-0 .1 0.6 0.4 3 .7 0 . 6 1 .4 1 .2
2.0 2 .1 2.5 0 .8 2 . 8 2 .0 2.0
 . -1 . 9 -0.5 -0 .2 3 . 6 -0 .5 -0.5
-2.7 -2.2 - 0 . 9 -1 .0 3 .7 -1 .2 -1.0
0.6 0.3 0.4 0 . 8 -0 . 1 0 .7 0.5
-2.1 -1. 0 -0 .1 0 .4 -0 ,. 6 2 . 6 0.3
-2.5 -1 .1 0.2 0 . 9 1 ,.2 3 . 6 0.8
0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0 ,.5 -0 ,. 6 -1 .0 -0.5
90-91% of respondents were prepared to rate the individual 
parties while 92-95% of respondents were prepared to give 
the individual party leaders marks. N of voters: PA (188- 
192), WA (180-188), SDP (221-231), PP (228-257), CiP (101- 
106), IP (435-449), all voters (1651-1749).
Q: Now I would like to ask if you generally like or dislike 
individual political parties. You indicate this by giving 
each party a mark from -5 to +5. If you like a party you 
give it a positive mark of up to 5, but if you don't like a 
party you give it a negative mark of down to -5. Zero means 
that you neither like nor dislike the party in question. 
What mark would you give the PP on such a scale? The IP?... 
What if you use the same scale for people who have been in 
leadership positions in Icelandic politics? What mark would 
you give Steingrimur Hermannsson? Thorsteinn Palsson?. ..
While we have to keep the shape of the ideological curve 
on the left-right dimension and the different sizes of the
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parties in mind when we compare their overall popularity, it 
is clear that it is not only the distance on the left-right 
axis that determines the like/dislike marks of the voters. 
Voters from all parts of the spectrum systematically give 
some parties more positive ratings than others.
WA gets the highest overall marks on the like-dislike 
scale (1.7). Voters of all the other parties give the WA a 
positive mean rating. The PP comes second (1.2); the party 
only gets a small negative rating from the PA voters (-0.1) . 
The IP comes third (0.8), despite its large size, mainly due 
to the negative rating of PA and WA voters. The SDP gets 
almost the same overall marks (0.7); only PP voters give the 
party a negative mean score. The PA is much more unpopular 
(-0.6); beside PA voters only WA voters give the party a 
positive rating. The most unpopular party among the voters 
is the new CiP (-1.0); voters of all other parties give it a 
negative mean score.
While its location on the left-right axis is clearly not 
the only factor explaining a party's popularity, strong 
relations between left-right distance and popularity 
nevertheless emerge. This can be seen if we look at the
ranking order of the mean ratings of the parties among the 
voters of each party (the columns in Table IV.2.4).
The ratings of the old parties follow the left-right 
continuum while the popularity of the WA and the
unpopularity of the CiP result in rifts in the ranking
order. The WA is more popular than the SDP among voters of 
all parties on the right of the SDP. The CiP is more
unpopular than the IP among voters of all parties left of 
the CiP.
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If we look on the other hand only at the mean scores of 
the old parties, the ranking order of their popularity is in 
accordance with the left-right dimension. PA voters dislike 
IP most (-2.5), then PP (-0.1) and SDP (0.5). WA voters give
the PA a positive ranking (0.5) on the left and their
ranking of the old parties to the right follows their order 
from left to right: SDP (0.6), PP (0.6), IP (-1.1). SDP
voters give the PP (0.4) slightly higher marks than they 
give the IP (0.2). PP voters give the SDP higher marks
(-0.5) than they give the PA (-1.0). CiP voters also follow 
the left-right continuum when giving like-dislike marks: PP 
(0.6), SDP (0.0), PA (-1.2), and the same is the case for IP 
voters: PP (1.4), SDP (0.3) and PA (-2.1). The affinity
between PA and PP on the one hand and the IP and the SDP on
the other, which we observed in the 1983 data, is not strong
enough here to disturb the ranking order. It may 
nevertheless be noted that the SDP voters' marks for the IP 
are only slightly lower than their marks for the PP and PP 
voters give the SDP a negative ranking despite the parties' 
closeness on the left-right scale.
If we compare each party's marks among different groups 
of voters (the party rows in Table IV.2.4) - thus
eliminating the effects of each party's different overall
popularity - we see that there is a strong tendency for each
party to receive a lower rating as the distance increases, 
even though there are some small discrepancies.
On the whole, the pattern of liking and disliking the 
parties corresponds better in 1987 to the left-right 
spectrum than was the case in 1983. To some extent this 
might be the result of the differences in measurement, but
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is should also be kept in mind that in 1983 the PP and the 
PA had been partners in the government coalition, while both 
IP and SDP were in opposition. The 1983-87 coalition 
consisted on the other hand of the IP and the PP, leaving 
both SDP and PA on the opposition benches.
Table IV.2.4 also shows how the voters of different 
parties ranked the six party leaders on the like-dislike 
scale. While there are clear differences in the overall 
popularity of the party leaders, their marks are related to 
the overall popularity of their parties and the left-right 
scale.
There is a strong relationship between the marks voters 
give a party and its leader. The correlation is strongest 
for the CiP and its leader Albert Gudmundsson (r=.77) and 
lowest for the PP and Steingrimur Hermannsson (r=.58), while 
the correlations for the other leaders and their parties 
range from .67 to .73.
The ranking of the overall popularity of the party 
leaders corresponds to the overall popularity of their 
parties, with the exception that PP-leader Hermannsson is by 
far the most popular leader (3.2) although his party came 
second (1.2). Gudrun Agnarsdottir, the leader of the most 
liked party, the WA (1.7), is clearly the second best liked 
leader (2.1). While her score is 1.1 point lower than 
Hermannsson's, it is almost 2 points higher than the 
popularity score of the next two leaders, Palsson and 
Hannibalsson.
Hermannsson's popularity is outstanding. He scores a 
whole 2 points higher on the like-dislike scale than his 
party, while the deviations for the other party leaders
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range from 0.5 to -0.5. His lowest score (1.9 from PA 
voters) is higher than the highest score all leaders except 
Agnarsdottir get from voters outside their party. While 
Hermannsson and Agnarsdottir are clearly in a league of 
their own in terms of popularity, Hermannsson easily beats 
her on that score among voters of all parties except WA and 
PA.
The overall popularity ranking of the four other leaders 
corresponds to the ranking of their parties. While the 
differences between the scores of a party and its leader are 
rather small, Thorsteinn Palsson (0.3) and Jon Baldvin 
Hannibalsson (0.2) are liked less than their parties, while 
Svavar Gestsson (-0.3) and Albert Gudmundsson (-0.5) are not 
disliked as much as their parties.
If we look at how each party's voters like their own 
party and its leader a somewhat different pattern emerges. 
Voters of all parties give their party a higher score than
their party leader except for PP voters, who like
Hermannsson (4.5) more than their party (3.7) . The voters of
the WA and CiP give their party (4.2 for WA, 3.7 for CiP) a 
similar score as their leaders (4.0 for Agnarsdottir, 3.6 
for Gudmundsson) , while voters of IP, SDP and PA clearly 
like their parties better than their leaders. The respective 
voter groups like the IP (3.6) better than Palsson (2.6), 
the SDP (3.5) better than Hannibalsson (2.7) and the PA 
(3.2) better than Gestsson (2.3).
Four of the party leaders tend to be better liked than 
their parties among voters of other parties. The most
popular leaders, Hermannsson and Agnarsdottir, are more 
popular than their parties among voters of all other
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parties. At the other end of the spectrum the leaders of the 
most unpopular parties, the CiP and PA, tend to be less 
disliked than their parties. WA voters give Gestsson (0.4) 
similar marks as the PA (0.5) while the voters of SDP, PP, 
CiP and IP dislike Gestsson less than his party, even though 
all those voter groups give him negative marks. Voters of 
all parties except the CiP give Gudmundsson a negative
rating but they dislike his party still more.
The two remaining party leaders tend to get lower marks 
than their party. While Hannibalsson only gets negative
marks from PP and CiP voters, he is liked less than his
party in all voter groups. Palsson gets a negative rating 
among voters of all parties except his own and the PP and he 
is less popular than his party in all voter groups, except 
among WA and PA voters, who in fact give both the IP and 
Palsson strong negative marks.
If we compare each party leader's popularity among the 
voters of the different parties (the party leaders' rows in 
Table IV.2.4) - thus eliminating the effect of their overall 
popularity - we can see that their popularity ranking tends 
to follow the left-right scale. The like-dislike ranking of 
the three leaders Gestsson, Hermannsson and Gudmundsson is 
in accordance with the left-right spectrum. Agnarsdottir's 
marks also follow the left-right scale, except that PP
voters give her slightly higher marks (2.3) than do SDP 
voters (2.1). Palsson's ratings also correspond to the left- 
right spectrum, except that CiP voters break the ranking 
order by giving him lower marks (-0.6) than both PP and SDP 
voters - very likely a reflection of Palsson's leading role 
in the IP split before the election when he demanded
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Gudmundsson's resignation from the government and declared 
that Gudmundson would never again become a minister for the 
IP, events which led to the formation of the CiP.
Hannibalsson is the only leader whose popularity does not 
follow the left-right dimension. Voters of three parties, 
the PA, WA and IP, give him the same marks (0.0) while CiP 
voters (-0.3) and PP voters (-0.9) give him a negative
rating. Hannibalsson's unpopularity among PP voters can be 
explained by his severe attacks on the PP in the election 
campaign: one of his catch-phrases had been the necessity of 
"cleaning the PP stable", a reference to the near-continous 
PP participation in government coalitions since 1971^^^, 
while during the campaign he openly discussed the
possibilities of an IP-SDP coalition after the election.
Three party leaders do not get the highest popularity 
score among their own voters. Agnarsdottir (2.8) has a 
higher score than Gestsson (2.3) among PA voters,
Hermannsson (2.9) gains a higher score among SDP voters than 
Hannibalsson (2.7), and Hermannsson (3.4) easily beats
Palsson (2.6) as the most popular leader among IP voters. 
But as those figures are means, they do not necessarily tell 
us if the ranking order of the leaders among each party's 
voters is the same, e.g. if Agnarsdottir gets highest marks 
from more PA voters than G e s t s s o n . IG) Table IV.2.5 on the
15) The PP has taken part in all coalitions since 1971, but 
the party was out of government for a few months (Oct. 15th 
1979-Feb. 8th 1980), while a SDP minority cabinet formed 
after the breakdown of a PP-SDP-PA coalition served as a 
caretaker government through the electoral campaign leading 
up to the December election of 1979 and during the coalition 
formation process after the election, which ended in the 
formation of the Thoroddsen coalition in which the PP took 
part.
16) Many factors can influence the means. A leader, for 
instance, controversial in his own party, who gets +5 from
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other hand gives us the first preference for a leader among 
each party's voters - how large a percentage of PA voters 
gave Gestsson a higher score than any other leader, how many 
PA voters gave Agnarsdottir a higher score than the other 
leaders, and so on. The table gives both a single first 
preference, indicating that the voter gave one leader a 
higher mark than all other leaders, and a shared first 
preference, indicating that the voter gave two or more 
leaders his highest marks. The table also indicates how 
large a percentage of each party's voters had a single 
preference among the party leaders (the sum column in Table 
IV.2.5).
Table IV.2.5 reveals that 66% of all voters had a single 
first preference among the party leaders - a relatively low 
figure compared to Sweden in 1979, when 78% of the voters 
had a single preference for one of the five party 
l e a d e r s . 17) More than half of the voters with a single 
preference like Hermannsson best of the leaders, or 37% of 
all voters, while 14% name Agnarsdottir as a single first 
preference. Only 2-5% of voters name the other four party 
leaders as a single first preference. If we look at first 
single or shared preference, 65% of the voters give 
Hermannsson their highest marks, while 35% do so for 
Agnarsdottir.
75% of his own voters and -5 from 25%, would get 2.5 as an 
overall score, while a popular leader of another party, 
getting +3 from the entire group would of course get mean 
score of 3.0. In this case 75% of the party's voters 
nevertheless clearly prefer their own leader.
17) S. Holmberg (1981), p. 136.
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Table IV. 2.5. First preferences of party leaders by 
of the parliamentary parties 1987. Total sample. 
Percentages.
Party leaders ranked
voters
SG GA JBH SH AG ThP Sum
PA voters (N=185) :
PA WA SDP PP CiP IP %
Single first preference 15 25 3 14 2 - 58
Shared first preference 31 36 2 21 1 2
Sum first preference 46 61 5 35 3 2
WA voters (N=182):
Single first preference - 49 - 18 1 1 68
Shared first preference 3 32 2 28 2 3
Sum first preference 3 81 2 46 3 4
SDP voters (N=217) :
Single first preference - 12 19 35 1 1 68
Shared first preference 4 20 24 24 5 7
Sum first preference 4 32 43 59 6 8
PP voters (N=232):
Single first preference 1 4 1 75 1 0 83
Shared first preference 2 13 2 18 3 3
Sum first preference 3 17 3 93 4 3
CiP voters (N=100):
Single first preference - 2 1 28 29 1 61
Shared first preference 3 20 2 34 33 6
Sum first preference 3 22 3 62 62 7
IP voters (N=432):
Single first preference 0 3 1 35 3 16 59
Shared first preference 2 12 4 36 7 30
Sum first preference 2 15 5 71 10 46
Total sample (N=1648) :
Single first preference 2 14 4 37 4 5 66
Shared first preference 7 21 7 28 7 13
Sum first preference 9 35 11 65 9 18
The table only includes respondents, 
leaders like/dislike marks.
r who gave all six party
There are great differences in the first preferences for 
leaders among the voters of the different parties, as was to 
be expected. All party leaders are much more preferred by 
the voters of their own party than by voters of other 
parties. Nevertheless, three party leaders do not come out 
on top among their own voters, both when we consider single
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first preference and single or shared first preference, thus 
corresponding to the results we obtained by looking at the 
mean popularity scores among the voters of various parties.
Gestsson, Palsson and Hannibalsson only get 15-19% single 
first preferences among their own voters. Less than half of 
their own voters (43-46%) give them a single or shared first 
preference among the party leaders.
Gudrun Agnarsdottir is the single first preference of 25% 
of PA voters, while 15% of them give their highest marks 
exclusively to Gestsson and 14% to Hermannsson. 61% of PA 
voters have Agnarsdottir as single or shared first 
preference, 46% Gestsson and 35% Hermannsson. Very few PA 
voters give first preference to the other leaders.
35% of SDP voters give their highest marks exclusively to 
Hermannsson, 19% to Hannibalsson and 12% to Agnarsdottir. 
Hermannsson gets single or shared first preference from 59% 
of SDP voters, Hannibalsson 43% and Agnarsdottir 32%. Few
SDP voters give first preferences to other leaders.
Hermannsson also leads among IP supporters, 35% of them 
have him as a single first preference and 16% Palsson, while 
only 3% name Agnarsdottir as a single first preference, the 
same number who prefer Gudmundsson. Hermannsson gets single
or shared first preference of 71% of IP voters, Palsson 46%,
Agnarsdottir 15% and Gudmundsson 10%.
29% of CiP voters give their highest marks exclusively to 
Gudmundsson while 62% have him as a single or shared first 
preference. This makes him just about even with Hermannsson 
(28% and 62%) , while Agnarsdottir (2% and 22%) is far 
behind.
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Both Hermannsson and Agnarsdottir are clear first 
preferences of their own parties' voters. 75% of PP voters 
have Hermannsson as a single first preference and 93% as 
single or shared first preference as compared to 4% and 17% 
for Agnarsdottir. Among WA voters Agnarsdottir on the other 
hand is the single first preference of 49% while 81% have 
her as a single or shared first preference. Hermannsson is 
the single first preference of 18% of WA voters and single 
or shared first preference among 4 6%. Very few PP or WA 
voters give their first preferences to other leaders.
The overall pattern in first preferences is clear. Only 
two leaders - Hermannsson and Agnarsdottir - are definitely 
attractive as a first preference to voters of other parties. 
What is surprising is that three party leaders are clearly 
less popular among their own ranks than either Hermannsson 
or Agnarsdottir. While there were considerable differences 
in the popularity of party leaders in Norway in 1981 and 
1985 and Sweden in 1979, in all cases the party leader was 
clearly the most popular choice within his own party. 8^) The 
likes and dislikes of party leaders among Icelandic voters 
are clearly more independent of party choice than is the 
case in Norway and Sweden.
The appeal of Hermannsson and Agnarsdottir among voters 
of other parties is on the other hand clearly related to the 
left-right spectrum. Agnarsdottir is the most popular leader 
among PA voters while Gestsson beats Hermannsson for second 
place. Hermannsson is most popular among SDP voters while 
Hannibalsson beats Agnarsdottir for second place.
18) H. Valen and B.O. Aardal (1983, p. 36). H. Valen and B. 
Aardal (1989, p. 33). S. Holmberg (1981), pp. 133 and 136.
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Hermannsson is clearly the most popular leader among IP 
voters while he competes with Gudmundsson for the first 
place among CiP voters. While Hermannsson's stronger showing 
in the IP ranks than in the CiP ranks might at first seem to 
contradict the left-right continuum, this is due to the fact 
that Gudmundsson shows a much stronger standing among CiP 
voters than does Palsson among IP voters. In accordance with 
the left-right spectrum, Agnarsdottir is less often a first 
preference among CiP voters than SDP voters and even more 
seldom among IP voters.
We have seen that, even though the popularity of party 
leaders is both clearly related to the left-right dimension 
and voters' liking and disliking of the parties, Icelandic 
voters show more independence from party choice when 
estimating leaders than is the case in Norway and Sweden - 
possibly a result of a greater emphasis on personalities 
(and less emphasis on parties and policies) in Icelandic 
politics. The variations in party leader popularity seem to 
be greater in Iceland. But does this really matter? Does a 
popular party leader attract votes to his party to any 
significant extent?
It seems self-evident that a popular leader is an asset 
for a party. Popular leaders may, for instance, boost morale 
among the party's activists and candidates or voters' 
general liking of the party, and this might result in a 
higher vote for the party. This would be an example of an 
indirect impact of the party leader's popularity on the 
party's electoral fortunes. The direct impact of the 
leader's popularity would on the other hand be the extent to 
which his popularity increases the party's vote when voters'
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liking of the party and other factors are taken into 
account.
Our data does not allow us to test indirect effects. We 
have only one measurement of the party leaders' popularities 
from 1987. Thus we can not say if - or to what extent - the 
high popularity of a leader will in turn increase the 
popularity of his party, or if the dislike of a leader will 
result in the increasing dislike of his party. In order to 
do this we would have to have panel data - and at least some 
of the same leaders at both time points.
We can on the other hand try to estimate the direct
impact of the popularity of the leaders on voting. We know 
that both the popularity of a party and its leader are
strongly intercorrelated and both variables are correlated 
to voting behaviour. We can measure the direct impact of a 
leader's popularity by observing if it increases the 
likelihood of voting for his party when the popularity of 
the party is taken into account.
This can be done in various ways. The most visual way is 
perhaps the presentation in Table IV.2.6. By crosstabulating 
the like/dislike scores of a party and its leader and 
calculating the percentage received by the party in each of 
the cells, we can observe if the party's percentage
increases with increasing popularity of the party leader 
within each category of the party's popularity (the rows)
and vice versa (the columns) . As very few voters give the 
party they vote for or its leader negative marks, we have 
truncated both scales, putting all those who give negative 
marks into the 0 category.
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Table IV.2.6. Proportion of vote for each parliamentary
party 1987 by like/dislike of the party and the party
leader. Total sample.
A. Percentage voting for PA
Like/dislike of Svavar Gestsson
Like/dislike -5/0 -hi -h2 +3 -h4 -h5 All
of PA
-5/0 2 1 2 4 *13 17 2
+ 1 10 8 4 *0 *0 - 7
+ 2 25 15 25 30 *0 - 23
+ 3 39 50 42 41 *67 *78 46
+ 4 *80 *67 72 66 69 *46 66
+ 5 *47 *100 *100 *100 *100 92 90
All 4 12 22 38 54 68 13
B. Percentage voting for WA
Like/dislike of Gudrun Agnarsdottir
Like/dislike -5/0 -hi -h2 ■hS -h4 -h5 All
of WA
-5/0 1 0 0 5 4 0 1
+ 1 0 0 0 0 *0 - 0
+ 2 0 5 4 2 0 0 2
+ 3 *0 17 12 14 11 30 14
+ 4 *0 *0 21 23 21 23 21
+ 5 *32 *0 67 38 48 54 51
All 1 2 8 12 18 40 13
C . Percentage voting for SDP
Like/dislike of Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson
Like/dislike -5/0 -hi -h2 -hS -h4 +5 All
of SDP
-5/0 1 4 0 5 *0 *40 2
+ 1 2 7 10 *0 - - 5
+2 8 19 19 20 10 *100 15
+ 3 29 11 48 32 *29 *31 33
+ 4 *22 *82 49 61 37 *100 49
+5 *85 *100 *89 75 94 90 87
All 4 12 26 33 44 80 16
continued...
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D. Percentage voting for PP
Like/dislike of Steingrimur Hermannsson
Like/dislike -5/0 -hi -h2 -hS -h4 -h5 All
of PP
-5/0 2 0 1 0 3 9 2
+ 1 *12 5 0 3 8 6 5
+2 *0 *0 3 8 4 12 7
+ 3 *50 *50 *26 22 24 16 21
+ 4 *0 *100 *100 *0 27 47 43
+5 — *100 *0 *100 *67 74 74
All 4 4 3 7 13 35 17
E . Percentage voting for CiP
Like/dislike of Albert Gudmundsson
Like/dislike -5/0 -hi -h2 -h3 -h4 -h5 All
of CiP
-5/0 0 0 0 0 11 17 1
+ 1 5 5 0 0 *33 - 4
+2 0 18 21 24 0 *0 13
+ 3 *0 *31 34 19 14 24 23
+ 4 - *0 *50 *38 19 *45 31
+ 5 *67 *100 *100 *80 69 79 78
All 1 5 12 16 22 54 7
F . Percentage voting for IP
Like/dislike of Thorsteinn Palsson
Like/dislike -5/0 -hi +2 +3 + 4 -h5 All
of IP
-5/0 3 13 10 18 *17 *14 5
+ 1 15 16 *0 *0 *0 - 12
+ 2 17 5 18 16 *40 *100 17
+ 3 42 67 44 30 60 *100 45
+ 4 53 *71 75 77 66 84 72
+5 60 *74 63 89 97 86 82
All 10 31 35 47 69 82 31
* denotes that 
individuals in
the percentage 
that cell.
is based on less than 10
The problem with the presentation in Table IV.2.6 is that 
some of the cells are empty and many have very few 
respondents.19) The margins of error are therefore large for 
many of the percentages resulting in great fluctuations.
19) The figures marked with in Table IV.2.6 are based on 
less than 10 respondents and should therefore not really be 
taken seriously.
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Nevertheless, clear patterns emerge in the table. On the 
whole, the percentage voting for a party increases as the 
popularity of the party leader increases (the All row). Thus 
only 4% of those who give Gestsson a negative mark or 0 vote 
for the PA, while 68% of those who give him +5 do so 
although 13% of all respondents in the table vote for the 
PA. Also, as was to be expected, most of those who give an 
unpopular leader high marks also vote for his party while 
this is not case for a popular leader: only 40% of those who 
give Agnarsdottir +5 vote for the WA while 86% of those who 
give Palsson +5 vote for the IP.
The table also reveals that the percentage voting for a 
party increases as the party's popularity increases (the All 
column) . Thus only 2% of those who give the PA negative 
marks or 0 vote for the party while 90% of those who give 
the PA +5 also vote for the party. The figures also reflect 
the popularity of the party; only 51% of those who give the 
popular WA +5 vote for the party while 90% of those who give 
the unpopular PA +5 also vote for the PA.
What is of major interest, however, is the main body of 
the table. If the popularity of a party leader has a direct 
effect on the likelihood of voting for his party we would 
expect the pattern of the last row (All) to be repeated in 
the other rows, i.e. that within each category of party 
popularity the percentage voting for the party increases 
with increasing popularity of the leader. Despite the great 
fluctuations we can see that in general this does not 
happen. If we, for instance, look at the row for those 
respondents who gave the WA +4 we can see that 21% of those 
who gave Agnarsdottir +2 voted for the WA, 23% of those who
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gave her +3, 21% of those who gave her +4 and 23% of those 
who gave her +5. Thus, among those who gave the WA +4, the 
.proportion voting for the WA does not increase with the
increasing popularity of Agnarsdottir. While the patterns 
are often not as clear as in this example, we cannot discern 
any strong trend for any of the party leaders.
This is not the case for party popularity. When we go 
down the columns of the main body of the table there is a 
clear trend within each category of the leader's popularity 
for an increasing proportion to vote for a party as the 
party's popularity increases. Despite the fluctuations the 
overall trend is clear: a party's growing popularity
increases the likelihood of voting for that party, even when 
the impact of its leader's popularity is controlled.
Another way of trying to estimate the direct impact of a 
party leader's popularity on voting is to use multiple 
regression. In so doing we can to some extent solve the
problem of few respondents in many of the cells, although 
the problem of intercorrelation remains. But as the
relationships tend to be linear the multiple regression 
analysis allows us to estimate the impact of the popularity 
of the party leaders when the popularity of the parties has 
been taken into account.
Table IV.2.7 gives the regression equations and the 
amount of variance explained for each party, both for party 
popularity as the only independent variable and for both
party and leader popularity as independent variables. It is 
clear that leader popularity has little independent impact 
on explained variance for all six parties. In two cases - 
for PP and CiP - leader popularity is not included in the
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equation as its contribution is not significant. For the 
other parties party leader popularity increases explained 
variance by 0.2 - 1.0%.
Table IV.2.7. The impact of the popularity of a party and 
its leader on the party's vote 1987. Multiple regression. 
Total sample.
Party Regression equation Multiple R squared
PA %VOTE= .0078 + 
%VOTE=-.0013 +
.158
.149
PARTY
PARTY + .014 LEADER
.438
.440
WA %VOTE=-.0425 + 
%VOTE=-.0557 +
.082
.073
PARTY
PARTY + .014 LEADER
.204
.207
SDP %VOTE=-.0200 + 
%VOTE=-.0281 +
.137
.117
PARTY
PARTY + . 030 LEADER
.359
.367
PP %VOTE=-.0303 + .115 PARTY 
LEADER not significant (PIN= .05)
.288
CiP %VOTE=-.0053 + .116 PARTY 
LEADER not significant (PIN= .05)
.386
IP %VOTE= .0190 + 
%VOTE= .0077 +
.156
.136
PARTY
PARTY + .036 LEADER
.420
.430
%VOTE is coded 1 for those voting for the party in question 
and 0 for those voting for other parties. PARTY contains the 
like/dislike scores of the party in question and LEADER the 
scores for its leader. As very few voters give own party or 
leader a negative score, PARTY and LEADER are recoded so 
that negative scores are included in the 0 category. The 
regression was run stepwise.
Party and leader popularity has weakest explanatory power 
for the two most popular parties, the WA and the PP, which 
also had the two most popular leaders. These variables 
explain 21% of the variation in the WA vote while party 
popularity explains 29% of the variation in the PP vote. For 
the other parties those variables can explain 37-43% of the 
variance in their vote.
As the dependent variable gives the proportion voting for 
a given party and as both the independent variables are 
measured on similar scales, we can interpret the regression
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coefficients as the percentage increase^O) in a party's vote 
for an increase of one unit on the independent variable. The 
PA vote, for instance, can be expected to increase by 15.8% 
when the party's popularity increases by +l and party 
popularity is the only independent variable. When both 
independent variables are in the equation the PA vote can be 
expected to rise by 14.9% for an increase of +1 in party 
popularity when leader popularity is taken into account and 
the PA vote can be expected to rise by 1.4% for an increase 
of +1 in leader popularity when party popularity is
controlled.
The regression coefficients of party popularity are
lowest for the WA/ its vote can be expected to rise by 7-8% 
for each rise of +1 in party popularity. The regression 
coefficients for the other parties range from .115 to .158, 
indicating a rise in the likelihood of voting for a party of 
12-16% for each increase of +1 in party popularity.
The direct effect of leader popularity on voting, i.e. 
when party popularity has been taken into account, is small. 
For the PP and CiP it is so close to 0 that it is not
significant. For the WA and the PA an increase of +1 in the
popularity of the party leader increases the likelihood of 
voting for those parties by 1%. For the SDP and the IP the 
figures are 3-4%.
A comparable analysis of Swedish voters in 1979 gave 
regression coefficients for the parties ranging from .10 to 
.18 while the coefficients for party leaders were in all 
five cases close to 0 and not statistically significant.^1)
20) By multiplying the coefficients by 100, of course
21) S. Holmberg (1981), p. 143.
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The Swedish and Icelandic results are thus rather similar, 
even though Icelandic voters show somewhat more independence 
from party choice when evaluating leaders and leader 
popularity does in some cases have a small direct effect on 
voting behaviour.
The main conclusion must, however, be that the great 
popularity of Hermannsson and Agnarsdottir did not increase 
their parties' votes in a direct way in 1987. It should be 
underlined that their popularity may have had an indirect 
effect, e.g. served to increase voters' liking of their 
parties. That is a question we cannot answer here. The 
results - both from Iceland and Sweden - should on the other 
hand serve as a reminder that leader popularity does not 
automatically increase the party vote at the polls.
IV.3 Left-right positions of voters within each party and 
the parties' popularities
In the last section we saw that when we calculate the 
means of voters' own left-right positions for each party, 
those party means are positioned at regular intervals along 
the left-right scale. We should nevertheless not ignore the 
fact that within the ranks of each party there are 
considerable differences in the self-position of individual 
voters. The distribution of each party's voters' own 
positions on the left-right scale can be seen in Figure 
IV.3.1. While the shape of distributions clearly changes 
from left to right, voters of each party are concentrated on 
3-6 points of the 11-point scale. The centre of the scale, 
5, is the modal point for four of the parties, for all 
except the PA and the IP.
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Figure IV.3.1. Left-right position of the voters of the 
parliamentary parties 1987. Total sample.
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The modal point for the PA is 0; almost a fourth of all 
PA voters position themselves at the extreme left end of the 
scale. Almost all other PA voters are rather regularly 
distributed from 1-5.
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While the WA is clearly second furthest to the left, its 
profile is quite different from that of the PA. A third of 
WA voters position themselves at point 5 but almost all 
other voters of the party are left of centre.
The distributions of SDP and PP voters are rather similar 
with the main difference being that fewer PP voters (39%) 
position themselves in the centre (point 5) than is the case 
among SDP voters (43%), while 36% of PP voters are right of 
centre as compared to 32% of SDP voters.
38% of CiP voters position themselves in the centre but 
almost all other voters of the party are to the right of 
centre.
The modal point for the IP is 8 and almost half of the 
party's voters choose point 7 or 8 to describe their left- 
right position. The rest are rather evenly divided between 
points 5 and 6 on the left of the party's centre of gravity 
and point 9 and 10 on the right.
In the last section we saw that the parties' left-right 
positions were clearly related to their voters' like or 
dislike of parties and party leaders. Here we will examine 
whether similar differences in the popularity of the parties 
can be discerned within each party's following. In Table 
IV. 3.1 we have on the basis of own position on the left- 
right scale divided voters of each party into three groups, 
left, centre and right, as equal in size as possible, and 
then calculated the mean like-dislike score for the parties 
among each voter group.
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Table IV.3.1. Likes and dislikes for parties in 1987 among 
each party's voters divided by their left-right position. 
Means.
PA voters 
Left (0-1) 
Centre (2-3) 
Right (4-7)
Mean
PA
3.6 
3.3
2.7
score
WA
2.1
2.9
2.0
on dislike-like scale for 
SDP PP CiP IP
0.0 -0.2 -3.3 -3.2 
0.6 0.0 -3.5 -2.8 
0.9 0.0 -1.5 -1.2
N
(61-63)
(59-61)
(47-49)
F-prob. .0156 .0280 .0482 .8088 .0000 .0001
WA voters 
Left (0-3) 
Centre (4) 
Right (5-10)
1.9
0.7
-0.7
4.5
4.1
4.0
0.4
0.8
0.7
0.2
0.6
1.0
-3.3 
-1 .4 
-1 . 6
-2.7
-0 . 9 
-0 .1
(59-60)
(27)
(62-63)
F-prob. .0000 .0681 .6858 . 1385 . 0001 . 0000
SDP voters 
Left (0-4) 
Centre (5) 
Right (6-10)
-0.7
-0.9
-1.5
1. 6 
2.0 
1.1
3.6
3.4
3.5
-0.3
0.6
0.7
— 1 . 8
-1.1 
-0.3
-1. 0
0 .1 
1.5
(51-52)
(83-85)
(60-61)
F-prob. .2071 .0832 .6642 .0671 .0106 . 0000
PP voters 
Left (0-4) 
Centre (5) 
Right (6-10)
0.1
-0.9
-2.0
1.7
1.9
1.4
-1.1 
-0.6 
-0.4
3.5
3.8
3.8
-1.3 
-1.3 
-0 . 9
-0.2
1.2
1.8
(41-44)
(68-69)
(62-66)
F-prob. .0000 .3608 .2487 .7106 . 6484 .0001
CiP voters 
Left (2-5) 
Centre (6-7) 
Right (8-10)
0.1
-2.6
-2.2
1.2
0.9
1.0
-0.1
0.4
0.3
0 . 6 
1.5 
0.2
3.9
3.7
4.1
0.4
1.5
2.7
(37)
(26-27)
(24-25)
F-prob. .0000 . 9082 .7049 .1051 ,. 6813 .0046
IP voters 
Left (1-6) 
Centre (7-8) 
Right (9-10)
-1.3
-2.4
-3.0
1.2
0.7
-0.4
0.6
0.4
-0.2
1.3
1.4 
1.3
-1.0 
-1 .1 
-1.3
3.0
3.8
4.2
(108-110)
(185-187)
(93-94)
F-prob. .0000 .0000 .0141 .8825 .7760 .0000
Table IV.3.1 reveals some interesting patterns. Two major 
questions concern us here. First, do the three different 
left-right groups within each party like their own party to 
a different extent? Second, is the like or dislike of other
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parties among the groups related to the left-right scale so 
that, for instance, left-wing PA voters dislike the IP more 
than right-wing PA voters?
For three of the parties, SDP, PP and CiP, there are 
clearly no significant differences among the left-right 
groups in the liking of their own party. This is not the 
case for the polar parties, the PA and the IP, where the 
differences are significant at the .05 level. The PA voters 
furthest to the left like the PA more (3.6) than PA voters 
in the centre (3.3) and on the right (2.7). The IP voters 
furthest to the right like the IP better (4.2) than IP 
voters in the centre (3.8) and on the left (3.0). A similar 
tendency can be observed among WA voters: those on the left 
in the party like it better than those in the centre or on 
the right. While the relationship is weaker than for the PA 
and the IP it is still significant at the .10 level.22)
Like and dislike of other parties is clearly not 
independent of left-right position within own party. Out of 
30 such entries in Table IV.3.1, 18 cases show significant
(at the .10 level) differences in the groups' liking of 
other parties. In 14 of these cases the ranking order 
follows the left-right model completely while in three more 
the marks of the left and right groups are clearly in the 
expected direction, even though there is a (slight) break in 
the ranking order.23)
22) It should be noted that as the number of respondents in 
many groups is low the differences in the means have to be 
quite large to be significant.
23) These three cases are PA voters' estimates of the CiP,
WA voters' estimates of the CiP and SDP voters' estimates of 
the WA. In the fourth case PA voters in the centre give WA 
2.9 while those on the left give the WA 2.1 and those on the 
right give the party 2.0.
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In 12 of the 30 cases the differences between the left, 
centre and right groups are not great enough to be 
significant at the .10 level, but most of them go in the
expected direction.24)
Thus it is clear that not only is the left-right position 
of a party relevant to its voters' liking and disliking of 
other parties but also that a voter's left-right position 
within his own party tends on the whole to have an effect on 
his evaluation of other parties. The analysis in this
section further supports our earlier conclusion that left- 
right positions are important guides for voters when they 
cognitively map the political world in their minds,
IV.4 The left-right model and voters' stances on issues
While the left-right model is commonly used, it is by no 
means self-evident how individual issues should be placed on 
it. In Europe, however, one of the main criteria has been 
the socialist/non-socialist division, especially on 
questions concerning economic and social issues. While 
communist ideas of a centralized economy have had little 
success in Western Europe, the social democratic version of 
strong government involvement in the economy has been
influential. Traditionally, socialist and social democratic 
parties favoured nationalization, at least of large
companies, regulation of banking, high taxation on
24) Four of those cases have a ranking order in accordance 
with the left-right model, and six more have the left and 
right groups in the expected positions. The remaining cases 
are CiP voters' estimate of the SDP, where those on the left 
give lower marks (-0.1) than those in the centre (0.4) and 
those on the right (0.3), and PP voters' estimate of SDP, 
where the ranking order is reversed, so the lowest marks 
come from the left (-1.1), then from centre (-0.6), and 
highest from the right (-0.4).
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companies, reduction in wage differentials and a strong 
welfare state with high expenditure on public services. 
Their overall aim was a more egalitarian society and their 
basic conception of the capitalist society was constructed 
in class terms; they saw themselves as pro-labour and anti­
business. The economic policies of the right-wing parties on 
the other hand tended to favour the free-market system.
Those distinctions, never completely clear cut, have 
become more blurred in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Social democratic parties have increasingly 
accepted the market system and the parties on the right have 
accepted the welfare state. In the 1950s and the 1960s 
social scientists used the term "the end of ideology" to 
describe these tendencies towards consensus politics in 
Western democracies. In many European democracies there were 
strong trends towards corporatism - the cooperation of 
government, labour unions and employers' federations in 
forming economic and social policy.
In the 1970s and 1980s we have seen to a certain extent 
the resurrection of "conviction politics" in many countries, 
especially on the right wing, as exemplified by increased 
emphasis on the virtues of the market system by politicians 
like Reagan and Thatcher. The change seems though to be more 
clearly observed at the level of rhetoric rather than on the 
level of results; government expenditure has continued to 
grow in most Western democracies in recent years. While 
there has probably been increasing acceptance of some of the 
"iron laws of the market", no strong tendency towards 
abolishing or strongly reducing the welfare state can be 
observed among politicians or voters.
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Besides different emphases on economic issues found among 
parties of the left and the right, other issues have also 
tended to follow the left-right division. In Western Europe 
right-wing parties have for example tended to be more 
strongly committed to strong defence and support of NATO 
than left-wing parties. On other issues the left-right 
dimension does clearly not reflect the battle lines between 
parties. Good examples are the debate on nuclear energy in 
Sweden, on membership of the EC in Norway, and on government 
support and regulation of agriculture in many European 
countries.
We have seen that most . Icelandic voters use the terms 
left and right to conceptualize the party system. The terms 
are ideological and thus we would expect the voters' 
attitudes on some issues to be related to their overall 
left-right position. In order to elaborate this relationship 
we can adopt several strategies.
First, we can define what we mean by left and right in 
abstract terms and then deduce propositions that are 
testable. The advantage with such an approach is that it is 
clear and logically coherent. The disadvantage is that by 
doing this we are testing how our model of left and right 
relates to voters' stands on individual issues; their 
perceptions of "left" and "right" may be different.
Second, we can analyse how voters' stands on individual 
issues are related to their left-right positions. While a 
high correlation does not necessarily mean that the issue in 
question is considered to be a left-right issue in the mind 
of the voter, the lack of such a correlation means that the 
issue is not a left-right issue.
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Third, we can use factor analysis to see if the 
individual issues are structured in such a way that we can 
explain the variance in attitudes by assuming that there are 
underlying dimensions that influence the individual 
attitudes. Such an analysis should give us a dimension that 
we would recognize as a left-right dimension, even though it 
may not correspond completely to our own "logical” model of 
left and right, and it should be related to the voters' own 
positions on the left-right scale.
In Table IV.4.1 we have the correlations between voters' 
stands on individual issues and their own left-right 
position both in 1983 and 1987. We have divided the 
attitudes into six general issue areas: security and foreign 
policy, economic issues, environment, women's rights, 
morals, and the political system. Besides giving the 
correlations for individual issues and the left-right scale, 
we have calculated an attitude index for each issue area 
simply by reversing the values on variables correlating 
negatively with the left-right scale and adding together 
each individual's scores on all the variables in each issue 
area. Thus the sign of the correlation coefficient between 
an attitude index and the left-right spectrum is always 
positive by definition. The table gives the correlation 
between each attitude index and the left-right scale.
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Table IV.4.1. Correlations between stand on issues and own 
left-right position 1983 (l=left, 2=centre, 3=right) and 
1987 (scale 0-10). Pearson's r . Total samples.
1983 1987
Security and foreign policy:
Keflavik base should stay -.59 -.59
Iceland should stay in NATO (2-fold scale) -.54 -.56
Iceland should stay in NATO (3-fold scale) -.45 -.48
Supports the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone
in the Nordic countries even though this would
weaken NATO .33
Icelanders should take payment for the presence
of U.S. military forces in the country -.17 -.23
Attitude index (incl. 3-fold NATO scale) .52 .60
Economic issues:
Gradual reduction of inflation is impossible.
The best policy is a quick solution by strict
reduction in spending and toughness towards
pressure groups -.33
Taxes should be reduced even though it meant
reduced public services, e.g. in health care,
education and social security -.29 -.25
Steps to make it possible to operate private
radio and TV stations have gone too far .27
It is necessary to do more to decrease the
differences in conditions between the regions
and the capital area .22
Progress in the capital area may be decreased in
order to increase prosperity in the regions .21
Real and long-term increases in living
standards can only be obtained if the government
closely cooperates with the trade unions and
really considers their point of view .21
Government should prioritize full employment
even though companies are inefficient .18
Cooperation with foreigners on power intensive
plants is only acceptable if at least 50% of the
ownership in such companies is Icelandic .13
Clientelistic politics are necessary for the
underprivileged when dealing with "the system" -.13
Agricultural production must be greatly
reduced as now there is overproduction at
taxpayers expense -.12
All pension funds should be joined in one fund .12
Government should give organizations of employees
and employers effective part in decision-making
on major issues .10
Attitude index .44 .37
continued...
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Environment :
In the next years environmental issues
should be prioritized over economic growth .17
Women's rights:
Attempts to assure women equal position to men
have gone too far -.28 -.24
Liberalization in women's rights to abortion
has gone too far -.09
Attitude index .26
Morals :
Beer should be sold in the state's liquor
stores -.09
The political system:
All parties should hold open primaries where
supporters as well as members can decide which
candidates are put in the lists' top seats -.06 -.07
Preferably all votes should have equal weight
when parliamentary seats are allotted -.13
The new electoral law's rules providing for
more equal weight of votes between regions
have gone too far .11
The party system is outdated .03
Attitude index .13 .12
The relationship between individual issues and the left- 
right dimension is statistically significant at the .05- 
level in all cases but o n e . 25) some of the relationships are 
nevertheless weak. It should also be noted that for 
questions asked both in 1983 and 1987 the strength of 
relationships are similar in both elections.
Issues concerning security and foreign policy are most 
strongly related to the left-right spectrum. The attitude 
index for this issue area gives correlations of .52 (1983, 3 
questions) and .60 (1987, 4 questions). Attitudes towards
25) The relationship between answers to the 1987 question of 
whether the party system is outdated (r=.03) is not 
significant.
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the U.S. military base in Keflavik are more strongly related 
to left-right position than any other single issue (-.59 
both in 1983 and 1987; the negative sign on the coefficient 
of course signifying that those on the left (low scores on 
left-right variable) are more likely to oppose the base 
(high scores on base variable)). The relationship is almost 
as strong for attitudes on NATO membership (.-54 and -.56 on 
a 2-fold scale including only those for or against; -.45 and 
.-48 on a 3-fold scale also including those with no 
opinion). The other two security policy issues, support for 
the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Nordic 
countries (.33) and the idea of charging for the Keflavik 
base (-.17 and -.23), are less strongly related to the left- 
right dimension, even though those relationships are 
stronger than is the case for many other issues.
The second most important are economic issues, the 
attitude index giving .44 (1983) and .37 (1987) . The most
strongly related single issues are attitudes for a tough and 
quick anti-inflationary policy in 1983 (-.33), for tax
reduction at the expense of public services (-.29 and -.25), 
and against private TV and radio stations in 1987 (.27).
Somewhat more weakly related are attitudes for 
prioritizing full employment in 1983 (.18) and for
supporting regional policy, which is similar both in 1983 
(.22) and 1987 (.21) even though the wording of the
questions are different. Pro-corporatist attitudes are on 
the other hand more strongly related to left-right in 1983 
(.21) than in 1987 (.10). This is most likely a result of
different wording, as the 1983 question focuses only on 
cooperation between government and labour unions, while the
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1987 question focuses on cooperation between government, 
unions and employers' organizations. The relationships 
between other economic issues and left-right position are 
weak ( + /- .12 and .13) even though they are statistically
significant.
Concerning other issues, both in 1983 and 1987, leftists 
are clearly more prone to disagree with the statement that 
attempts to assure women equal position to men have gone too 
far (-.28 and -.24) and in 1987 they are more ready to 
prioritize the environment over economic growth (.17). In 
1983 the relationship between left-right position and an 
anti-abortion stand is on the other hand weak (-.09) and the 
same is the case for legalization of beer, which is only 
slightly more opposed by those on the left (-.09) .26) All 
attitudes towards the political system are very weakly (.03 
to .13) related to the left-right dimension.
While this analysis shows that there is clearly a 
relationship between left-right position and stands on 
issues, especially those concerning foreign and economic 
policy, we have not shown how those attitudes are 
intercorrelated nor how the overall relationship between 
attitudes and left-right position compares to other 
countries. A factor analysis should help us to answer both 
of these questions.
In Chapter V we present the results of a factor analysis 
of our issue questions (see Tables V. 7 and V.8) . For each 
election we extract four factors; three of the factors are 
common to both elections. The strongest factor in both
26) Until 1989 it was illegal to sell beer in Iceland 
although wine and liqour were sold through a State monopoly
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elections is clearly a left-right factor, which in 1983 is 
strongest related to the questions on the Keflavik base, 
NATO membership, inflation strategy, equality for women, and 
reduction of taxes at the expense of the welfare system. In 
1987 the left-right factor is most strongly related to the 
questions of the Keflavik base, a nuclear-weapons-free zone, 
NATO membership, equality for women, uniting the pension 
funds, and reduction of taxes. In both elections we also 
have a factor related to the urban-rural cleavage, which we 
call the old-new economy factor. In 1983 this is most 
strongly related to the questions on equality of votes, 
regional support, and reduction of agricultural production 
and in 1987 to equality of votes, private radio and TV, and 
regional support. The third factor, common to both 
elections, is a populism factor. In 1983 this is most 
strongly connected to the questions on open primaries, base 
payment, and power industry ownership and in 1987 to base 
payment, clientelistic politics, and open primaries. The 
fourth factor in 1983 is a moral factor, most strongly 
correlated to full employment, beer legalization, abortion, 
and corporatism, while the fourth factor in 1987 is a green 
factor, most strongly related to the questions on the 
environment and whether the party system is outdated. In 
Chapter V we also calculate additive indices based on the 
factors (see Table V.9) simply by using the three questions 
most strongly correlated with each factor (except we use 
only two questions for the green factor). The correlations 
of these additive indices to own left-right positions are 
shown in Table IV.4.2.
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Table IV.4.2. Correlations between issue indices 1983 and 
1987 and own left-right position.
1983
Left-right index 
Old-new economy index 
Populism index 
Morality index
1987
Left-right index 
Populism index 
Old-new economy index 
Green index
Correlation (r) with own 
left-right position
-.58 (N=902)
-.22 
-.05 
.13
-.60 (N=1439)
-.21 
.28 
.12
For construction of indices see Table V.9. The different 
signs on the correlations with the new-old economy index in 
1983 and 1987 are of no substantial importance/ they are 
simply a result of differences in coding.
The left-right attitude indices are, as expected, much 
more strongely related to own left-right position than are 
the other attitude indices. In 1983 the correlation between 
left-right attitudes and own left-right position is r=-.58 
and in 1987 r=-.60, indicating that in 1983 those on the 
left tend to oppose the Keflavik base, NATO membership, and 
a tough inflation strategy. In 1987 those on the left tend 
to oppose the Keflavik base and NATO membership and be in 
favour of a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Comparable additive 
attitude indices from Swedish electoral research, based on 
the questions most strongly related to the left-right 
factor, have somewhat stronger relationships to own left- 
right position, r=0.68 in 1979 and r=0.67 both in 1982 and 
1985.27) The strongest relationships between individual 
questions and own left-right positions in the 1985 Swedish 
data were on abolition of workers' funds and aiming at a 
socialist society (r=0.64 for both), while other
27) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987), p. 301.
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associations were weaker, e.g. with questions on nursery 
schools (r=0.33), six-hour working day (r=0.36), and 
advertising on TV (r =0.33).28)
While the results from the Norwegian election surveys are 
not directly comparable, they also show a strong
relationship between stands on left-right attitude questions
and own left-right position. The Norwegian association 
between factor scores on the left-right factor and own 
position on the left-right scale was tau b=0.44 in 1977, tau 
b=0.45 in 1981, and tau b=0.50 in 1985.29) The Icelandic 
voters thus resemble the Swedish and Norwegian ones in that 
their left-right attitudes are strongly anchored to their 
abstract perception of their position on the left-right 
scale. The issues most strongly related to the left-right 
factor are, however, to some extent different between the 
countries and the Swedish associations are somewhat stronger 
than the Icelandic ones.
The relationships between the other attitude indices and 
own left-right position are much weaker than the 
relationship to the left-right attitude index. Nevertheless, 
in both elections the old-new economy index is related to 
own left-right position. In 1983 those on the right tended
to support the view that all votes should have equal weight
and that agricultural production should be reduced, while 
they were sceptical of regional support (r=-.22). In 1987 
those on the left favour regional support and think that 
increased equality of votes and steps to make it possible 
for private companies to operate radio and TV stations had
28) Ibid., pp. 263, 265, and 274.
29) B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), p. 72
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gone too far (r=.28). The populism factor is also moderately 
related to own left-right position in 1987 (r=-.21) : those
on the left tended to oppose base payment, clientelistic
politics and open primaries.
IV.5 The left-right model and vote switching
We have seen that left-right position is clearly related 
to voting, liking and disliking of parties, and stand on 
issues. Thus we would also think it likely that it is
related to party switching. If the left-right position of a 
voter is relatively stable and it influences his choice of 
party we would expect that when a voter leaves his old party 
he is most likely to choose a new party that is close to his 
old one on the left-right scale. In this section we will 
examine if our data supports that hypothesis.
Such an examination is more problematic than it may seem 
at first and involves at least three concerns. First, the 
same parties were not fighting the elections of 1979, 1983
and 1987. Thus we do not have a fixed number of parties and 
a fixed ranking order on a left-right scale. We try to
tackle this problem by looking separately at movements 
between the four old parties both in 1983 and 1987,
movements between the five parliamentary parties which took 
part both in 1983 and 1987, and movements to the new 
parties, the SDA and WA in 1983 and the CiP in 1987.
The second problem is that the number of respondents 
moving between individual parties is in many cases small, 
especially in 1983. We have therefore to be cautious in our 
interpretation. Nevertheless, having data from both 1983 and 
1987 for the four old parties is an advantage; the
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similarity in the patterns of voter movements between the 
old parties in both elections suggests that those patterns 
are not chance results due to small sample size.
Third, the different sizes of the parties constitute a 
problem. Ideally, we should construct a model showing the 
expected movements between parties if voters leaving each 
party simply showed the same tendency to vote for another 
party as the electorate as a whole, without any ideological 
considerations. Instead we shall only examine if there are 
clear tendencies in the data, but the size factor should be 
borne in mind.
Table IV.5.1 shows voters who switched between the four 
old parties in 1983 and 1987. This group constituted half of 
all party switchers in 1983, and 38% in 1987. The table 
shows what percentages of those switchers moved between each 
pair of parties and the grouping is based on the 
conventional left-right dimension.
Table IV.5.1. Vote switching between the four old parties 
1979-83 and 1983-1987. Total samples. Percentages.
Left-right model: PA - SDP - PP - IP.
Switches to an adjacent party. 
Between PA and SDP 
Between SDP and PP 
Between PP and IP
Jumps one party:
Between PA and PP 
Between SDP and IP
Jumps two parties:
Between PA and IP
Total
N=
9
10
19
16
34
13
1983
38
50
13
101%
(80)
11
26
15
34
1987
45
49
100%
(163)
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The movements in the table do not correspond well to the 
left-right model. If all parties were of equal size and the 
party switches were random we would expect half of the 
switches to be between adjacent parties (3 pairs), 1/3 would 
jump one party (2 pairs), and 1/6 jump two parties (1 pair). 
If the left-right dimension had an impact we would expect 
more than half of the movements to be between adjacent 
parties.
Instead, in both elections a majority of voters do not 
switch to a party adjacent to their old party. Half of the 
voters jump one party: move between PA and PP on the one
hand and SDP and IP on the other. This is clearly not only 
an effect of different party size. The small size of the 
SDP in 1983 may partially explain why there is clearly much 
more movement between the PA and the PP than between the SDP 
and either of those parties. But this clearly does not even 
partially account for the fact that there are considerably 
more movements between the IP and the SDP than between the 
IP and the PP.
The observed movements between the old parties in both 
elections have a much better fit to another left-right 
model: PA - PP - SDP - IP. If we classify the movements on 
that basis 60% of switching between the old parties in both 
elections is between adjacent parties, while 28% in 1983 and 
34% in 1987 jump one party. The ties between the IP and the 
SDP on the one hand and the PP and the PA on the other, 
which we have observed before, are simply manifested more 
strongly in vote switching than in the various patterns we 
discussed earlier.
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Table IV.5.2 shows the movements between the four old 
parties and the WA from 1983 to 1987 both based on the total 
sample (recalled 1983 vote) and on the panel (1983 vote as 
reported then). The differences between the two samples are 
generally s m a l l .30)
Table IV.5.2. Vote switching between the four old parties 
and the WA 1983-87. Panel and total sample. Percentages.
Left-right model: PA - WA - SDP - PP - IP
Switches to an adjacent party: 
Between PA and WA 
Between WA and SDP 
Between SDP and PP 
Between PP and IP
Jumps one party:
Between PA and SDP 
Between WA and PP 
Between SDP and IP
Jumps two parties:
Between PA and PP 
Between WA and IP
Jumps three parties:
PA-IP
Total
N=
14
7
4
21
1
9
16
Panel
46
32
16
100%
(104)
Total sample 
46
16
6
7
16
5
6 
21
32
99%
(265)
The overall pattern fits the five-party left-right model 
better than was the case for the four old parties. 88% of 
the movements are between adjacent parties or include 
jumping over one party, as compared to 70% which we would 
expect if all parties were of equal size and the movements 
random. While the relationship is obviously weak, it is in
30) It is nevertheless interesting that in the panel a 
higher percentage switches between the IP and the PP than 
between the IP and the SDP and the difference between PA-PP 
switchers and PA-SDP switchers is smaller than in the total 
sample. But we do not know if the panel is more accurate, 
despite its superior measurement, as the number of 
respondents is so low.
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the expected direction. If we group the data on the basis of 
a left-right model where the positions of SDP and PP are 
reversed (PA-WA-PP-SDP-IP) the fit is similar/ it is 
slightly better if we use the total sample and slightly 
worse if we use the panel.
Table IV.5.3. Party switchers in the new parties ' votes 1983
and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
SDA vote WA vote All switch­
1983 1983 ers 1983*
Vote in 1979
PA 20 50 27
SDP 33 12 28
PP 13 9 19
IP 33 29 25
Total 99% 100% 99%
N= (45) (34) (159)
CiP vote All switch­
1987 ers 1987
Vote in 1983
PA 2 18
WA 2 6
SDP 8 13
PP 11 14
SDA 4 10
IP 72 39
Total 99% 100%
N= (83) (423)
* Three voters for Trotskyites in 1979, all of whom voted 
for the PA in 1983, are omitted here.
Table IV. 5.3 shows the party of origin of the party 
switchers who voted for parties fighting their first 
election in 1983 and 1987. For comparison we also show which 
party all party switchers voted for in the previous 
election. If party switching was random we would expect the 
profiles of the new parties to mirror that distribution. If 
the left-right dimension has an effect, we would expect the
new parties to get relatively more votes from parties close 
to them on the left-right scale.
There are clear differences between the three new parties 
in terms of the origins of their converts. The profile of 
the SDA in 1983 is rather similar to that of all switchers, 
thus indicating that the party got its voters from all parts 
of the left-right spectrum even though the SDA appealed more 
to previous voters of SDP and IP than PP and PA. The other 
two new parties, however, have a stronger left-right 
profile. In 1983 the WA gets half of its switchers from its
neighbour on the left, the PA, but relatively few from the
SDP and the PP. The CiP in 1987 shows the strongest 
correspondence to the left-right spectrum. Almost three of 
every four switchers to the party come from the IP and the 
appeal of the party decreases as we go further to the left 
on the spectrum.
On the whole the pattern of party switching does not
correspond well to the left-right spectrum. It should be 
noted, however, that our analysis is only based on movements 
between the parties and their ranking order on the left- 
right scale. As we saw earlier, voters of each party are 
distributed over a considerable space on the left-right
dimension. Left-right position within a party may influence 
party switching but our data does not allow us to test this.
More important is the fact that the parties' ranking 
orders along the old-new economy dimension, which is clearly 
related to party choice, is different from their ranking on 
the left-right dimension. On the old-new economy dimension 
the PP and the PA are adjacent parties both in 1983 and 
1987, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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Chapter V: Issues and voting behaviour
Political parties are the structured alternatives voters 
face in elections. If politics is about the peaceful - and 
meaningful in a democratic sense - resolution of conflict 
through the ballot box, it seems necessary that there should 
be some consistency between cleavage at voter level and in 
the party system. The parties should reflect differences 
among voters on ideological concerns and on disputed issues 
or interests. A complete correspondence is logically 
impossible if parties are relatively few and voters' stances 
on issues are not completely structured along a few 
ideological dimensions. In the real world it is to be 
expected that a voter cannot vote for a party with which he 
agrees on all issues but party systems can realistically be 
expected to differ in this respect. In one party system the 
correspondence between voters' opinions and party choice may 
be relatively small while in another there can be 
considerable correspondence.
An obvious precondition for the latter is that voters
have different opinions concerning issues and ideology and
that the parties offer different policy options in
elections. A complete lack of ideological or issue-related
connection has serious consequences for the democratic
nature of a party system or - as Soren Holmberg has observed
- makes it a facade:
It can be to a party's advantage in an election 
campaign to stress the qualities of trust and the 
voters' old bonds of loyalty to the party. This is 
a defensive strategy aimed at preventing potential 
party switchers from betraying the party. Election 
campaign strategy of this kind is not uncommon 
among Western European parties, and is not - of 
course - illegitimate. But - as often happens in
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the U.S.A. - if it is combined with a tactic of 
trying to keep a low profile on many political 
issues and avoiding taking an open position on 
different social problems, this can have negative 
consequences in the long run. There is a risk that 
the political content becomes unimportant. The 
ability of politicians to gain from the voters' 
bonds of loyalty to the parties then becomes the 
factor that decides elections. And then democracy 
becomes only Potemkin curtains. The will of the 
people does not determine development. That role 
goes to the forces that play on people's emotions 
and keeps the problems of reality away from the 
election campaigns.
Classical democratic theory - and armchair speculation 
before the advent of electoral surveys - had assumed the 
rationality of the voters and "championed the nonpartisan, 
independent voter, rationally choosing between competing 
issues and candidates".2) Early research on voting behaviour 
- mainly American and in particular The American Voter - 
radically changed that perception. In that influential book 
the Michigan scholars maintained that issue orientations 
were of relative insignificance in the voting decision and 
that ideologies, or coherent patterns of belief across issue 
areas, were largely absent in the mass electorate.3) in a 
classic article Converse argued not only that stand on 
issues had little impact on voting decision but also that 
voters' attitudes were not structured to a great extent, 
i.e. he did not find strong correlations between voters' 
stands on issues which theoretically seemed related, thus 
indicating that voters did not have consistent belief 
systems. Moreover, voters' stands on issues did not seem to 
be consistent from one instance to the next. Most voters
1) S. Holmberg (1981), p. 223. My translation.
2) G.M. Pomper (1988), p. 114.
3) Idid., p. 117.
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thus seemed to have non-attitudes and simply give random 
responses to interviewers' questions about issues.4)
This view of the electorate became the conventional 
wisdom among political scientists and remained predominant 
until the 1970s. It seemed confirmed by other research, e.g. 
studies of British voters in the 1960s by Butler and 
Stokes.
An early challenge to this model of the unsophisticated
voter was made in the 1960s by V.O. Key in his book The
Responsible Electorate:
The perverse and unorthodox argument of this 
little book is that voters are not fools. To be 
sure, many individual voters act in odd ways 
indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves 
about as rationally and responsibly as we should 
expect, given the clarity of the alternatives 
presented to it and the character of the 
information available to it.^)
Since the 1970s the predominant view has been that Key's 
basic argument was correct: issues do matter in the voting
decision. In 1976 Nie, Verba and Petrocik argued in The 
Changing American Voter that the 1964 election in the U.S. 
marked a watershed in the importance of issues in American 
elections :
We think it important that three major changes 
occur during the same period, between the 1960 and 
1964 elections. These are the increase in 
consistency among attitudes themselves, the 
increased relationship between attitudes and the 
vote, and the decreased relationship between party 
identification and the vote.^)
4) P.E. Converse (1964). Converse's analysis of issue 
consistency was based on a panel survey conducted between 
1956 and 1960.
5) M. Harrop and W.L. Miller (1987), pp. 122-123. Stokes was 
one of the Michigan scholars and a co-author of The American 
Voter,
6) V.O. Key (1966), p. 7.
7) N.H. Nie, S. Verba, and J.R. Petrocik (1979), p. 166.
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Nie, Verba and Petrocik found that issue voting was much 
higher in 1964, 1968 and 1972 (especially in 1964 and 1968) 
than had been the case in 1956 and 1960.8) On the other 
hand, in 1976 "Ford and Carter, by underplaying the issue 
distance between them, conducted an election campaign that 
returned issue voting to the pre-1964 level".^) While the 
apparent increase in issue constraint in 1964 seems at least 
partly to be due to different methodologies (e.g. changes in 
question format on issue q u e s t i o n s ) ,^8) the conclusion seems 
to be that issues "are more significant when, as in 1964 and 
1972, there is at least one ideological candidate".^^) In 
summing up the most recent American debate on issue voting, 
Niemi and Weisberg conclude that "the contemporary issue 
voting literature is concerned not with whether issues 
matter but with which issues matter and how they m a t t e r " . 12) 
On the other hand, model building "has not resulted in firm 
conclusions regarding the relative importance of candidates, 
issues, and party in the vote d e c i s i o n " . 18)
Research on voting behaviour in Britain has in general 
also emphasized the importance of issue voting since the 
1970s. Some authors claim that issue voting has increased 
considerably since the 1960s as an explanatory factor in 
voting, at the expense of other factors such as class or 
family loyalties. On the basis of a multiple regression 
analysis Rose and McAllister found e.g. that in the 1987 
election political values were by far the strongest
8) Idid., p. 165.
9) Idid., p. 381.
10) M. Harrop and W.L. Miller (1987), pp. 123-124
11) Idid., p. 156.
12) Niemi, R.G. and H. Weisberg (1993b), p. 138.
13) Idid.
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determinant of voting, explaining 27.9% of the vote.^^) 
According to their calculations the explained variance due 
to political values had increased from 9.3% in 1964.^5)
Crewe argues that recent studies "have established a 
close fit between respondents' positions on the main issues 
of an election and the way they voted - a much closer fit 
than found between social class (or any other social 
attribute) and the vote".!^) Franklin argues along similar 
lines :
what evidence we have been able to bring to bear 
points to the causal primacy of the decline of 
class voting in opening the way to an increase in 
the importance of issues in determining the 
electoral choice of British voters.
Heath et al., while arguing that the decline of class
voting in Britain has been greatly exaggerated, nevertheless
accept that issue voting in Britain has increased.
In 1983 and 1987 voters' attitudes towards the 
issues were more closely associated with the way 
they voted than had been the case in previous 
election studies. Attitudes have become better 
predictors of how people will vote.^^)
They argue on the other hand that this change is not due 
to changing social psychology of voters but rather to the 
fact that the major parties. Labour and Conservative, have 
moved ideologically apart. Thus
14) Other factors were family loyalties, explaining 19.7% of 
the vote, current performance of political leaders (10.5%), 
socio-economic interests (9.3%), party identification 
(3.4%), and social and political context (1.7%). Total 
explained variance was 72.5%. See R. Rose and I. McAllister 
(1990, p. 152). The dependent variable is coded from 
Conservative (1) through Alliance (0.5) to Labour (0). (See 
p. 58) .
15) Idid., p. 166. Explained variance due to political 
values was 16.6% in 1974, 17.2% in 1979, and 22.6% in 1983.
16) I. Crewe (1984), p. 199. See also Himmelweit et al.
(1985) .
17) N.M. Franklin (1985), p. 152.
18) A. Heath, R. Jowell, J. Curtice, G. Evans, J. Field and 
S. Witherspoon (1991), p. 33.
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voters were rational and sophisticated in the 
1960s just as they are today, and the changes 
since then are largely to be explained by the 
changes in the ideological positions of the 
parties.19)
Dunleavy and Husbands, while arguing for a "radical"
approach to voting, also accept the importance of issues.
Even though they believe that "peoples' social situations
continue to structure their voting behaviour in important
ways" they admit that "social-structural change in Britain
cannot alone explain the undoubted political volatility and
voter detachability of the past fifteen y e a r s " . ^0) on the
other hand they doubt the causal primacy of issues on voting
indicated by many authors.
Our analytic approach towards issues is very 
different from that of mainstream issue-oriented 
analysis, which invariably sees voters' attitudes 
as primary causal influences on their voting 
decision. This approach simply infers from
empirical correlations between issue attitudes and 
voting, without inquiring in any depth how
particular issue positions came to be held by
voters ... we argued that the mass media,
especially the national press, have a major 
influence in determining political attitudes and 
alignments ... In addition, on certain issues 
voters may adopt attitudes merely to fit a voting 
intention produced by social influences ... ^^)
Thus, while there remains a considerable controversy over 
why issue voting has increased in Britain and if the
conclusions support a rational model of voting behaviour,
the simple fact that issues and voting increasingly
correlate among the British electorate seems not to be
disputed.
In Scandinavia there seems to be a widespread consensus 
among researchers that issue voting increased in Denmark,
19) Idid., p. 43.
20) P. Dunleavy and C.T. Husbands (1985), p. 147
21) Ibid.
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Norway and Sweden during the 1960s and especially since the 
19708.22) Some authors even maintain that "issues and 
ideology have gradually replaced social class (and other 
socially determined groups, such as local communities) as 
the chief bases for the voter's orientation toward the 
parties".23) Holmberg notes that recent findings on 
increasing issue voting in Sweden have not been as 
controversial as similar findings in the U.S., partly
because Swedish electoral researchers have never doubted 
that ideological concerns and different stands on issues are 
important explanatory factors behind the voter's choice of a 
party.24)
In a very interesting comparison of Sweden and the United
States Granberg and Holmberg find that while in both
countries "there is a tendency for people to be in
subjective agreement with their preferred political actor
and subjective disagreement with a nonpreferred political
a c t o r " , 25) this tendency is considerably stronger in Sweden.
They also maintain that "ideology was also shown to be more
closely linked to specific issues and more stable across
time in Sweden than in the United S t a t e s " . 26) They argue
that the main reason for this difference is the stronger
party system in Sweden, which has greater range and clarity
of alternatives presented in the electorate.
It is in no way intended to cast aspersions on the 
American voter. It is, after all, not realistic to 
expect that voter groups be more divided along 
lines of ideology and issues than the alternatives 
confronting them in an election. V. 0. Key's
22) 0. Borre (1984), pp. 355-362.
23) Idid., p. 355.
24) S. Holmberg and M. Gill jam (1987), p. 286.
25) D. Granberg and S. Holmberg (1988), p. 10.
26) Idid., p. 213.
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(1966) concept of an echo chamber has a direct 
application here. The echo chamber metaphor 
implies that there ought to be a relation between 
how distinct the alternatives are and the degree 
to which voter groups are polarized. The 
assumption is that voter groups echo, in a 
slightly muted form, the alternatives with which 
they are presented in elections. If the voter 
groups are not divided on an issue or on ideology, 
this is often traceable back to a lack of 
distinctiveness among the alternatives.^7)
In this chapter we will analyse the relationship between 
issues and voting in the Icelandic elections of 1983 and 
1987. First, we will examine the distributions of the 
individual issue questions put to the respondents in 1983 
and 1987. Second, we will analyse how voters' stands on 
individual issues relate to party choice and if the ranking 
of the parties on the issues corresponds to their ranking 
along the left-right dimension. Third, we will compare the 
attitudes of different voter groups, thus showing to what 
extent voters of different parties have different attitudes 
and if those differences reflect the distance of the parties 
on a left-right continuum. Fourth, we will use factor 
analysis to examine if voters' attitudes are structured 
along a few ideological or attitudinal dimensions. Finally, 
we will explore how those dimensions are related to party 
choice.
This analysis will not allow us to draw any clear cut 
conclusions about the direct causal impact of attitudes on 
party choice or vote s w i t c h i n g . 28) in order to do that we 
would need a more complex analysis and a considerably larger 
sample of panel data. Our more modest aim is simply to
27) Idid., p. 217.
28) A strong correlation between stands on issues and party 
choice or high issue voting could of course also be a 
result of the parties' success in convincing their 
supporters to adopt the "correct" issue positions.
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establish to what extent a link between issues and party 
choice exists in the Icelandic electorate. Such a link is of 
course a prerequisite if an issue-oriented explanation of 
Icelandic voting is to be at all valid. So while our 
conclusions cannot establish the causal priority of issues 
in the Icelandic setting, we can at least see the analysis 
as an attempt to test an issue model. No link between issues 
and party choice would refute such a model.
We will also examine if the patterns of issue voting in 
the Icelandic electorate correspond to the voters' cognitive 
left-right map of the party system as outlined in Chapter 
IV. While a good fit would not demonstrate the causal 
primacy of issues on voting, a link between a stand on 
issues and the abstract left-right dimension in the expected 
direction at least supports the notion of the voter as a 
relatively sophisticated being.
In our analysis we will attempt to, draw comparisons to 
other Nordic countries, especially to Sweden, and our method 
of analysis has partly been chosen to make such comparisons 
possible.
We argued before that Icelandic parties were less 
programmatic and more pragmatic or opportunistic than was 
the case for the Swedish parties.29) Thus, the alternatives 
facing Icelandic voters are less clear and stable than in 
Sweden. Bearing in mind Granberg and Holmberg's thesis that 
unclear alternatives are reflected in weaker attitude 
polarization among voters, we would expect the Icelandic 
voters to show a lesser degree of issue voting than is the 
case among Swedish voters.
29) See Chapter I and Chapter IV.
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In the following analysis we will be using issue 
questions that were put to our total samples in 1983 and 
1987. Each survey contained 15 such questions. Some of those 
questions were identical in both election surveys, some 
dealt with the same issue but used different wording or 
format/ and questions on some issues were only in one of the 
surveys.
On most of the issue questions respondents were asked if 
they agreed or disagreed with a statement, and then they 
were probed as to whether they strongly agreed/disagreed or 
tended to agree/disagree.^0) in 1983 two middle categories 
were used/ "ambivalent" and "makes no difference". In 1987 
two middle categories were also used; "makes no difference" 
and "do not want to pass a judgement". Those questions thus 
form a 5-fold scale.
Another format used was to ask respondents if they 
thought that a certain development (e.g. attempts to assure 
women equal position to men) had gone much too far, a bit 
too far, about right, a bit too short, or much too short. 
This format, which also forms a 5-fold scale, was used on 
two questions in 1983 and three questions in 1987.
Both in 1983 and 1987 a "filtered" question was used to 
ask about NATO membership. Thus respondents were first asked 
if Iceland's continued membership of NATO was an issue on 
which they had an opinion. Those who said yes were then 
asked if they wanted Iceland to stay in NATO or discontinue 
its membership. The question can thus be used as a 
dichotomous variable or a 3-fold scale using the "no
30) In the 1983 face-to-face interviews a different format 
was used in four issue questions. See Appendix A.
257
opinion" as a middle category. This question gave by far the 
highest "no opinion" response, most likely due to the 
"filtering".
One question in 1987 was a combined question. Those who 
said they favoured the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone 
in the Nordic countries were then asked if they would favour 
the idea if this would weaken NATO. Those who opposed the 
idea were asked if they tended to oppose the idea or if they 
strongly opposed it. This question thus forms a 5-fold scale 
as can be seen in Table V.2.
Tables V.l and V.2 give an overview of the responses to 
the issue questions. In those tables we have combined the 
"tend to" and "strongly" agree/disagree. We also give the 
percentage who did not answer each question, i.e. refusing 
to answer or saying "don't know". Opinion balance is 
calculated simply be subtracting the percentage disagreeing 
from the percentage agreeing.31) The exact wording of 
questions and the 5-fold distribution can be found in 
Appendix A.
In general the respondents are quite ready to give an 
opinion on the issues. Relatively few end up in the "no 
answer" category. Leaving the "filtered" NATO question 
aside, by far the highest "no answer" percentage is 25% on 
the question if steps taken to increase the equality of 
votes had gone far enough in 1987, followed by the question 
on prioritizing environment over economic growth in 1987 
(17%) and the combined question on a nuclear-weapons-free
31) It is noteworthy that on most issues the opinion balance 
is positive. This may reflect a tendency among respondents 
to agree rather than disagree with a question, especially 
questions on which they have no strong opinion.
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zone in 1987 (17%). On the majority of questions 5% or less
give "no answer".
Table V.l. Answers to issue questions 1983. Total sample -
all respondents. Percentages.
Agree Ambi­ Dis­ No Total Opinion
valent agree answer balance
Corporatism# 72 7 16 5 100 + 56
Power industry
ownership 64 12 19 5 100 + 45
Regional support# 67 5 23 5 100 + 44
Equal weight of
votes 59 9 23 9 100 + 36
Base payment 60 9 27 5 101 + 34
Open primaries 59 10 25 5 99 + 34
Keflavik base* 53 14 30 3 100 + 23
Beer legalization#53 10 35 2 100 + 18
Reduce agricultural
production 43 19 32 6 100 + 11
Inflation# 40 3 48 9 100 -8
Full employment 30 17 49 4 100 -19
Reduce taxes 23 17 56 3 99 -33
# Agree, makes no difference, disagree.
* Support, makes no difference, oppose.
Current developments have 
Gone too About Gone to No
far right short answer
Equality for
women
Abortion
19
42
34
45
45
6
Total
101
100
Should Iceland stay in NATO - a "filtered" question :
Stay No
opinion
Leave No
answer
Total Opinion 
balance
52 33 13 100 + 39
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Table V.2. Answers to issue questions 1987. Total sample -
all respondents. Percentages
Agree Makes Dis­ No Total Opinion
no diff. agree answer balance
Unite pension
funds 68 9 14 10 101 +54
Regional support 65 12 15 7 99 + 50
Corporatism 54 18 17 11 100 + 37
Base payment 56 9 30 5 100 + 30
Party system
outdated# 44 35 17 3 99 + 27
Open primaries 48 15 31 7 101 + 17
Environment 41 17 26 17 101 + 15
Keflavik base* 40 24 32 5 101 + 8
Clientelistic
politics# 24 35 36 4 99 -12
Reduce taxes 17 4 73 6 100 -56
# Agree, do not want to pass judgement, disagree.
* Support, makes no difference, oppose.
Current developments have
Gone too About Gone to No Total
far right short answer
Equality for
women 6 34 57 3 100
Private radio
and TV 33 58 7 3 101
Equality of votes: 11 41 23 25 100
Should Iceland ^tay in NATO -■ a "filtered" question :
Stay No Leave No Total Opinion
opinion answer balance
48 37 14 2 99 + 34
Nuclear-weapons-f ree zone in Nordic countries - a combined
question :
For the idea even if this weakens NATO 56
For the idea but don't know if this weakens NATO 12
For the idea but not if it weakens NATO 8
Tend to be against the idea 2
Strongly against the idea 4
No answer (refuse , don' t know) 17
Total 99
Opinion balance= +42
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Those choosing a middle category are usually more 
numerous than those with "no opinion". In most cases those 
percentages are nevertheless not high. Notable exceptions 
are the two questions in 1987 where respondents can choose 
the category "do not want to pass a judgement" - 35% of the 
respondents pick that answer in each case. On the whole, an 
overwhelming majority of the respondents is ready to agree 
or disagree on most of the issues.
Question format and the exact wording of questions can 
influence the pattern of response. If we want to discover 
the "true" attitude of a population on a given issue it is 
therefore advisable to ask more than one question on the 
same issue. We have not been able to do that here. Answers 
to individual questions should therefore be interpreted with 
some caution. It should also be pointed out that we do not 
know the saliency of individual questions to the 
respondents. Bearing this in mind we will nevertheless give 
here an overview of the outlines of Icelandic public opinion 
in 1983 and 1987 as reflected by the answers to our issue 
questions.
Support for corporatism seemed strong both in 1983 and 
1987. A clear majority agreed in 1983 that "real and long 
term increases in living standards can only be obtained if 
the government closely cooperates with the trade unions and 
really considers their point of view" (+56). This was also 
the case in 1987/ the majority agreed that "government 
should give organizations of employees and employers an 
effective part in decision making on major issues" ( + 37) .
The most popular suggestion in 1987 was "that all pension 
funds in the country should be united in one fund" (+54), a
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position frequently advocated by the SDP, some other forces 
of the left and various trade union leaders without any 
success in legislation.
A clear majority also agreed in 1983 that "cooperation 
with foreigners on power intensive plants is only acceptable 
if at least 50% of the ownership in such companies is 
Icelandic" ( + 45) . The support for this left wing plank is 
perhaps higher than expected and probably reflects a 
nationalistic feeling.
Regional support is also strongly backed both in 1983 and 
1987 . The majority in 1983 agreed that "it is necessary to 
decrease the differences in conditions between the regions 
and the capital area" ( + 44) and in 1987 that "progress in 
the capital area may be decreased in order to increase 
prosperity in the regions" ( + 50) .
In 1987 the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapons-f ree 
zone in the Nordic countries - a policy that NATO strongly 
opposed - proved very popular among the Icelandic 
electorate. Originally 76% said they were for such an idea, 
but when asked if they would support the idea even though 
this would weaken NATO the support dropped to 56%, with 14% 
opposed, thus giving an opinion balance of +42.
A clear majority agreed in 1983 that "preferably all 
votes should have equal weight when parliamentary seats are 
allotted" (+36). Nevertheless, in 1987, after changes in 
electoral law which reduced the overweight of the rural 
constituencies only slightly, only 23% thought the changes 
had not gone far enough, while 11% thought they had gone too 
far and 41% said "about right". The 25% who gave "no answer"
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to this question in 1987 might, however, indicate some 
uneasiness in the electorate on this issue.
Somewhat surprisingly, a large majority supported the 
statement that "Icelanders should take payment for the 
presence of U.S. military forces in the country" both in 
1983 ( + 34) and in 1987 ( + 30) . While it was known that this
idea had some support, it had been vehemently rejected by 
all the political parties regardless of whether they were 
pro- or anti-base.32)
The idea that all parties should hold open primaries was 
also popular both in 1983 (+34) and in 1987 (+17). The idea
that the party system is outdated also got strong support in 
1987 (+27) .
More people supported than opposed the continued presence 
of the Keflavik base both in 1983 (+23) and 1987 (+8). The
change in public attitude on this long-standing and hotly 
disputed issue is nevertheless interesting. The number of 
opponents to the base did not significantly increase between 
1983 and 1987, but as many voters have moved from the 
"support" to the "makes no difference" category we see a 
considerable reduction in the opinion balance. Changes in 
the attitudes towards NATO membership are on the other hand 
small; about 80% of those stating an opinion both in 1983 
and 1987 favour continued membership.
More controversial among voters in 1983 was the question 
of whether beer should be legalized in Iceland (+18), an 
issue that had been disputed for a long time, but on which 
the parties as such did not take positions. Another moral
32) The only exception was that some CiP candidates in 1987 
seemed keen on the idea.
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issue - abortion - where the parties' stands were generally 
unclear also divided the 1983 electorate. 42% thought that 
the liberalization in women's rights to abortion had gone 
too far, while 45% claimed it was about right and 6% thought 
it had not gone far enough.33)
Attitudes towards the heavily state subsidized 
agricultural system also divided the electorate fairly 
evenly in 1983, even though slightly more agreed than 
disagreed that "agricultural production must be greatly 
reduced as now there is overproduction at taxpayers expense" 
( + 11) .
Environmental issues entered the Icelandic political 
arena in the 1980s. In 1987 more people agreed than 
disagreed that "in the next years action on environmental 
issues should be prioritized over attempts to increase 
economic growth" (+15) while 34% either gave "no answer" or 
said this "made no difference".
A clear change took place between 1983 and 1987 
concerning a question on women's rights. The proportion 
claiming that "attempts to assure women equal position to 
men" had gone too far decreased from 19% to 6%, while the 
proportion saying it had not gone far enough increased from 
45% to 57%.
The abolition of the state monopoly of broadcasting 
seemed to be supported by a majority in 1987. Only 33% said 
that "steps to make it possible for private companies to
33) Iceland has a liberal abortion law. Women are allowed 
abortion for "social reasons" after consultation with health 
care officials. This means de facto "abortion on demand" in 
most cases.
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operate radio and TV stations” had gone too far, 58% said 
about right and 7% not far enough.
Slightly more people disagreed than agreed in 1983 that 
"gradual reduction of inflation is impossible. The best 
policy is a quick solution by strict reduction in spending 
and toughness towards pressure groups" (-8) . Such a 
proposition, usually connected with the right of centre, had 
been the core of the IP platform in its unsuccessful 1979 
campaign.
Similarly, in 1987 more people disagreed than agreed that 
"clientelistic politics are necessary for the 
underprivileged when dealing with 'the system'" (-12), a 
view openly championed by the CiP-leader, Albert 
Gudmundsson, who tended to be more outspoken about his role 
as a patron in the Icelandic political system than most 
other politicians.
More unpopular, however, was the idea in 1983 that 
"government should prioritize full employment, even when 
companies are inefficient" (-19). By far the most unpopular 
statement, both in 1983 (-33) and in 1987 (-56) was that
"taxes should be reduced, even though it meant that public 
services had to be reduced, e.g. in health care, education 
or social security". While differences in the question 
format could account for part of the increasing unpopularity 
of welfare cuts between 1983 and 1987, the change is 
nevertheless noteworthy and may be related to the policies 
of the PP-IP government 1983-1987.
The next step in our analysis - and a much more 
interesting one - is to examine to what extent voters of 
different parties also had different opinions on the issue
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questions. We do this by coding the answers from the 
questions on a scale from 1-5 in such a way that each issue 
scale correlates positively with voters' own positions on 
the left-right s c a l e .34) The category "no answer" has been 
e x c l u d e d .35) Then we calculated the mean position for each 
party's voters on each issue. The exact position of each 
party on an issue scale is not of interest here - that 
depends e.g. on question wording. What is interesting is to 
what extent the means for individual parties differ from 
each other and the ranking order of the parties, especially 
if the ranking order corresponds to the parties' positions 
on the left-right continuum. The greater the difference 
between the parties' means, the more distinct are the voters 
of the different parties concerning that issue. The more 
distinct the voter groups are on an issue, the better do the 
parties reflect divisions on that issue in the electorate.
In order to estimate the strength between stance on 
issues and party choice, we have calculated ETA squared for 
each issue. ETA is a coefficient comparable to Pearson's r 
but allows a nominal independent variable. ETA can be 
interpreted in a similar way to r; thus ETA squared gives 
the explained variance in the dependent variable (issue)
34) Thus we convert some questions from the order shown in 
Appendix A/ the answers on the Keflavik base e.g. in Tables 
V.3 and V.4 are coded: l=strongly disagree, 2=tend to 
disagree, 3=makes no difference, 4=tend to agree, 5=strongly 
agree. Questions converted like this in 1983 are: Keflavik 
base, NATO membership, inflation, equality for women, all 
votes equal weight, reduce agricultural production, reduce 
taxes, base payment, abortion, open primaries, and beer 
legalization. Converted scales in 1987 are: Keflavik base, 
NATO membership, equality for women, base payment, 
clientelistic politics, reduce taxes, and open primaries.
35) "No opinion" is included on the NATO-scale, which is 
coded thus: l=leave NATO, 3=no opinion, 5=continue 
membership. "No answer" is excluded.
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accounted for by the independent variable (party choice). If
ETA squared is .50 (ETA=.71), 50% of the variance in
attitudes can be explained by party choice. Such a figure 
should be considered very high in social science, especially 
in the study of attitudes. ETA squared of .10 (ETA=.32)
indicates a rather weak relationship, but even an explained 
variance of 10% is often considered quite high in social 
science.36)
First we will examine the ranking order of the parties on 
the individual issue dimensions in Tables V.3 and V.4. It 
should be borne in mind that each issue dimension correlates 
positively to voters' own positions on the left-right scale.
This means that the lower values on each scale tend to be
"leftist" and the higher values "rightist". As we saw in 
Chapter IV the correlation of some of the issues to the 
left-right own position is weak, as was to be expected: some 
of the issues are not traditional left-right issues. It 
should also be borne in mind that sometimes the difference 
between individual parties on the issue scales is too small 
to be of any significance. Nevertheless it is of great 
interest to see to what extent the ranking of the parties' 
voter groups on the issue scales reflects their perceived 
left-right position.
By glancing at the tables we see immediately that on the 
whole the positions of the parties' voter groups on the 
issue dimensions tend to reflect the parties' left-right 
positions as perceived by the voters (see Chapter IV) , even 
though there are also clear deviations from that ranking 
order on some issues.
36) See e.g. S. Holmberg (1981), p. 236.
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Table VI.3. Relationship between stand on issues 
choice in 1983 (means on a 1-5 scale and ETA^).
and party
Keflavik base 
ETa 2=.4 4
PA
1.60
WA
2.25
PP
3.20
SDA
3.38
SDP
3.45
IP 
4 .16
NATO membership 
ETa 2=.28
PA
2.21
WA
3.12
SDA
3.91
PP
3.95
SDP
3.97
IP 
4 .39
Inflation
ETa 2=.13
PA
2.05
WA
2.16
SDP
2.83
SDA 
2 . 91
PP
2.92
IP
3.36
Equality for women 
ETa 2=.12
WA 
1 .75
PA
2.20
SDA
2.42
PP
2.73
SDP
2.76
IP
2.90
All votes equal weight 
ETa 2=.10
PP
2.82
PA
3.49
WA
3.94
IP
4.05
SDP 
4 . 07
SDA
4.25
Reduce agricult. prod. 
ETa 2=.10
PP
2.44
PA
2.83
WA
3.24
IP
3.50
SDA
3.63
SDP
3.78
Reduce taxes 
ETa 2=.09
PA
1.76
WA
1.88
PP
2.33
SDA
2.41
SDP
2.48
IP
2.86
Regional support 
ETa 2=.08
PP 
1 . 61
PA
1.88
SDP
2.07
WA
2.20
IP
2.53
SDA 
2 .81
Base payment 
ETA^=.06
WA
2.83
PA
2.86
SDA
3.59
IP
3.78
PP
3.79
SDP
3.86
Corporatism
ETA^=.05
PA
1.66
WA
1.70
SDP
2.03
SDA
2.12
PP 
2 . 12
IP
2.31
Full employment 
ETA/=.05
PA
2.72
WA
3.04
PP
3.30
SDP
3.38
SDA
3.47
IP
3.57
Abortion
ETa 2=.04
WA
3.17
PA
3.32
SDA
3.37
IP
3.63
SDP
3.68
PP
3.79
Open primaries 
ETa 2=.04
PA
3.19
WA
3.54
SDP
3.63
IP
3.64
PP
3.66
SDA
4.48
Beer legalization 
ETa 2=.03
PP
2.80
PA
2.99
SDP
3.29
IP
3.36
SDA
3.69
WA
3.69
Power industry ownership 
ETA^=.03
WA
1.72
PA
1.72
SDA
1.92
PP 
1. 98
SDP
2.05
IP
2.35
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Table VI.4. Relationship between stand on issues and party 
choice in 1987 (means on a 1-5 scale and ETA^)
Keflavik base 
Et a 2=.40
PA
1.55
WA
2.08
SDP
3.12
PP
3.16
CiP
3.67
IP
3.96
NATO membership 
ETa 2=.30
PA
2.13
WA
2.88
PP
3.88
SDP
3.94
CiP 
4 . 15
IP
4.45
Nuclear-weapons-free zone 
ETa 2=.09
PA
1.16
WA
1.34
SDP
1.50
PP 
1 . 61
CiP
1.86
IP 
2 .10
Equality for women 
ETa 2=.07
WA
1.76
PA 
1. 94
SDP
2.22
CiP
2.34
PP
2.37
IP
2.44
Regional support 
ETa 2=.07
PA
1.73
PP
1.81
WA
1.93
SDP
2.21
CiP
2.31
IP
2.55
Private radio and TV 
ETa 2=.06
PA
2.19
PP
2.52
WA
2.58
SDP
2.60
CiP
2.76
IP
2.83
Base payment 
ETa 2=.06
PA
2.62
WA
3.18
PP
3.50
IP
3.55
SDP
3.69
CiP
4.22
Clientelistic politics 
ETa 2=.0 6
PA
2.23
WA
2.51
IP 
2 . 65
SDP
2.70
PP
2.85
CiP
3.55
Reduce taxes 
ETa 2=.05
WA 
1. 63
PA 
1 . 69
PP 
1 . 91
SDP
2.01
IP
2.34
CiP
2.45
Unite pension funds 
ETA^=.04
CiP 
1 . 64
SDP
1.69
WA 
1 . 75
PP 
1 .88
PA 
1 . 90
IP
2.28
Environment
ETa 2=.04
WA
2.32
PA
2.43
PP
2.72
CiP
2.89
SDP
2.90
IP
2.92
Equality of votes 
ETa 2=.03
PP
2.99
PA
3.09
WA
3.13
CiP
3.32
IP
3.36
SDP
3.39
Corporatism
ETA?=.02
WA
2.23
PA
2.31
SDP
2.51
PP
2.53
CiP
2.54
IP
2.64
Open primaries 
ETa 2=.01
PA
3.02
IP
3.14
PP
3.23
WA
3.24
SDP
3.35
CiP
3.76
Party system outdated 
ETA^=.01
CiP
2.30
WA
2.38
SDP
2.58
PA
2.59
IP
2.69
PP
2.75
As we have 15 issues in each election we have a total of 
30 issue dimensions in the two tables. Out of those 30 the 
PA is positioned furthest to the left on 15 issues. In both
years the PA is furthest to the left on the 3 issues most
strongly related to party choice: NATO and the Keflavik base
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in both elections, inflation strategy in 1983, and a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in 1987. PA voters come second 
from the left on 13 issues. Only on two issues did PA voters 
deviate further to the "right": in 1987 they were rather
critical of the ideas of uniting the pension funds and that 
the party system was outdated. Both of those issues are 
weakly related to party choice.
The WA occupies the second from the left position on 13 
of the 30 issues, including those most strongly related to 
party choice. On 8 issues the party's voters are furthest 
to the left, most clearly on the issue of women's rights in 
1983 and 1987, abortion in 1983, and the environment in
1987. On 6 issues the WA was third from the left. On only 
three issues was the WA "right" of centre: most liberal on 
the legalization of beer in 1983, slightly more critical of 
regional support than the SDP in 1983, and the party's
voters are shown to be a little more in favour of open 
primaries than PP voters in 1987, although the difference is 
clearly not significant.
On 16 out of 30 issues the SDP occupies one of the two 
middle positions, third or fourth place from the left. The 
party's voters are never in the position furthest to the 
left but come second from the left on the question of
uniting the pension funds in 1987. On 10 issues the party is 
second to the right: on the Keflavik base and NATO in 1983 
(for), women's rights in 1983 (gone too far), equal value of 
votes in 1983 (for), tax reduction at the expense of welfare 
in 1983 (for) , abortion in 1983 (gone too far) , power 
industry ownership in 1983 (against), base payment in 1987 
(for), prioritizing the environment in 1987 (against), and
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open primaries in 1987 (for) . On most of these issues the 
SDP is only slightly to the right of the party in the fourth 
place from the left. Sometimes the difference is clearly 
insignificant. On three issues the SDP voters are furthest 
to the "right": they are most in favour of reducing the
agricultural production in 1983, most in favour of base 
payment in 1983 (slightly more than the PP), and most likely 
to think that increase in equality of votes had not gone far 
enough in 1987 (just ahead of IP and CiP).
The PP occupies one of two centre positions on 15 issues 
out of 30. On five occasions the party is furthest to the 
"left": its voters are clearly most opposed to equal weight 
of votes and reduction of agricultural production in 1983, 
most in favour of regional support in 1983, most opposed to 
beer legalization in 1983, and most likely in 1987 to think 
that increase in equality of votes had gone too far. These 
positions clearly reflect the party's role as "the champion 
of the regions".
On two issues the PP is second from the "left". In 1987 
PA voters are slightly more in favour of regional support 
than PP voters and, while PA voters in 1987 are clearly more 
opposed to the establishment of private radio and TV 
stations than PP voters, the latter are slightly more 
critical of that development than voters of the WA and SDP. 
The PP is second from the right on six issues, but on five 
of those six the difference between the PP and the party 
occupying the third place from the left is clearly not 
significant. On two issues the PP is furthest to the 
"right": most critical of abortion in 1983 (slightly more
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than SDP), and least likely to agree that the party system 
is outdated (just ahead of IP).
The IP voters are furthest to the right on 17 out of 30 
issues, including the issues strongest related to party 
choice, the four strongest in 1983, and the six strongest in 
1987, On four issues the party is second from the right; SDA 
voters are even less in favour of regional support than IP 
voters in 1983/ CiP voters are more in favour of tax cuts at 
the expense of the welfare system in 1987; SDP voters are 
more likely to think that increased equality of votes had 
not gone far enough in 1987; and PP voters were less likely 
to think the party system was outdated in 1987. The 
difference in the two last cases is, however, very small. In 
seven cases the IP voters are third from the right, but 
sometimes the difference between them and the party coming 
second is insignificant. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, 
that in 1983 IP voters were less keen on reducing the 
agricultural production than SDA and SDP voters and less in 
favour of beer legalization than the SDA and WA voters. On 
two occasions IP voters are "left" of centre. In 1987 only 
PA and WA voters are more opposed to clientelistic politics, 
and only PA voters are more critical of open primaries.
If we look at the five parties that contested both the 
1983 and 1987 elections it is clear that the positions their 
voters took on different issues tended on the whole to 
reflect the ranking of the parties on the left-right 
continuum. PA voters are clearly furthest to the left and it 
is equally clear that WA voters are second from the left. 
The SDP and PP tend to occupy the two centre positions, and 
while PP voters clearly have a stronger tendency than SDP
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voters to occupy the two positions furthest to the "left" on 
various issues, this is mainly on issues that follow an 
urban-rural cleavage rather than a conventional left-right 
division. IP voters are without doubt generally furthest to 
the right.
In 1983 we did not ask our respondents to rank the SDA on 
the left-right scale, but we would expect the party to 
occupy a centre position and exhibit a profile similar to 
the SDP concerning its voters' stands on issues. This is 
borne out in Table V.3. On 7 issues out of 15 SDP and SDA 
are side by side on the issue ranking and on 5 more issues 
voters of only one party come between the voters of the SDP 
and the SDA. SDA voters never occupy the two positions 
furthest to the left. On 9 out of 15 issues the SDA occupies 
one of the two centre positions, three times it is second 
to the right, and three times furthest to the right. The SDA 
voters tend to be "socially liberal", thinking like PA and 
WA voters that attempts to assure women equal position have 
not gone far enough, and express liberal views concerning 
abortion; like WA voters they also support beer 
legalization. Concerning the urban-rural cleavage they are 
"economically liberal", most opposed to regional support, in 
favour of reducing agricultural production and most strongly 
supporting equal weight of votes. Not surprisingly, SDA
voters are also by far the strongest supporters of open
primaries.
In 1987 our respondents clearly ranked the CiP second to 
right on the left-right continuum. This position is largely 
reflected in Table V.4. On 13 out of 15 issues CiP voters
occupy the three places right of centre, three times they
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are third from the right, six times second from the right 
(including the three issues most strongly connected to 
voting choice), and four times furthest to the right. Only 
in the last four instances is the CiP on the "right" of the 
IP: CiP voters are much more in favour of base payment,
clientelistic politics, and open primaries than voters of 
other parties. On the fourth issue where the party is 
furthest to the right CiP voters are slightly more in favour 
of tax cuts at the expense of the welfare system than IP 
voters. This is somewhat surprising as the CiP platform 
emphasized the party's commitment to traditional "mild" 
conservatism. On two issues the CiP voters come furthest to 
the "left": they are most in favour of a united pension fund 
and most readily agree that the party system is outdated.
In general then, the positions the voters of different 
parties take on different issues tend to reflect the 
parties' rankings on the left-right continuum. This is 
important, as it indicates that the voters' left-right 
cognitive map of the party system is related to political 
values.
Another important question concerns the strength of the 
relationship between stances on issues and party choice. To 
what extent do the party alignments reflect differences of 
opinion in the electorate? The squared ETAs in Tables V.3 
and V.4 help us to answer that question.
In 1983 two issues were strongly related to party choice: 
the Keflavik base and NATO membership. Party choice accounts 
for 44% and 28% of the variance in the distribution of 
attitudes towards those two issues respectively. In 1987 
those same two issues also stood out, with 40% and 30%
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explained variance. Those two issues reflect the foreign 
policy cleavage in Icelandic politics which has been very 
important in the post-war period. The positions of the 
parties regarding those issues have been relatively stable 
and clear for decades, which is more than can be said of the 
parties' stands on, for example, economic policy. While the 
importance of the foreign policy cleavage in election 
campaigns and coalition formations clearly declined in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, different opinions on those issues 
still are strongly reflected in the party alignments of the 
electorate. This does of course not mean that those issues 
were the most important ones when the electorate was making 
up its mind in 1983 and 1987, but only that the party system 
successfully reflects divisions in the electorate on the 
foreign policy dimension.
Other relationships between party choice and attitudes 
are much weaker. Only in two cases, both in 1983, does 
explained variance exceed 10% - on the issues of inflation 
strategy and women's rights. On five issues in 1983 and six 
issues in 1987, explained variance was 6-10%: on equal
weight of votes, reduction of agricultural production, 
reduction of taxes, regional support and base payment in 
1983 and a nuclear-weapons-free zone, women's rights, 
regional support, private radio and TV, base payment and 
clientelistic politics in 1987. The explained variance for 
the remaining issues was 5% or less; this was the case for 6 
out of 15 issues in 1983 and for 7 out of 15 issues in 1987.
While most of the relationships appear rather weak, it 
should nevertheless be borne in mind that they are all 
statistically significant at the .001 level (F-test). And
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even though 6% explained variance (which means that 
ETA=0.24) seems rather low relationships of that magnitude 
are common in attitude research.
It is useful to compare our results with Swedish evidence
while bearing in mind that issue voting in Sweden is
extremely high. In the 1979 Swedish election survey party 
choice explained over 40% of the variance in attitudes on 
two out of 18 attitude questions. On two questions the 
explained variance was 21-40%, on six questions 11-20% and 
below 11% on 8 q u e s t i o n s . 3^) in 1982 explained variance was 
over 40% on two questions out of 26, 21-40% on five
questions, 11-20% on six questions and 10% or less on 13 
questions.38) In 1985 explained variance was over 40% on two 
out of 25 questions, 21-30% on 7 questions, 11-20% on 9 
questions and below 11% on 7 questions.39) The strongest
relationships in the Swedish data were in all cases on 
workers' funds and also quite strong on some other issues 
closely related to the left-right scale such as 
nationalization, the market economy, socialist society, 
influence of big business, privatization of health care and 
the size of the public sector.
While the strongest relationships between party choice 
and stand on issues are not much weaker in the Icelandic
than in the Swedish data, there is a great difference if we 
look at issues where 11-40% of the variance is explained. 
Many Swedish questions fall in that range but very few of 
the Icelandic ones. On the whole, issue voting seems 
stronger in Sweden than in Iceland.
37) S. Holmberg (1981), pp. 238-240.
38) S. Holmberg (1984), p. 182.
39) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987), p. 129.
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Of course, this could simply be a result of the question 
selection: that the Swedish researchers included issues
which divide the electorate along party lines while we 
failed to do so. To some extent it is plausible that our 
selection of issues for the questionnaires was not the best 
possible. With hindsight one might say that we should have 
put in more questions directly related to the left-right 
cleavage, for instance on nationalization, socialist society 
and free market economy. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely 
that question selection can explain all the observed 
difference between the Icelandic and the Swedish data. The 
overall results are in accord with our hypothesis that, due 
to less ideological clarity and consistency among the 
Icelandic parties as compared to their Swedish counterparts, 
we should expect issue voting in general to be weaker in the 
Icelandic electorate.
We have seen that the issue positions taken by the voters 
of different parties tend to reflect the parties' left-right 
position. Our next step is to examine the distance between 
voters of the different parties on the issue dimensions. How 
far apart are the parties' voters on average on the issue 
dimensions? On what particular issues are they close and on 
what issues are they further apart? In order to answer those 
questions we compare two parties at a time, calculating the 
difference between their voters' means on the issue 
questions. In Tables V.5 and V.6 we thus have 15 pairs of 
parties for each election. For each pair we show the 
difference between the means presented in Tables V.3 and V . 4 
and also calculate the mean difference of all 15 issues for
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each pair of parties. As the scales are coded from 1-5, the 
lowest conceivable difference is 0 and the highest 4.
Table V.5. Attitude differences 1983 between voters from 
different parties. Ranked from greatest to lowest difference 
(difference between means).
PA and WA voters
NATO membership 0.91
Beer legalization 0.70
Keflavik base 0.65
Equality for women 0.45
All votes equal weight 0.45 
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.41 
Open primaries 0.35
Regional support 0.32
Full employment 0.32
Abortion 0.15
Reduce taxes 0.12
Inflation 0.11
Corporatism 0.04
Base payment 0.03
Power industry ownersh. 0.00
Mean of 15 issues 0.33
PA and PP voters
NATO membership 1.74
Keflavik base 1.60
Base payment 0.93
Inflation 0.87
All votes equal weight 0.67 
Full employment 0.58
Reduce taxes 0.57
Equality for women 0.53
Abortion 0.47
Open primaries 0.47
Corporatism 0.46
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.39 
Regional support 0.27
Power industry ownersh. 0.2 6 
Beer legalization 0.19
Mean of 15 issues 0.67
PA and SDP voters
Keflavik base 1.85
NATO membership 1.7 6
Base payment 1.00
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.95
Inflation 0.78
Reduce taxes 0.72
Full employment 0.66
All votes equal weight 0.58
Equality for women 0.56
Open primaries 0.44
Corporatism 0.37
Abortion 0.36
Power industry ownersh. 0.33
Beer legalization 0.30
Regional support 0.19
Mean of 15 issues 0.72
PA and SDA voters
Keflavik base 1.78
NATO membership 1.7 0
Open primaries 1.29
Regional support 0.93
Inflation 0.86
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.80
All votes equal weight 0.76
Full employment 0.75
Base payment 0.73
Beer legalization 0.70
Reduce taxes 0.65
Corporatism 0.4 6
Equality for women 0.22
Power industry ownersh. 0.20
Abortion 0.05
Mean of 15 issues 0.79
continued.
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PA and IP voters WA and SDP voters
Keflavik base 2.56
NATO membership 2.18
Inflation 1.31
Reduce taxes 1.10
Base payment 0.92
Full employment 0.85
Equality for women 0.70
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.67
Regional support 0.65
Corporatism 0.65
Power industry ownersh. 0.63
All votes equal weight 0.56
Open primaries 0.45
Beer legalization 0.37
Abortion 0.31
Mean of 15 issues 0.93
WA and PP voters
Keflavik base 1.20
Base payment 1.03
Equality for women 1.01
NATO membership 0.85
Inflation 0.67
Reduce taxes 0.60
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.54
Abortion 0.51
Beer legalization 0.40
Full employment 0.34
Corporatism 0.33
Power industry ownersh. 0.33
Regional support 0.13
All votes equal weight 0.13
Open primaries 0.09
Mean of 15 issues 0.54
WA and SDA voters
All votes equal weight 1.12 
Equality for women 0.98
Base payment 0.9 6
Keflavik base 0.95
Beer legalization 0.89
NATO membership 0.8 3
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.80 
Inflation 0.76
Abortion 0.62
Regional support 0.59
Reduce taxes 0.45
Corporatism 0.42
Full employment 0.2 6
Power industry ownersh. 0.26 
Open primaries 0.12
Mean of 15 issues 0.67
Keflavik base 1.13
Open primaries 0.94
NATO membership 0.7 9
Base payment 0.7 6
Inflation 0.75
Equality for women 0.67
Regional support 0.61
Reduce taxes 0.53
Full employment 0.43
Corporatism 0.42
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.39
All votes equal weight 0.31
Abortion 0.20
Power industry ownersh. 0.20
Beer legalization 0.00
Mean of 15 issues 0.54
con t i n u e d..
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WA and IP voters SDP and PP voters
Keflavik base 1.91
NATO membership 1.27
Inflation 1.20
Equality for women 1.15
Reduce taxes 0.98
Base payment 0.95
Power industry ownersh. 0.63
Corporatism 0.61
Full employment 0.53
Abortion 0.46
Regional support 0.33
Beer legalization 0.33
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.2 6
All votes equal weight 0.11
Open primaries 0.10
Mean of 15 issues 0.72
Reduce agricult. prod. 1.34
All votes equal weight 1.25
Beer legalization 0.49
Regional support 0.4 6
Keflavik base 0.25
Reduce taxes 0.15
Abortion 0.11
Inflation 0.09
Corporatism 0.09
Full employment 0.08
Base payment 0.07
Power industry ownersh. 0.07
Equality for women 0.03
Open primaries 0.03
NATO membership 0.02
Mean of 15 issues 0.30
SDP and SDA voters SDP and IP voters
Open primaries 0.85
Regional support 0.74
Beer legalization 0.40
Equality for women 0.34
Abortion 0.31
Base payment 0.27
All votes equal weight 0.18
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.15
Power industry ownersh. 0.13
Full employment 0.09
Corporatism 0.09
Inflation 0.08
Keflavik base 0.07
Reduce taxes 0.07
NATO membership 0.06
Keflavik base 0.71
Inflation 0.53
Regional support 0.4 6
NATO membership 0.4 2
Reduce taxes 0.38
Power industry ownersh. 0.30
Corporatism 0.28
Reduce agricult. prod. 0.28
Full employment 0.19
Equality for women 0.14
Base payment 0.08
Beer legalization 0.07
Abortion 0.05
All votes equal weight 0.02
Open primaries 0.01
Mean of 15 issues 0.26 Mean of 15 issues 0.26
continued,
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PP and SDA voters
All votes equal weight 
Regional support 
Reduce agricult. prod. 
Beer legalization 
Open primaries 
Abortion
Equality for women 
Base payment 
Keflavik base 
Full employment 
Reduce taxes 
Power industry ownersh 
NATO membership 
Inflation 
Corporatism
Mean of 15 issues
SDA and IP voters
Open primaries 
Keflavik base 
Equality for women 
NATO membership 
Inflation 
Reduce taxes 
Power industry ownersh. 
Beer legalization 
Regional support 
Abortion
All votes equal weight 
Base payment 
Corporatism 
Reduce agricult. prod. 
Full employment
Mean of 15 issues
PP and IP voters
1.43 All votes equal weight 1.23
1.20 Reduce agricult. prod. 1 .06
1.19 Keflavik base 0.96
0.89 Regional support 0.92
0.82 Beer legalization 0.56
0.42 Reduce taxes 0.53
0.31 Inflation 0.44
0.20 NATO membership 0.44
0.18 Power industry ownersh. 0.37
0.17 Full employment 0.27
0.08 Corporatism 0.19
0.06 Equality for women 0.17
0.04 Abortion 0.16
0.01 Open primaries 0.02
0.00 Base payment 0 .01
0.47 Mean of 15 issues 0.49
0.84
0.78
0.48
0.48
0.45
0.45
0.43
0.33
0.28
0.26
0.20
0.19
0.19
0 .13
0.10
0.37
Table V.5 shows that in 1983 the PA was clearly closest 
to the WA when we look at the mean difference in attitudes 
(0.33). The parties were furthest apart on NATO membership 
(0.91), beer legislation (0.70) and the Keflavik base 
(0.65), while the difference between the parties was 0.45 or 
less on all other issues. Further apart from the PA were the 
PP (mean of 0.67), the SDP (0.72) and the SDA (0.79) . In all 
cases the PA was furthest from those three parties on NATO 
membership and the Keflavik base (1.60-1.85). On the
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question of reducing the agricultural production the SDP 
(0.95) and the SDA (0.80) were much further apart from the 
PA than was the case for the PP (0.39) . The SDA was much 
further from the PA on regional support (0.93) than was the 
case for the SDP (0.19) and the PP (0.39) . On average the IP 
is clearly furthest away from the PA (mean 0.93). PA and IP 
voters are furthest apart on the questions of the Keflavik 
base (2.56), NATO membership (2.18), inflation strategy 
(1.31) and tax cuts at the expense of the welfare system 
(1.10). On 12 out of 15 issues the difference between IP and 
PA is 0.56 or greater.
While the mean difference of the WA to the PA on its left 
was 0.33, the party's distance to the centre parties on its 
right was greater: 0.54 to the SDP and the SDA, 0.67 to the 
PP. IP voters were furthest apart from WA voters (0.72) . The 
distance between those two parties is, however, clearly
smaller than was the case for the IP and the PA (0.93).
The SDP is closer to the centre and right parties than to 
the parties on its left, the PA (0.72) and the WA (0.54) . 
The party's average distance from the SDA and IP is 0.26 and 
0.30 in the case of the PP. While the greatest differences
between the SDP and the IP are on left-right issues, the
Keflavik base (0.71) and inflation strategy (0.53), the
issues that most divide PP voters from SDP voters are
clearly reduction of agricultural production (1.34), 
equality of votes (1.25), beer legalization (0.49), and
regional support (0.46), reflecting the urban-rural 
cleavage.
Nevertheless, the PP is closer to the SDP (0.30) on
average than to any other party. As was the case for the
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SDP, the PP is further away from the left parties, the PA 
and WA (0.67), than the SDA (0.47) and the IP (0.49). The 
distance of the PP and the SDP from the PA and the WA is 
rather similar but the SDP is closer to the SDA and the IP 
than is the case for the PP.
The SDA is closest to the SDP (0.26) and the IP (0.37). 
The party's distance from the PP is somewhat greater (0.47), 
especially as there are clear differences between the voters 
of the two parties on the urban-rural cleavage issues: 
equality of votes (1.43), regional support (1.20) and 
reduction of the agricultural production (1.19) . The SDA's 
average distance from the WA is 0.54/ the two new parties 
differ most on the Keflavik base (1.13), open primaries 
(0.94), NATO membership (0.79), base payment (0.76) and 
inflation strategy (0.75) . The PA is furthest from the SDA 
(0.79). The two parties strongly disagree on the same issues 
that divide the WA and the SDA and also on the urban-rural 
cleavage issues: regional support (0.93), reduction of
agricultural production (0.80) and equality of votes (0.76).
The IP is closest to the SDP (0.26), the SDA (0.37) and 
the PP (0.49). The reason for the party's greater distance 
from the PP than the SDP is largely the disagreement between 
IP and PP voters on equality of votes (1.23), reduction of 
agricultural production (1.06) and regional support (0.92). 
The differences between IP and SDP voters on those three 
urban-rural issues are considerably smaller. The distance of 
the IP from the left parties, the WA (0.72) and the PA 
(0.93), is much greater than the party's distance from the 
three centre parties.
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Table V.6. Attitude differences 1987 between voters from 
different parties. Ranked from greatest to lowest difference 
(difference between means).
PA and RA voters PA and SDP voters
NATO membership 0.75
Base payment 0.56
Keflavik base 0.53
Private radio and TV 0.39
Clientelistic politics 0.28
Open primaries 0.22
Party system outdated 0.21
Regional support 0.20
Nuclear free zone 0.18
Equality for women 0.18
Unite pension funds 0.15
Environment 0.11
Corporatism 0.08
Reduce taxes 0.0 6
Equality of votes 0.04
Mean of 15 issues 0.26
NATO membership 1.81
Keflavik base 1.57
Base payment 1.07
Regional support 0.48
Clientelistic politics 0.47
Environment 0.4 7
Private radio and TV 0.41
Nuclear free zone 0.34
Open primaries 0.33
Reduce taxes 0.32
Equality of votes 0.30
Equality for women 0.28
Unite pension funds 0.21
Corporatism 0.20
Party system outdated 0.01
Mean of 15 issues 0.55
PA and PP voters PA and CiP voters
Keflavik base 1.61
NATO membership 1.75
Base payment 0.8 8
Clientelistic politics 0.62
Nuclear free zone 0.45
Equality for women 0.43
Private radio and TV 0.33
Environment 0.2 9
Reduce taxes 0.22
Corporatism 0.22
Open primaries 0.21
Party system outdated 0.16
Equality of votes 0.10
Regional support 0.08
Unite pension funds 0.02
Mean of 15 issues 0.49
Keflavik base 2.12
NATO membership 2.02
Base payment 1.60
Clientelistic politics 1.32
Reduce taxes 0.7 6
Open primaries 0.74
Nuclear free zone 0.70
Regional support 0.58
Private radio and TV 0.57
Environment 0.4 6
Equality for women 0.40
Party system outdated 0.29
Unite pension funds 0.26
Equality of votes 0.23
Corporatism 0.23
Mean of 15 issues 0.82
continued . . .
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PA and IP voters WA and SDP voters
Keflavik base 2.41
NATO membership 2 . 32
Nuclear free zone 0.94
Base payment 0.93
Regional support 0.82
Reduce taxes 0.65
Private radio and TV 0.64
Equality of women 0.50
Environment 0.4 9
Clientelistic politics 0.42
Unite pension funds 0.38
Corporatism 0.33
Equality of votes 0.27
Open primaries 0.12
Party system outdated 0.10
Mean of 15 issues 0.75
Keflavik base 1.04
NATO membership 1.0 6
Environment 0.58
Base payment 0.51
Equality of women 0.4 6
Reduce taxes 0.38
Regional support 0.28
Corporatism 0.28
Equality of votes 0.26
Party system outdated 0.20
Clientelistic politics 0.19
Nuclear free zone 0.16
Open primaries 0.11
Unite pension funds 0.06
Private radio and TV 0.02
Mean of 15 issues 0.37
WA and PP voters WA and CiP voters
Keflavik base 1.08
NATO membership 1.0 0
Equality for women 0.61
Environment 0.40
Party system outdated 0.37
Clientelistic politics 0.34
Base payment 0.32
Corporatism 0.30
Reduce taxes 0.28
Nuclear free zone 0.27
Equality of votes 0.14
Unite pension funds 0.13
Regional support 0.12
Private radio and TV 0.06
Open primaries 0.01
Mean of 15 issues 0.36
Keflavik base 1.59
NATO membership 1.27
Base payment 1.04
Clientelistic politics 1.04
Reduce taxes 0.82
Equality for women 0.58
Environment 0.57
Nuclear free zone 0.52
Open primaries 0.52
Regional support 0.38
Corporatism 0.31
Equality of votes 0.19
Private radio and TV 0.18
Unite pension funds 0.11
Party system outdated 0.08
Mean of 15 issues 0.60
continued.
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WA and IP voters SDP and PP voters
Keflavik base
NATO membership
Nuclear free zone
Reduce taxes
Equality of women
Regional support
Environment
Unite pension funds
Corporatism
Base payment
Party system outdated
Private radio and TV
Equality of votes
Clientelistic politics
Open primaries
Mean of 15 issues
88
57
0.76
0.71
0.68
0.62
0.60
0.53
0.41
0.37
31
25
0.23
0.14
0.10
0.61
Regional support 0.4 0
Equality of votes 0.40
Base payment 0.19
Unite pension funds 0.19
Environment 0.18
Party system outdated 0.17 
Equality for women 0.15
Clientelistic politics 0.15 
Open primaries 0.12
Nuclear free zone 0.11
Reduce taxes 0.10
Private radio and TV 0.08
NATO membership 0.0 6
Keflavik base 0.04
Corporatism 0.02
Mean of 15 issues 0 .16
SDP and CIP voters SDP and IP voters
Clientelistic politics 0.85 
Keflavik base 0.55
Base payment 0.53
Reduce taxes 0.44
Open primaries 0.41
Nuclear free zone 0.36
Party system outdated 0.28 
NATO membership 0.21
Private radio and TV 0.16
Equality for women 0.12
Regional support 0.10
Equality of votes 0.07
Unite pension funds 0.05
Corporatism 0.03
Environment 0.01
Keflavik base 0.84
Nuclear free zone 0.60
Unite pension funds 0.59
NATO membership 0.51
Regional support 0.34
Reduce taxes 0,33
Private radio and TV 0.23
Equality for women 0.22
Open primaries 0.21
Base payment 0.14
Corporatism 0.13
Party system outdated 0.11
Clientelistic politics 0.05
Equality of votes 0.03
Environment 0.02
Means of 15 issues 0.28 Means of 15 issues 0.29
c o n t inued.
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PP and CiP voters
Base payment 0.72
Clientelistic politics 0.70
Reduce taxes 0.54
Open primaries 0.53
Keflavik base 0.51
Regional support 0.50
Party system outdated 0.45
Equality of votes 0.33
NATO membership 0.27
Nuclear free zone 0.25
Private radio and TV 0.24
Unite pension funds 0.24
Environment 0.17
Equality for women 0.03
Corporatism 0.01
Mean of 15 issues 0.37
CiP and IP voters
Clientelistic politics 0.90
Base payment 0.67
Unite pension funds 0.64
Open primaries 0.62
Party system outdated 0.39
NATO membership 0.30
Keflavik base 0.29
Nuclear free zone 0.24
Regional support 0.24
Reduce taxes 0.11
Equality for women 0.10
Corporatism 0.10
Private radio and TV 0.07
Equality of votes 0.04
Environment 0.03
Mean of 15 issues 0.32
PP and IP voters
Keflavik base 0.80
Regional support 0.74
NATO membership 0.57
Nuclear free zone 0.49
Reduce taxes 0.43
Unite pension funds 0.40
Equality of votes 0.37
Private radio and TV 0.31
Clientelistic politics 0.20
Environment 0.20
Corporatism 0.11
Open primaries 0.0 9
Equality for women 0.07
Party system outdated 0.06
Base payment 0.05
Mean of 15 issues 0.33
In 1987 the average differences between the parties tend 
to be somewhat smaller, but the overall pattern remains 
largely the same. PA clearly remains much closer to the WA 
(0.26) than to the centre parties, the PP (0.49) and the SDP 
(0.55). The PA is much closer to the PP on regional support 
(0.08) than to the SDP (0.48); it is also closer to the PP 
on equality of votes (0.10) than to the SDP (0.30). The PA 
is on average furthest away from the IP (0.75) and the CiP 
(0.82) . While the IP and the PA are furthest apart on the
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issues most strongly related to party choice (the Keflavik 
base (2.41), NATO membership (2.32) and a nuclear-weapons- 
free zone (0.94)), the average distance between the PA and 
CiP is somewhat greater, largely because CiP voters and PA 
voters disagree to a greater extent on base payment (1.60) 
and clientelistic politics (1.32) than do IP and PA voters 
(0.93 and 0.42 respectively). The difference between IP and 
PA voters is much smaller on the questions of open primaries 
(0.12) and whether the party system is outdated (0.10) than 
is the case for the CiP and the PA (0.74 and 0.29 
respectively). These issues, which move the CiP further than 
the IP from the PA on average, are not traditional left- 
right issues.
As in 1983 the WA is closest to the PA (0.26), closer 
than to its neighbours in the centre, the PP (0.36) and the 
SDP (0.37). The WA's distance from the CiP (0.60) and the IP 
(0.61) is greater still, reflecting the left-right spectrum.
Contrary to 1983 in 1987 the SDP is closer to the PP 
(0.16) than to the IP (0.29) . As in 1983 the greatest 
differences between the SDP and the PP are along the urban- 
rural cleavage, on regional support and equality of votes 
(0.40) . As in 1983 IP and SDP voters disagree most on 
foreign policy: the Keflavik base (0.84), a nuclear-weapons- 
free zone (0.60) and NATO membership (0.51). While in 1983 
there was also considerable disagreement on inflation 
strategy (0.53), a question not asked in 1987, IP and SDP 
clearly disagreed on a new question in 1987 as SDP voters 
were much more in favour of uniting the pension funds than 
IP voters (0.59) . The distance between the SDP and the CiP 
(0.28) was similar to the IP-SDP distance while, as in 1983,
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the left parties, the WA (0.37) and PA (0.55), were clearly
further away from the SDP than was the case for the parties
of the centre and the right.
The PP is closest to the SDP (0.16) in 1987 as in 1983.
PA voters were still furthest away from PP voters (0.49),
but while the PA-PP and WA-PP distances were the same in
1983 in 1987 the distance of the PP towards the WA on the
left (0.36) was similar to the distance of PP voters to the
parties on their right, the CiP (0.37) and the IP (0.33).
The CiP was closest to the IP on its right (0.32) and the 
centre parties on its left, the SDP (0.28) and the PP
(0.37). The party's voters were much further away from the
left parties, the WA (0.60) and the PA (0.82).
In 1987 the IP was closest to the SDP (0.29), the CiP
(0.32) and the PP (0.33), but IP voters' disagreements with 
the voters of those parties tended to be on different 
fronts. While IP voters clearly disagreed with SDP and PP 
voters on foreign policy, the Keflavik base, a nuclear-
weapons-free zone, and NATO membership (0.49-0.84), this was 
not the case for IP and CiP voters (0.24-0.30) . SDP and IP
voters differed on the question of pension funds (0.59),
while PP and IP voters differed on regional support (0.74). 
IP and CiP voters differed most on clientelistic politics 
(0.90), base payment (0.67), uniting pension funds (0.64) 
and open primaries (0.62). Thus, the disagreement between
those two parties' voters was mainly on issues not 
associated with the traditional left-right cleavage. As in 
1983 the WA voters (0.61) and PA voters (0.75) were much 
further away from the IP, reflecting their positions on the 
left-right continuum.
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In general, the issue differences between the parties 
tend to reflect their left-right positions. This is 
especially clear for the left parties, the PA and the WA on 
the one hand and the IP on the other. The centre parties are 
in general rather close on the issue dimensions; their 
distances from the polar parties are on the other hand 
different on unlike issue dimensions.
Until now we have been examining individual issue 
questions and how the parties' voters relate to them. Our 
next step is to examine if voters' stands on individual 
issues are structured along a few cleavage lines. We would 
expect some issues to be highly intercorrelated. Voters who 
support the Keflavik base are e.g. likely to support 
continued NATO membership. Factor analysis can help us to 
analyse the overall structure of the attitudes in our data. 
On the basis of the correlations between individual 
attitudes factor analysis extracts factors which are said to 
represent underlying, theoretical dimensions not directly 
measurable themselves. The factors are therefore general 
attitude dimensions or ideological dimensions. The factor 
loadings shown in Tables V.7 and V.8 indicate how strongly 
each issue variable is correlated to each factor. As a rule 
of thumb we consider factor loadings over 0.40 as high.
The number of factors extracted is not simply a result of 
the intercorrelations between the issue variables; the 
researcher can influence the number, e.g. in order to obtain 
factors that can be interpreted in a meaningful way. In 
Table V.7 we represent a four-factor solution from the 15
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1983 issues.40) The four factors can account for 46.3% of 
the variance of the attitudes and the first factor, left- 
right, is clearly by far the strongest, explaining 18% of 
the total variance. In Table V.8 we represent a four-factor 
solution for the 1987 issues.41) The four factors can 
explain 42.8% of the total variance in the 15 issue 
questions; as in 1983 the left-right factor is by far the 
strongest, explaining 16.4% of the total variance. Those 
results echo the findings of the Norwegian and Swedish 
election studies.42)
By far the strongest factor both in 1983 and 1987 is 
Factor 1 which clearly represents the left-right dimension 
in Icelandic politics. In 1983 voters on the right tended to 
support the Keflavik base (factor loading .72) and continued 
membership of NATO (.71), support tough inflation strategy 
(.60), think that attempts to assure women equal position 
with men had gone too far (.50), and support tax reductions 
at the expense of the welfare system (.49) .
40) This solution was obtained by using the default criteria 
in the SPSSPC.
41) We have chosen the four-factor solution here. By using 
the default criteria SPSSPC extracted five factors 
explaining 49.9% of the variance.
42) In Norway in 1977 a five-factor solution explained about 
a third of the total variance; the left-right dimension 
accounted for almost half of the explained variance (H.
Valen (1981), pp. 246-249). The left-right dimension also 
accounted for about half of the explained variance in a 
five-factor solution in 1981 (H. Valen and B.C. Aardal 
(1983), pp. 164-165) and in a four-factor solution in 1985, 
where the left-right factor explained almost 16% of the 
total variance (B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), pp. 60-61) .
In Sweden in 1979 the left-right dimension explained 18% of 
the total variance, while all four factors accounted for 46% 
(S. Holmberg (1981), p. 262).
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Table V.7. Dimensions of political attitudes among voters
1983. Factor analysis of answers to 15 issue questions
(varimax rotation).
Factor
1 2 3 4
Left-Right Old-New Populism Moral
Keflavik base .72 .21 .11 -.05
NATO membership .71 .14 .02 -.06
Inflation .60 -.03 -.05 -.10
Equality for women .50 -.08 .01 .05
Reduce taxes .49 .27 -.03 .04
Abortion .40 -.17 .03 .54
Corporatism -.35 .08 .34 .43
Base payment .34 -.10 .64 .27
Power industry ownership -.30 -.01 .47 .33
Full employment -.28 .07 . 04 .59
Beer legalization — .16 .25 .17 -.58
Regional support -.13 -.67 .27 .17
Reduce agricult.prod. .06 .66 .05 -.06
All votes equal weight .05 .70 .21 . 04
Open primaries .03 .10 .72 .00
Eigenvalue 2.70 1 . 61 1.50 1 .13
Explained percentage of
total variance 18.0 10.8 10.0 7.5
= 46.3%
Table V.8. Dimensions of political attitudes among voters
1987. Factor analysis of answers to 15 issue questions
(varimax rotation, four factors selected)
Factor
1 2 3 4
Left -Right Populism Old-new Green
Keflavik base .63 .26 -.26 -.29
Nuclear-weapons-free zone -. 61 .08 .14 .03
NATO membership .56 .18 -.23 -.31
Equality for women .52 .16 .21 -.09
Unite pension funds -.47 .20 -.09 — . 32
Reduce taxes .45 .15 -.21 .33
Corporatism -.34 .34 -.02 .19
Regional support -.19 .20 .60 .14
Environment -.16 — .09 .12 .61
Clientelistic politics .16 .62 .18 .01
Base payment .11 .72 .00 -.14
Open primaries -.04 .55 -.08 .13
Party system outdated -.03 .31 -.07 .57
Equality of votes -.02 .08 .66 -.22
Private radio and TV -.01 -.22 .62 .18
Eigenvalue 2.45 1.63 1.22 1.11
Explained percentage of
total variance 16.4 10.9 8.2 7.4
=42.8%
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In 1987 voters on the right tended to support the 
Keflavik base (.63), oppose a nuclear-weapons-free zone 
(-.61), support NATO membership (.56), think that attempts 
to further women's rights had gone too far (.52), oppose 
uniting the pension funds and support the reduction of taxes 
at the expense of the welfare system (.45) . Four of the 
variables strongly correlated with the left-right factor in 
1983 were also included among our issue questions in 1987/ 
all of them also have high factor loadings in 1987. Several 
more variables had considerable factor loadings on the left- 
right factor even though they do not meet our rule of thumb 
criteria. Right wingers in 1983 tended to think that 
abortion liberalization had gone too far (.40), oppose 
corporatism (.-35), support base payment (.34), oppose the 
policy that foreign investment in power intensive plants 
should not exceed 50 per cent (-.30), and oppose government 
prioritization of full employment even though companies are 
inefficient (-.28) . In 1987 those on the right also tended 
to oppose corporatism (-.34), while the factor loading for 
base payment (.11) was much lower than in 1983.
Our second strongest factor in 1983, explaining 10.8% of 
the total variance, is clearly related to the urban-rural 
cleavage. We have chosen to call it the old-new economy 
dimension. Those in favour of the new economy tend to agree 
that all votes should have equal weight (.70), oppose 
regional support (-.67) and support the reduction of 
agricultural production (.66).
This factor is the third strongest in 1987, explaining 
8.2% of the total variance. Those in favour of the old 
economy tend to think that the new rules of more equal
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weight of votes had gone too far (.66), think that the steps 
to make it possible for private companies to operate radio 
and TV stations had gone too far (.62), and favour regional 
support (.60).
We have chosen to call the third strongest factor in 1983 
populism. This factor explains 10% of the total variance. 
The "populists" tend to favour open primaries (.72), favour 
base payment (.64) and support the view that foreign 
investment in power intensive industry must not exceed 50 
per cent (.47) . In 1987 populism is the second strongest 
factor, explaining 10.9% of the total variance. The 
"populists" in 1987 tend to support base payment (.72), 
clientelistic politics (.62) and open primaries (.55) . It 
should be noted that the question on foreign investment was 
only asked in 1983 and the question on clientelistic 
politics was only asked in 1987.
Due to different questions in 1983 and 1987 the fourth 
factor is not the same in both elections. The fourth factor 
in 1983, explaining 7.5% of the total variance, seems to be 
a moral one. The "moralists" tend to agree that the 
government should prioritize full employment even though 
companies are inefficient (.59), oppose beer legalization 
(-.58), think that abortion liberalization has gone too far 
(.54) and support corporatism (.43).
The fourth factor in 1987, explaining 7.4% of the total 
variance, we have somewhat tentatively chosen to call the 
green factor. It has only two strong factor loadings: the
"greens" tend to think that in the next years action on 
environmental issues should be prioritized over attempts to
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increase economic growth (.61) and agree that the party 
system is outdated (.57).
Table V.9. Issue voting; Issue indices and party choice in 
1983 and 1987. Parties' deviations from the mean.
1983:
Left-right index (Mean=7.99) ETA^=.42
(Keflavik base+
NATO membershipt PA WA PP SDA SDP IP
Inflation) 4.10 2.43 -0.06 -0.13 -0.22 -1.81
N= (135) (53) (136) (67) (107) (356)
Old-new economy index (Mean=8.79) ETA^=.16
(All votes equal weight+
Regional supportt PP PA WA SDP IP SDA
Reduce agricult.prod.) 2.26 1.01 -0.11 -0.60 -0.79 -1.40
Populism index (Mean=6.93) ETA^=.02
(Open primariest
Base payment+ PA WA IP PP SDP SDA
Power industry ownership) 0.69 0.46 0.05 -0.27 -0.35 -0.90
Morality index (Mean=9.04) ETa 2=.04
(Full employmentf
Beer legalization+ PP PA SDP IP WA SDA
Abortion) -0.65 -0.62 -0.01 0.27 0.51 0.75
1987:
Left-right index (Mean=9.36) ETA^=.41
(Keflavik base+
Nuclear-weapons-free zone+ PA WA SDP PP CiP IP
NATO membership) 3.67 2.22 -0.15 -0.19 -1.22 -2.04
(202) (192) (241) (262) (110) (462)
Populism index (Mean=8.67) ETa 2=.07
(Base paymentt
Clientelistic politics+ PA WA IP PP SDP CiP
Open primaries) 1.42 0.42 0.01 -0.22 -0.37 -2.02
Old-new economy index (Mean=8.01) ETA^=.10
(Equality of votes+
Private radio and TV+ PA PP WA SDP CiP IP
Regional support) -0.93 -0.56 -0.34 0.19 0.33 0.69
Green index (Mean=5.39) ETA^=.03
(Environments WA PA CiP SDP PP IP
Party system outdated) -0.59 -0.26 -0.17 0.12 0.15 0.25
The attitude indices are additive. Answers have been coded 
1-5 (also for NATO), values on variables negatively
correlated to the factors have been inverted. "No answer" is
included, coded 3. The table includes only those who give 
party voted for. Ns for the parties are the same for all 
indices in each election.
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We have seen that the voters' attitudes on the issues we 
put to them in 1983 and 1987 are clearly structured along a 
few general dimensions which can explain almost half of the 
total variance. Our final step in this chapter is to examine 
whether those general attitude dimensions are related to 
party choice. We do this by calculating additive indices for 
each of the factors. To construct each index we simply add 
the values of the three variables most strongly correlated 
to the relevant factor, after having inverted the values on 
variables showing a negative factor loading. For the green 
index we only use two variables. Thus, each index can take 
values from 3-15 (the Green Index from 2-10).
Both in 1983 and 1987 the left-right index is by far the 
most strongly related to party choice. In 1983 party choice 
can explain 42% of the variance in left-right attitudes and 
in 1987 41%. The ranking of the parties on the left-right 
index corresponds well to the voters' perceptions of the 
parties' positions on the left-right scale as discussed in 
Chapter IV. PA voters are clearly furthest to the left on 
this attitude index; they deviate 4.1 points from the mean. 
WA voters are equally clearly second from the left (2.43). 
Close to the centre are the PP (-0.06), the SDA (-0.13) and 
the SDP (-0.22). The attitudes of IP voters are much further 
to the right (-1.81). The pattern is largely repeated in 
1987. The PA (3.67) and the WA (2.22) are much further to 
the left than the centre parties, the SDP (-0.15) and the PP 
(-0.19). The CiP voters (-1.22) are clearly further to the 
right than the voters of the centre parties, while IP voters 
come by far furthest to the right (-2.04) . General left- 
right attitudes thus not only structure issues to a greater
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extent than other dimensions, they are also strongly related 
to party choice and the left-right attitudes of the voters 
of different parties correspond to the positions voters give 
the parties when asked to rank them on an abstract left- 
right scale. While this does not by itself show that issues 
do influence voting, it at least shows a great deal of 
political sophistication in the Icelandic electorate.
The old-new economy index is also clearly related to 
party choice even though the relationship is much weaker 
than for the left-right dimension. Party choice can explain 
16% of the distribution on this index in 1983 and 10% in 
1987. The ranking of the parties differs from the left-right 
index. In 1983 the PP is most in favour of the "old economy" 
(2.26), followed by the PA (1.01) . In 1987 those parties 
change places: the PA is most opposed to the "new economy" 
(-0.93), followed by the PP (-0.56). The reason for this is 
partly that PA voters are more opposed to private radio and 
TV stations in 1987 than are PP voters but also that PA 
voters have moved much closer to PP voters on the question 
of equality of votes than was the case in 1983. PA voters 
are also slightly more in favour of regional support than PP 
voters in 1987, while the reverse was true in 1983.
WA voters come third in support for the old economy both 
in 1983 (-0.11) and 1987 (-0.34), clearly less supportive
than PP and PA voters but more supportive than voters of 
other parties. In 1983 both the SDP (-0.60) and the IP 
voters (-0.79) are much more opposed to the "old economy", 
while the strongest opposition clearly comes from the SDA 
(-1.40). In 1987 SDP (0.19) and CiP (0.33) support for the 
"new economy" is considerably less than is the case for IP
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voters (0.69). The reason for a greater difference between 
the IP and the SDP on this dimension in 1987 is that while 
in 1983 SDP voters were more keen on reducing the 
agricultural production than IP voters (a variable not 
included in 1987), in 1987 IP voters were more supportive of 
private radio and TV stations than SDP voters (a variable 
not included in 1983) . The most important contrast between 
the old-new economy index and the left-right index is that 
on the former the PP and the PA are closest together while 
the centre parties, the PP and the SDP, are far apart.
The populism index is more weakly related to party 
choice, which can explain only 2% of its distribution in 
1983 as compared to 7% in 1987. While in both years PA 
voters (0.69 and 1.42) and WA voters (0.46 and 0.42) show 
the strongest anti-populist attitudes, they are followed by 
IP voters (0.05 and 0.01), PP voters (-0.27 and -0.22) and 
SDP voters (-0.35 and -0.37) . Populism is by far the 
strongest among SDA voters in 1983 (-0.90) and especially
CiP voters in 1987 (-2.02), a result that is hardly
surprising.
The two remaining indices are weakly related to party
choice, which can explain 4% of the variance on the morality 
index in 1983 and 3% of the green index variance in 1987. It 
should nevertheless be noted that the PP and the PA voters 
are clearly most conservative on the morality dimension in 
1983, while WA and SDA voters are most liberal. WA voters
are, as expected, most in favour of the green issues in
1987, followed by PA voters.
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Let us finally consider what the relationships between 
left-right attitudes and party choice tell us about the 
strength of issue voting when compared to Norway and Sweden.
In Norway the left-right dimension was not only by far 
the strongest factor in a factor analysis for the elections 
of 1969, 1977, 1981 and 1 9 8 1 , ^ 3 )  it is also strongly related 
to party choice. Using the factor scores from the left-right 
factor as a dependent variable and party choice as an 
independent variable, ETA^ was 0.52 in 1981 and 0.47 in 
1 9 8 5 . 4 4 )  While not directly comparable to our left-right 
index, this clearly indicates a very high level of issue 
voting along the left-right dimension. The correlation
between factor scores from the left-right factor and party 
choice in the Icelandic data was weaker: ETA^ was 0.42 in
1 9 8 3  and 0 . 3 3  in 1987.45)
Holmberg and Gilljam have constructed left-right indices 
for Swedish elections from 1956-1985. Those indices are 
additive and, like our indices, based on the three issue
questions in each election survey that were most strongly 
related to the left-right factor in a factor analysis. Those 
indicators of the strength of issue voting in Sweden (shown 
in Table V.IO) should therefore be directly comparable to 
our results.
The figures in Table V.IO show - like many other
indicators - that issue voting has sharply increased in 
Sweden in the last three decades. The Icelandic figures for 
issue voting, measured as the correlation between the left-
43) Aardal, B. and H. Valen (1989), p. 63.
44) Idid., p. 65.
45) In those calculations we have included "no answer", 
coded as 3.
299
right index and party choice (ETA^ = 0.42 for 1983 and 0.41 
for 1987), are of similar strength as the Swedish figures 
from 1973-1976. The Icelandic relationship 1983-1987 is 
considerably stronger than the Swedish one in the 1950s and 
the 1960s but weaker than in Sweden 1979-1985.
Table V.IO. Issue voting in Sweden 1956-1985. Explained 
variance on a left-right index (ETA^)
Election ETA^
1956 .23
1960 .29
1964 .23
1968 .35
1970 .33
1973 .40
1976 .39
1979 .55
1982 .58
1985 .52
The figures in the table are from S. Holmberg and M. Gill jam 
(1987), p. 292.
Our overall conclusion is that, while issue voting can be 
considered relatively high in Iceland, it seems to be weaker 
than is the case in Norway and Sweden. The most probable 
reason for this seems to be that the alternatives facing 
Icelandic voters in elections are not as clear nor as 
consistent as is the case in Norway and Sweden.
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Chapter VI: Social background
Emphasis on social background as an explanatory factor 
for voting behaviour can be traced to general sociological 
theory. Two of the great nineteenth century social thinkers, 
Marx and Weber, both gave weight to the impact of social 
structures on human behaviour and consciousness. Marx's 
famous dictum - that it is not social consciousness that 
conditions social being but social being that determines 
consciousness - has perhaps sometimes been interpreted, both 
by Marxists and non-Marxists, rather too narrowly as being a 
simple form of economic determinism. Nevertheless, Weber was 
clearly closer to the mark in his emphasis that economic 
structures were not the only ones that mattered - and that 
social structure was but one of many factors that had a part 
to play.
Much of sociological theory in this century has also
stressed the impact of social structures. It may be
overstating the case to say that Talcott Parsons' structural
functionalism is a form of cultural determinism, but the
heavy emphasis in many sociological studies on the impact of
socialization easily gives rise to a model of man as largely
the captive of his environment or social system, be that
societal or based on a smaller community or subculture of
class, religious denomination, etc. In one of the first
American voter studies. The People's Choice (1944) ,
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet argue, for instance, that
There is a familiar adage in American folklore to 
the effect that a person is only what he thinks he 
is, an adage which reflects the typically American 
notion of unlimited opportunity, the tendency 
toward self-betterment, etc. Now we find that the 
reverse of the adage is true: a person thinks^
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politicallyf as he is^ socially. Social 
characteristics determine political preference.^'^
Different sociological theories of voting need not
concern us greatly here. Empirical evidence has clearly
shown that the relationship between social structures and
voting differs greatly both in time and space. Even in the
19th century, when Disraeli greatly extended the franchise
to the working classes, it became clear that this was not
the end for the Conservative Party - as some of his
colleagues had feared. Yet in few countries has class been
as important an explanatory factor for voting as in Britain.
In this chapter we will examine several social-structural 
characteristics of Icelandic voters and their relationship 
to voting and electoral volatility. First we look at gender, 
age and education, then class, occupation, public or private 
sector and income, and finally we analyse the impact of 
parental influences.
VI.1 Sex and age
Sex and age have long been known to be relevant to some 
aspects of political behaviour. Even though empirical 
evidence has contradicted some long believed simple "truths" 
- that people become more conservative with age or that 
women are inherently more conservative than men - those 
variables still deserve to be taken into account. Their 
impact seems to vary with time and space, just as other 
background variables do. Their impact on some types of 
political behaviour can also be greater than on others. We 
have, therefore, to be careful to make clear whether we are
1) P.P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson and H. Gaudet (1968), p. 27 
Emphasis added.
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talking about voting patterns, strength of partisanship, 
attitudes and ideology, turnout, etc.
In discussing voting Robertson points out that there is
no reason why age and sex should not be 
relevant to a person's voting decision, in the 
same way, based on self-interest and cultural 
perspective, that class is relevant. As our 
political parties are not, however, organized 
expressly in terms of age group interest or 
sexual ideology, any gender/age pattern ought 
to be flexible, and relatively easily 
alterable between elections.2)
In view of the influence of the women's movement and the 
increasing number of old-age pensioners in many Western 
democracies, these variables may indeed become more 
important. Even though political parties are not based on 
cleavages along these lines their policies may favour such 
groups differently - or be perceived to do so. In the 
Icelandic context we also have a party based on gender, the 
Women's Alliance.
The impact of age on voting patterns can both be a life­
cycle effect, where we treat "the correlation between age 
and conservatism as tantamount to that between age and 
arthritis",3) and a generational effect, described thus by 
Butler and Stokes:
We shall argue that there are, in fact, common 
aspects to the way in which each of these 
political generations absorbed its political 
ideas. Indeed, the very concept of a 
'political generation' - of there being a 
common pattern in the behaviour of those 
entering the electorate in the same period - 
implies that the young show a common 
susceptibility to political ideas during their 
years of growing awareness.
2) D. Robertson (1984), pp. 37-39.
3) D. Robertson (1984), p. 37.
4) D. Butler and D. Stokes (1974), p. 4
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Butler and Stokes clearly favour the generational
explanation of increasing vote for the Conservatives with 
age in Britain: "We must ask not how old the elector is but 
when it was that he was y o u n g " . 5) Robertson, showing that
older voters gave more support to the Conservatives both in
1974 and 1 9 7 9 ,6 ) concludes that "whilst there cannot be a
final decision between the generational and the ageing 
model, the former seems more plausible".
Evidence from other countries shows that the impact of 
age on voting patterns differs. In Denmark there was a clear 
tendency for the young to support the socialist left (the 
parties on the left of the Social Democrats) in the 1970s 
and 1980s. In 1971-79 17-31% of the young voted for the
socialist left while 8-12% of older voters did so. In 1981- 
84 36-37% of the young voted for the socialist left as
compared to 16-17% of the older.®)
In Norway in the 1957-85 period the impact of age on 
voting patterns was in general not strong, although some 
interesting patterns nevertheless emerge.9) In 1957 Labour 
was the party of young voters; support for the party clearly 
decreased with age. In 1965 and 1969 the party had no clear 
age profile but in all elections since 1973 the party has 
had more support among older voters. In 1985 32-33% of those 
under 40 voted for the party, while 44-46% of those over 50 
did so. The support for Labour in the youngest age group
5) D. Butler and D. Stokes (1974), p. 62.
6 ) D. Robertson (1984), see Table p. 38.
7) D. Robertson (1984), p. 37.
8 ) P. Svensson (1984), p. 238. The young are those 24 years 
and younger. In 1971-79 there were four parliamentary 
elections in Denmark and two in 1981-84.
9) See H. Valen (1981), Table 2.3, vote by age 1957-79 (p.
28) .
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went down from 64% in 1957 to 32% in 1985.10) The fortunes 
of the Conservatives {Hoyre) were quite the reverse. The 
party had no clear age profile until the late 1970s. In 1985 
33-34% of those under 50 voted Conservative as compared to 
21-26% of older voters. The centre parties tended to have 
somewhat more support among older voters in the whole
period/ especially the Christian People's Party. The left 
socialists always obtained around twice as much support 
(often ca. 8%) among the youngest voters than among older
voters (3-5%) . The other flank party, the extreme right
Progressives, has had a similar profile in recent elections.
In Sweden the relationship between age and voting has
been weak in the 1948-1985 period, or as Holmberg puts it:
Swedish voters have for the whole post-war 
period largely voted the same way, regardless 
of age. The small differences that can be
observed in the party choice of different age 
groups are nevertheless interesting.^^)
Thus the Communists, who had been somewhat stronger among 
older voters in the cold war years, have had more support 
among younger voters in all elections since 1970, as had 
been the case for the party in 1948. The Social Democrats 
have changed from being stronger among the young in the 
1950s to being stronger among the older in 1979 and 1982. 
The Centre Party has always been stronger among the old 
except in the party's great upswing in the early 1970s when 
it was stronger among the young. The Conservatives 
(Moderatarna) were stronger among the old until 197 6/ in
10) See B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), Table 8.6, vote by 
age 1985 (p. 165).
11) S. Holmberg (1984), p. 75. (My translation). Table 4.4 
(p. 76) gives vote by age 1982 and Table 4.6 (p. 77) gives a 
summary of direction and strength of relationship between 
vote and age 1948-82. S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987) give 
vote by age 1985 (Table 9.4, p. 176).
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1979 and 1982 the party has been strongest among the middle- 
aged and in 1985 it had no age profile.
Those examples show that there is no simple relationship 
between age and voting patterns for parties. There has been 
a great deal of controversy concerning the impact of life­
cycle effects vs. generational effects. Methodologically it 
is difficult to get any clear cut answers, as both processes 
can be going on at the same time in opposite directions. In 
addition, we can have so-called period effects, i.e. some 
factors influencing all age groups. The generational theory 
presupposes that each generation is moulded in a certain way 
when its members are relatively young and more or less stays 
that way for the rest of its life. Such a theory cannot 
explain change in the older cohorts such as increased 
support for the Conservatives in Norway in the late 1970s. A 
period effect alone cannot explain why factors changing a 
party's fortune do not affect all age groups in the same 
way: the drastic decline in support for the Norwegian Labour 
Party in the younger age groups seems to be generational. A 
political generation and party identification can explain 
why the party has not suffered in the same way in older 
cohorts.12) This example also goes contrary to the life­
cycle theory, which on the other hand gets limited support 
from the fact that the Swedish Communists have been a youth 
party for twenty years without growing: a great deal of 
their young voters are obviously leaving them as they get 
older.
Table VI.1.1 shows that the age profiles for all the old 
Icelandic parties are weak. The clearest profile is that of
12) See B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), p. 169.
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the PP, which receives more votes from older people both in 
1983 and 1987. This may be partly a generational effect. The 
mean support for the PP in Althingi elections was 26.7% in 
1931-37 and 25.9% 1942-1967,13) while its mean for 1971-1987 
is down to 21.7%. Since 1974 the party has polled under 20% 
in three elections out of four.
Table VI.1.1. Party voted for in 1983 and 1987 by age. Total
samples. Percentages.
18-23* 24-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-80**
SDP 1983 8 17 13 13 16 7
1987 13 18 12 23 17 12
PP 1983 14 9 15 19 17 22
1987 15 13 17 16 22 19
IP 1983 41 35 40 45 44 46
1987 33 31 27 25 30 37
PA 1983 14 20 14 13 15 20
1987 15 12 15 11 11 14
WA 1983 8 11 8 4 4 2
1987 13 16 17 11 8 8
SDA 1983 16 9 10 7 4 3
CiP 1987 5 5 8 9 10 7
Others 1987 7 5 4 5 3 2
Total 1983 101 101 100 101 100 100
N= (80) (138) (224) (148) (115) (149)
Total 1987 101 100 100 100 101 99
N= (221) (239) (374) (281) (162) (253)
* 20-23 in 1983. 
** 60-83 in 1983.
The SDP, PA and IP do not have clear age profiles. It may 
be noted, however, that the SDP was weak among the youngest 
and the oldest in both elections, especially in 1983. The 
weak showing of the SDP in 1983 among first time voters may
13) Excluding the 1956 election.
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partly be a result of the SDA's success in that age group. 
In 1983 the IP was clearly weaker among those under forty 
than older voters, while in 1987 the youngest and oldest age 
groups showed strongest support for the party. The IP lost 
only 4% between 1983 and 1987 among the 24-29 year olds, 
while its losses in other age groups were 8-14%.
The three new parliamentary parties had clearer age 
profiles. The WA was clearly stronger among younger voters 
than older ones both in 1983 and 1987, though it should be 
noted that in neither election was its strongest support 
among first time voters. The party gained in all age groups 
between 1983 and 1987 (4-9%), relatively more among the
older cohorts, resulting in a somewhat weaker age profile 
for the party in 1987.
The SDA in 1983 was clearly a party of the young. The 
party obtained 16% among first time voters, 7-10% among 24- 
49 year olds and only 3-4% among voters over fifty. The 
reverse was true of the CiP in 1987: the party only got 5% 
of the poll among voters under thirty, while its support in 
other age groups was 7-10%.
The difference between the SDA and the CiP is easily 
understandable. While both were breakaway parties with 
popular leaders - the SDA from the SDP under Vilmundur 
Gylfason, the CiP from the IP under Albert Gudmundsson - the 
leadership, candidates and policies of the two parties were 
quite different. While both party leaders may be 
characterized somewhat loosely as populists, Gylfason was a 
young, radical anti-establishment figure, the father of 
controversial investigative journalism in Iceland and the 
main architect of the enormous SDP victory in 1978, and most
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of the candidates were young and new to politics. 
Gudmundsson, on the other hand, was an old-fashioned 
clientelistic veteran of the IP, never strong on ideology, 
and some of his candidates were IP veterans who had been 
unsuccessful in IP primaries. The success of the CiP on the 
other hand shows that a new party need not necessarily 
appeal to young voters; older voters are obviously also 
prepared to leave their old ship.
In general, however, young voters tend to be more 
volatile than older ones. As we saw in Chapter III, strength 
of partisanship in Iceland follows the general pattern, as 
it clearly increases with age. Table VI.1.2 shows that in 
Iceland age is also clearly related to actual vote 
switching and the young also tend to make their decision on 
what party to vote for closer to polling day than older 
voters. Turnout is also lower among the youngest voters.
A number of studies have shown that the young are more 
prone to switch parties between elections than older voters. 
In Denmark 17-25% of the total electorate switched parties 
between elections in the 1975-1984 period. The number of 
switchers in the youngest age group was on the other hand 
29-34% in four elections and as high as 51% in one.^^) in 
Sweden 33% of 22-30 year olds changed parties 1979-82, while 
23% of 31-40 year olds, 16% of 41-50 year olds and only 11- 
13% of those over 50 did so.^^) Similar trends have been 
observed in Norway and B r i t a i n . IG)
14) P. Svensson (1984), p. 242.
15) S. Holmberg (1984), Table 2.10, p. 35.
16) See e.g. H. Valen (1981), p. 27, and B. Sarlvik and 
I.Crewe (1983), pp. 91-93.
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Table VT.1.2. Time of voting decision, party switching and
non-voting 1983 and 1987 by age. Total samples. Percentages.
18-23 24-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-80 All
VOTING DECISION:
Did not
consider 1983 35 37 36 55 68 78 51
other party 1987 24 27 33 38 53 65 39
More than a 1983 13 10 12 12 8 11 11
month before 1987 7 9 7 9 13 10 9
8-30 days 1983 9 8 7 7 5 4 7
before 1987 16 18 16 13 11 10 14
One week 1983 10 13 9 9 9 4 9
before 1987 12 11 7 8 4 3 8
During the 1983 10 18 15 7 4 1 10
last week 1987 16 12 14 15 9 6 12
On polling 1983 22 13 21 10 6 3 13
day 1987 26 23 24 17 10 6 18
Total 1983 99 99 100 100 100 101 101
N= (77) (137) (216) (145) (110) (142) (827)
Total 1987 101 100 101 100 100 100 100
N= (246) (250) (391) (298) (175) (268) (1526)
PARTY SWITCHING
Switched 1979-83 32 29 25 19 10 23
Switched 1983-87 52 39 40 31 20 37
N (1983) - (119) (193) (136) (105) (143) (696)
N (1987) - (186) (335) (252) (154) (233) (1160)
NON-VOTING
Did not vote 1983 9 8 6 6 6 9 7
Did not vote 1987 9 3 3 4 5 5 4
N (1983) (93) (159) (246) (158) (125) (167) (948)
N (1987) 246) (250) (391) (298) (175) (268) (1628)
In 1983 the youngest age group' is 20-23, the oldest 60-83.
Time of voting decision is only for respondents who reported
party voted for. The base (N) for party switching are the
respondents who reported vote both in current and previous
election. The base for non-voting are the respondents who
reported party voted for, turned in a blank or void ballot
or claimed not to have voted.
This general pattern clearly emerges in the Icelandic 
data. Both in 1983 and 1987 young voters were much more 
prone to switch parties than older ones. The relationship
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tends to be linear. It is however important to note that the 
increased overall volatility from 1983 (23%) to 1987 (37%)
is a result of increasing party switching within all age 
groups; a clear example of a period effect.
Another indication of greater volatility among the young
is that they tend to make their voting decision later than
older voters. In Danish elections 1971-1984 17-29% of the
youngest voters reported that they made their decision in
the last few - days before the election, while the
corresponding figure for the whole electorate was 9-15%.
In Sweden the same question on decision time has been asked
since 1964. The results are a clear indication of increasing
volatility. The number of respondents claiming to have made
the voting decision during the election campaign has risen
in every election, from 18% in 1964 to 39% in 1985.^8)
The results from the interview question on 
when the voters decided what party to vote for 
should of course not be interpreted literally.
The question is crude and measures not only 
the voters' perceptions of when they made the 
voting decision but also uncertainty in the 
party choice. Less convinced voters tend to 
say they made the decision late irrespective 
of when the actual voting decision was made.
The increasing proportion of voters reporting 
late voting choice is a sign of the Swedish 
parties' decreasing grip” on the voters, which 
has led to increasing uncertainty and 
volatility.^9)
This indicator of volatility is clearly related to age in 
Sweden. In 1985 of 40% voters aged 18-21 years said they had 
made their voting decision in the last week, while the
17) P. Svensson (1984), p. 240.
18) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987), p. 100.
19) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987), p. 101. My
translation.
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corresponding figure was 21-26% for 22-50 year olds and 9- 
13% for 50-80 year olds.20)
The percentage of Icelandic voters who reported they made 
their voting decision in the last week before polling day 
rose from 32% in 1983 to 38% in 1987.21) The percentage 
reporting voting decision on polling day rose from 13% to 
18% - and the number of those who did not consider voting 
for another party fell from 51% to 39%. This data indicates 
that volatility increased from 1983-1987 in all age groups. 
Nevertheless, in each year there emerges a clear age 
pattern: the young are more volatile than the old.
Table VI.1.3. Proportion of voters claiming to have made 
their voting decision during the last week before the 
election in 1983 and 1987 by age. Total samples. 
Percentages.
18-23 24-29 30-39 4 Q — 4 9 50-59 60-80 All
1983 42 42 45 26 19 8 32
1987 54 46 45 40 23 15 38
20-23 and 60-83 in 1983. The percentages shown are an
addition of "one week before ","during the last week" and "on
polling day" in Table VT.1.2 •
Among first time voters, only one of every three did not 
consider voting for another party in 1983; in 1987 the 
figure was down to one in every four. Among those over 
sixty, 78% did on the other hand not consider voting for 
another party in 1983 and 65% in 1987. 22-26% of the 
youngest voters claimed to have made their decision on 
polling day; only 3-6% of the oldest voters did so. Table
20) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam, p. 101. In 1979 27% of the 
18-21 year olds reported voting decision in the last week, 
as did 14-21% of 21-50 year olds, and 4-11% of 51-80 year 
olds. S. Holmberg (1981), p. 47.
21) The figure for decision in the last week is computed by 
adding the categories "one week before", "during the last 
week", and "on polling day" in Table VI.1.2.
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VI.1.3 shows how large a proportion claimed to have made 
their voting decision during the last week before the 
elections in 1983 and 1987.
Non-voting is usually related to age.
Most research on political participation has 
found that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between age and turnout. Among the young
turnout is relatively low in the first years 
after they come of voting age. Turnout then 
increases with age until it culminates around 
sixty; then it decreases again among the
old. )
Survey research usually underestimates non-voting. Non­
voters are more likely to refuse to participate in a survey 
on politics and there seems also to be a tendency for 
respondents not to admit that they did not vote. The Swedish 
data on non-voting is unusually good: respondents' answers
to the question of whether they voted are checked by the 
voting records and corrected; adjustments are also made to
take account of the underrepresentation of non-voters in the
sample. The Swedish data shows a curvilinear trend: In 1985 
13-15% of those aged 18-30 years did not vote, 8-9% of those 
aged 31-70 years and 12% of those aged 71-80 years.
The uncorrected Icelandic data in Table VT.1.2 
underestimates non-voting by around 5% in 1983 and around 6% 
in 1987. The age trends in the data are on the other hand 
curvilinear in the expected direction. Turnout among young 
and old voters is lower than among middle-aged voters but 
the differences are by no means drastic; their impact on 
election outcomes is minimal. It seems likely that the 
Icelandic age pattern is in fact very similar to the Swedish 
one, as are the overall turnout figures in recent elections.
22) P. Svensson (1984), p. 232. My translation.
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Like age, gender has some role to play in politics. An
overwhelming majority of the political elite continues to be
male even though participation of women in some legislatures 
has increased considerably in recent years, especially in
the Nordic countries. On the electoral level the sex 
differences have been much less pronounced but nevertheless 
not without significance. Relatively small differences in
the voting patterns of men and women can have more impact on 
electoral outcomes than similar differences among, say, age 
groups or educational categories, as men and women each 
constitute roughly half of the electorate.
In most western countries the turnout of women was much 
lower than of men in the first years after women were 
enfranchised but the difference has now become insignificant 
or disappeared.23) in Iceland the turnout of women was 38.9% 
lower than among men in 1916, the first eletion after the 
introduction of women's suffrage, and in 1919 the difference 
was 35%. In 1923-1943 the difference between the turnout of 
men and women usually varied between 10 and 1 9 %,24) in 1946- 
1959 5 -7 %,25) and in 1963-1971 3-4%. From 1974 it remained 
between 2-3% until the 1987 election, when the difference 
between the turnout of the sexes was only 0.8%. Only once 
has turnout among Icelandic women been higher (90.9%) than 
among men (90.1%) - in the 1980 presidential election, when 
a women president, Vigdis Finnbogadottir, was elected for 
the first time.
In Sweden there was 10-15% difference in turnout between 
men and women in the 1920s but after 1960 the difference was
23) D. Dahlerup (1984), p. 252.
24) In 1937 the difference was, however, only 7.7%.
25) Except in 1946 (8%) and the 1959 June election (4.9%) .
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never greater than around 2%. Women's turnout has, in fact,
been somewhat higher than men's in all Swedish parliamentary
elections since 1 9 7 6 .2 6 )
Concerning voting behaviour "there has been a belief,
held particularly profoundly amongst those on the Left, that
women are innately more Conservative then men".27) it seems
indeed to have been the case in Europe that from the 1920s
to the 1940s women tended to vote for religious and
conservative parties to a greater extent than men, while the
social democrats and especially the communists got fewer
votes from women than men.28) As we shall see, this trend
was on the other hand temporal in many European countries,
and it is not known to have existed in America:
The earliest European study of female voting 
found that women were more likely to support 
bourgeois over socialist parties, and to 
reject both left and right-wing extremities in 
favor of clerical and moderate parties . . .
Among Americans, there is no evidence of a 
more conservative character among women ... In 
the vote, American women have not evidenced
any special fondness for conservative or 
Republican candidates.29)
In the 1950-1980 period the differences in the voting
behaviour in Northern Europe between men and women tended to
grow smaller, while women in Italy and France continued to
vote more heavily for religious parties than men. In 1976
the old truth that women supported the West German Christian
Democrats to a greater extent than men was no longer
true.20) in Britain in 1979
The votes of men and women were virtually 
identical. Women were fractionally the more
26) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987), p. 73.
27) D. Robertson (1984), p. 36.
28) D. Dahlerup (1984), p. 255.
29) G.M. Pomper (1975), p. 77.
30) D. Dahlerup (1984), pp. 257-259.
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likely to vote Conservative, as customary, but 
the difference was probably smaller than at 
any time since the war.31)
In Norway men voted consistently more socialist than 
women in 1957-1981, but the difference was small, e.g. only 
1% in 1977 and 4% in 1981.32) in Sweden the differences 
between men's and women's voting behaviour was very small in 
the post-war period but followed a systematic pattern. The 
Communists usually received 1-2% more votes from men 1948- 
1982. The Social Democrats were also slightly stronger among 
men 1948-1968 (except in 1960), but from that time to 1979 
there was virtually no difference. The Centre party was 
stronger among men until the early 1970s; in the "nuclear- 
power elections" of 1976 and 1979 the party's support was 
stronger among women (2 and 4% respectively). The liberal 
People's Party usually got slightly more votes from women 
for the whole period. The Conservatives usually obtained 3- 
4% more votes among women 1948-1968; in the early 1970s 
there was no difference; in the late 1970s this trend was 
reversed.33)
In the 1970s and especially the 1980s a gender gap
developed in American presidential elections: women started
to vote more to the left than men.
In 1972, for the first time in available 
survey research, a significant sex difference 
was found in the two-party vote, as 7 percent 
more of men voted for Richard Nixon. The 
difference between the sexes was particularly 
important among the youngest v o t e r s .34)
While 7% more of men voted for Carter in 1976, the 1972- 
pattern re-emerged in 1980 when Carter got 6 % more votes
31) B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe (1983), p. 91.
32) B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), pp. 250-251.
33) S. Holmberg (1984), pp. 73-75.
34) G.M. Pomper (1975), p. 78.
316
from women than from men. The swing to Reagan was mainly 
among male voters.^5)
The radicalization of voting behaviour among women also 
took place in Scandinavia in the late 1970s and 1980s. Even 
though the sex differences in Sweden had been small and 
decreasing in the post-war period, women had never voted 
more socialist than men. That happened first in 1982 and the 
trend was reinforced in 1985. The new gender gap was visible 
mainly among the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. In 
1979 and 1982 4% more men voted Conservative, while in 1985 
the figure was up to 7%. In 1979 1% more women voted Social 
Democrat, 2% in 1982 and 5% in 1 9 8 5 .^6 ) in Norway the trend 
of women voting less socialist was reversed in 1985, when 5% 
more women voted for the socialist parties than did men. 
That trend remained in the local elections of 1 9 8 7 .3^) %n 
Denmark there is also some evidence of women moving to the 
left since the mid-1970s, even though the trend is largely 
confined to women in the middle strata.38)
We do not have survey data on the voting behaviour of the 
sexes in Iceland prior to 1983. On the basis of various 
indirect evidence Kristjansson argues that in the 1930s and 
1940s women tended to vote more heavily for the IP than 
m e n . 39) in our 1983 survey we asked our respondents what 
party their parents had generally supported when they were 
growing up. Of those giving one of the four major parties 
46% said their father used to support the IP, while 49% said 
their mother supported the party. This was not at the
35) See D. Dahlerup (1984), Table 11.4, p. 262.
36) S. Holmberg and M. Gilljam (1987), pp. 173-175.
37) B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), pp. 250-251.
38) D. Dahlerup (1984), p. 263.
39) S. Kristjansson (1977).
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expense of the socialist parties, as both the SDP (16%) and 
the CP/USP/PA (11%) got equal reported support among fathers 
and mothers/ fathers were more inclined to support the PP 
than m o t h e r s . 40) Thus, the available evidence suggests that 
women in Iceland may in the past have followed the trend of 
supporting Conservatives somewhat more than men.
Table VI .1.4. Party voted for 1983 and 1987 by sex. Total
samples. Percentages.
1983
Men Women
1987 
Men Women
SDP 13 1 2 17 14
PP 17 14 18 16
IP 41 42 34 25
PA 17 14 13 13
WA 3 1 1 5 2 2
SDA 9 6 - -
CiP - - 8 6
Others - - 5 4
Total 1 0 0 99 1 0 0 1 0 0
N= (472) (382) (830) (705)
In the 1983 election by far the largest gender gap
emerges - not unexpectedly - in the following of the WA: the
party got 8 % more support from women than men. This is at 
the expense of all other parties except the IP. The SDP, PP 
and SDA got 1-3% more votes from men than women, while the 
IP received 1% more from women.
A major change took place in 1987. A new major gender gap
emerged on the right, as 9% fewer women than men voted for
the IP. The WA continued to have a mainly female following - 
around four-fifths of its voters were women as in 1983 - but 
since the party almost doubled its vote the difference in 
its male/female vote rose to 17%. Men and women gave the
40) A further discussion of parental vote is found in 
Section VI.5.
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same amount of support to the PA while the PP, CiP and SDP 
got 2-3% fewer votes from women than from men.
The emerging gender gap in the IP vote is not to any 
great extent a result of a direct transfer of votes from the 
IP to the WA. As we saw in Chapter II only 1.4% of voters 
moved from IP to WA in 1983, while 1% moved from the SDP or 
the PP to the WA and 2.4% from the PA to the WA. In 1987 
only 1.7% moved from the IP to the WA, while the party got 
2.2% from the SDP and the PP and 2.8% from the P A . ^ l )  what 
happened in 1987 - besides direct transfers between the IP 
and the WA - was that the IP lost woman voters to the 
parties on its left, which in turn lost woman voters to the 
WA.
Table VI.1.5 shows the gender profiles of the IP and the 
WA in different age groups both in 1983 and 1987. In 1983, 
when the IP had no overall gender profile, the party was 
nevertheless much stronger among men than women in two age 
groups, among first time voters and 50-59 year olds. In 
other age groups the party was stronger among women, 
especially among the oldest voters. In 1987 the oldest 
voters were the only age group in which women voted more 
heavily for the IP than men. The gender gap among first time 
voters and 50-59 year olds from 1983 remained and a clear 
gap emerged among 24-39 year olds. In 1987 the IP was 
strongest among men under thirty and over fifty and weakest 
among women under sixty.
41) See Tables II.2.8 and II.5.12 in Chapter II.
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Table V I .1.5. Vote for the IF' and the WA by age and sex 1983
and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
18-23 24-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-82
IP
1983 Men 49 33 37 44 50 39
Women 28 38 43 45 37 54
Difference +21 -5 — 6 -1 + 27 -15
1987 Men 42 37 31 26 37 34
Women 22 23 20 25 23 41
Difference +20 + 14 + 11 + 1 + 14 -7
WA
1983 Men 0 7 4 0 0 3
Women 21 15 13 10 10 1
Difference -21 -8 -11 -10 -10 + 2
1987 Men 0 5 7 4 2 6
Women 28 29 30 17 15 9
Difference -28 -24 -23 -13 -13 -3
N (1983 men)= (51) (70) (121) (86) (64) (80)
N (1983 women)= (29) (68) (103) (62) (51) (69)
N (1987 men)= (121) (132) (207) (137) (90) (142)
N (1987 women)= (98) (107) (169) (144) (75) (111)
20-23 year olds and 60- 83 year olds in 1983 .
The base (N) is the number of male and female respondents
who reported the party voted for.
The WA had a clear age profile among women in 1983: the 
party's vote decreased with increasing age. In 1987 the 
party increased its share among women in all age groups, 
most strongly among 24-39 year olds, resulting in an age- 
profile where 28-30% of 18-39 year old women voted for the 
WA, 15-17% of 40-59 year olds and 9% of women over sixty. 
The gender gap in both elections is largest among first time 
voters, as no male respondents in that age group voted for 
the WA in either election. Among males the WA was clearly 
strongest among 24-39 year olds in 1983 but the party did 
not increase its share among men in that age group in 1987, 
while its support grew among men over forty.
320
While both men and women became more volatile from 1983- 
1987, the change among women was greater. In 1987 women were 
clearly more volatile than men, as can be seen in Table 
VI. 1.6.
Table V I .1.6. Strength of party identification, time of
voting decision, party switching , and non-voting by sex 1983
and 1987. Total samples. Percentages.
1983 1987
Men Women Men Women
STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party supporter 53 45 50 41
Closer to a party 28 35 30 35
No party identification 18 20 20 24
Total 101 100 100 100
N= (532) (462) (915) (783)
VOTING DECISION
Did not consider
another party 50 53 41 37
More than a month before 13 8 9 8
8-30 days before 7 6 16 12
One week before 9 8 8 7
During the last week 9 11 12 13
On polling day 12 14 15 23
Total 100 100 101 100
N= (456) (371) (829) (698)
PARTY SWITCHING
Switched parties 23 24 34 40
N= (389) (307) (637) (526)
NON-VOTING
Did not vote 6 9 4 5
N= (513) (435) (876) (753)
The base for "strength of party ;identification" is all
respondents who answered the question. For the base of other
dependent variables see Table VI .1.2.
In 1983 the amount of party switching was similar among 
men and women, while in 1987 there had emerged a 6% gap: 34% 
of men switched parties and 40% of women. In 1983 the 
strength of party identification was weaker among women: 8%
more men considered themselves party supporters and 2% more
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women had no party identification. In 1987 both sexes showed 
weaker party identification, but the difference between the 
sexes had increased slightly: 9% more men considered
themselves party supporters and 4% more women had no party 
identification.
In 1983 the question on time of voting decision showed 
small differences between the sexes. 50% of men and 53% of 
women did not consider voting for another party. 30% of men 
and 33% of women made their decision in the last week. In 
1987 both sexes showed more volatility, women to a greater 
extent than men. 41% of men and 37% women did not consider 
voting for another party. 35% of men and 43% of women made 
their decision in the last week; 15% of men and 23% of women 
as late as on polling day.
While the main change in volatility between 1983 and 1987 
was the overall increase, we can also say that in 1987 a 
small gender gap emerged with women showing weaker 
attachments to the party system then men.
Finally, our data shows abstaining to be more common 
among women. As we saw earlier, the data underestimates non­
voting. The data nevertheless reflects the difference 
between the sexes rather accurately - Table VI.1.6 shows a 
difference of 3% in 1983, when the actual difference was 
2.3% and of 1% in 1987, when the actual difference was 0.8%.
VI.2 Education
The impact of education on politics is similar to that of 
age and gender: it is bound by time and space, and can
influence some aspects of the political system to a greater 
extent than others. Thus, the authors of The American Voter
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found that while the impact of education on partisan
behviour in America in the 1950s tended to be trivial or
non-existent when the occupation factor was held constant,
education nevertheless "has many striking consequences for
political behavior that are independent of status
implications ...".42) The more educated tended to be better
informed, have different cognitive structures, show higher
turnout and discuss politics more often, and they were more
likely to think they could and should influence political
events.43) The most important finding of early American
voting research - and the most serious for democratic theory
- was that independents, most likely to switch parties in
elections, were the "least admirable v o t e r s " , 44) or in the
words of The American Voter:
The ideal of the Independent citizen, 
attentive to politics, concerned with the 
course of government, who weighs the rival 
appeals of a campaign and reaches a judgement 
that is unswayed by partisan prejudice, has 
had such a vigorous history in the tradition 
of political reform - and has such a hold on 
civic education today - that one could easily 
suppose that the habitual partisan has the 
more limited interest and concern with 
politics . . . Far from being more attentive, 
interested, and informed. Independents tend as 
a group to be somewhat less involved in 
politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge 
of the issues, their image of candidates is 
fainter, their interest in the campaign is 
less, their concern over the outcome is 
relatively slight, and their choice between 
competing candidates, although it is indeed 
made later in the campaign, seems much less to 
spring from discoverable evaluations of the 
elements of national p o l i t i c s .45)
42) Campbell et al. (1960), p. 475.
43) Ibid., pp. 476-481.
44) B. Berelson, P.Lazarfeid, and W.McPhee (1954), p. 316.
45) Campbell et al. (1960), p. 143.
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While this low estimate of independent voters was to
become accepted truth in American political science, it was
already outdated in the early 1970s.
The recent growth in the proportion of 
Independents has come from persons of advanced 
education, the young, and those of higher 
social status - individuals who presumably are 
able to analyze political issues and make 
sense of campaigns ... Those who switch votes
from one election to another ... are about as
educated, concerned, and aware of policy 
questions, as those who stay with the same 
party.46)
In Europe we have examples of education influencing
voting choice, values and volatility. In Britain in 1979
there was a clear relationship between education and voting:
Labour support was 21% among those with the most education,
47% among those with the least education. The Conservative
and the Liberal vote on the other hand increased with
increasing e d u c a t i o n .47) in their book on the 1983 British
election Heath et al. claim that
Education, when it has been considered at all 
by British political scientists, has usually 
been thought of as an aspect of class 
structure rather like housing . . . However, it 
is quite misleading to treat education as if 
it were related to class in the same way that 
housing is.48)
Housing is associated with "free market" values, while 
education is on the other hand related to "liberal values", 
like opposing the death penalty and supporting free speech. 
But whereas "education is as strongly associated with 
liberal values as class is with free enterprise values, its 
association with vote is much weaker than that of c l a s s " . 49) 
Nevertheless, education clearly had an impact on the vote in
46) G. Pomper (1975), p. 31-32.
47) See B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe (1983), Table 3.12, p. 101.
48) A. Heath et al. (1985), p. 64.
49) Ibid., p. 67.
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the 1983 British election independent of class: Inside what 
Heath et al. call the salariat the Conservatives got 42% 
among those with a degree and 60% among those below 0-level, 
while the Alliance got 41% of those with a degree and only 
22% among those below 0-level. The Conservatives were 
stronger among those with 0-levels or more than among those 
below 0-level both in the intermediate classes (8% stronger) 
and the working class (12% stronger), while the reverse was 
true for Labour (8% weaker among the more educated in the 
intermediate classes; 16% weaker in the working class) .50)
In Norway education has been strongly related to voting 
choice. In 1977 Labour had a clear educational profile, as 
it received 65% of the votes of those with 7 years of 
education or less but only 16% among those with 14 years of 
education or more. While the Christian People's Party and 
the Centre Party were also overrepresented among those with 
little education, the reverse was true for the Conservative 
and the Socialist Left Party. Among those with 7 years 
education or less, 8% voted Conservative and 3% Socialist 
Left. Among those with 14 years education or more, 39% voted 
Conservative, 14% Socialist Left.51) While the impact of 
structural variables on voting choice declined in Norway 
from 1969 to 1985, in both of these years education was 
among the strongest factors when other structural variables 
were controlled f o r . 5 2 )
In Sweden electoral volatility has been related to 
education. In the elections of 1979, 1982 and 1985 around
15% of those with least education switched parties, while
50) See ibid., Table 5.6, p. 67.
51) See H. Valen (1981), Table 6.9, p. 119.
52) See B. Aardal and H. Valen (1989), pp. 200-205.
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those with more education were more volatile., Among those
with the most education 24-27% switched parties .53)
Table VI.2. 1. Party voted for in 1983 and 1987 by level of
education. Total samples. Percentages.
A B C D E F
SDP 1983 14 13 12 9 9 15
1987 14 15 21 15 13 17
PP 1983 20 19 13 15 8 3
1987 24 21 13 14 8 13
IP 1983 41 43 45 38 50 30
1987 25 28 37 30 41 28
PA 1983 16 15 18 12 16 23
1987 14 11 10 14 18 16
WA 1983 3 5 2 15 11 18
1987 7 14 3 23 17 21
SDA 1983 6 6 10 11 6 13
CiP 1987 8 8 12 4 3 1
Others 1987 8 4 5 1 2 5
Total 1983 100 101 100 100 100 102
N= (258) (195) (182) (114) (64) (40)
Total 1987 100 101 101 101 102 101
N= (382) (344) (300) (226) (120) (160)
Levels of education:
A: Compulsory education only.
B : 1-2 years of further education.
C: 3-5 years of further education; vocational training for 
manual jobs (e.g. tradesmen, ship captains, etc.).
D: 3-5 years of education; general, commercial, vocational 
training for non-manual jobs.
E: University education.
F: Students.
Table VI.2.1 reveals that education is related to party 
choice in Iceland even though there are great differences in 
the sharpness of the parties' educational profiles. One of 
the old parties, the PP, is clearly stronger among the less 
educated. The relationship is almost linear, both in 1983
53) S. Holmberg (1981), p. 364, S. Holmberg (1984), p. 118, 
S. Holmberg and M. Gill jam (1987), p. 211.
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and 1987, and the party is especially weak among those with 
university education. In 1987 the party's support among 
those with compulsory education only was three times 
stronger than among those who had finished university.
The traditional working-class parties, the SDP and the 
PA, have weak educational profiles. The SDP was somewhat 
weaker among those with higher education in 1983, but not in 
1987. The PA was strongest in 1987 among the university 
educated.
The IP is stronger among those with more education. Both 
in 1983 and 1987 the party's share increases with each 
educational category, except that in both years the party's 
support drops among those with 3-5 years of non-manual 
further education. It is noteworthy that both in 1983 and 
1987 the party is relatively weak among students.
The new parties have different educational profiles. The 
WA is clearly a party of the better educated, both in 1983 
and 1987, and its strongest support is among those with 3-5 
years non-manual further education and students. The SDA in 
1983 is strongest among those with 3-5 years further 
education, while the CiP in 1987 resembles the PP : the
party's support is much stronger among those with little 
education.
Table VI.2.2 shows an MCA analysis of the mean number of 
years respondents reported having attended school by age and 
party voted for. As expected, length of school attendance is 
strongly related to age. Its relationship to party voted for 
is much weaker but a clear pattern nevertheless emerges. In 
both years the PP and the WA voters show the greatest 
deviations and in opposite directions: PP voters have on
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average the shortest school attendance, WA voters the 
longest. Voters of the SDP, PA and IP deviate less from the 
overall mean. IP voters have the longest school attendance 
of the three in both years when controlled for age. In 1983 
SDA voters had relatively long school attendance, also when 
controlled for age, but they deviated by no means as much as 
WA voters. In 1987 CiP voters had attended school for fewer 
years than other voters, except those voting for the PP and 
those voting for the minor parties, which in fact had the 
shortest mean school attendance when controlled for age.
Table VI.2!.2. Mean length of education (years) by party
voted for and age 1983 and 1987. Total samples. MCA table.
1983 1987
GRAND MEAN=10.:36 GRAND MEAN=11.12
Deviations Deviations
Unadj. Adjusted N Unadj. Adjusted N
PARTY
PP -1.80 -1.41 (135) -1.45 -1 . 30 (253)
PA -0.17 0.01 (134) 0 . 12 0 .17 (200)
SDP 0.12 -0.13 (106) 0.39 0.29 (236)
IP 0.13 0.24 (350) 0.20 0.37 (455)
WA 2.56 1.76 (53) 1 . 64 1 .14 (190)
SDA 1.07 0.37 (67)
CiP -0.74 -0.59 (107)
Others -1.01 -1 . 38 (69)
ETA BETA ETA BETA
.24 .18 .22 .19
AGE
18-23 1.78 1.69 (79) 0.74 0.73 (220)
24-29 1.99 1.82 (138) 1 . 94 1.83 (237)
30-39 1.26 1.22 (223) 1.44 1.42 (371)
40-49 0.13 0.20 (148) -0.03 0.00 (280)
50-59 -1.39 -1.33 (113) -1.40 -1.28 (163)
60-80 -3.88 -3.73 (144) -3.84 -3.82 (239)
ETA BETA ETA BETA
.49 .47 .47 .46
Multiple R Squared .27 .26
Multiple R .52 .51
Age was 20--23 and 60-83 in 1983.
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Table VI.2.3. Strength of party identification, party
switching, and non-voting by education 1983 and 1987. Total
samples. Percentages.
A B C D E F
STRENGTH OF PARTY
IDENTIFICATION
Party supporter
1983 51 • 49 48 52 52 34
1987 43 48 46 45 61 44
Closer to a
party 1983 25 35 33 32 38 43
1987 32 29 30 37 34 33
No party ident.
1983 24 16 19 16 10 23
1987 25 23 23 18 6 23
Total 1983 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= (316) (222) (206) (130) (71) (47)
Total 1987 100 100 99 100 101 100
N= (426) (379) (340) (248) (125) (175)
PARTY SWITCHING
Switched parties
1979-1983 19 20 27 28 28 (42)
N= (219) (164) (154) (89) (57) (12)
1983-1987 35 41 37 37 23 43
N= (292) (277) (244) (188) (107) (49)
NON-VOTING
Did not vote
1983 10 6 8 4 3 7
N= (297) (213) (201) (123) (67) (46)
1987 5 5 3 3 0 8
N= (411) (371) (313) (234) (121) (175)
Levels of education:
A: Compulsory education only.
B: 1-2 years of further education.
C : 3-5 years of further education; vocational training for
manual jobs (e.g. tradesmen , ship captains. etc.).
D : 3-5 years of education; general, commercial , vocational
training for non-manual jobs.
E : University education.
F : Students.
For base of dep. variables see Tables VI.1.2 and VI.1.6 •
Education is not as strongly - nor consistently - related
to volatility as to party choice if we exclude students , who
are more volatile on all counts than others. Table VI.2.3
reveals that in 19831 those with little education were
clearly less prone to switch parties, as has been the case
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in Sweden. 19-20% of those with 1-2 years of further 
education or less switched parties, while 27-28% of those 
with more education did so. In 1987 on the other hand only 
23% of the university educated changed parties, while 35-41% 
in other educational groups did so.
Strength of party identification is not strongly related 
to education. The number of party supporters was rather 
similar in the educational categories in both elections, 
except that in 1987 party supporters were substantially more 
numerous among the university educated than others. The 
number of those with no party identification was also lower 
among the more educated in both elections, especially among 
those with university education.
Table VI.2.4 shows that both in 1983 and 1987 those with 
little education were less likely to have considered voting 
for another party. The number of people claiming to have 
made a late voting decision did not vary greatly by 
educational categories. In 1983 26% of those with compulsory 
education only said they had made their decision in the last 
week, while the corresponding figures were 31-35% for other 
categories. In 198, 30% of those with university education
made the decision in the last week, while 36-40% of 
respondents with less education did so. On the whole, our 
data does not reveal any great differences in the strength 
of ties to the parties among the various educational 
categories.
Table VI. 2.3 shows on the other hand that non-voting is 
clearly related to education. In both elections non-voting 
goes steeply down with increased education. It may be noted.
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however, that among students - most of whom are young - non­
voting is relatively high.
Table VI.2.4. Time of voting decision by education 1983 and 
1987. Total samples. Percentages.
A B C D E F
Did not con­
sider another 
party 1983 62 52 44 46 45 34
1987 45 41 38 37 38 25
More than 
a month 1983 7 13 13 12 11 16
before 1987 7 8 11 8 16 7
8-30 days 
before 1983 5 5 9 7 10 5
1987 11 15 14 16 16 17
One week 
before 1983 8 8 9 6 16 11
1987 9 6 11 4 3 10
During the last 
week 1983 6 10 12 13 8 18
1987 10 13 11 15 14 16
On polling 
day 1983 12 13 13 16 10 16
1987 19 17 15 21 13 25
Total 1983 99 101 100 100 100 100
N= (249) (191) (174) (112) (62) (38)
Total 1987 101 100 100 101 100 100
N= (380) (343) (299) (223) (119) (159)
Levels of education:
A: Compulsory education only.
B: 1-2 years of further education.
C: 3-5 years of further education; vocational training for 
manual jobs (e.g. tradesmen, ship captains, etc.).
D: 3-5 years of education; general, commercial, vocational 
training for non-manual jobs.
E: University education.
F: Students.
For base of dependent variable see Table V I .1.2.
VI.3 Class, occupation, public or private sector
Most modern party systems in Europe have been heavily 
influenced by class. The development of the working class 
movement and Social Democratic or Labour parties, which 
largely got their support from the working class, was among 
the most important political changes in the early twentieth
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century. In America, where the working class movement
differed greatly from what was common in Europe, class
nevertheless had its impact on voting behaviour. In 1960
Lipset described the general tendency in class voting thus:
The most important single fact about political 
party support is that in virtually every 
economically developed country the lower 
income groups vote mainly for the parties of 
the Left, while the higher income groups vote 
mainly for the parties of the R i g h t . 54)
The fact that class is usually not defined by income need 
not concern us here. Lipset is simply arguing that some 
basic economic situation was important for voting choice. 
Definitions of class vary and they are related to different 
class t h e o r i e s .55) Different definitions of class can have 
an important impact on the extent of class voting shown in 
empirical studies. One of the problems of cross-national 
comparisons is that scholars rarely use exactly the same 
definitions and the more sophisticated the analysis becomes 
for one country the less likely we are to find similar 
analyses for other countries.
The most commonly used measure to compare class voting is 
a very simple index presented in 1963 by Robert Alford in 
his book Party and Society, usually referred to as "the 
Alford index" or simply "the index for class voting". The 
index is based on two dichotomies: working class (manual)
and middle class (non-manual) on the one hand and left-wing 
parties (often socialist parties) and non-left parties on 
the other. The value of the index is simply calculated by 
subtracting the percentage of middle class voting left from 
the percentage working class voting left (including only
54) S.M. Lipset (1960), pp. 223-224.
55) See e.g. D. Robertson (1984), pp. 3-13.
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those who give the party supported or voted for) .56) while 
this index has been criticized^^) and is obviously not well 
suited to describe the complexities of the relationship 
between economic situation and voting in individual 
countries, it is nevertheless useful as a rough measure of 
comparison.
Class voting has always varied greatly among countries. 
An average index for the post-war period in the four 
English-speaking democracies that Alford studied shows 
strong class voting in Britain (41%) and Australia (34%), 
while it has been much lower in the USA (16%) and in Canada
(8%).5 8 )
56) See D. Robertson (1984), pp. 18-20.
57) A. Heath et al. (1985, p. 41) claim for instance: 
"Unfortunately, the Alford index is inappropriate as a 
measure of relative class alignment since it confuses 
relative with overall support. Suppose, for example, that 
Labour support among manual voters fell to 33 per cent while 
support among nonmanual fell to zero. On the Alford index 
this would give a score of 33 points, less than in 1945, but 
surely we would want to say that such a situation where 
Labour drew all its votes from the working class represented 
a much higher degree of class alignment than in 1945." Are 
we so sure? What if a socialist party obtains 5% of manual 
votes, but none from non-manuals? Is that a strong class 
alignment? Their relative class support refers really to the 
class composition of each party's vote; not the party 
destination of class vote. In most of the post-war period 
the Labour party has clearly had a clearer class profile 
than the Conservatives in the sense that they got ca. 75-80% 
of their vote from the working class, while working-class 
votes constituted almost half of the Conservative vote. (See 
Sarlvik and Crewe (1983), p. 90). The middle class was on 
the other hand more class conscious in the sense that it 
usually gave Labour only ca. 20-25% of its vote, while the 
Conservatives obtained ca. 30-35% of the working class vote. 
Both facts are important when we consider class alignment. 
More to the point is the criticism that overall loss for 
Labour is likely to deflate the Alford index even though the 
loss is of the same proportion in both classes (p. 31). If 
Labour gets 60% of manuals and 20% of non-manuals in 
Election A, the index value is 40. If Labour loses 20% of 
its support in both classes in Election B its support among 
manuals is 48% and 16% among non-manuals, giving a score of 
32 on the Alford index.
58) See D. Robertson (1984), Table 1.2, p. 21.
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Class voting also varies with time. In recent decades
there has been a general decline in class voting as measured
by the Alford index. In USA class voting was stronger in the
1930s and 1940s, culminating in 1948 (ca.43%) but has been
low and somewhat fluctuating since the 1950s (from almost
zero (in 1972) to 15-20%). In West Germany the Alford index
showed 30-35% in the 1950s but had declined to ca. 10-15% in
the early 1980s.59) in Britain the index score was usually
around 40% 1955-1966 but was down to 25-33% in 1970-1983.^0)
A dramatic decline has taken place in Scandinavia, where
class voting has been among the highest in the world for the
whole post-war period - and still is. Ole Borre, describing
class voting in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, concludes that
There is a rather steady drop in class voting, 
from an index value of around 55 percent in 
the 1950s to around 45 percent in the 1960s 
and further to the level of 40 to 45 percent 
in the 1970s, finally decreasing to the 35
percent level by 1980.51)
Despite the decline in class voting - which in the case 
of Britain has been disputed by Heath et a i . 52) -  class, and
59) R. Inglehart (1984), pp. 29-30.
60) D. Robertson (1984), gives the figures for 1955-1979 
(Table 1.3, p. 26). For 1983, see Heath et ai. (1985), Table 
3.1, p. 30 (Labour got 17% of non-manuals, 42% of manuals). 
Robertson also calculates the Alford index for 1964-79, 
including those who did not vote in the base figures (Table 
1.4, p. 28). This measure gives a value of 35% in 1964 and 
1966, 24-29% 1970-1974 and 22% in 1979. The table also 
reveals that while the Labour vote has been 20-22% the whole 
period, its share in the working class has dropped from 55- 
57% 1964-1966 to 42% in 1979. Less than half of the manuals 
have voted Labour in all elections in the 1970s when non­
voters are taken into account.
61) 0. Borre (1984), p. 352.
62) While they agree that the absolute level of class voting 
has declined, i.e. the overall proportion of the electorate 
voting for its "natural" party has decreased from 60-67% in 
the 1945-1970 period to 54-55% 1974-1979 and 47% in 1983, 
they claim this is not as important a measure of class based 
politics as is relative class voting, measured by odds 
ratios ( (% non-manual voting Conservative/% non-manual 
voting Labour)/(% manual voting Conservative/% manual voting
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various class related groupings, are still important for 
voting behaviour in Britain and Scandinavia. Class voting as 
measured by the Alford index is still relatively high 
compared to other countries: pooled results from surveys in 
the nine EC-countries 1973-1979 gave an Alford index of 18%. 
And a more detailed analysis - based on a greater number of 
classes or occupational groups - shows that such a group 
membership still correlates highly with voting. We can 
briefly look at two examples from countries where class 
voting has been strong, Britain and Sweden, before we 
examine the impact of class and class-related factors on 
Icelandic voting.
Heath et ai. claim that while the six social grades 
scheme conventionally used in British electoral research, 
focusing on income and life-style, may be appropriate for 
market research it is of limited political relevance. 
Instead they develop a classification of five classes based 
on economic interests: salariat, routine non-manual, petty
bourgeoisie, foremen and technicians, and the working class. 
The most important innovation in their scheme is probably 
the class of the petty bourgeoisie, consisting of farmers, 
small proprietors and own-account manual workers. In the 
social grades scheme those occupations were dispersed across 
the A to D grades but, while the group is small, it is very 
distinct and homogeneous in political values and behaviour. 
The petty bourgeoisie is for instance more supportive of 
free-enterprise values than any other class.
Labour). Those odds ratios show no consistent trend in the 
1945-1983 period. (See A. Heath et al. (1985), pp. 31-34). 
Those results and the use of odd ratios have been criticized 
for instance by P. Dunleavy (1987) .
63) A. Heath et ai. (1985), pp. 13-19.
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The voting behaviour of those five classes was quite 
different in 1983. The Conservatives got 71% of the petty 
bourgeoisie vote, 30% of the working class vote and 46-54% 
in the three remaining groups. Labour obtained 49% of the 
working class vote, 25-26% among routine non-manual and 
foremen and technicians, 14% in the salariat and 12% in the 
petty bourgeoisie. The Alliance was strongest among the
salariat (31%) and routine non-manual (27%), but weakest 
among the working class (20%) and the petty bourgeoisie 
(1 7 %).64) Class is obviously still not unimportant in 
British voting.
Class is also still important in Sweden. In 1976-1985 the 
Social Democrats got 68-75% of the votes of industrial 
workers, 58-62% of other workers, 42-44% of lower non­
manuals, 34-37% of intermediary non-manuals, 20-24% of 
higher managerial and administrative, 19-24% of small
businessmen and 6-13% of farmers. The Conservatives got 3-7% 
of industrial workers, 6-13% of other workers, 36-46% of 
higher managerial and administrative and 11-23% among
farmers. The Conservatives' following among small 
businessmen jumped from 25% in 1976 to 40-43% in 1979-1985. 
In 1985 the Conservatives' support was strongest in this 
group (43%) - 7 percentage points stronger than among the
higher managerial and administrative group. The class
profiles of the other parties tended to be weaker, except
64) A. Heath et al. (1985), p. 20. D. Robertson (1984, pp. 
45-49) also notes that the strongest support for the 
Conservative Party in 1979 was among owners of small 
enterprises and self-employed professionals (63%) and the 
manual own-account workers (60%).
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that the Centre Party obtained 65-70% of the farmers' 
vote.G5)
Using ecological analysis Svanur Kristjansson has tried 
to estimate class voting in Iceland in elections from 1931- 
1 9 4 2 .6 6 ) According to his figures the socialist parties 
obtained 73-83% of the manual vote in this period, while the 
socialist vote among non-manuals was only 10-16% in 1931- 
1937 and 5-6% in the two 1942 elections - resulting in 
extremely high figures on the Alford index (57-77%) . While 
the estimates of socialist voting among manuals are clearly 
too high,G7) thus strongly inflating the values of the 
Alford index, this does not affect Kristjansson's main 
conclusion that in stark contrast to Scandinavia the 
proportion of manual workers voting for non-socialist 
parties was considerably higher than the proportion of non­
manuals voting for socialist parties. While Kristjansson's 
calculations for 1946-1953 continue to show very high 
figures on the Alford index (75-80%), a sharp decline (to 
49%) can be observed in 1 9 5 9 .6 8 )
In our 1983 survey we asked our respondents what party 
their fathers and mothers had mainly supported when the 
respondents were growing up. We also asked about the 
occupation of their parents at that time. Almost 70% of our 
respondents gave party and occupation of their fathers.69)
65) See S. Holmberg and M. Gill jam (1987), Table 9.10, p.
181.
6 6 ) S. Kristjansson (1977), pp. 63-70.
67) See O.Th. Hardarson (1979), p. 47.
6 8 ) O.Th. Hardarson (1981), p. 7. The 1959 June election is 
the last one for which ecological calculations can be made, 
as after that the number of constituencies was reduced to 
eight. Calculations for the 1956 election are not possible 
because of the SDP-PP electoral alliance.
69) When asked about mother's occupation 62% said their 
mother was a housewife and 1 1 % that she was a farmer's wife.
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While such data is obviously prone to error, it is of great 
interest to examine if class voting among the respondents' 
fathers is similar to what Kristjansson's ecological 
analysis gives. Table VI.3.2 gives the support for each of 
the four main parties among the respondents' fathers as 
reported in 1983, broken down by respondents' age cohorts.
Table V I .3.2. Party usually supported by fathers of 
respondents in different age cohorts. 1983 total sample
1901-20
Respondent's year of birth 
1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-63 Total
Father's party 
CP/USP/PA 1 9 12 11 15 11
SDP 17 12 26 17 13 16
PP 38 32 26 26 23 28
IP 44 48 37 47 49 46
Total 100 101 101 101 100 101
N= (97) (103) (104) (161) (214) (679)
If we assume that the bulk of fathers are 20-45 at birth 
of their children and that the respondents are in fact 
accurately reporting their father's party affiliation during 
the respondents' adolescence, the figures in Table VI.3.2 
should, roughly tell us the voting behaviours of fathers aged 
30/35-55/60 years old, 10-15 years after the respondents 
birth. They indicate, for instance, that only 1% of the 
fathers of the first cohort voted for the CP in the 1915- 
1935 period. While there is no way to check the accuracy of 
the figures, we can roughly compare them to election results 
in the p e r i o d . ^0) on the whole the figures look rather 
credible. The low figures for the Communist Party in the 
first two cohorts accurately reflect the fact that the party
Therefore we only use fathers in our analysis of class 
voting here.
70) Even if the figures were completely correct they should 
only match election results for a corresponding period if 
the fathers voted exactly like the rest of the electorate.
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first put up candidates in 1931 and obtained only 3-9% in 
elections 1931-37. The CP/USP/PA following in later cohorts 
seems on the other hand underestimated as the party usually 
obtained 16-18% of the vote after 1942. The IP vote seems on 
the other hand somewhat overestimated in most cohorts/ for 
the whole period its support was around 38-42%. Thus the
total socialist vote is probably somewhat too low in the 
later cohorts.
In Table VI.3.3 we have divided the fathers into two
groups according to when their responding children were 
born. Even though the groups overlap in time to some extent, 
the former group should be more representative of class
voting in the party system from the 1920s to the early 1950s 
and the latter from the 1950s to the 1970s.
Table VI.3.3 reveals a clear decline in class voting. The 
Alford index for the older fathers shows +38, for the
younger fathers +21 and for the respondents themselves in 
1983 and 1987 only +11 and +10. While the limitations of the 
data on earlier voting should be borne in mind, it clearly 
suggests that class voting in Iceland in the 1930s and 1940s 
was quite strong - similar to Britain but not as strong as 
in Scandinavia - grew weaker in the late 1950s to 1970s, and 
had become very weak in the 1980s. The declining class 
voting is both a result of declining socialist vote among 
manual workers and increasing socialist vote among non­
manuals .
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Table VI.3.3. Class voting of respondents' fathers in
respondents' youth (as reported in 1983) and respondents
1983 and 1987. Percentages . Total samples.
Fathers ' vote Respondents ' vote
(reported 1983)
Respondent born
1901-40 1941-63 1983 1987
Man- Non- Man- Non- Man- Non- Man­ Non­
uals man. uals man. uals man. uals man
CP/USP/PA 12 4 18 8 19 14 15 11
SDP 34 5 20 9 14 9 19 13
PP 6 54 16 33 16 18 17 18
IP 48 38 47 49 37 45 26 34
WA 4 8 8 15
SDA 10 7
CiP 10 6
Others 6 4
Total 100 101 101 99 100 101 101 101
N= (137) (166) (200) (174) (355) (364) (604) (682)
Percentage socialist
(CP/USP/PA,SDP) 46 8 38 17 34 23 33 23
Alford index + 38 + 21 + 11 + 10
Manual=Seamen, unskilled and skilled manual workers
Non-manual=Farmers, lower non-manual. professionals , skilled
non-manuals, employers, higher managerial and
administrative •
The Alford index of 38% in Table VI.3.3 is only half of 
the figure indicated by Kristjansson's ecological analysis, 
mainly because of much lower socialist vote among manuals. 
The ecological analysis on the other hand shows a similar 
trend in the reduction of the Alford index values from 57- 
80% in the 1931-1953 period to 49% in 1959. Both sets of 
data also clearly indicate that the non-socialist vote among 
manuals far exceeded the socialist vote among non-manuals.
In general the class voting profiles of the two socialist 
parties in Table VT.3.3 are similar. Only among the fathers 
of the older cohort does a clear distinction emerge: while 
the CP/USP support is three times greater among manual than
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non-manual workers, the SDP's manual support is seven times 
stronger than its non-manual support. This stronger working 
class profile of the SDP compared to the CP/USP/PA has on 
the other hand all but disappeared among the fathers of the 
younger cohort and among voters in the 1980s.
The PP support among the manual older fathers is very 
weak, only 6%, but in the younger groups it is 16-17%. 
Somewhat astonishing is on the other hand the fact that in 
the older fathers' cohort the IP is 10% stronger among 
manuals than among non-manuals and while this trend is 
reversed among the younger groups, the party's support among 
the working class is only 2-8% weaker than in the middle 
class. To some extent this is a reflection of the fact that 
farmers are included among the non-manuals. As Table VI.3.4 
shows, farmers' voting behaviour was very distinct from that 
of other non-manuals as well as manuals for the whole 
period.
The data suggests that an overwhelming majority of 
farmers has voted for the PP since the formation of the 
modern party system. Among fathers 59-64% of the farmers are 
reported to have supported the PP.^l) in 1983 58% of farmers 
voted for the party and its lower share of 48% in 1987 is 
mainly due to the success of the new regional parties 
(mainly the NP and the URE) in the farming community that 
year. While the party gets 40% of other non-manuals among 
the older fathers, its support in this group is much lower 
among the younger fathers (16%) and the respondents
71) An ecological analysis of the PP's vote indicates that 
from the 1920s to 1959, the party polled 60-80% among 
farmers, except in the mid-1950s when its support dropped to 
50% due to the PP split that resulted in the short-lived 
Farmers' Party. See G.H. Kristinsson (1991), pp. 211-213.
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themselves (11-12%). In the 1980s elections the party is 5 
percentage points stronger among manual workers than among 
non-manuals outside farming.
Table VI.3 .4. Party supported by respondents' fathers in
respondents' youth (as reported in 1983) and respondents
vote in 1983 and 1987 among farmers, other non-manual
workers and manual workers. Total samples. Percentages •
Father's party (reported 1983)
Respondent's father born
1901-1940 1941-1963
Farmers Other Man­ Farmers Other Man­
non-man. uals non-man. uals
CP/USP/PA 2 8 12 6 9 18
SDP 4 6 34 3 13 20
PP 59 40 6 64 16 16
IP 35 46 48 27 62 47
Total 100 100 100 100 100 101
N= (118) (48) (137) (63) (111) (200)
Percentage socialist
(CP/USP/PA,. SDP) 6 15 46 8 22 38
Alford's index
(EXCLUDING farmers) + 31 + 16
Respondents' vote
1983 1987
Farmers Other Man­ Farmers Other Man­
non-man. uals non-man. uals
PA 8 15 19 7 12 15
SDP 4 10 14 2 15 19
PP 58 11 16 48 12 17
IP 30 48 37 23 36 26
WA 0 9 4 4 16 8
SDA 0 8 10
CiP 5 7 10
Others 11 3 6
Total 100 101 100 100 101 101
N= (50) (314) (355) (101) (581) (604)
Percentage socialist
(PA, SDP) 12 25 34 9 26 33
Alford's index
(EXCLUDING farmers) + 9 + 7
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The IP's following among farmers is rather similar in our 
four groups: 27-35% among fathers and 1983 voters, but
dropping to 23% in the party's disastrous 1987 election. 
Among our older fathers the IP is still 2% stronger among 
manuals than non-manuals outside farming, mainly because of 
the strong showing of the PP in the latter group. In other 
groups we get on the other hand the expected relationship: 
manual support for the IP is weaker than among non-farming 
non-manuals among younger fathers (-15) and voters both in 
1983 (-11) and 1987 (-10). For most of the period the IP
thus seems to have been weakest among farmers, stronger 
among manual workers and strongest among non-manuals outside 
the farming community. It should nevertheless be underlined, 
that the party's working class support is very impressive 
even if compared to Britain's Conservatives, not to mention 
their Scandinavian counterparts.
The socialist parties enjoy the least support among 
farmers in all groups, less than among other non-manuals. 
The USP/PA has nevertheless clearly had a greater appeal to 
farmers than the SDP. If we calculate an Alford index 
excluding farmers class voting tends to be somewhat lower 
than when farmers are included, especially among fathers. 
The general trend is nevertheless the same, a sharp decline 
in class voting.
In our calculations of class voting the new parties in 
1983 and 1987 have been counted with the non-socialist 
parties. Their class profiles are nevertheless of interest. 
The WA, obviously furthest to the left of those parties, is 
like many green or protest parties of the 1980s clearly a 
middle class party both in 1983 and 1987. The SDA, the anti-
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establishment party of liberal social democrats, had a 
slight class profile in 1983, except that it had no support 
among farmers. The CiP in 1987 was stronger among the 
working class than the middle class, while the small 
regional parties appealed most strongly to farmers.
We have already mentioned that the manual/non-manual 
division is a crude one; it can in fact hide as much as it 
reveals if the groups within each class are heterogeneous. 
In the remainder of this section we will examine the 
relationship of other class-related variables to voting 
behaviour.
Table VI.3.5 gives vote by occupation. We use a 7-fold 
occupational scale. All farmers and seamen are included in 
their occupational c a t e g o r i e s , ^2) while employers are 
included in the category employers and higher managerial and 
administrative along with higher management jobs, both in 
public and private employment. Unskilled manual workers 
include e.g. workers in the fishing industry, construction 
and industry, and some service occupations like cleaning and 
catering. Skilled manuals are tradesmen and drivers, many of 
them self-employed, police officers and foremen. Lower non­
manuals includes routine clerical and commercial jobs. 
Professionals and skilled non-manuals include university 
educated professionals like physicians and lawyers, but also 
occupations where only some have a university education, 
like teachers, nurses and artists.
72) Including a few who hire labour.
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Table VI.3.5. Party voted for 1983 and 1987 by occupation. 
Total samples. Percentages.
Farm­ Sea­ Unsk. Sk. Lo. Pro. Emp. House
ers men man. man. non. sk .n. hi .m. wl ves
Fathers 4 27 33 21 13 19 1 —
SDP 1983 4 11 17 13 11 10 9 17
1987 2 15 16 23 16 15 12 16
Fathers 61 11 17 10 23 32 20 -
PP 1983 58 21 13 16 15 7 9 15
1987 48 20 16 18 15 10 11 15
Fathers 32 50 30 54 54 39 65 -
IP 1983 30 32 35 41 44 37 64 52
1987 23 27 24 28 30 24 57 29
Fathers 3 11 20 16 10 10 8 —
PA 1983 8 30 18 18 13 21 10 9
1987 7 21 16 . 10 10 18 7 12
WA 1983 0 2 6 2 7 17 3 5
1987 4 5 13 4 17 26 5 16
SDA 1983 0 5 12 10 10 7 4 2
CiP 1987 5 6 10 12 8 4 7 7
0th 1987 11 6 5 6 3 4 1 4
TOTAL :
Fathers 100 99 100 101 100 100 101 -
N= (181) (114) (76) (147) (39) (31) (89) -
1983 100 101 101 100 100 99 99 100
N= (50) (44) (159) (152) (131) (93) (90) (93)
1987 100 100 100 101 99 101 100 99
N= (101) (88) (284) (231) (247) (172) (162) (103)
The decline of class voting is clearly reflected in the 
voting behaviour of the seven occupational categories. Among 
the fathers all four of the old parties have clear profiles, 
and their support differs greatly in the various 
occupations. In 1983 and 1987 the differences, in general, 
are much smaller. Only three outstanding deviations remain 
in the 1980s: the extremely weak position of the SDP among 
farmers and the overwhelming support that the PP enjoys 
among farmers and the IP among employers and higher
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managerial and administrative. But while the occupational 
differences in voting have generally become weak, some of 
the old patterns nevertheless remain, as can clearly be seen 
in Table V I . 3 .6.^3) Some changes of the old patterns that 
have taken place are also of great interest.
Table VI.3.6. Ranking of occupations within each party by 
strength of support for that party. Fathers, voters 1983 and 
voters 1987. Total samples. Percentage supporting party 
within each category in brackets.
Fathers
CP/USP/PA
Voters 1983 Voters 198 7
Unsk man (20) 
Sk man (16) 
Seamen (11)
Lo non-man 
Prof (10) 
Empl/manag 
Farmers (3)
(10)
(8 )
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
SDP 
1 .
2 .
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
7.
PP 
1 .
2 .
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
7.
IP
1. Empl/manag (65)
2. Lo non-man (54)
3. Sk man (54)
4. Seamen (50)
5. Prof (39)
6. Farmers (32)
7. Unsk man (30)
Unsk man (33) 
Seamen (27)
Sk man (21)
Prof (19)
Lo non-man (13) 
Empl/manag (7) 
Farmers (4)
Farmers (61) 
Prof (32)
Lo non-man (23) 
Empl/manag (20) 
Unsk man (17) 
Seamen (11)
Sk man (10)
1. Seamen (30) 1. Seamen (21)
2. Prof (21) 2. Prof (18)
3. Sk man (18) 3. Unsk man (16)
4 . Unsk man (18) 4 . Lo non-man (10)
5. Lo non-man (13) 5. Sk man (10)
6. Empl/manag (10) 6. Farmers (7)
7. Farmers (8) 7 . Empl/manag (7)
1 . Unsk man (17) 1 . Sk man (23)
2. Sk man (13) 2. Unsk man (16)
3. Seamen (11) 3. Lo man-man (16)
4. Lo non-man (11) 4 . Prof (15)
5. Prof (10) 5. Seamen (15)
6. Empl/manag (9) 6. Empl/manag (12)
7. Farmers (4) 7 . Farmers (2)
1 . Farmers (58) 1 . Farmers (48)
2. Seamen (21) 2. Seamen (20)
3. Sk man (16) 3. Sk man (18)
4 . Lo non-man (15) 4 . Unsk man (16)
5. Unsk man (13) 5. Lo non-man (15)
6. Empl/manag (9) 6. Empl/manag (11)
7. Prof (7) 7. Prof (10)
1. Empl/mang (64) 1 . Empl/manag (57)
2. Lo non-man (44) 2. Lo non-man (30)
3. Sk man (41) 3. Sk man (28)
4 . Prof (37) 4 . Seamen (27)
5. Unsk man (35) 5. Unsk man (24)
6. Seamen (32) 6. Prof (24)
7. Farmers (30) 7. Farmers (23)
When the same percentages are shown for two occupations the 
ranking order has been determined by the decimal fractions.
73) Table VI.3.6 gives the same information as Table VI.3.5 
in a simpler form, but only for the four old parties.
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The occupational profile of the CP/USP/PA among fathers 
is weaker than the profiles of the other old parties but the 
party was clearly strongest among skilled and unskilled 
manual workers, considerably weaker among seamen and those 
in non-manual occupations, and very weak among farmers. In 
both of the elections in the 1980s the party was, on the 
other hand, strongest among seamen and professionals and 
skilled non-manuals. The party remained relatively strong 
among unskilled manual workers in both elections and 
continued to be weakest among farmers and the group of 
employers and higher managerial and administrative 
occupations. The party's farming support was nevertheless 
considerably stronger among voters in the 1980s than it had 
been among the fathers. The party's strength among seamen in 
the 1980s may to some extent be a result of PA's emphasis on 
the periphery and regional policy or to the tough stand the 
party took on extending the fishery limits. Its strong 
showing among professionals and skilled non-manuals, many of 
whom work in the public sector, is an example of the new 
left middle class radicalism in Iceland which also is 
manifested in the following of the WA.
The SDP has maintained its working class character to a 
greater degree than the PA. While the party's occupational 
profile had become much weaker in the 1980s, the SDP still 
enjoyed its greatest support among skilled and unskilled 
manual workers but the party had lost its strong support 
among seamen. The party is consistently weak among employers 
and the higher managerial and administrative occupations and 
very weak among farmers.
347
The profile of the PP has changed considerably. While the 
party is consistently very strong among farmers, it has 
become more working class. Among the fathers the PP was 
clearly stronger among non-manuals than among skilled and 
unskilled manual workers and seamen. In the 1980s the 
party's strongest support - outside the farming sector - 
came from seamen and skilled manual workers and was somewhat 
weaker among unskilled manuals and lower non-manuals. Both 
in 1983 and 1987 the PP was clearly weakest among employers 
and higher managerial and administrative occupations on the 
one hand and among professionals and skilled non-manuals on 
the other. This occupational profile fits the strong 
educational profile of the PP; we observed earlier (Table 
VI.2.1) that the PP is much stronger among those with little 
education. Those characteristics of the party fit the fact 
that the party is weak in "the new economy" in Reykjavik and 
the Southwest but strong in "the old economy" in the 
regions.
The IP has been successful in maintaining its very strong 
support among employers and the higher managerial and 
administrative occupations. The differences in the party's 
support among other occupations were on the other hand much 
smaller in the 1980s - especially in 1987 - than among the 
fathers. The lower non-manuals continued to be the IP's 
second strongest occupation. Among the fathers the IP was 
surprisingly strong among seamen and skilled manual workers, 
while the party was weakest among farmers and unskilled 
workers. The gap between skilled and unskilled manual 
workers remained in the 1980s but narrowed considerably. The 
skilled manual workers continued to be the IP's third
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strongest occupation, while the IP continued to be rather 
weak among unskilled manual workers and farmers. Somewhat 
surprising is the relatively weak position of the party 
among professionals and skilled non-manuals. On the whole, 
the profile of the IP does not follow the manual/non-manual 
divide neatly.
Table VI. 3.5 shows that the strong showing of the WA 
among non-manuals is most pronounced among professionals and 
skilled non-manuals. The party is also relatively strong 
among lower non-manuals and unskilled workers but weak in 
other occupations. We will later examine, if this is to some 
extent simply due to different male/female ratios inside the 
occupations. There are some similarities in the occupational 
profiles of the SDA in 1983 and CiP in 1987; both parties 
are strongest among manual and lower non-manual workers.
Table VI.3.7 shows a further breakdown of voting 
behaviour within the working class. It has to be borne in 
mind that the number of respondents in some of the groups is 
really too small for any serious analysis. Two things of 
interest can nevertheless be pointed out. First, in both 
elections in the 1980s the SDP is stronger among workers in 
the fish industry, construction and other industries than 
among service workers, while the reverse is true for the WA. 
Second, among the fathers the IP enjoys extremely high 
support of foremen, police officers and drivers while its 
support among tradesmen is lower, even though it is 
considerably higher than among unskilled workers. In the 
1980s foremen and police officers remained the IP's 
stronghold in the working class and tradesmen supported the 
party to a greater extent than unskilled workers.
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Table VI.3.7. Party voted for 1983 and 1987 by occupation: 
Manual workers. Total sample. Percentages.
Unskilled manual Skilled manual
Fish
industry
Industry 
constr.
Services Foremen,
police
Drivers Trades­
men
Fathers 30 40 31 17 8 28
SDP 1983 22 19 14 0 16 15
1987 26 19 12 9 19 27
Fathers 40 7 16 17 8 8
PP 1983 17 16 11 16 28 13
1987 12 22 15 23 34 12
Fathers 20 33 31 63 69 45
IP 1983 31 30 38 56 34 40
1987 26 23 23 37 23 28
Fathers 10 20 22 4 14 20
PA 1983 19 14 19 16 9 21
1987 16 16 17 20 2 10
WA 1983 3 5 7 0 3 2
1987 5 8 18 0 5 4
SDA 1983 8 16 12 12 9 10
CiP 1987 10 10 10 6 11 14
Others 1987 6 2 5 6 7 6
Tot.fathers 100 100 100 101 99 101
N= (10) (15) (51) (24) (36) (87)
Total 1983 100 100 101 100 99 101
N= (36) (37) (86) (25) (32) (95)
Total 1987 101 100 100 101 101 101
N= (63) (60) (161) (35) (43) (154)
Table VI.3.8 gives a further breakdown of the non­
manuals. We have divided professionals and skilled non­
manuals into three groups. Despite the far too low number of
respondents in some groups, a clear difference emerges 
between the professionals on the one hand and "the caring 
professions" - i.e. teachers, nurses and similar occupations 
- on the other. The reason for the low share of the IP among 
professionals and skilled non-manuals that we observed
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earlier is the party's weak standing in the caring 
professions. The party is on the other hand as strong among 
professionals as among lower non-manuals but considerably 
weaker than among employers and higher managerial.
Table VI.3.8. Party voted for 1983 and 1987 by occupation: 
Non-manual workers. Total samples. Percentages.
Lower Nursesf Teachers Profess­ Employers
noL\-man. etc. ionals hi.manag.
Fathers 13 — 14 24 1
SDP 1983 11 14 13 5 9
1987 16 18 15 13 12
Fathers 23 — 50 18 20
PP 1983 15 5 13 5 9
1987 15 9 13 7 11
Fathers 54 — 29 47 65
IP 1983 44 36 19 50 64
1987 30 18 15 35 57
Fathers 10 — 7 12 8
PA 1983 13 27 23 18 10
1987 10 21 15 20 7
WA 1983 7 14 19 18 3
1987 17 32 30 19 5
SDA 1983 10 5 13 5 4
CiP 1987 8 0 7 3 7
Others 1987 3 2 5 3 1
Tot.fathers 100 — 100 101 100
N= (39) (0) (14) (17) (89)
Total 1983 100 101 100 101 99
N= (131) (22) (31) (40) (90)
Total 1987 99 100 100 100 100
N= (247) (44) (60) (68) (162)
The PA and the WA are exceptionally strong among the
caring professions, the PA being the stronger of the two in 
1983 but having clearly lost first place to the WA in 1987. 
In 1983 the parties obtained jointly 41% of the votes of 
nurses, etc. while this figure rose to 53% in 1987. The
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parties obtained 42-45% of teachers' votes in those 
elections. While the parties were not quite as strong among 
professionals in the 1980s elections, they nevertheless got 
36-39% of the votes in that group.
A further note is needed on the occupational profile of 
the WA. Is the occupational profile of the party - which 
gets around 80% of its votes from women - simply a 
reflection of the fact that women are more numerous in some 
occupations than others? Table VI.3.8 gives the WA, share of 
votes among males and females in different occupations and 
while some of the groups are too small to be of any 
significance, the table on the whole nevertheless gives a 
reasonably clear answer to the question.
Table VI.3. 8. The WA s share of votes in 1983 and 1987 by
sex and occupation. Total samples. Percentages •
Men Women
1983 1987 1983 1987
% % N % % N
Farmers 0 0 (38/62) 0 11 (12/37)
Seamen 2 5 (43/88) 0 0 (1/0)
Unskilled manuals 2 8 (61/110) 8 16 (98/174)
-Fish industry 0 6 (9/16) 4 4 (27/47)
-0th ind,construct 4 8 (25/48) 8 8 (12/12)
-Services 0 9 (27/47) 10 22 (59/114)
Skilled manuals 1 2 (145/215) 14 25 (7/16)
Lower non-manuals 3 4 (39/72) 9 23 (92/174)
Prof, skilled non-man 13 15 (48/69) 22 34 (45/103)
-Nurses etc. 0 0 (2/0) 15 32 (20/44)
-Teachers 6 16 (18/25) 39 40 (13/35)
-Professionals 18 14 (28/44) 17 29 (12/24)
Empl,hi manag 1 2 (77/128) 15 15 (13/34)
On the whole, the occupational profile of the WA is not
simply a reflection of the male/female ratio in the
different occupations. Women in non-manual jobs are in
general more supportive of the WA than are women in manual
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jobs. The male/female ratio is nevertheless not without 
consequences.
As in the electorate in general, the WA is weakest among 
women in the primary industries, farming and the fishing 
industry, where the party obtained only 4% of women's votes 
both in 1983 and 1987. The party is stronger among women in 
unskilled manual service jobs and lower non-manual jobs, 
obtaining 9-10% of the votes in 1983 and 22-23% in 1987. The 
very few women in skilled manual occupations show similar 
support for the party; if those figures can be trusted the 
very low overall figure for the WA among skilled manuals is 
a function of the domination of men in this category.
The strong position of the WA among professionals and the 
caring professions is on the other hand clearly not a 
reflection of the gender ratio. Those groups show the 
strongest support for the WA in 1983 and 1987, both among 
men and women. The WA gets less support from the few women 
in higher managerial and administrative jobs, especially in 
1987, but the difference is not as great as the overall 
figures indicate, as the party gets virtually no support 
from men in the heavily dominated male category.
Table VI.3.9 gives voting behaviour by another class- 
related measure: a division between employers, self-employed 
and employees. Employers are the most homogeneous - or class 
conscious - economic group yet encountered. Among fathers 
82% of employers voted for the IP. In 1983 the IP got 71% of 
the employers' vote, but the lower figure of 57% in 1987 
should be interpreted in the light of the heavy losses of 
the IP in that election.
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Table VI.3.9. Party voted for 1983 and 1987 by occupational 
status. Total samples. Percentages.
Employers Self-employed Employees
All NOT in All Priv. Publ. Co-ops
agricult. sect. sect.
Fathers 5 7 19 24 na na na
SDP 1983 7 10 14 13 17 9 9
1987 10 9 15 17 21 13 18
Fathers 8 50 17 18 na na na
PP 1983 7 41 17 14 12 11 30
1987 14 36 24 15 14 14 23
Fathers 82 37 50 44 na na na
IP 1983 71 31 36 40 42 37 30
1987 57 23 24 28 30 24 28
Fathers 5 6 15 14 na na na
PA 1983 7 12 19 18 15 22 20
1987 4 9 10 14 12 19 13
WA 1983 3 2 6 6 4 11 4
1987 6 5 7 13 10 20 5
SDA 1983 5 4 8 10 10 10 7
CiP 1987 8 8 10 8 10 7 8
Others 1987 2 11 9 4 4 4 6
Tot. fath. 100 100 101 100
(62) (231) (54) (381)
Total 1983 100 100 100 101 100 100 100
N= (59) (83) (36) (578) (250) (227) (70)
Total 1987 101 101 99 99 101 101 101
N= (120) (147) (71) (1007) (502) (384) (86)
As farmers constitute a large part of the self-employed
the PP is strong in this group. If we exclude farmers from
this category a different picture emerges. The voting 
behviour of the self-employed outside farming, largely 
consisting of own-account manual workers, is on the whole 
rather similar to that of employees. Among fathers the IP is 
somewhat stronger in this group than among employees, 
although somewhat weaker in the elections of the 1980s. The
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tendency of the "petty bourgeoisie" to vote heavily 
conservative in Britain and Sweden discussed earlier in this 
section is clearly absent in Iceland.
Another class-related division which has received
increasing attention in recent years is that between the
public and private sectors. The public sector has grown
considerably in the last few decades in most Western
democracies. Recently this growth and the expansion of the
welfare state have increasingly been criticized, especially
on the right wing of the political spectrum. Thus it is not
unreasonable to expect those who earn their living in the
public sector to be more likely to support the left.
The emphasis here is on the growth of welfare 
state occupations like teaching, nursing and 
social work which are funded through taxation. 
Correspondingly, their members are seen to 
have a greater interest, like the working 
class, in government intervention in the 
economy and government spending on the welfare 
services. )
Hans Zetterberg puts the point more bluntly - arguing 
that increasing sectorial voting, which was not previously 
strong in Sweden, was the reason for the Social Democrat 
victories in 1982 and 1985. Zetterberg claims that "the 
great conflict in society now is not only - or mainly - a 
class struggle but a sectorial struggle, a struggle over 
resources between the private and the public sector". Voters 
dependent on the public sector can hardly be expected to 
"bite the hand that feeds t h e m " . ^ 5 )
Zetterberg's claims are greatly overstated in light of 
the empirical evidence. In 1985 the Social Democrats and the
74) A. Heath et ai. (1985), p. 58.
75) H. Zetterberg, Sifo Indicator (1985), quoted in S. 
Holmberg and M. Gill jam (1987), p. 191. My translation.
355
Communists obtained 52% of the votes in the public sector 
and 46% in the private sector. The Conservatives got 24% in 
the private sector and 15% in the public sector. An 
inclusion of welfare clients, such as pensioners and long­
term hospitalized or unemployed, in the public sector only 
marginally increases the differences. The difference in 
voting for the Social Democrats and the Communists in the 
public and the private sector was +2 in 1976, +5 in 1979, +8 
in 1982 and +6 in 1985. The corresponding figures for the 
Conservatives were +1 in 1976, -3 in 1979 and -9 in 1982 and 
1985.76) The sectorial voting, while going in the expected 
direction, is much weaker in Sweden than class voting.
In Denmark on the other hand there was a much greater
increase in sectorial voting in the 1970s and 1980s. The
percentage difference in socialist voting in the public and
private sector was 0 in 1971, +7 in 1975, +17 in 1979, +27
in 1981 and +13 in 1984.77)
In Britain the voting differences between the public and
private sector have been more modest. In 1979 the
Conservatives got 37% in the public and 45% in the private
sector (-8%) while the figures for Labour were 44% and 39%
(+5%).78) The differences in Conservative voting were
greatest among managerial and professional (-9), lower non-
manual (-6) and unskilled manual (-13).79) Sarlvik and Crewe
conclude that
the division between private and public sector 
did not prove to be a major basis of the vote 
in 1979, or of the change in vote since 
October 1974 ... It is true, too, that the
76) See S. Holmberg and M. Gill jam (1987), pp. 191-198.
77) J. Goul Andersen (1984), p. 121.
78) B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe (1983), Table 3.9, p. 96.
79) See D. Robertson (1984), Table 2.4, p. 50.
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Conservative vote was lower and the Labour 
(and Liberal) vote higher among public-sector 
as opposed to private-sector workers, and that 
this was irrespective of whether they did 
manual or non-manual jobs. But the difference 
between the sectors was relatively small, 
falling well short of that made by the 
division between manual and non-manual 
workers.
In their analysis of the 1983 election. Heath et al. 
divide the public sector into two sections: the nationalized 
industries and the government sector. The difference in 
Conservative voting between their two public sectors on the 
one hand and the private sector on the other was -15% and 
-16% among their salariat, -15% and -12% among their 
intermediate classes, and -17% and -5% in the working 
class.81)
In Iceland we would not necessarily expect a division 
between the private and the public sector following the 
socialist/non-socialist division. While the IP has clearly 
been the party most critical of increased taxation, it can 
be argued that the SDP has been most critical of the heavy 
state regulation of the economy. While the SDP claims a firm 
commitment to the welfare state - as in fact the IP also 
does - the Social Democrats have probably been more critical 
of public sector expansion and increased taxation than the 
PP. The PA and the WA have been the strongest advocates of 
the welfare state, demanding increased public spending for 
welfare, and those parties, along with the PP, have most 
strongly supported the current state regulation of the 
economy.
80) B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe (1983), pp. 95-97.
81) A. Heath et ai. (1985), p. 69.
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In Table VI. 3.10 we have divided the voters in three 
groups: the private sector, the public sector and those who 
work for the co-operative movement, traditionally strongly 
linked to the PP. Not unexpectedly, the PP is much stronger 
among co-op employees than in the other sectors. Most 
interesting, however, is the clear distinction that emerges 
between the public and the private sector.
Table VI.3.10. Party voted for 1983 and 1987 by sector 
Total samples. Percentages.
Private
1983 
Public Co-opsPublic- Private
1987
Public Co-opsPublic-
sector sector private sector sector private
SDP 14 9 8 -5 17 13 16 -4
PP 17 11 30 -6 18 14 26 -4
IP 44 37 31 -7 32 24 29 -8
PA 13 22 19 + 9 10 19 12 + 9
WA 3 11 4 + 8 9 20 4 + 11
SDA 8 10 8 + 2 - - - -
CiP - - - - 9 7 7 -2
Others — — - — 5 4 6 -1
Total 99 
N= (387)
100
(227)
100
(74)
100
(757)
101
(387)
100
(91)
The parties of the public sector are clearly the PA and 
the WA, both of which are 8-11 percentage points stronger in 
the public sector. Those parties jointly obtained 16% of the 
votes in the private sector in 1983, while their share in 
the public sector was more than twice as high at 33%. In 
1987 the corresponding figures were 19% and 39% 
respectively, a difference of +20 percentage points.
SDP, PP and IP are all stronger in the private sector. As 
expected, the difference is greatest for the IP, -7 in 1983 
and -8 in 1987.
In Table VI.3.10 employers and the self-employed, 
including farmers, are by definition included in the private
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sector. Table VI.3.9 shows on the other hand if the division 
we have observed also holds for employees in the public and 
the private sector.
As the PA and WA are relatively weak among employers and 
self-employed the difference between the public and private 
sectors decreases when those groups are excluded. 
Nevertheless, a strong pattern remains. Among employees 
those two parties obtained 19% in the private sector in 1983 
as compared to 33% in the public sector. In 1987 the figures 
are 22% and 39% respectively.
The strong position of the IP among employers leads to 
slight decrease in the difference between the public and 
private sector when we only look at employees. The weak 
position of the SDP among employers and self-employed on the 
other hand increases the difference. Among employees the SDP 
shows the greatest overrepresentation in the private sector; 
both in 1983 and 1987 the party received 8% more votes among 
employees in the private sector than in the public sector.
The strong position of the PP among farmers means that 
the differences between public and private sectors decrease 
when they are excluded. Among employees there is virtually 
no difference in the support for PP in the two sectors 
either in 1983 or 1987.
While the differences between the public and private 
sector in Iceland are not much stronger than in Britain and 
Sweden, the existence of such a pattern is nevertheless very 
interesting considering the meagre impact of other class- 
related variables on Icelandic voting.
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Table VI.3.11. Strength of party identification. party
switching, and non -voting by occupation 1983 and 1987. Total
samples. Percentages.
Farrn- Sea­ Unsk. Sk. Lo. Pro. Emp.
ers men man. man. non. sk.n. hi .m.
STRENGTH OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Party supporter 
1983 66 52 47 51 50 46 57
1987 63 41 38 45 48 47 60
Closer to a 
party 1983 20 26 34 26 38 38 27
1987 28 33 33 33 29 39 25
No party ident. 
1983 15 22 19 23 12 16 16
1987 8 26 29 22 23 15 15
Total 1983 101 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= (55) (54) (194) (174) (149) (108) (97)
Total 1987 99 100 100 100 100 101 100
N= (107) (99) (324) (257) (269) (189) (171)
PARTY SWITCHING 
Switched parties 
1979-1983 11 19 24 30 25 32 16
N= (47) (32) (131) (130) (106) (79) (81)
1983-1987 26 35 39 39 40 35 25
N= (91) (66) (210) (179) (187) (151) (147)
NON-VOTING 
Did not vote 
1983 7 12 8 8 5 4 4
N= (54) (51) (184) (168) (142) (102) (95)
1987 4 7 5 4 2 2 1
N= (106) (97) (305) (244) (258) (177) (165)
For base of dep. variables see Tables VI. 1. 2 and VT.1.6 •
Two occupations show less volatility than others, as can 
be seen in Table VI.3.11, farmers and employers and higher 
managerials. These same occupational categories showed by 
far the most homogeneous voting behaviour (see Table 
VI.3.5). In 1983 only 11% of farmers and 16% of employers 
switched parties, while 19-32% of voters in other 
occupational categories did so. In 1987 26% of farmers and 
25% of employers and higher managerials switched parties, 
while the corresponding figure was 35-40% for other
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occupations. The overall increase in volatility in 1987 is 
on the other hand a result of increased party switching in 
all occupations from 1983 to 1987.
The strength of party identification follows a similar 
pattern. 63-66% of farmers and 57-60% of employers and 
higher managerials consider themselves party supporters, 
while the corresponding figures are 46-52% for other 
occupations in 1983 and 38-48% in 1987.
Table VI.3.12. Time of voting decision by occupation 1983
and 1987. Total samples.
Farm­
Percentages.
Sea- Unsk. Sk. Lo. Pro. Emp.
ers men man. man. non. sk. n . hi ,m.
Did not con­
sider another 
party 1983 81 63 51 46 45 43 51
1987 63 40 40 37 38 33 39
More than a month 
before 1983 8 5 13 14 7 16 7
1987 8 10 8 8 9 14 7
8-30 days 
before 1983 2 9 7 8 8 6 10
1987 11 12 14 18 11 16 16
One week 
before 1983 4 7 11 10 11 9 7
1987 6 10 9 10 6 4 6
During the last 
week 1983 2 5 9 8 11 16 10
1987 4 14 10 11 13 13 17
On polling 
day 1983 2 12 11 15 19 11 15
1987 9 14 20 16 23 21 15
Total 1983 99 101 102 101 101 101 100
N= (48) (43) (152) (147) (129) (90) (88)
Total 1987 101 100 101 100 100 101 100
N= (101) (88) (283) (229) (243) (171) (162)
For the base of dependent variable see Table V I .1 .2.
Table VI. 3.12 shows on the other hand that only farmers 
stand out concerning the time of voting decision. In 1983 
81% of farmers did not consider voting for another party, as 
compared to 63% of seamen and 43-51% in other occupations. 
In 1987 the number not considering another party had fallen
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in all occupational categories, but farmers still stand out : 
63% of them did not consider another party, while the 
corresponding figure was 33-40% in other occupations. On the 
whole, farmers and employers and higher managerials, the 
only remaining occupational groups that still show a 
considerable "class consciousness", are also the two 
occupations that show the strongest ties to the party 
system.
Table V I .3.13. Strength of party identification. party
switching, and non-voting by class, sector and occupational
status 1983 and 1987. Total samples. Percentages •
CLASS SECTOR OCCUR. STATUS
Man­ Non­ Priv. Publ. Empl­ Self- Empl­
uals man . sect. sect. oyers empl. oyees
STRENGTH OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Party supporter
1983 50 53 53 46 57 64 49
1987 41 53 48 46 55 50 46
Closer to a 
party 1983 30 33 29 35 26 21 33
1987 33 31 30 36 29 31 32
No party ident. 
1983 21 14 18 19 17 15 18
1987 26 17 22 19 16 19 22
Total 1983 101 100 100 100 100 100 100
N= (422) (409) (531) (263) (65) (95) (671)
Total 1987 100 101 100 101 100 100 100
N= (679) (735) (927) (428) (129) (162) (1111)
PARTY SWITCHING 
Switched parties 
1979-1983 26 22 22 29 11 14 27
N= (293) (313) (390) (188) (53) (72) (481)
1983-1987 39 33 35 37 31 37 36
N= (455) (576) (673) (319) (105) (122) (794)
NON-VOTING 
Did not vote 
1983 8 5 7 5 5 8 7
N= (403) (393) (511) (251) (63) (92) (642)
1987 5 2 3 3 2 6 3
N= (647) (706) (889) (405) (124) (157) (1058)
For base of dep. variables see Tables VI. 1. 2 and VI.1.6 •
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Tables VI.3.13 and VI.3.14 show the same variables by 
class, sector and occupational status. While the differences 
in most instances are not great, manual workers, public 
sector voters and employees tend to show weaker party 
identification and more party switching than non-manual 
workers, private sector voters and employers and self- 
employed. To a large extent, this is simply a result of the 
fact that farmers and employers and higher managerials are 
mostly included in the latter categories.
Table VI.3.14. Time of voting decision by class. sector and
occupational status 1983 and 1987. Total samples. 
Percentages.
CLASS SECTOR OCCUf STATUS
Man­ Non­ Priv. Publ. Empl­ Self- Empl­
uals man . sect. sect. oyers empl. oyees
Did not con­
sider another 
party 1983 50 51 52 47 52 72 47
1987 39 41 39 40 36 47 39
More than a month 
before 1983 12 9 10 13 9 10 11
1987 9 10 8 12 8 10 10
8-30 days 
before 1983 8 7 8 5 9 1 8
1987 15 13 14 15 18 14 14
One week 
before 1983 10 9 8 11 5 5 10
1987 9 6 9 5 9 6 8
During the last 
week 1983 8 11 9 11 12 7 10
1987 11 12 11 13 15 9 12
On polling 
day 1983 13 14 13 13 14 5 14
1987 17 19 19 15 15 15 19
Total 1983 101 102 100 100 101 100 100
N— (342) (355) (448) (219) (58) (81) (559)
Total 1987 100 101 100 100 101 101 102
N= (601) (677) (846) (381) (120) (147) (999)
For base of the dependent variable see Table VI.1.2.
Concerning the time of voting decision only the self- 
employed (a large part of which consists of farmers) stand
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out: a larger proportion did not consider another party than 
was the case in other occupational categories.
Non-voting is clearly more common among manuals and 
farmers than among the middle classes, the lowest turnout
being among seamen, who are often at see on polling day.
VI.4 Income
Income is a background variable that is usually related 
to other background variables such as age, sex, education, 
occupation, sector, etc. It is common in the literature on 
voting behaviour that income is not treated as an
independent variable. There are several reasons behind this. 
Some classification schemes, like the British one of six 
social grades, do in fact follow the income structure rather 
neatly, so it can be argued that a separate analysis of 
incomes is not necessary. Some authors, e.g. Heath et ai. 
who reject the usefulness of the social grades scheme 
"question whether income and life-style are particularly 
relevant to p o l i t i c s " . 8 )^ others who use income as a 
variable claim that more interesting than a simple analysis 
of the relationship between income and party vote is the 
question of whether income variations within occupations are 
related to political p r e f e r e n c e s . 83) Here we will
nevertheless treat income as an independent variable and 
examine if it is more strongly related to our political 
variables than other class- or status-related background 
variables.
82) Heath et al. (1985), p. 14.
83) See H. Valen (1981), pp. 114-115.
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Income has been related to party choice in the Nordic 
countries. In Norway the main pattern was similar both in 
1977 and 1981. The Labour Party was much stronger among the 
middle income groups (43-45% in 1981) than among those with 
the highest (24%) and lowest income (25%) . The Conservatives 
obtained much higher percentages in the top income group 
(51% in 1981) than in lower groups (20-33%) . The centre 
parties had a more even profile, but tended to get more 
votes in the lower income groups; those parties are 
relatively strong in the primary s e c t o r . 8 )^ in Denmark the 
Social Democrats obtained only 17% in the highest income 
group in 1971 but 37-47% in others. The Conservatives got 9- 
11% in the two lowest income groups, 17% in the second 
highest and 28% in the highest income group. Other parties 
had weaker p r o f i l e s . 85) %n Sweden in 1976 the Social 
Democrats obtained 30% in the highest income group, while 
getting 43-52% in the lower ones. While the Conservatives 
got 28% in the highest income group, their share was 10-13% 
in the lower ones. The other parties had weaker p r o f i l e s . 8 6 ) 
Thus, similar tendencies can be observed in all three 
countries: there are no simple linear relationships between 
income and voting, but among those with highest income the 
Social Democrats tend to be much weaker than among the rest 
of the electorate and the Conservatives much stronger.
In Iceland we only have data on income for the 1987 
election, when we asked both for the respondent's own income
84) See H. Valen (1981), pp. 114-115 and H. Valen and B. 
Aardal (1983), pp. 71-72.
85) 0. Borre et al. (1976), p. 55.
86) 0. Petersson (1977), p. 46.
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and for family income. Compared to Scandinavia the income 
profiles of the Icelandic parties are clearly weaker.
Table VI.4.1. Party voted for by own income 1987. Total 
sample. Percentages.
Own income (in thousands of kronur)
3-24 25-39 40-58 60-83 85-600
PA 17 12 17 14 15
WA 17 18 14 10 4
SDP 11 19 17 17 19
PP 21 14 14 17 9
CiP 5 8 9 7 8
IP 25 23 25 34 40
Other parties 5 6 5 2 5
Total 101 100 101 101 100
N= (174) (189) (175) (200) (202)
Table V I .4.2. Party voted for by family income 1987. Total
sample. Percentages.
Family income (in thousands of kronur)
4-42 43-69 70-89 90-118 120-600
PA 18 16 12 13 14
WA 15 11 12 14 10
SDP 14 16 17 22 16
PP 18 17 20 8 17
CiP 6 8 9 7 9
IP 21 28 27 34 32
Other parties 8 4 3 3 3
Total 100 100 100 101 101
N= (222) (222) (217) (250) (301)
Table VI.4.1 shows party vote by own income. The IP shows 
a profile similar to the Nordic one, but weaker: the party 
obtains 23-25% of the votes in the three lowest income 
groups, 34% in the second highest, and 40% in the highest. 
The party with a reverse profile turns out to be the WA, 
obtaining 14-18% in the three lowest income groups, 10% in 
the second highest and only 4% in the highest income group. 
The WA's profile is largely due to the lower income of women 
as compared to men, as we shall see.
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Other parties have weaker profiles. The PA and the CiP do 
not have any profiles to speak of but SDP is clearly weakest 
in the lowest income group and the PP in the highest.
Table VI.4.2 shows the party voted for by family income. 
Now all the parties have weak profiles; the strongest one is 
that of the IP, which obtained 21% in the lowest income 
group but 32-34% in the two highest ones.
Table VI.4.3. Mean own income (kronur) by vote and sex 1987. 
Mean family income (kronur) by vote 1987. Total sample. 
Percentages.
Own income Family income
All voters Male voters Female voters All voters
PA 60 .200 (138) 77 .400 (83) 34 .000 (55) 87 .500 (175)
WA 43 .200 (115) 76 .700 (27) 32. 900 (88) 79 .400 (148)
SDP 63 .300 (155) 78 .600 (100) 35. 900 (55) 92 .100 (207)
PP 55 .000 (137) 75 .200 (76) 29. 800 (61) 88 . 600 (188)
CiP 64 .500 (70) 81 .600 (46) 30. 300 (23) 98 .000 (94)
IP 70 .300 (280) 89 .500 (176) 37 .600 (103) 97 .500 (346)
All 61 .200 (894) 81 .800 (508) 34 .100 (386) 91 .300 (1157)
Only respondents with some income are included in the table. 
Means are rounded to the nearest hundred. Numbers in 
brackets give the number of respondents in each category.
MCA analysis shows that the rather weak relationship between 
own income and party (ETA=.17) goes down when controlled for 
by sex (BETA=.09). The strong relationship between own 
income and sex (ETA=.47) on the other hand remains when 
controlled for by vote (BETA=.46). The relationship between
family income and vote is very weak (ETA=.ll, BETA=.08 when
controlled for by sex). The relationship between family
income and sex is also low (ETA=.16, BETA=.14 when
controlled for by vote).
The mean difference in own income between voter group is 
significantly different according to LSD procedure (.05) 
between WA and IP, CiP, SDP, PA and between PP and IP, but 
according to Scheffe (.05) only between WA and IP.
Among men the mean own income was not significantly 
different between any two voter groups, neither according to 
LSD nor Scheffe. Among women PP and IP were sign. diff. by 
the LSD-test but no two groups according to Scheffe.
Mean family income was significantly different between WA 
and IP, CiP, SDP by LSD; no two groups by Scheffe.
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Table VI.4.3 shows the mean income of males and females 
by party. The table clearly reveals that the main reason for 
the much lower own income among WA voters (43,200 kronur) 
than among voters of other parties (55,000-70,300) is the 
huge difference in mean income of men (81, 800) as compared 
to women (34,100). Among males PP voters show the lowest 
income (75,200) but the differences between parties are 
small, except that the mean income of IP voters is clearly 
the highest (89,500). The same pattern is repeated for 
female voters, with the PP being lowest (29,800) and IP 
highest (37, 600) . As regards family income, the WA voters
are on the other hand lowest (around 80,000), the PP, PA and
SDP in the middle (around 90, 000) and the IP and the CiP 
highest (around 98,000). The reason behind the low mean
family income of WA voters is partly that for single women
own income constitutes family income, and that women also 
seem to have some tendency to report a slightly lower family 
income than men.^^) on the whole, the differences in income 
between parties cannot be considered great when gender is 
taken into account. Nevertheless, the IP is consistently 
strongest among those with highest income, just as its 
Scandinavian counterparts. The socialist parties do on the 
other hand not show the weakness among the highest income 
group that can be observed in Norway, Denmark and Sweden.
87) Among all couples female respondents report a mean 
family income of 93,300, while the figure is 106,200 for 
male respondents. Among couples where both are economically 
active female respondents report a mean family income of 
106,500, while the corresponding figure is 114,000 among 
male respondents. Family income should be the same in 
comparable groups irrespective of the sex of the respondent 
The observed difference is more likely to be a result of 
systematic bias than sampling error.
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Table VI.4.4. Time of voting decision, strength of party
identification, party switching 
income 1987. Percentages. Total
and non­
sample .
voting by family
Family income1 (in thousands of kronur)
4-42
Did not consider
43-69 70-89 90-118 120-600
another party 45 
More than month
37 40 39 31
before 7 10 6 8 12
8-30 days before 9 17 14 14 17
One week before 8 
During the last
9 7 8 7
week 10 10 15 13 15
On polling day 21 17 19 19 19
Total 100 100 101 101 101
N= (221)
STRENGTH OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION
(220) (214) (250) (299)
Party supporter 45 46 44 48 49
Closer to a party 26 33 33 33 33
No party ident. 29 21 23 19 18
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N= (261)
PARTY SWITCHING 
Switched parties
(249) (232) (267) (320)
1983-1987 35 39 38 34 40
N= (135)
NON-VOTING 
Did not vote
(174) (174) (205) (260)
1987 10 4 3 1 1
N= (248) (238) (230) (256) (307)
For base of dep. variables see Tables VI.,1.2 and VI.1.6.
Table VI.4.4 does not reveal any great differences by 
income regarding our measures of volatility, time of voting 
decision, strength of party identification and party 
switching. Non-voting is on the other hand clearly related 
to income, being much higher among the lower income groups.
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VI.5 Parental influences
Socialization theories usually give a large role to the 
family, which is supposed to be the main agent transferring 
culture from one generation to the next. According to the 
Michigan model, party identification is largely "inherited" 
from the f a m i l y . 8 8 )
Many studies have found a strong relationship between the 
party preference of respondents and their parents. Such 
findings are nevertheless problematic for several reasons, 
two of which we will mention here. First, the evidence of 
parental party preference is usually according to the 
respondent's recall. This may result in an inflated 
correlation, because of a tendency to "remember one's 
parents as having one's own b e l i e f s " . 89) On the other hand, 
the recall can also deflate the relationship, as "more 
random errors of memory will tend to understate the real 
strength of these t i e s " . 90) have already seen (Chapter
II) that some respondents make errors when recalling own 
voting behaviour; errors in recalling their parents' 
preferences should be expected and the results therefore 
interpreted with caution. It should also be kept in mind 
that many voters do not recall their parents' preferences. 
When the overall impact of parental preference is 
considered, it is important to keep this group in mind but 
not only concentrate on the relationship that can be 
observed among those who recall the preference of their 
parents. Children who never knew their parents' political
88) Campbell et al. (1964), pp. 86-87.
89) D. Butler and D. Stokes (1974), p. 50.
90) Ibid.
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preferences can hardly have been directly influenced by 
them !
The second problem concerns spurious relationships. If 
voting behaviour is strongly influenced by other variables, 
such as class, and social mobility is limited, we should 
expect a strong relationship between the voting behaviour of 
parent and offspring, even though there is no causal link. 
The apparent relationship is then simply is a result of 
class influencing both parents' and offspring's party 
preference.
Despite those problems it is of interest to analyse the 
parent-offspring relationship in the Icelandic setting. We 
have seen that in Iceland voting behaviour is weakly related 
to structural variables; its relationship to class seems to 
have greatly declined in the last few decades. Family is 
commonly expected to be important in Icelandic politics. On 
the elite level, considerable family patterns can be 
observed in recruitment to leadership positions, e.g. in the 
political parties. In the 1980s two party leaders, 
Hannibalsson of the SDP and Hermannsson of the PP, were sons 
of fathers who had also been leaders of their respective 
parties. In the electorate many cases are known of extended 
families heavily supporting one party - or, on the contrary, 
being split between two parties. Such observations do, of 
course, not tell us how common such patterns are but they 
suggest that "inherited" party preference should be 
considered as a potential explanatory factor, especially in 
a country where the explanatory power of social factors seem 
to be weak and the parties tend to be pragmatic on policy 
and strongly marked by clientelism.
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Table VI.5.1. Parental vote of respondents 1983. Total 
sample. Percentages.
Party usually voted for by parents Mean results 
Father Mother 1931-67
SDP 12 16 11 16 16.4
PP 20 28 16 23 26.1
IP 33 46 33 49 40. 9
CP/USP/PA 7 11 7 11 14 .2
Other, more than one 5 4
Did not know 24 29
Total 101 101 100 99
N= (945) (679) (970) (655)
Q: Do you know which party your father generally supported 
while you were growing up? (If yes) : What party was that? - 
What about your mother?
-Those who refused to answer (2% for fathers, 1.6% for 
mothers) and those to which the question was not applicable 
(3.8% for fathers, 1.7% for mothers) are omitted from the 
table.
Mean results 1931-67 gives the parties' mean percentages in 
the 14 Althingi elections in that period (13 elections for 
the SDP and the PP, as the 1956 election is omitted for 
those parties due their electoral alliance).
Table VI.5.1 shows the reported party preferences of 
fathers and mothers in 1983.^1) a  quarter of the respondents 
reported that they did not know their father's party 
preference and 29% did not know their mother's preference. 
17% on the other hand neither knew their father's nor their 
mother's party preference (Table VI.5.3). Thus, about eight 
in every ten voters claimed to know the party preference of 
at least either their father or their mother.
The proportion not knowing their parents' party is 
strongly related to the respondents' interest in politics, 
as can be seen in Table VT.5.2. This proportion was on the 
other hand not higher among those respondents who in 1983 
claimed not to have voted or turned in a blank ballot than
91) The question of parents' party was not asked in 1987.
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among those who reported a party vote. A clear difference 
emerges on the other hand concerning age; a much higher 
proportion of respondents under 30 did not know their 
fathers' party preferences than is the case among those over 
30.
Table VI.5,2. Proportion not recalling their fathers' party 
in 1983 by own interest in politics and by age. Total 1983 
sample.
Interest In politics 
Very Great SomeLittle None All
great
Percentage who did
not know father's party 7 18 22 29 37 24
N= (41) (130) (448) (265) (60) (944)
Age
20-23 24-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-83 All
Percentage who 
did not know
father's party 38 33 24 23 9 17 24
N= (89) (156) (249) (157) (127) (167) (945)
The difference in fathers' and mothers' preferences is 
small with the PP being slightly stronger among fathers and 
the IP among mothers. The strength of the parties is not far 
off the mark if we consider the strength of the parties in 
the period in which the parents were voting (see Table 
VI.5.1). The major deviations are an overrepresentation of 
the IP and an underrepresentation of the CP/USP/PA, while 
the proportion of PP and SDP voters among fathers and 
mothers is very close to the mean results for those parties 
in Althingi elections 1931-1967. The strength of the parties 
among parents seems on the whole rather credible, despite 
the limitations of the data.
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Table VI .5.3. Mother's vote by father's vote. 1983 total 
sample. Total percentages.
Father's vote
Mother's vote
SDP PP IP PA Other
/more
Didn't
know
SDP 7 0 1 1 0 1
PP 1 13 1 0 0 1
IP 1 2 26 1 0 4
CP/USP/PA 0 1 1 5 0 1
Other, more than one 0 1 0 - 2 0
Did not know 2 4 4 1 1 17
Total 100% (N=930)
Table VI.5.3 gives the reported vote of mother by that of 
father .(total percentages) . As we have already noted, 17% of 
respondents did not know the party affiliation of either 
their mother or their father. 11% give their father's party 
but did not know their mother's party and 7% knew their 
mother's but not their father's p a r t y . 2^) on the whole, 19% 
give parental preference of one parent while the preference 
of the other is unknown, 51% report that their mother and 
father voted for the same party, 10% report that their 
parents voted for different parties, and 17% knew neither 
parental preference. According to this, 70% of the 
respondents were prone to one-sided parental cues concerning 
party preference, while 10% were prone to conflicting 
preferences by their parents and 17% without any parental 
cue.
Table VI.5.4 gives the same information as Table VT.5.2, 
except that here we get column percentages showing how large 
a proportion of mothers shared party preference with fathers 
from each party. Here IP stands out - 78% of the respondents 
whose father supported the IP also had a mother supporting
92) Here we omit the category "Other, more than one".
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that party, while the corresponding figure for the other 
three parties is 59-65%. Of the respondents with IP fathers, 
only 8% had mothers supporting one of the three other old 
parties, while the corresponding figures are 14% for the PP, 
21% for the SDP and 24% for the CP/USP/PA. Conflicting 
parental cues are thus least common among respondents whose 
fathers supported the IP and most common among those whose 
fathers supported SDP or CP/USP/PA.
Table VI .5.4. Mother's vote by father's vote. 1983 total 
sample. Percentages.
Father's vote
SDP PP IP PA Other Didn't
Mother's vote /more know
SDP 59 2 4 11 3 6
PP 5 63 3 3 10 5
IP 12 9 78 10 5 15
CP/USP/PA 4 3 2 65 5 3
Other, more than one 3 4 1 - 49 1
Did not know 18 20 12 11 28 70
Total 101 101 100 100 100 100
N= (110) (185) (304) (71) (39) (221)
Table VI.5.5 shows the respondents' 1983 vote by their 
father's and mother's party. The first thing to note is that 
the figures for fathers and mothers are almost identical, so 
it makes little difference if we look at the "success-rate" 
of mothers or fathers in recruiting their offspring to their 
party.
The IP fathers are at first sight by far the most 
"successful recruiters" if we look at the data in those 
terms. Of those respondents who give party voted for in 
1983, 64% of those with a father supporting the IP vote for 
the same party. The corresponding figures for the other 
parties are only 39-45%.
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Table VI.5.5. Respondents vote in 1983 by father's and 
mother's vote. 1983 total sample. Percentages.
Father's vote
Respondent's
SDP
vote
PP IP PA Other
/more
Didn't 
know
All
SDP 39 5 9 10 8 14 13
PP 8 43 7 11 13 14 16
IP 28 23 64 18 37 40 41
PA 13 16 9 45 21 17 16
SDA 10 7 7 7 11 9 8
WA 2 6 6 10 11 7 6
Total 101 100 102 101 101 101 100
N= (95) (159) (270) (62)
Mother'
(38)
s vote
(188) (812)
Respondent's
SDP
vote
PP IP PA Other
/more
Didn't
know
All
SDP 40 4 8 8 12 15 13
PP 7 45 6 9 9 18 16
IP 26 22 65 17 35 38 41
PA 18 20 6 48 27 14 16
SDA 8 4 9 8 6 9 8
WA 2 5 6 9 12 7 6
Total 101 100 100 99 101 101 100
N= (90) (137) (287) (64) (34) (219) (831)
We can on the other hand interpret those figures in terms 
of the relative size of the parties. If no parental 
influence existed we would expect the offspring of fathers 
from each party to behave like the total electorate, i.e. 
all the columns should look like the last one, "all". This 
is indeed the case for those who did not know their parents' 
party preferences/ their column is almost identical to the 
one for the whole electorate. The columns for the parties 
are on the other hand very different. Among those with SDP 
fathers 39% vote for the SDP, while only 13% of the total 
electorate do so. Thus we could say that having a father 
from the SDP increases the likelihood of voting SDP from 13% 
to 39% or by 26 percentage points. Similar calculations
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result in 27 points for the PP, 23 points for the IP and 29 
points for the PA. While the data clearly supports the 
hypothesis of parental influence, the different "success- 
rates" of the parties disappear.
If we note the destination of the "deserters", a familiar 
pattern e m e r g e s sDP fathers "loose" by far the largest 
proportion of offspring to the IP (28%), PP fathers also 
"loose" most to the IP (23%) , but a also a considerable 
proportion to the PA (16%), and the PA fathers "recruit" a 
much higher proportion to the WA (10%) than do fathers 
supporting other parties.
Table V I .5.6. Respondent's 
sample. Percentages.
vote 1983 by
Respondent's
parental
vote 1983
vote. Total
Parental vote
SDP PP IP PA SDA WATotal N =
SDP/SDP 45 9 26 13 4 2 99 (53)
SDP/no party 37 3 17 23 17 3 100 (30)
SDP/dther party 24 5 48 10 14 - 101 (21)
PP/PP 3 51 20 16 5 6 101 (103)
pp/no party 6 40 17 26 6 6 101 (35)
pp/other party 14 24 33 14 10 5 100 (21)
IP/IP 8 5 66 8 7 7 101 (210)
IP/no party 7 7 67 3 10 7 101 (61)
IP/other party 13 13 39 26 9 - 100 (23)
CP-USP-PA/CP-USP-PA 5 12 14 52 5 12 100 (42)
CP-USP-PA/no party 20 10 20 40 10 - 100 (10)
CP-USP-PA/other party 21 7 29 29 7 7 100 (14)
No party/no party 14 17 40 14 8 7 100 (126)
All voters 13 16 42 16 8 6 101 (854)
Parental vote: The first line for each party gives the 1983 
vote of respondents whose parents both supported that party. 
The second line gives voters whose one parent supported the 
party in question, but the respondent did not know the other 
parent's party preference. The third line gives voters whose 
father supported the party in question, but the mother 
supported another party.
93) See Sections II.2, II.3, II.5, II.6, and IV.5.
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In Table VI.5.6 we have combined the party preferences of 
both parents and compare those to the respondents' 1983 
votes. If parental influence exists we would expect the 
relationship between father's (or mother's) vote and the 
offspring's vote to be strongest when both parents support 
the same party and weakest if the parents support different 
parties. This pattern is borne out in the table.
As before, the IP stands out: 66% of the respondents
whose parents both supported the IP voted for the party in 
1983, as did 67% of those who had one parent supporting the 
IP but did not know the other's preference. However, only 
39% of those having a father supporting the IP and a mother 
supporting another party voted for the IP. For the other
parties the figures are lower: 45-52% of those whose parents 
supported the same party voted for that party in 1983, as
did 37-40% of those who only knew the preference of one
parent, while only 24-29% voted for their fathers's party 
when their mother had a conflicting party preference. While 
it should be noted that the number of respondents in some of 
the categories is very low, the overall pattern is too clear 
to be disregarded. For all parties, conflicting parental 
preference means lower support for the party among
offspring. For all parties except the IP the support is 
higher when both parents support the party than it is when 
only one parent supports the party and the respondent does 
not know the preference of the other parent.
Another way of looking at the relationship between 
parents and offspring is to examine the composition of each 
party's vote in 1983 with regard to father's party, as is 
done in Table VI. 5.7. First we may note that a similar
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proportion of all parties' voters comes from respondents who 
did not know the party preference of their father. If we on 
the other hand consider only those who claimed to know their 
father's party preference the two parties that were most 
popular among the fathers, the IP and the PP, also have the 
highest proportion of offspring agreeing with their father's 
preference in their 1983 vote, 66% and 64% r e s p e c t i v e l y . 4^) 
In 1983 48% of the SDP vote and only 29% of the PA vote, 
comes on the other hand from respondents who shared party 
preference with their father.
Table VI.5.7 Father's party by respondent's 1983 vote. 1983 
total sample. Percentages.
Respondent's 1983 vote
SDP PP IP PA SDA WA Didn't All
Father's vote
SDP 4 8 8 10 12 20 5
vote
13 15
PP 10 64 14 27 24 27 29 26
IP 30 17 66 24 39 41 39 43
CP/USP/PA 8 7 4 29 9 16 12 10
Other/more th.one 4 5 5 8 9 11 7 6
Total 100 101 99 100 101 100 100 100
N= (77) (106) (261) (97) (46) (37) (69) (693)
Did not know 
fathers preference 25 20 22 25 26 26 23 23
Comparable figures for Sweden in 1976 show a similar 
pattern. The proportion of each party's following coming 
from respondents sharing preference with their father were 
78% for the largest party, the Social Democrats, 50% for the 
Conservatives, 43% for the Centre Party, 36% for the 
Liberals and only 18% for the small Communist P a r t y . 5^)
94) Even though PP fathers "recruited" only 43% of their 
offspring to the PP compared to the IP's 64% (see Table
VI.5.5) the parties are similar in Table VI.5.7, as the PP's 
following among fathers is much stronger (26%) than in our 
1983 electorate (17%).
95) 0. Petersson (1977), Table 2.11 p. 26. -The proportion 
not knowing or not willing to reveal their father's party
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On the whole, 49% of the Icelandic sample voted for the 
party their father supported, if we only look at those who 
gave a party vote in 1983 and also gave their father's 
party. The relationship does not vary by age: the figures
are 48% for 20-29 year olds, 50% for 30-49 year olds and 48% 
for 50-83 year olds. In Sweden in 1976 58% voted for their 
fathers party and the difference between age groups was 
small. The young were not more prone to leave their father's 
party than older voters.9^ ) The overall relationship between 
voting behaviour of parents and offspring seems thus rather 
similar in Iceland and Sweden, even though it is somewhat 
weaker in Iceland.
Class voting has on the other hand been much stronger in 
Sweden than in Iceland, as we noted before. In 1976 the 
Alford index was 36% in S w e d e n , 7^) while in Iceland in 1983 
it was only 11%. We should therefore expect that the Swedish 
relationship between father's and offspring's voting 
behaviour is more likely to be spurious, i.e. simply a 
result of class voting both among fathers and offspring, 
than is the case in Iceland.
The relationship between own voting and father's class 
was almost as strong in Sweden in 1976 as the relationship 
between own voting and own class. The correlation between 
own voting and father's class was 0.32, while it was 0.36 
between own voting and own class. The correlation between
preference was on the other hand slightly higher in Sweden 
(33%) and the variation between parties was greater than in 
Iceland: Communists 21%, Social Democrats 28%, Centre Party 
35%, Liberals 35%, Conservatives 27%, non-voters 55%.
96) Ibid., p. 26.
97) Ibid., Table 2.8, p. 22.
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father's class and own class was 0.22.98) using path 
analysis, Petersson concludes that most of the impact of 
father's class on own voting is a direct one, not indirect 
through own class position. "Independent of the individual's 
altered social class, the political importance of the 
parents' class still exists. In such a way yesterday's 
socio-economic antagonisms are transplanted to today's 
political life".99)
Social mobility and the importance of father's class on 
own voting serves to deflate the Alford index. If we take 
father's class into account, 61% of manuals with manual 
fathers voted socialist in Sweden in 1976, while only 24% of 
non-manuals with non-manual fathers did so, giving an 
"Alford index" of 57% between the core groups based on both 
own and father's class instead of 36% when only own class is
taken into a c c o u n t . ^90)
While social mobility in Sweden has been high in this 
century,101) social mobility in Iceland could be expected to 
have been even greater in the last decades, as the 
industrialization process started later in Iceland. Stefan 
Olafsson's results nevertheless indicate that social 
mobility in Iceland in the early post-war period was similar 
to that in S w e d e n . 102) in Table VI.5.8 we have separated 
farmers into a special class group distinct from other non­
manuals. If we compare own and father's class in our sample
98) Ibid., p. 27. The three variables were made dichotomous; 
manual/non-manual, socialist/non-socialist.
99) Ibid., p. 29. My translation.
100) Ibid., p. 30. Socialist voting among manuals with non- 
manual fathers was 51% and 46% among non-manuals with manual 
fathers.
101) See ibid., pp. 23-25.
102) S. Olafsson (1982).
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the major change in the size of the class groups has taken 
place among non-manuals, as the proportion of farmers has 
fallen from 25% to 7%, while other non-manuals have 
increased from 22% to 43% (Table VI.5.8).
VI .5.8. Changes in the class structure: Class of fathers and 
respondents. Total 1983 sample. Percentages.
Fathers Respondents
Manuals 53 51
Farmers 25 7
Other non-manuals 22 43
Total 100 101
N= (963) (839)
Behind those changes in sizes of class groups lies a 
great deal of social mobility between generations, as can be 
seen in Table V I .5.9. The mobility creating the changes we 
can observe in Table VI.5.8 is clearly not only that 
farmers' offspring move into the middle class; a much more 
complex pattern of social mobility has been taking place.
Table VI.5.9. Social mobility: Father's and respondent's 
class. 1983 total sample. Percentages.
Father's class Respondent's class Percentage
Farmer Farmer 5
Farmer Manual 14
Farmer Non-manual 6
Manual Farmer 2
Manual Manual 31
Manual Non-manual 21
Non-manual Farmer 0
Non-manual Manual 7
Non-manual Non-manual 16
Total 102
N= (805)
Only around half the respondents belong to the same class 
group as their father; almost half of the sample has been 
socially mobile. More farmers' offspring have moved to the
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working class (14% of the whole sample) than to the middle 
class (6%) , but 28% of the sample have moved between the 
working class and the middle class. A large majority of them 
have been upwardly mobile, moving from manuals to non­
manuals (21%), as compared to 7% moving from non-manual to 
manual.
The correlation between own class and father's class is 
much lower in Iceland than in Sweden or only 0.15. The 
correlations with own voting are also much lower, 0.15 to 
father's class and 0.12 to own c l a s s . 1^3) The relationship 
of voting to father's class is thus slightly stronger in 
Iceland than the relationship to own class! If we calculate 
an Alford index for own vote and father's class it comes to 
13% as compared to 11% if we use the respondents' own class.
As was the case in Sweden, father's class has an 
independent impact on own vote, i.e. voting behaviour 
differs within own class according to father's class. Thus 
the socialist vote among workers with a working class father 
is 37%, while it is 21% among workers with middle class 
fathers. Among middle class voters with middle class fathers 
the socialist vote is only 17%, compared to 31% among middle 
class voters with working class fathers. Thus, an "Alford 
index" comparing the core groups (workers with working class 
fathers versus non-manuals with non-manual fathers) is 20%, 
considerably higher than the proper one (11%) , which we 
obtained when we used only own class as the base.
103) The three variables are dichotomized: father's class 
and own class into manuals (seamen, unskilled and skilled 
manual workers) and non-manuals (farmers, lower non-manuals, 
professionals, skilled non-manuals, employers, higher 
managerial and administrative). Own vote is socialist (SDP, 
PA) and non-socialist (PP, IP, SDA, WA). The correlation 
coefficient is Pearson's r.
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Table VI.5.10. Respondent's 1983 vote by father's class and 
own class. Total 1983 sample. Percentages.
Respondent's 1983 vote
Class of
father/respondent
SDP PP IP PA SDA WATotal N Soc. 
vote
Farmer/farmer — 71 24 6 — — 101 (34) 6
Manual/farmer 18 46 36 — - — 100 (11) 18
Farmer/manual 6 29 27 25 8 4 99 (99) 31
Manual/manual 20 10 41 17 7 4 99 (198) 37
Non-manual/manual 5 11 41 16 25 2 100 (44) 21
Farmer/non-manual 3 36 31 23 5 3 101 (39) 26
Manual/non-manual 14 4 48 17 10 8 101 (153) 31
Non-manual/non-man. 8 11 53 9 7 12 100 (108) 17
All 12 17 41 16 8 6 100 (687) 28
Socialist vote=SDP+PA.
The impact of father's class is also evident in the case 
of the PP. The party was supported by 71% of the farmers 
whose fathers also were farmers. The PP's share among 
workers whose fathers were farmers is 29%, while the party 
obtains only 10-11% of the votes among other workers. In the 
middle class, 36% of the offspring of farmers vote for the 
PP, while only 4% of those with working class fathers and 
11% of those with middle class fathers do so.
While the IP is stronger among middle class voters than 
working class voters, the strength of the party inside the 
classes does not differ by father's class, except that the 
party is much weaker among those whose fathers were farmers. 
Whether the father was working class or middle class does 
not on the other hand make a significant difference.
On the whole the Icelandic pattern resembles the Swedish 
one, except that all relationships between voting and class 
are much weaker in Iceland. While it seems to be true for
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Iceland like Sweden that today's politics are affected by 
yesterday's class structure, the overall impact of class - 
past and present - on the 1983 vote is very weak. Thus we 
can to a greater extent look at the parent-offspring 
relationship in voting behviour as a more independent one in 
Iceland than in Sweden. While the importance of "inherited" 
partisanship should not be overemphasized and the 
methodological shortcomings of our analysis of parental 
party preferences should be borne in mind, the family 
nevertheless seems to play an independent role in 
maintaining voter alignments in Iceland, while social 
factors have largely ceased to do so.
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Chapter VII: Conclusions
Iceland, a micro-state with an electorate of ca. 170, 000 
people, exhibits a structure of voter alignments as complex 
as are found among larger nations. In many respects the 
Icelandic electorate resembles its neighbours in the other 
Nordic countries, while considerable differences also exist.
Electoral volatility has greatly increased in Iceland in 
the last three decades. Since the early 1970s, the Icelandic 
political system has become one of the most volatile 
democratic systems in the world. Net gains or net volatility 
(in percentages of votes) for the victorious parties in the 
1983 and 1987 elections were 16.6% and 23.1% respectively.
In this thesis we demonstrate that those major changes in 
parties' fortunes at the polls were mainly the result of 
gross volatility or the direct switching of voters between 
parties. Of respondents voting both in 1979 and 1983, 23%
claimed to have changed parties, while the corresponding 
figure for 1983-1987 was 36%. If we look at three 
consecutive elections, one-half of those who reported party 
vote in 1979, 1983 and 1987 voted for the same party in all 
three elections, while the other half claimed to have 
changed parties. These figures show extremely volatile 
voting behaviour in the Icelandic electorate.
Another potential source of net volatility is movement of 
voters from voting in one election to non-voting in the next 
(demobilization), or vice versa (mobilization). Such 
movements can have great impact on election results, 
especially if turnout is rather low or fluctuating. Non­
voting in Iceland has been around 10% in recent decades.
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Most of the non-voting is due to occasional non-voting of 
some voters rather than to consistent non-voting, thus 
allowing for some impact of movements in and out of the 
voting electorate on election outcomes. In 1983 and 1987, 
however, the impact of such movements on the fortunes of the 
parties was very small.
The impact of first time voters on the election results 
was small both in 1983 and 1987. While the SDA in 1983 
clearly had much greater appeal to first time voters than to 
other voters, first time voters in general voted in a 
similar fashion to the older ones. The hypothesis that first 
time voters had a somewhat greater tendency to follow the 
electoral winds, or jump on the bandwagon, gained some 
support from the 1983 data, but not from the 1987 data. Non­
voting, on the other hand, was somewhat higher among the 
youngest and oldest voters.
In this thesis three theoretical approaches are used to 
analyse voting behaviour in the highly volatile Icelandic 
electorate: a psychological or party identification
approach, a rational or issue-oriented approach and a 
social-structural approach.
Party Identification among the Icelandic electorate 
decreased slightly from 1983-1987. The number of party 
supporters dropped from 49% to 46%; 32% of those who were
not party supporters nevertheless felt closer to a party in 
both . elections, while the figure for those with no party 
identification rose from 19% to 22%. Party identification in 
Iceland is weaker than in Denmark and Sweden.
In accordance with the party identification model, party 
identification is clearly related to age: partisanship is
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stronger among those in older age groups. While our data 
does not allow us to test if this pattern is mainly a result 
of life-cycle or generational effects, we nevertheless 
compared the strength of party identification among the same 
respondents in 1983 and 1987. While the party identification 
did in fact strengthen among the youngest respondents, the 
number of party supporters decreased in most other age 
groups during those four years, indicating a period effect 
rather than either a life-cycle or generational effect. The 
basic assumption of the party identification model, that 
party identification generally strengthens with age, is thus 
not supported by our data.
If party identification is a lasting characteristic, we 
would expect identification for new parties to develop 
slowly, unless we expect most of the converts to become 
"true believers" immediately. Both in 1983 and 1987 the
proportion of own identifiers among each party's voters was 
much lower for new parties than older ones. In 1983, while 
72-86% of voters for the old parties identified with the
party voted for, this was only the case for 28% of SDA and 
42% of WA voters. In 1987, while 62-83% of voters for the 
old parties also identified with their party, only 46% of 
CiP voters did so. In 1987 69% of WA voters also identified 
with the party. In four years the WA had become similar to 
the old parties in that respect.
We would also expect identifiers with new parties to 
identify less strongly with their party than identifiers 
with old parties. This is borne out for the SDA and the WA
in 1983. Not only are their identifiers relatively few, but
their attachments to their parties are also weaker than is
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the case for those who identify with the old parties. In 
1987, on the other hand, the identifiers of the CiP show 
stronger attachments to their party than is the case for any 
other party, both in 1983 and 1987. While it can be open to 
interpretation whether the considerable number of 
identifiers for new parties (even though it is lower than 
for the old parties), and the rapid increase in WA- 
identifiers 1983-1987, are in accord with the party 
identification model, the measured strength of party 
identification of CiP identifiers in 1987 clearly 
contradicts the model.
More serious for the party identification approach is the 
fact that many Icelandic voters tend to change their party 
identification when they change their vote, as is common 
among voters in Europe. While our data shows that party 
identification and party vote are not identical, and that 
party identification is a more lasting characteristic for 
some voters than party vote, the fact that in 1983-1987 more 
party switchers changed their party identification than 
retained it severely limits the usefulness of the concept of 
direction of party identification in the Icelandic setting.
Strength of party identification is on the other hand 
clearly related to electoral volatility. In 1983 7-12% of 
party supporters switched parties, while 58% of those with 
no party identification did so. In 1987 17-20% of party
supporters changed parties, while the corresponding figure 
for those with no party identification was 65%. This would 
suggest that party identification still serves as a 
stabilizing factor in the electorate. On the other hand, the 
strength of party identification is not a good predictor of
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actual volatility. Party switching increased greatly between 
1983 and 1987, while the strength of party identification 
decreased only slightly. The overall increase in party 
switching in 1987 as compared to 1983 was the result of an 
increase in party switching within all groups: party
supporters, those who only feel closer to a party, and those 
with no party identification.
The basic assumption of the Michigan model, that voters 
develop a strong identification with the parties and retain 
it even though they vote for other parties, has limited 
validity among the Icelandic electorate. Weak party
identification in Iceland also allowsgives room for large 
changes in party fortunes at elections. Nevertheless many 
voters identify strongly with the parties and this 
identification is related to their behaviour. It seems
likely that the greatly increased net volatility in Iceland 
in the 1970s is partly due to weakening party attachments.
Besides party identification, other ties between parties 
and voters were also examined. Both in 1983 and 1987 20% of 
the respondents claimed to be party members. The IP is far 
more successful than other parties in mobilizing their
support into formal membership of the party. 27-32% of the 
IP votes comes from IP members, while the corresponding 
figures for the other old parties are 17-23%. The new 
parties get a lower share of votes from own members: only 3% 
of SDA voters in 1983 claimed to be members of the party 
while the corresponding figures for the WA were 6% in 1983 
and 9% in 1987, and 13% for the CiP in 1987. The increase in 
party membership for the WA is clearly much slower than was 
the case for party identification.
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Party members are indeed the core of party support in the 
sense that party members both identify more strongly with 
the parties than non-members and they are less likely to 
switch parties. And while party membership and party 
identification are strongly related, they are by no means 
identical. Many of the voters who strongly support their 
party and show a weak tendency to switch parties are not 
party members.
While the increasing use of primary elections since the 
early 1970s has probably served to weaken the parties 
organizationally, they nevertheless serve as a link between 
parties and voters. In 1983 46% of the respondents claimed 
that they had at some time participated in a primary, while 
29% claimed to have done so before the 1983 election, and 
19% reported primary participation before the 1987 election.
Primary participation is by no means confined to party 
members. In 1983 78% of party members claimed to have
participated in a primary at some time, while the 
corresponding figure for party identifiers who were not 
members was 39% and 37% for those with no party 
identification. Even 24% of those who did not vote or cast a 
blank ballot in the 1983 election claimed to have voted in a 
primary at some time. Around 40% of those who took part in 
primaries before the 1983 elections were party members, 
while 60% of the 1987 participants were members of a party.
Newspapers can serve as a link between parties and the 
electorate. Five out of six Icelandic daily newspapers 
support a political party, and the papers still serve as a 
connection between the parties and voters. Readers of 
different newspapers tend to support different parties. The
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relationship between party vote and newspaper readership is 
strongest for the PA daily, Thjodviljinn, followed by 
Morgunbladid, supporting the IP, and the PP daily, Timinn, 
while it is very weak for the independent paper DV. Despite 
clear links between voting behaviour and newspaper 
readership the papers' power to mould the voters' behaviour 
in the polling booth should not be exaggerated. In most
cases over a half of each paper's daily readers do not vote 
in accordance with the paper's political line.
Personal ties between MPs and voters should be expected 
to be stronger in a micro-state like Iceland than among
larger nations. Half of Icelandic voters claim to know an MP
personally. While acquaintance with MPs is related to age, 
party membership, gender and party identification, its 
relationship with region is surprisingly weak; we would have 
expected greater differences in acquaintance with MPs 
between the urban Reykjavik and Sothwest constituencies on 
the one hand and the less populous constituencies in the 
countryside on the other, not only because of the size of 
the electorate, but also because clientelism is much more
common in the latter. The impact of acquaintance with MPs on 
vote switching is also weak, and seems to be minimal when 
party membership and strength of party identification are 
taken into account.
The applicability of a rational model in the Icelandic 
setting is tested by exploring to what extent the voters 
have a cognitive map of the party system along left-right 
lines, whether this cognitive map has electoral 
consequences, and to what extent issue voting takes place 
among voters.
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The concepts of left and right clearly have meaning for 
Icelandic voters. Most voters are prepared to position 
themselves on a left-right scale. They are also prepared to 
rank the parties on such a scale, and tend to agree on the 
ranking: the PA is clearly furthest to the left in the minds 
of the voters and the WA is second from the left. The SDP 
and the PP are close together at the centre, while the CiP 
is second from the right in 1987 and the IP is clearly 
furthest to the right. If we compare the perceived position 
of the parties on the left-right scale to voters' own 
positions on the scale, it is clear that in the polling 
booth voters do indeed prefer parties that are close to them 
on the left-right dimension.
Voters' like and dislike of parties and party leaders is 
also clearly related to the left-right dimension. Voters 
tend to dislike a party more the further away it is from 
their own party on the left-right scale. An affinity between 
the PP and the PA on the one hand, and the SDP and the IP on 
the other, can nevertheless be discerned. Voters' left-right 
positions within a party are also related to their like and 
dislike of other parties.
While the relationship between voters' stands on 
individual issues and their own positions on the left-right 
scale varies a great deal between issues, as was to be 
expected, some of these relationships are quite strong. When 
attitude indices based on factor analysis are correlated to 
own left-right position, the left-right attitude index is by 
far the most strongly related, as is the case in Norway and 
Sweden.
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Thus it is clear that the voters' cognitive map of the 
party system in abstract left-right terms is meaningful, as 
indicated by the relationship of own left-right position to 
voting, to like and dislike of parties and party leaders, 
and to voters' stands on issues.
Voters' stands on issues are also clearly related to 
party choice, even though there are great differences in the 
strength of the relationship. In general, the positions the 
voters of different parties take on different issues tend to 
reflect the parties' ranking on the left-right continuum, 
even though there are notable exceptions, such as issues 
related to the urban-rural cleavage.
When attitude indices based on factor analysis are 
constructed, the left-right index is most strongly related 
to party choice (ETA^ is .42 in 1983 and .41 in 1987) . PA 
voters are clearly furthest to the left on this attitude 
index and WA voters second from the left. In 1983 the PP, 
the SDA and the SDP are close to centre on the index, the PP 
being slightly on the left of the SDP. In 1987 the SDP and 
the PP also occupy the centre but the SDP is slightly to the 
left of the PP. The IP voters are clearly furthest to the 
right, while CiP voters are second from the right in 1987. 
The voters' ideological positions on the left-right attitude 
index thus clearly correspond to the parties' perceived 
positions on the left-right scale.
An attitude index which we call the old-new economy 
index, largely reflecting the urban-rural cleavage, is 
second most strongly related to party choice (ETA^ is .16 in 
1983 and .10 in 1987). Voters' positions on this index do 
not follow the left-right dimension. Both in 1983 and 1987
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the PP and the PA voters are most supportive of the old 
economy, while the WA voters are closer to the centre. 
Voters of the SDP, IP and SDA in 1983 are on the other hand 
more supportive of the new economy, as are SDP, CiP and IP 
voters in 1987. This may partly explain why party switching 
among the four old parties does not correspond well to the 
PA-SDP-PP-IP left-right model.
On the whole, issue voting can be considered relatively 
high in Iceland, even though it is weaker than in Norway and 
Sweden. The most probable reason for this seems to be that 
the alternatives facing Icelandic voters in elections are 
not as clear or as consistent as is the case in the other 
two countries.
Social-structural variables are in general very weakly 
related to voting behaviour in Iceland. Class voting, as 
measured by the Alford index is extremely low, both in 1983 
(11%) and in 1987 (10%) . An analysis of the class voting of 
the respondents' fathers gave much higher values for the 
Alford index: 38% for older fathers (fathers of respondents 
born 1901-40) and 21% for younger fathers (fathers of 
respondents born 1941-63) . While the figures for the fathers 
can, of course, only be seen as very crude approximations, 
we nevertheless feel confident, on basis of other evidence 
as well, that class voting in Iceland in the 1930s and 1940s 
was quite strong (probably similar to Britain but weaker 
than in Scandinavia), grew weaker in the 1950s and the 
1960s, and became very weak in the 1980s. While class voting 
has decreased in Scandinavia from around 55% in the 1950s to 
around 35% by 1980, the decrease is much more dramatic in 
Iceland.
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A more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
various occupational categories and voting further shows 
that the parties tend to have weak profiles. The main 
exceptions are that the SDP is extremely weak among farmers, 
the PP is very strong among farmers, and the IP is very 
strong among employers and higher managerial and 
administrative. A tendency for the "petty bourgeoisie" to 
vote heavily conservative, observed in Britain and Sweden, 
is not the case in Iceland. The PA and the WA are on the 
other hand much stronger in the public sector than in the 
private sector. While the sectoral effect is not much 
stronger than in Britain and Sweden, it is nevertheless 
interesting considering the meagre impact of other class 
related variables on Icelandic voting.
The relationship between income and voting is also weaker 
in Iceland than in Scandinavia. The IP obtains more votes 
among higher income groups than among lower income groups 
but the difference is smaller than in Scandinavia. The PA 
and the SDP do not show the weakness among those with 
highest income that can be observed among socialist parties 
in Scandinavia. The WA is strongest in the lower income 
groups mainly because women, even with considerable higher 
education, tend to have lower incomes than men.
Some of the parties tend to have educational profiles. 
The PP is clearly stronger among those with little education 
and very weak among University graduates. While the WA is 
very clearly a party of the better educated, the IP also 
shows a weaker tendency in that direction. The CiP in 1987 
did badly among those with higher education.
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The relationship between age and voting is in general 
weak. The PP nevertheless has an age profile: the party is
stronger among older voters. The WA also has a slight age 
profile: the party is weaker among older voters. The SDA was 
clearly stronger among younger voters, while the CiP was 
stronger among older voters.
There is a clear gender gap in voting for the WA, as 
around 80% of the parties' voters are women. The differences 
for other parties are small, except that in 1987 9% fewer
women than men voted for the IP. The new gender gap, where 
women tend to be more to the left than men, a tendency which 
has been observed in many countries in recent years, also 
seems to be emerging in Iceland.
In 1983 80% of the respondents claimed to know the party 
preference of their father or their mother or both. There is 
a strong correspondence between the political preferences of 
parents and offspring, the relationship being strongest when 
both parents support the same party, and weakest when the 
father and the mother support different parties. In an 
electorate where class voting has become extremely weak, the 
family seems to play some part, in accordance with the 
Michigan model, in maintaining voter alignments.
All three of our theoretical approaches seem to have a 
part to play in explaining Icelandic voting behaviour. While 
our data in general perhaps best fits a rational or issue- 
oriented approach, party identification serves to maintain 
stability in a highly volatile system and social structures 
still have some impact, even though that impact is very 
weak, both in comparison to earlier voter alignments in 
Iceland and in comparison to Scandinavia.
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In Scandinavia, class voting has been declining in recent 
decades. Class voting in Iceland, while probably never as 
strong as in Scandinavia, has been decreasing at a much 
faster rate.
Party attachments have weakened in Scandinavia. This 
seems also to have taken place in Iceland but at a faster 
rate: party identification is weaker in Iceland.
Issue voting has been rising in Scandinavia. While we 
have only two measurements of issue voting in Iceland, from 
1983 and 1987, it seems likely that issue voting is now 
higher than it was in earlier decades when class voting was 
higher and partisanship stronger. Nevertheless issue voting 
in Iceland is still weaker than in Norway and Sweden. We 
would argue that this is mainly due to the state of the 
Icelandic party system: the Icelandic parties offer less
coherent and consistent alternatives to voters than is the 
case in Scandinavia. This shows the importance of not 
observing voters in isolation: they react to actions of
parties and politicians.
The increasing electoral volatility in Iceland since the 
1970s seems to be a result of a withering away of the 
parties' class base and of decreasing loyalties to the 
parties. Under such circumstances, voters have to find other 
clues on which to base their voting behaviour. Issues or 
ideological considerations can be among such clues. In a 
period when voters are giving up their old allegiances of 
class and class parties and looking for issue positions on 
which to base their vote, we should expect a great deal of 
volatility, especially if the issue positions of the parties 
are unclear and fluctuating.
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The Icelandic parties have gone through difficult times 
in recent decades. While they are clearly not narrowly 
defined class parties, they remain divided and weak on 
policy. If the parties manage to restructure themselves and 
present more comprehensive and consistent policies on the 
major questions and problems facing the Icelandic 
electorate, we might expect more stability in the electoral 
market.
Perhaps two major general conclusions can be drawn from 
the Icelandic case. First, the Icelandic electorate clearly 
exhibits trends that have been observed in Scandinavia as 
well as in many other European coutries: declining class
voting, decreasing loyalty to parties and increasing issue 
voting. This general development seems to be taking place at 
a faster rate in Iceland, perhaps because the population is 
small and the country has developed at a faster rate than 
most countries in recent decades, resulting in a weaker 
institutionalization of politics and society. Second, the 
Icelandic case seems to indicate that political institutions 
such as the parties are crucial when we try to explain the 
behaviour of the voter. Voters can only behave rationally - 
choose parties on the basis of policies - if they are faced 
with clear and meaningful choices. There is no reason to 
expect that weaker issue voting in Iceland as compared to 
Sweden and Norway is due to less sophistication or 
rationality among Icelandic voters. Inherently voters are 
not fools, but political parties can certainly influence 
their behaviour.
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APPENDIX A : Distributions of answers to issue questions in 
1983 and 1987.
Table headings are the labels used for the issue questions 
in Table V.l. Opinion balance is calculated by subtracting
the percentage opposed from the percentage in 
answer" included).
favour ("no
Table A.I. Abortion (1983).
Gone much too far 19 20
Gone a bit too far 23 25
About right 45 48
Gone a bit too short 5 5
Gone much too short 1 1
No answer 7
Total 100 99
N= (1003) (934)
Q: What about the liberalization in women's rights to 
abortion? Do you think this has gone much too far, a bit too 
far, about right, a bit too short, or much too short?
Table A.2. All votes equal weight (1983)
Strongly agree 46 51
Tend to agree 13 15
Ambivalent 9 10
Tend to disagree 11 12
Strongly disagree 12 13
No answer 9
Total 100 101
N= (1003) (910)
Opinion balance + 36
Q (statement): Preferably all votes in the country should 
have equal weight when parliamentary seats are allotted. Do 
you agree, disagree, or are you ambivalent? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to) .
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Table A.3. Base payment (1983 and 1987).
1983 1987
Strongly agree 47 49 39 41
Tend to agree 13 14 17 17
Ambivalent/Makes no diff 9 9 9 10
Tend to disagree 6 7 9 10
Strongly disagree 21 22 21 22
No answer 5 5
Total 101 101 100 100
N= (1003) (958) (1845) (1754)
Opinion balance + 34 + 30
Q. 1983 (statement): Icelanders should receive payment for 
the presence of US military forces in the country. Do you 
strongly agree, tend to agree, are you ambivalent, do you 
tend to disagree, or do you strongly disagree?
Q. 1987: Do you agree or disagree that Icelanders should 
receive payment for the presence of U.S. military forces in 
the country? (Probe: strongly/tend to).
Table A.4. Beer legalization (1983).
Strongly agree 26 26
Tend to agree 27 28
Makes no difference 10 11
Tend to disagree 15 15
Strongly disagree 20 21
No answer 2
Total 100 101
N= (1003) (987)
Opinion balance + 18
Q: What do you think about the proposition which has
sometimes been suggested that beer should be sold in
Icelandic liquor stores -■ do you agree, disagree, or do you
think this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
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Table A.5. Clientelistic politics (1987).
Strongly agree 9 9
Tend to agree 15 16
Do not want to pass a judgment 35 37
Tend to disagree 12 12
Strongly disagree 24 25
No answer 4
Total 99 99
N= (1845) (1764)
Opinion balance -12
Q: Do you agree or disagree, that clientelistic politics are
necessary for the underprivileged when dealing with "the
system” - or do you not want to pass a judgment on that?
(Probe: Strongly/tend to).
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Table A.6. Corporatism (1983 and 1987).
1983 1987
Strongly agree 32 34 14 16
Tend to agree 40 42 40 45
Makes no difference 7 8 18 21
Tend to disagree 11 12 10 11
Strongly disagree 5 5 7 8
No answer 5 11
Total 100 101 100 101
N= (1003) (950) (1845) (1764)
Opinion balance + 56 + 37
Q 1983 (statement): Real and long-term increases in living 
standards can only be obtained if the government closely 
cooperates with the trade unions and really considers their 
point of view. Do you agree, disagree^ or do you think this 
makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
1983 face-to-face interviews: People disagree on the best 
way to increase general living standards in the country 
in the long run. Some think this can only happen if the 
government closely cooperates with the trade unions. Others 
think on the contrary, that the government must be tough on 
pressure groups like the trade unions. What do you think? 
Which statement, A, B, or C, is closest to your opinion?
Show card: A. Real and long-term increases in living 
standards can only be obtained if the government closely 
cooperates with the trade unions and really considers their 
point of view. B. This makes no difference. C. Real and 
long-term increases in living standards in the country can 
only be obtained, if the government is tough on pressure 
groups like the trade unions. Those who favoured A or C were 
asked if they were very strongly in favour, rather strongly 
in favour, or tended to be in favour. Here, "very strongly 
in favour" is coded as "strongly agree/disagree".
Q 1987: Do you agree or disagree that government should give 
organizations of employees and employers an effective part 
in decision making on major issues - or do you think this 
makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
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Table A.7. Environment (1987).
Strongly agree 16 19
Tend to agree 25 30
Makes no difference 17 20
Tend to disagree 19 23
Strongly disagree 7 8
No answer 17
Total 101 100
N= (1845) (1529)
Opinion balance + 15
Q: Do you agree or disagree that in the next years action on
environmental issues should be prioritized over attempts to
increase economic growth - or do you think this makes no
difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
Table A.8. Equality for women (1983 and 1987),
1983 1987
Gone much too far 4 4 1 1
Gone a bit too far 15 15 5 5
About right 34 35 34 35
Gone a bit too short 32 33 33 34
Gone much too short 13 13 24 25
No answer 3 3
Total 101 100 100 100
N= (1003) (972) (1845) (1791)
Q 1983: If we turn to individual issues - first to attempts 
to assure women equal position to men. Do you think this 
development has gone much too far, a bit too far, about 
right, a bit too short, or much too short?
Q 1987: If we turn to several issues which have been widely 
discussed in society in recent years - first attempts to 
assure women equal position to men. Do you think this 
development has gone too far, about right, or too short? 
(Probe: Much/a bit).
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Table V.9. Equality of votes (1987).
Gone much too far 4 5
Gone a bit too far 7 9
About right 41 56
Gone a bit too short 14 18
Gone much too short 9 13
No answer 25
Total 100 101
N= (1845) (1375)
Q: What about the rules on the wore equal weight of votes in 
the new electoral law - do you think they go too far, about 
right, or too short? (Probe: Much/a bit).
Table V.IO. Full employment (1983)
Strongly agree 14 15
Tend to agree 16 17
Ambivalent 17 18
Tend to disagree 23 24
Strongly disagree 26 27
No answer 4
Total 100 101
N= (1003) (967)
Opinion balance -19
Q (statement): Government should prioritize full employment 
even though companies are inefficient. Do you agree, 
disagree, or are you ambivalent ? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
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Table A. 11. Inflation (1983).
Strongly agree 14 16
Tend to agree 26 29
Makes no difference 3 3
Tend to disagree 32 35
Strongly disagree 16 18
No answer 9
Total 100 101
N= (1003) (912)
Opinion balance -8
Q (statement): Gradual reduction of inflation is impossible. 
The best policy is a quick solution by strict reduction on 
spending, and toughness towards pressure groups. Do you 
agree, disagree - or do you think this makes no difference? 
(Probe: Strongly/tend to).
In the face-to-face interviews: People disagree on how 
inflation should be reduced. Some think it necessary to 
reduce inflation quickly, even though it may cost 
considerable sacrifices in the short term, while others 
think that such action is not justifiable, as it could lead 
to class warfare and unemployment. What do you think? Which 
of the statements. A, B, or C, is closest to your opinion? 
Show card: A. Gradual reduction of inflation is impossible. 
The best policy is a quick solution by strict reduct ion on 
spending and toughness towards pressure groups. B. This 
makes no difference. C. The cost of a quick reduct ion in 
inflation is too high. Therefore it should be reduced 
gradually by a coordinated long-term policy. Those who 
favoured A or C were asked if they were very strongly in 
favour, rather strongly in favour, or tended to be in 
favour. Here "very strongly in favour" is coded as "strongly 
agree/disagree".
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Table A. 12. Keflavik base (1983 and 1987).
1983 1987
Strongly approve 23 23 16 16
Tend to approve 30 31 24 25
Makes no difference 14 15 24 26
Tend to disapprove 15 15 14 15
Strongly disapprove 15 15 18 18
No answer (refuse, DK) 3 5
Total 100 99 101 100
N= (1003) (970) (1845) (1753)
Opinion balance +23 + 8
Q 1983: The Defence Agreement between Iceland and the United 
States has been much debated. Some people support the 
presence of the American armed forces here, while others 
oppose it. Do you support its presence here, oppose it, or 
do you think it makes no difference? (If support or oppose): 
Do you strongly approve/disapprove, or do you tend to 
approve/disapprove ?
In the 1983 face-to-face interviews: The Defence Agreement 
between Iceland and the United States has been much debated. 
Some people support the presence of American forces here, 
while others oppose it. What is your opinion? Which 
statement, A, B, or C, is closest to your opinion? Show 
card: A. While the present situation in international 
affairs prevails, the defence force in Keflavik is necessary 
for Icelanders. B. This makes no difference. C. The presence 
of the US military force does not serve the interests of 
Icelanders and it should leave. Those who favoured A or C 
were asked if they were very strongly in favour, rather 
strongly in favour, or tended to be in favour. Here "very 
strongly" from the face-to-face interviews is coded with 
"strongly approve/disapprove" from the telephone interviews. 
Q 1987: Do you support the presence of the American defence 
force here, do you think the armed forces should leave, or 
do you think this makes no difference? (If support or 
oppose): Are you strongly of that opinion, or do you tend to 
be of that opinion?
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Table A. 13. NATO membership (1983 and 1987}
1983 1987
Approve 52 53 48 49
No opinion 33 34 37 38
Disapprove 13 13 14 14
No answer 2 2
Total 100 100 99 101
N= (1003) (979) (1845) (1814)
Opinion balance + 39 + 34
Q 1983 and 1987: If we now turn to the question of whether 
Iceland should continue its membership of NATO, is that an 
issue on which you have an opinion? (If yes): Some people 
believe Iceland should stay in NATO, while others believe it 
should discontinue its membership. What is your opinion?
Table A. 14. Nuclear-weapons-free zone (1987)
For the idea even if this weakens NATO 56 80
For the idea but DK if this weakens NATO 12
For the idea but not if it weakens NATO 8 11
Tend to be against the idea 2 3
Strongly against the idea 4 6
No answer (refuse, DK) 17
Total 99 100
N= (1845) (1310)
Opinion balance + 42
Q: Are you for or against the idea of establishig a nuclear- 
weapons-free-zone in the Nordic countries - or are you 
uncertain on this issue? (If for) : But would you support the 
idea even though this would weaken NATO? (If against): Do 
you tend to oppose the idea or do you strongly oppose it?
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Table A.15. Open primaries (1983 and 1987).
1983 1987
Strongly agree 45 48 23 24
Tend to agree 14 15 25 27
Ambivalent/Makes no diff. 10 11 15 16
Tend to disagree 9 9 11 12
Strongly disagree 16 17 20 21
No answer 5 7
Total 99 100 101 100
N= (1003) (951) (1845) (1711)
Opinion balance + 34 + 17
Q 1983 (statement): All parties should hold open primaries, 
where supporters as well as party members, can decide the 
ranking of candidates in the lists' top seats. Do you agree, 
disagree, or are you ambivalent ? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
Q 1987: Do you agree or disagree that all parties should 
hold open primaries, where supporters as well as party 
members can decide the ranking of candidates in the lists' 
top seats - or do you think this makes no difference?
(Probe: Strongly/tend to).
Table A.16. Party system outdated (1987).
Strongly agree 23 23
Tend to agree 21 22
Does not want to pass judgement 35 36
Tend to disagree 11 11
Strongly disagree 6 7
No answer 3
Total 99 99
N= (1845) (1785)
Q: Do you agree or disagree, that the party system in this
country has become outdated - or do you not want to pass a 
judgement on that?
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Table A. 17. Power industry ownership (1983)
Strongly agree 51 54
Tend to agree 13 14
Ambivalent 12 13
Tend to disagree 8 8
Strongly disagree 11 11
No answer 5
Total 100 100
N= (1003) (952)
Opinion balance + 45
Q (statement): Cooperation with foreigners on power 
intensive plants is only acceptable if at least 50% of the 
ownership in such companies is Icelandic. Do you agree^ 
disagree, or are you ambivalent? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
Table A. 18. Private radio and TV (1987)
Gone much too far 14 14
Gone a bit too far 19 20
About right 58 60
Gone a bit too short 5 5
Gone much too short 2 2
No answer 3
Total 101 101
N= (1845) (1786)
Q: What (do you think) about steps to make it possible for
private companies to operate radio and TV stations - do you
think this has gone too far, about right, or too short ?
(Probe: Much/a bit).
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Table A.19. Reduce agricultural production (1983).
Strongly agree 25 21
Tend to agree 18 19
Ambivalent 19 20
Tend to disagree 17 18
Strongly disagree 15 16
No answer 6
Total 100 100
N= (1003) (941)
Opinion balance + 11
Q (statement): Agricultural production must be greatly
reduced as now there is overproduction at the tax-payers' 
expense. Do you agree, disagree, or are you ambivalent? 
(Probe: Strongly/tend to).
Table A.20. Reduce taxes (1983 and 1987)
1983 1987
Strongly agree 12 12 7 8
Tend to agree 11 12 10 10
Ambivalent/Makes no diff. 17 18 4 4
Tend to disagree 25 26 32 34
Strongly disagree 31 32 41 44
No answer 3 6
Total 99 100 100 100
N= (1003) (973) (1845) (1742)
Opinion balance -33 -56
Q 1983 (statement): Taxes should be reduced even though it 
meant that public services had to be reduced, e.g. in health 
care, education, or social security. Do you strongly agree, 
tend to agree, ambivalent, do you tend to disagree, or do 
you strongly disagree?
Q 1987: Do you agree or disagree that taxes should be 
reduced, even though it meant that public services had to be 
reduced, e.g. in health care, education, or social security 
- or do you think this makes no difference? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to) .
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Table A. 21. Regional support (1983 and 1987)
1983 1987
Strongly agree 37 39 36 39
Tend to agree 30 32 29 32
Makes no difference 5 5 12 13
Tend to disagree 14 15 9 10
Strongly disagree 9 9 6 6
No answer 5 7
Total 100 100 99 100
N= (1003) (953) (1845) (1712)
Opinion balance + 44 + 50
Q 1983 (statement): It is necessary to do more to decrease 
the differences in conditions between the rural regions and 
the capital area. Do you agree, disagree, or do you think 
this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to) .
In 1983 face-to-face interviews: So-called regional policy 
is sometimes disputed. Some think that government support 
for the rural regions should be greatly reduced, - others 
think that more should be done to decrease the difference in 
conditions between the regions and the capital area. What do 
you think? Which statement, A, B, or C, is closest to your 
opinion? Show card: A. Government regional policy has gone 
much too far at the expense of those who live in the capital 
area. B. This makes no difference. C. It is necessary to do 
more to decrease the differences in conditions between the 
rural regions and the capital area. Those who favoured A or 
C were asked if they were very strongly in favour, rather 
strongly in favor, or tended to be in favour. Here "very 
strongly in favour" is coded as "strongly agree/disagree".
Q 1987: Do you agree or disagree that progress in the 
capital area may be decreased in order to increase 
prosperity in the rural regions - or does this not make any 
difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
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Table A. 22. Unite pension funds (1987).
Strongly agree 49 54
Tend to agree 19 21
Makes no difference 9 10
Tend to disagree 6 7
Strongly disagree 8 9
No answer 10
Total 101 101
N= (1845) (1558)
Opinion balance + 54
Q: Do you agree or• disagree that all pension funds in the
country should be united in one fund - or do you think this
makes no difference? (Probe:: Strongly/tend to) .
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APPENDIX B : The questionnaire for telephone interviews in
the Icelandic Election Study 1983.
(The Icelandic version can be obtained at the Social Science
Research Institute, University of Iceland, Reykjavik) .
1. Do you consider your interest in politics very great, 
great, some, little, or are you not interested in 
politics at all?
2. Now I will read you the names of the newspapers in an 
alphabetical order, and for each paper I would like you 
to say how often you see it. If we start with 
Althydubladid, would you say that you see it daily, 
often, seldom, or never? What about DV? Morgunbladid? 
Timinn? Thjodviljinn?
3. Do you think that politicians are in general trustworthy, 
that many of them are trustworthy, some are trustworthy, 
few, or perhaps none?
4. If we turn to individual issues - first, to attempts to 
assure women equal position to men. Do you think this 
development has gone much too far, a bit too far, about 
right, a bit too short, or much too short?
5. What about the liberalization in women's rights to 
abortion? Do you think this has gone much too far, a bit 
too far, about right, a bit too short, or much too short?
6. What do you think about the proposition which has 
sometimes been suggested that beer should be sold in 
Icelandic liquor stores - do you agree, disagree, or do 
you think this makes no difference? (If agree or 
disagree, probe: Strongly/tend to).
7. The Defence Agreement between Iceland and the United 
States has been much debated. Some people support the 
presence of the American armed forces here, while others 
oppose it. Do you support its presence here, oppose it, 
or do you think it makes no difference? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to).
8. Now we will read you some statements that are sometimes 
heard when politics are discussed. We would like to know 
what you think about these statements. The first 
statement is: Real and long-term increases in living 
standards can only be obtained if the government closely 
cooperates with the trade unions and really considers 
their point of view. Do you agree, disagree, or do you 
think this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend 
to) .
9. The next statement is: It is necessary to do more to 
decrease the differences in conditions between the rural 
regions and the capital area. Do you agree, disagree, or 
do you think this makes no difference? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to).
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10. Next statement: Gradual reduction of inflation is 
impossible. The best policy is a quick solution by 
strict reduction on spending and toughness towards 
pressure groups. Do you agree, disagree, or do you think 
this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
11. All parties should hold open primaries, where supporters 
as well as party members can decide the ranking of 
candidates in the lists' top seats. Do you agree, 
disagree, or are you ambivalent? (Probe: Strongly/tend 
to) .
12. Cooperation with foreigners on power intensive plants is 
only acceptable if at least 50% of the ownership in such 
companies is Icelandic. Do you agree, disagree, or are 
you ambivalent? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
13. Agricultural production must be greatly reduced as now 
there is overproduction at the tax-payers' expense. Do 
you agree, disagree, or are you ambivalent? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to).
14. Icelanders should receive payment for the presence of US 
military forces in the country. Do you agree, disagree, 
or are you ambivalent? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
15. Taxes should be reduced even though it meant that public 
services had to be reduced, e.g. in health care, 
education, or social security. Do you agree, disagree, 
or are you ambivalent? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
16. Preferably all votes in the country should have equal 
weight when parliamentary seats are allotted. Do you 
agree, disagree, or are you ambivalent? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to).
17. Government should prioritize full employment even though 
companies are inefficient. Do you agree, disagree, or 
are you ambivalent? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
18a. If we turn to the question of whether Iceland should 
continue its membership of NATO, is that an issue on 
which you have an opinion?
18b. (If yes to 18a): Some people believe Iceland should 
stay in NATO, while others believe it should 
discontinue its membership. What is your opinion?
19. Some people always vote in Althingi elections and some 
people never vote. If you consider the period since you 
came of voting age, do you think you have always voted 
in Althingi elections, usually voted, seldom, or never?
20. Some people always vote for the same party in Althingi 
elections, while some people usually vote for different 
parties. Have you always voted for the same party in 
Althingi elections, have you usually voted for the same 
party, or have you usually voted for different parties?
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21a. Now I would like to ask you about your attitudes
towards the political parties. I would like to remind 
you that any information you may give is strictly 
confidential. Many people consider themselves 
supporters of political parties. Do you in general 
consider yourself as a supporter of any political party 
or organization? (If yes: What party?).
21b. (If yes to 21a): Would you say you are a very strong, 
rather strong or not a very strong supporter (of a 
given party)?
22. (If no or don't know to 21a): Do you nevertheless feel 
somewhat closer to any party or organization than to 
others? (If yes: What party?)
23a. (If yes to 21a or 22): Are you a member of (given 
party)?
23b. (If no to 23a): Would you consider becoming a member of 
(given party)?
24. Left and right are common terms in politics. Do you 
generally consider yourself to the right in politics, to 
the left, or are you in the centre in politics?
25. If you consider where the four old parties stand in this
respect, and we start with the SDP. Do you think the SDP
is to the right, to the left, or in the centre in 
politics? What about the PP? The IP? The PA?
26. Now I would like you to rank the four old parties, i.e. 
the SDP, the PP, the IP and the PA, according to how
much you like or dislike them. What party do you
generally dislike most? And the second most? Which one 
is the second best? And which one is the best?
27a. Have you ever taken part in a primary of any party 
before an Althingi election?
27b. (If yes to 27a): Did you take part in a primary before 
this election?
27c. (If yes to 27b): Could you to tell me in what 
primary/primaries you took part?
28a. If you try to remember individual elections in this 
country in recent years - did you vote in the 1978 
Althingi election?
28b. (If yes to 28a): May I ask what party or list you voted 
for then?
29a. What about the Althingi election in December 1979? (Did 
you vote?)
29b. (If yes to 29a): What list did you vote for then?
416
30a. What about the Althingi election on last April 23rd? 
(Did you vote?)
30b. (If yes to 30a): What list did you vote for then?
31a. Did you ever consider voting for another party before 
the last election? (If yes: What party/parties?).
31b. (If yes to 31a): How long before the election did you 
make a final decision?
31c. (If yes to 31a): If we had a fresh election in the next 
few days, do you think you would vote for the same 
party you voted for last time, or some other party?
32. Where in the country did you grow up. (Region, county, 
town-rural, age 8-16).
33a. What was your father's occupation in your youth (age 
12-17)?
33b. What was your mother's occupation?
34. Do you know what political party your father supported 
when you were growing up? (If yes: What party?).
35. What about your mother? (If yes: What party?).
36. Do you know one or more members of Althingi personally?
37a. Have you completed any studies after the age of 15?
37b. (If yes to 37a): In what field? What school? When?
38. How many years, approximately, have you attended school, 
including compulsory education?
39. Have you generally been economically active in the last 
3-4 months, or have you mainly been doing something 
else?
40. (If active, or has been active): What is your main 
occupation? (Name of occupation, and a short 
description. Public, private, cooperative. Employee, 
self-employed, employer. Manual, non-manual.
Agriculture, fisheries, fish industry, other industry, 
electricity or water supplies, constrution, 
communications, commerce, other servives).
41. Are you a member of a trade union or other economic or 
professional interest organization? (If yes: what 
union?).
42. Are you married or cohabiting?
43. (If yes to 42): Has your spouse generally been 
economically active in the last 3-4 months, or has 
he/she mainly been doing something else?
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44. (If spouse active, or has been active): What is the main 
occupation of your spouse?
45. (If spouse active, or has been active): Is your spouse a 
member of a trade union or other economic or 
professional interest organization? (If yes: what 
union?) .
46. Are you living in your own accommodation or do you rent?
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APPENDIX C: The questionnaire for telephone interviews in
the Icelandic Election Study 1987.
(The Icelandic version can be obtained at the Social Science
Research Institute, University of Iceland, Reykjavik) .
1. Do you consider your interest in politics very great, 
great, some, little, or are you not interested in 
politics at all?
2. Now I will read you the names of the newspapers in an 
alphabetical order, and for each paper I would like you 
to say how often you see it. If we start with 
Althydubladid, would you say that you see it daily, 
often, seldom, or never? What about Dagur? DV? 
Morgunbladid? Timinn? Thjodviljinn?
3. Do you think that politicians are in general trustworthy, 
that many of them are trustworthy, some are trustworthy, 
few, or perhaps none?
4. Next we have two questions on what you think is important 
in politics. If we begin with the Althingi election on 
April 25th. Were there any particular issues that greatly 
influenced what party you voted for? (Probe: Any more 
issues?)
5. What do you think are the most important tasks the new 
Althingi and government have to tackle? (Probe: Any 
more?)
6a. Now I would like to ask if you generally like or dislike 
individual political parties. You indicate this by 
giving each party a mark from -5 to +5. If you like a 
party you give it a positive mark of up to 5, but if you 
don't like a party you give it a negative mark of down 
to -5. Zero means that you neither like nor dislike the 
party in question. What mark would you give the PP on 
such a scale? The IP? The CiP? The PA? The SDP? The WA?
6b. What if you use the same scale for people who have been 
in leadership positions in Icelandic politics? What mark 
would you give Steingrimur Hermannsson? Thorsteinn 
Palsson? Albert Gudmundsson? Svavar Gestsson? Jon 
Baldvin Hannibalsson? Gudrun Agnarsdottir?
6c. If you try to give the government marks on the same 
scale for its general performance in the last term - 
what mark would you like to give the government of 
Steingrimur Hermannsson for its performance in the last 
four years?
6d. What marks would you give the opposition on the same 
scale?
6e. Finally I would like you to give the government a mark 
for its performance on individual policies or policy 
areas. If we start with housing, what marks would you 
give the government for its performance? Regional
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policy? Inflation? Foreign policy? Agricultural policy? 
Wages? Taxes?
7. If we turn to several issues which have been widely 
discussed in society in recent years - first, to attempts 
to assure women equal position to men. Do you think this 
development has gone too far, about right, or too short? 
(Probe: Much/a bit).
8 . What about steps to make it possible for private 
companies to operate radio and TV stations - do you think 
this has gone too far, about right, or too short? (Probe: 
Much/a bit).
9. What about the rules on the more equal weight of votes in 
the new electoral law - do you think they go too far, 
about right, or too short? (Probe: Much/a bit).
10. Do you support the presence of the American defence 
force here, do you think the armed forces should leave, 
or do you think this makes no difference? (Probe: 
Strongly/tend to).
11. Do you agree or disagree that all parties should hold 
open primaries, where supporters as well as party 
members can decide the ranking of candidates in the 
lists' top seats - or do you think this makes no 
difference? (Probe : Strongly/tend to).
12. Which of the following do you think is most responsible 
for the inflation problem in Iceland : governments, 
companies, or the trade unions?
13. Do you agree or disagree that government should give 
organizations of employees and employers an effective 
part in decision making on major issues - or do you 
think this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend 
to) .
14. Do you agree or disagree that progress in the capital 
area may be decreased in order to increase prosperity in 
the rural regions - or does this not make any 
difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
15a. If we now turn to the question whether Iceland should 
continue its membership of NATO, is that an issue on 
which you have an opinion?
15b. (If yes to 15a): Some people believe Iceland should 
stay in NATO, while others believe it should 
discontinue its membership. What is your opinion?
16. Do you agree or disagree that clientelistic politics are 
necessary for the underprivileged when dealing with "the 
system" - or do you not want to pass a judgment on that? 
(Probe: Strongly/tend to).
17. Do you agree or disagree that in the next years action 
on environmental issues should be prioritized over
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attempts to increase economic growth - or do you think 
this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
18. Do you agree or disagree that taxes should be reduced, 
even though it meant that public services had to be 
reduced, e.g. in health care, education, or social 
security - or do you think this makes no difference? 
(Probe: Strongly/tend to).
19. Do you agree or disagree that all pension funds in the 
country should be united in one fund - or do you think 
this makes no difference? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
20a. Are you for or against the idea to establish a nuclear- 
weapons-free zone in the Nordic countries - or are you 
uncertain on this issue?
20b. (If for in 20a): But would you support the idea even 
though this would weaken NATO?
20c. (If against in 20a): Do you tend to oppose the idea or 
do you strongly oppose it?
21. Do you agree or disagree that the party system in this 
country has become outdated - or do you not want to pass 
a judgment on that? (Probe: Strongly/tend to).
22. Do you agree or disagree that Icelanders should receive 
payment for the presence of U.S. military forces in the 
country? (Probe: strongly/tend to).
23. What parties would you like to see form a majority 
coalition government?
24a. Some people consider themselves supporters of political 
parties or organizations while others do not feel a 
solidarity with any party. Do you in general consider 
yourself as a supporter of any political party or 
organization? (If yes: What party?).
24b. (If yes to 24a): Would you say you are a very strong, 
rather strong or not a very strong supporter (of given 
party)?
25. (If no or don't know to 24a): Do you nevertheless feel 
somewhat closer to any party or organization than to 
others? (If yes: What party?)
26. (If yes to 24a or 25): Are you a member of (given 
party)?
27a. Sometimes people try to rank the political parties
according to how far to the left or the right they are. 
Now we would like you to rank the Icelandic political 
parties on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is furthest to 
the left, but 10 is furthest to the right. If we start 
with the SDP, where would you put it on such a scale? 
What about the WA? The IP? The CiP? The PA? The PP?
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27b. But where would you put yourself on such a scale?
28. Did you take part in a primary of any party before the 
last election? (If yes: What primary?)
29a. Did you vote in the Althingi election on April 25th?
(If yes: What party or list did you vote for?)
29b. (If yes to 29a): Did you ever consider voting for
another party before the last election? (If yes: What 
party/parties?).
29c. (If yes to 31a): How long before the election did you 
make a final decision?
30. What about the 1983 Althingi election - did you vote 
then? (If yes: What party or list did you vote for?)
31. Where in the country did you grow up? (Region, county, 
town-rural, age 8-16) .
32a. What was your father's occupation in your youth (age 
12-17)?
32b. What was your mother's occupation?
33. Have you completed any studies after the age of 15? (If 
yes : What?)
34. How many years, approximately, have you attended school, 
including compulsory education?
35. Have you generally been economically active in the last 
3 months, or have you mainly been doing something else?
36a. (If active, or has been active): What is your main 
occupation? (Name of occupation and a short 
description).
36b. Do you work for a private firm, in the public sector, 
or for a cooperative?
36c. Are you an employee or do you operate your own
business? (If own business: Do you have employees?)
36d. In what field is your work mainly: agriculture,
fisheries, fish industry, other industry, construction 
or transport, commerce, welfare services and education, 
other services?
37. Are you a member of a trade union or other economic or 
professional interest organization? (If yes: what 
union?).
38. Are you married or cohabiting?
39. (If yes to 38): Has your spouse generally been 
economically active in the last 3-4 months, or has 
he/she mainly been doing something else?
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40. (If spouse active, or has been active): What is the main 
occupation of your spouse?
41. If you compare your standard of living to that of two 
years ago, do you think it has generally improved, 
remained about the same, or grown worse?
42. Are you living in your own accommodation or do you rent?
43. What was your own total income last April, 
approximately? (If applicable): What was the total 
income of you and your spouse last April, approximately?
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